



**CERC WORKING  
PAPERS SERIES**

**No. 4 / 2000**

**Rafis Abazov**

**FOREIGN POLICY  
FORMATION IN  
KAZAKHSTAN,  
KYRGYZSTAN AND  
UZBEKISTAN:**

**Perceptions &  
Expert  
Assessments**





THE UNIVERSITY OF  
MELBOURNE

**CERC WORKING  
PAPERS SERIES**

**No. 4 / 2000**

**Rafis Abazov**

**FOREIGN POLICY  
FORMATION IN  
KAZAKHSTAN,  
KYRGYZSTAN AND  
UZBEKISTAN:**

**Perceptions &  
Expert  
Assessments**

## **CERC WORKING PAPERS SERIES INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD**

**Philomena Murray** (CERC Director)  
**Leslie Holmes** (CERC Deputy Director)  
**Peter Shearman** (CERC Principal Fellow) (**Editors**)

**Wladimir Andreff** (University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)  
**Michael Bradshaw** (University of Leicester / University of Birmingham)  
**Renaud Dehousse** (Institute of Political Science, Paris / European University Institute, Florence)  
**Maurizio Ferrera** (University of Pavia / Università Bocconi)  
**Stephen Fortescue** (University of New South Wales)  
**Graeme Gill** (University of Sydney)  
**Paul Hainsworth** (University of Ulster)  
**Simon Hix** (London School of Economics)  
**Robert Horvath** (University of Melbourne)  
**Elizabeth Meehan** (Queen's University of Belfast)  
**Andrew Moravcsik** (Harvard University)  
**Kirill Nourzhanov** (Australian National University)  
**Marko Pavlyshyn** (Monash University)  
**William Tompson** (University of London)  
**J. H. H. Weiler** (New York University)  
**Stephen Wheatcroft** (University of Melbourne)

**The Contemporary Europe Research Centre** (CERC) was established in 1997 as an interdisciplinary centre located within the University of Melbourne's Faculty of Arts. The Centre draws upon a broad pool of expertise from the University of Melbourne and beyond, bringing together specialists on all aspects of contemporary Europe, east, central and west. The Centre produces and coordinates quality academic and applied research, with a particular focus on interdisciplinary, comparative and transnational projects.

---

Copyright © 2000 by the Contemporary Europe Research Centre

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission from the Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne, 234 Queensberry Street, Victoria 3010, Australia.

**ISBN 0 7340 2059 7**

*Published by the Contemporary Europe Research Centre in December 2000.*

## Introduction

The research presented in this paper was designed to assess how the former Soviet Central Asian Republics (CARs) have formulated their foreign policy, defined their national interests and perceived their security issues since achieving independence in 1991. Despite the fact that during the last decade there have been a large number of publications on Central Asia in general and on the Central Asian international politics in particular, there has been little advance in research on the foreign policy processes in CARs.

There are several major obstacles to the study of foreign policy and foreign policy making in the Central Asian republics. First, the CARs are new actors in the international arena, having only recently achieved sovereignty and independence in their internal and external policy making. Although the CARs established their Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) in 1944, these Ministries were never plenipotentiary and functioning institutions during the Soviet era. In general these republics only started to restructure and develop their MFAs into workable foreign policy institutions after 1991. In this sense they are quite new as subjects for research foci.

Second, matters related to diplomacy are traditionally viewed by many countries as sensitive issues. In the case of the former Soviet countries this becomes even more complicated because the policy-making process under Soviet rule was never open, and thus was *terra incognita* to many observers.

Third, studies of foreign policy in the Soviet Union have in the past been dominated by Kremlinologists and the so-called 'bureaucratic collectivist' approach which focused on individual

politicians or bureaucratic groups (such as the *Politburo*).<sup>1</sup> When this approach is applied to foreign policy-making in the newly independent states it continues to be characterised by two features: it regards the state as a 'rational actor' and is often based on a 'rational actor model' (Morgentau, Kissenger); and it often overestimates the capacities of individual leaders or groups in terms of their ability to react to changes and their actual contribution to real policy making.

Such an approach is often applied to studies of CAR politics but it tends to be done without taking into consideration the social, political and bureaucratic environment that exists in these states, as well as the influence of other political actors and the specific political system to which they all belong.

### **Policy-Making in the CARs: What Makes These States Different?**

During the last seventy years the Central Asian Republics were subject to Soviet centralised political and economic rule. Soviet modernisation radically changed the social structures, and political and economic systems, in these republics, and affected interethnic relations and the construction of national identities. Although social and political changes were often forced upon these societies, in general they failed to completely eliminate some of the peculiar features of Central Asian identity. The last Soviet experiment in this region was Gorbachev's attempt to implement a policy of radical and comprehensive reforms, *perestroika*. However, this attempt to initiate changes instead brought back to the surface some of the old conflicts and problems.

One of the important implications of *perestroika* was the emergence of conflict between the Centre and the Republics. The area of international relations became one of the core aspects of this conflict. According to the Union Treaty of 1922, foreign policy formation was delegated from the republics to the Soviet central institutions. An important feature of the Soviet system of foreign political and economic policy was total control by the central authorities of all foreign political, cultural and economic relations, supplemented by centralised control over the foreign policy-making mechanism. For example, while in Soviet times commodities and natural resources produced in the CARs were sold on international markets, these republics did not have their own foreign trade institutions, and all international trade was conducted through Moscow-based institutions. At the republican level, MFAs were created in 1944 in each of these republics, in accordance with an amendment to Stalin's constitution,<sup>2</sup> but these ministries did not take part in the formation of Soviet foreign policy. The functions of these republican MFAs were mainly formal and were often limited to protocol and to the hosting of foreign delegations.<sup>3</sup>

These factors together made the political organisation of society, policy-making and the foreign policy experience in the CARs after independence, significantly different from that in many Third World countries, as well as in the other countries of Warsaw Pact Europe and Russia.

At the time of the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 the CARs, as distinct from many Third World countries, did not have national liberation movements. A consequence was that after gaining independence these states did not go through a dramatic change of their ruling elite. In the post-Soviet period the status quo was largely preserved in many CARs, with the ruling bureaucracy

(*nomenklatura*) firmly holding on to its power, which was challenged only by a weak and often disorganised opposition. These elites, although easily abandoning Soviet Communist ideology, retained existing administrative structures and their own centralised policy-making authority.

Unlike many East European countries, up until the late 1980s the Central Asian elite had very limited experience in international politics; these republics had no structured and institutionalised outward-oriented interest groups, businesses or foreign policy institutions that could have facilitated formulation of national interest and foreign policy. In the area of security, the Central Asian republics could not utilise the former Soviet army and security services, as Russia did, but instead had to create, basically from scratch, their own national armies and security services.

All this helps to explain why after 1991 many of the responses by Central Asian leaders to both internal and external economic and political challenges were of a more spontaneous nature, rather than being carefully crafted and well thought out. Throughout the last decade policy makers in the CARs have been steadily making attempts at formulating foreign policy objectives and implementing consistent foreign policies.

### **Foreign Policy Formation: the Actors**

One of the most important legacies of Gorbachev's *perestroika* in the first years following the CARs' independence was the relative openness of the policy-making process to influences from various actors. These included public structures, various interest groups and institutions. One should note that in Central Asia these groups were often poorly organised and traditionally had very limited channels

for the articulation of their interests. However, after the ruling elites had accepted the new rules and forms of political process, such as regularly held popular elections, they were eventually forced to take into account the interests of all participants of this political process.

By 1992 all of the CARs had formed their own foreign policy structures, which were similar to the Russian ones. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for the realisation of foreign policy, everyday foreign policy activities and the management of diplomatic missions in other countries. In addition, the Presidents of the CARs also established within their administrations separate foreign policy bodies, typically called the 'International Department of the Presidential Administration'. From the outset these two major institutions were actively competing for influence in foreign policy formation, and in most cases were together responsible for the formulation of the foreign policies of their respective republics.

The role played by Ministries for Defence and Security in the formation of foreign policy of the CARs is less clear, mainly due to the institutional underdevelopment of these ministries (since the Central Asian states only formed their own armies in 1991-92). In Central Asia, unlike in the Russian case, these institutions have rarely made any independent statements on foreign policy issues, although their representatives are included in security councils in all three republics.

Other institutions, groups and agencies with an interest in the formulation of foreign policy include parliaments, political parties and private business. However, their participation in the foreign policy-making process was neither clearly defined nor institutionalised. This is despite the fact that parliaments have the constitutional power to "define major directions of internal and

external policies,"<sup>4</sup> while ministers, including foreign affairs ministers, often have to be confirmed in their position by the parliament. In many cases private business has lobbied for its interests through informal channels such as patronage and clan networks.

Having established a broad outline of the situation, specific questions related to the role of actors in foreign policy-making process in the CARs still remain to be addressed. To what extent was the foreign policy-making environment open to influences from various actors? Was there interaction between foreign policy experts, policy practitioners and other groups that have specific interests in foreign policy issues? Did that provide for the generation of new ideas and foreign policy choices for the leaders of these republics? And to what extent did these actors directly participate in the identification of foreign policy priorities and the formation of policy consensus on different issues, as opposed to simply observing the process?<sup>5</sup>

### **Theoretical Approach**

In this paper, I assume that a foreign policy-making process is a group action, which takes place in a particular political, social and economic environment. In defining their policies policy makers in CARs need to achieve some level of consensus between the most influential actors, since Central Asian leaders cannot totally ignore the opinions, interests and views of major actors. Thus, policy makers need to manoeuvre between these actors, and attempt to build coalitions with both institutionalised and non-institutionalised actors capable of ensuring broad support from various groups of society during the elections.

In order to investigate foreign policy-making process in the CARs during the 1990s in an analytical and systematic manner, I will assess several major variables. First, the foreign policy determinants classified by Rosenau (size, state of the economy, political accountability, penetration or non-penetration, and issue area) that shape the environment of the decision-making.<sup>6</sup> Second, organisational structures of foreign policy-making as they form frameworks for decision-making, formal and informal input from various participants, and competition between them. Third, major actors that have the capacity to influence foreign policies and that contribute to foreign policy process. Here I focus on the following groups: the government bureaucracy; political parties; military and security services; private business and private interests; and academia and foreign actors. Fourth, perceptions of foreign policy issues that are common among the leading actors are also important. I support the view that the decision-making process is largely affected by the views and belief systems that these actors share. As David Edwards puts it: "Man reacts, of course, to how he perceives reality rather than to reality as such. The sum of what we think we know, rather than what is really true, determines what plan or policy we adopt and what actions we then attempt."<sup>7</sup> In this regard, the perceptions of various issues that are common among the local policy makers and other actors, who in one way or another have been involved in the foreign policy process, are crucial to the analysis of foreign policy trends in the CARs.

Taking the above as a starting point, I decided to focus on the perceptions of different policy actors related to the foreign policy issues. I expected that this investigation of the views on foreign policy of the different actors involved in or related to it might help to advance our understanding of foreign policy formation and the interactions of major foreign policy actors in transitional countries.

With this purpose I conducted a series of questionnaire-based surveys in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.<sup>8</sup>

This research did not aim at surveying public opinion. Rather, it focused on the top layer of the so-called 'attentive public,'<sup>9</sup> or the group of policy-makers and experts who are well-informed, articulate and directly or indirectly involved in intellectual debates, decision-making, expertise and 'problem representation.'<sup>10</sup> Their perception of foreign policy issues is especially important because they will be the most likely to take part in the formation of the intellectual environment for foreign policy debates in their respective countries, and are likely to significantly influence the policy-making process through their expertise, criticism or policy implementation.

## **Research Framework**

Generally, when one deals with people's opinion, there are two factors that need to be taken into consideration. First, the views of people are to a considerable extent formed within the context of events taking place around them and the environment that surrounds them. In this regard, I would like to briefly describe the context of this survey. This questionnaire-based survey was conducted among the 'attentive public' of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in March-April 1999. At that time several events were in the centre of public attention. On 10 January 1999 presidential elections were held in Kazakhstan. These elections gave a start to the prolonged election 'season' in Central Asia, with presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan scheduled to be conducted later in the year. Another important event was a February 1999 bomb attack in Tashkent, allegedly masterminded by so-called 'Islamic fundamentalists'. It should be noted that this

survey was conducted before another important event occurred: the incursion of a group of Uzbek guerrillas from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan's territory in August-October 1999. It took almost three months for ill-prepared Kyrgyzstani defence forces, supported by Uzbekistan's air force, to finally defeat the guerrillas. Finally, this survey was also conducted at a time when events in Kosovo had become the centre of international attention and were provoking intense debates.

Secondly, it is important to note that in any survey the respondents' views are also affected by their understanding and interpretation of the relevant terms, concepts and definitions. This paper attempts to assess foreign policy formation in the CARs as seen by the citizens of these republics. Thus, the conclusions of this study are based upon the understandings of major definitions as used by the local 'attentive public'. For example, I use a wide definition of 'national security', because academic debates in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have brought about a general consensus on a wider definition of 'national security'.<sup>11</sup> This wide definition of national security and national interests was further consolidated in the 'Law on the National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan' introduced on 30 June 1998. Prevailing local perspectives have also affected the choice of events, and internal and external challenges, that are listed in the first and second sections of this report.

### **Research Design: the Survey Study**

The selection of respondents and issues was carried out in several stages.<sup>12</sup> First, the most important issues for Central Asian foreign policy-making were selected through personal interviews and via assessments of local academic publications. In 1997-99 a survey of

post-Soviet mass media in the CARs was conducted, and several of the most important and influential foreign policy 'think tanks' in the CARs were selected for interviews. Current foreign policy debates in the region were also analysed.

During the second stage, the author conducted interviews with Central Asian experts on foreign policy formation. During this stage the sample size of the survey and the list of covered institutions were clarified; information on the research and other activities of these institutions was obtained; and important issues in CARs' foreign policy formation were outlined. Also at this stage a questionnaire was pre-tested at the Centre for Social Research in the Kyrgyz National Academy of Science.

The questionnaire (see Appendix) was designed to investigate the following issues:

- (a) the opinion of local experts and practitioners on the development of the foreign policy-making process in Central Asia;
- (b) prevailing perceptions of security issues and international development;
- (c) opinion on the role of various actors in Central Asia with regard to the formulation of national interest perceptions and security policies in post-Soviet foreign policy.

The data was collected through structured questions, Likert and semantic-differential scales.

During the third stage, the author selected specific institutions in CARs for the survey study, improved the questionnaire, and conducted the survey. The study population covered 1800 staff

members of different organisations and institutions related to the field of international relations from three Central Asian newly independent countries: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.<sup>13</sup> The population of the study consisted of three major groups: (1) experts, academics, scholars and researchers; (2) members of parliament, political parties and the mass media; and (3) staff members of Central Asian ministries of foreign affairs and government apparatus. The sample size of 19 per cent (around 360) was selected with the help of a computer programme capable of generating random samples.

The questionnaire-based survey study was conducted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in March-April 1999, and in Uzbekistan in the summer of 1999, with assistance from the Centre for Social Research (Kyrgyzstan). Around 206 questionnaires were received back immediately and 130 questionnaires were collected by the Centre for Social Research and posted to me at a later stage. Thirty of the received questionnaires were incomplete and, therefore, considered invalid. A total of 306 (or 85%) questionnaires were used in the analysis, which was carried out with the help of SPSS for Windows and involved descriptive statistics like frequencies, means and cross tabulations.

### **Respondents' Assessment of Foreign Policy Issues**

During the 1990s the Central Asian republics experienced major changes in their domestic and international environment and policies. Policy makers in each of these newly independent states were confronted with the unenviable task of evaluating these changes and responding to new challenges. Their policy options were limited by a number of constraints.

From the start Central Asian policy makers were limited not only in the resources available for pursuing policy-making and for policy implementation, but also, because of the speed with which changes took place, in terms of the time framework for policy-making. There were also limitations in the financial resources available for establishing and developing diplomatic and foreign policy institutions; in the availability of professionals required to do the job; and in training facilities and accessible expertise. Moreover, since these republics were unprepared for independence, they did not have clearly formulated concepts of national interests, a fact that was aggravated further by the absence of historical precedents for their independent statehood, at least in modern times.

It was against this background that policy-making in Central Asia developed during the last decade. The complexity of this dynamically changing situation forced leaders of the three states to introduce collective decision-making. Under these circumstances policy-making became open to input from a certain number of domestic actors (both institutionalised and non-institutionalised) and, to some extent, from some international actors.

Below I present findings of this survey study in more detail.

### *The Most Influential Foreign Policy Actors*

Democratisation and the opening of the political process to wide public participation in the post-Soviet period not only created new opportunities for the articulation of traditional private and group interests in policy-making; it also led to the involvement of new actors in political process. Traditional interest groups still remain active in Central Asia, although they now have much less influence and have undergone significant transformation. In the new domestic


environment these traditional groups have had to accommodate the interests of new political actors. The question that arises is whom can we identify as the most influential foreign policy actors, and how can we measure the level of their influence?

As already outlined, this survey project was designed with the aim of searching for answers from the Central Asians themselves. At the first stage I identified the most influential actors in foreign policy-making in Kyrgyzstan. A series of individual interviews with foreign policy experts was carried out, accompanied by content analysis of the local mass media, in order to identify actors (institutional and non-institutional) that could be considered as active and influential in foreign policy-making in Kyrgyzstan (for a listing of groups see Figure 1). During the second stage, a questionnaire-based survey study was conducted with the objective of identifying the level of influence of major interest groups in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

**Figure 1**

*The Level of Influence of Different Groups on the Formation of Foreign Policy (1999)*

*(means) where 1 = no influence and 4 = the highest level of influence*




Questions in the survey study were intended to clarify how Central Asian experts evaluate the input of different institutions and actors in foreign policy formation in their respective countries. The respondents were asked the following question: *In your opinion, which of the following groups have the greatest influence on the formation of foreign policy in your republic?* There were several choices (see Appendix and Figure 1 above) with the following scale: does not influence; influences insignificantly; influences significantly; influences greatly.

The results of the survey are presented in Figure 1, together with a comparison of the perceptions of respondents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. According to these results, the majority of respondents in all three republics believed that the 'president's office' had the greatest influence in the formation of foreign policy. Ministries of Foreign Affairs were in the second place, followed by external actors such as the IMF and the World Bank.

Opinions of respondents about the levels of influence of other actors differed from republic to republic. In Kazakhstan, the fourth most influential actor was deemed to be foreign business (2.91); followed by the parliament (2.46); military and security forces (2.24); private business (2.17); and the mass media (2.14). According to the respondents, scholars and researchers, public opinion, political parties and NGOs had least influence.

**Figure 2.**

*Opinion on which groups of experts does the government turn for advice to (%) (1999)*



In Kyrgyzstan, the fourth most influential actor was seen to be the parliament (2.61), followed by foreign business (2.35); the mass media (2.22); military and security forces (2.12); and private business (1.85). The respondents perceived that ‘scholars and researchers,’ public opinion, political parties and NGOs were at the bottom of the scale.

In Uzbekistan, the fourth most influential actor was also the parliament (2.94), followed by foreign business (2.58); military and

security forces (2.54); and scholars and researchers (2.15). The respondents there perceived that the mass media, public opinion, political parties and NGOs were at the bottom of the scale.

Respondents were also asked the following question: *In your opinion, who are the main experts upon which your government can rely upon in the process of foreign decision-making? Please check no more than 3 options.* Several choices were available (see Appendix and Figure 2).

Answers to this question are summarised in Figure 2. One of the findings of this survey is that a correlation exists between the anticipated level of influence and the likelihood that governments would ask for an expert opinion in their foreign policy-making. According to the results of this survey respondents believed that in foreign policy issues, the governments of their republics could seek advice from and rely upon the staff of their ministry of foreign affairs (79.4% in Kazakhstan, 64.4% in Kyrgyzstan, and 88.2% in Uzbekistan) and the presidential office (63.7% in Kazakhstan, 63.5% in Kyrgyzstan, and 88.2% in Uzbekistan). They listed foreign advisers in third place (40.2% in Kazakhstan, 40.5% in Kyrgyzstan, and 47.6% in Uzbekistan), followed by scholars and experts. It should be noted that a large proportion of Uzbekistani respondents believed that 'the government makes decisions on its own'. Remarkably, a majority of respondents thought that military and security officials play a relatively small role in providing expert opinion on foreign policy issues.

### *Identities*

Following the collapse of the USSR in 1991 the notion of 'statehood' changed tremendously for Central Asian societies, shrinking from an 'all-Union' understanding to the borders of the newly independent Central Asian nation-states. The Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani populations, including ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and so on, could no longer consider themselves citizens of the Soviet Union; they had to accept the new identities bestowed by their now independent states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established soon after the disintegration of the USSR, failed to materialise into any viable political entity, although to a certain degree it did inherit some symbols from its predecessor.

There were predictions that Islamic solidarity and an Islamic identity would be dominating factors in the formation of the new Central Asian identity for the international arena and in the formation of foreign policy for the CARs. These predictions failed to materialise, and the Central Asian national elites still continue to identify more with Europe than Asia. For instance, this is how President Akayev described the new situation: "Central Asia plays a special role in establishing relationships with the East and West, being a sort of link between them."<sup>14</sup> Similarly, President Nazarbayev's idea of a "Eurasian Union" which could include all former Soviet republics, was also designed as a transitional concept that could allow Central Asian policy makers to facilitate their search for a new place in the international arena, as well as helping them to formulate a new national identity for their states.<sup>15</sup> This, however, did not prevent the CARs from joining a number of other regional organisations, including the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO).<sup>16</sup>

Neither did it prevent CARs from applying for membership in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Several questions in the survey dealt with perceptions of self-identity in the international arena, and were designed to test two main assumptions:

(1) that from an international perspective, CARs' identities are bound by their cultural, predominantly Islamic, heritage, and that, therefore, Central Asians will look for cultural unity with South Asia, Turkey and the Middle East<sup>17</sup>, or

(2) that CARs' international identities are bound by the prolonged effect of the Soviet policy of enforced modernisation, and that therefore Central Asian elites perceive themselves as East Europeans or 'Eurasians,' and will most likely attempt to unite with European countries or the CIS.


In posing this particular set of questions, I did not expect clear and straightforward answers or unanimity of opinion, particularly given the complexities and uncertainty surrounding this issue. Rather, the survey was designed to assess existing tendencies and views on prevailing perceptions of self-identity of the Central Asian 'attentive public'.

One question in our questionnaire was as follows: *In your opinion, your republic should develop its foreign policy and form its identity in the international arena as part of what region of the world?* Respondents were given several choices and were asked to select no more than three options from the list. The results of their responses to this question are presented in Figure 3. The survey found (see Figures 3 and 4) that there is a correlation between

perception of international identities and the existing interest in participating in international organisations.

**Figure 3.**

*Opinion on the Development of the Republic's Foreign Policy and Self-Identification in the International Arena (%)*



The survey found that the Commonwealth of Independent States, despite the fact that it has failed to produce any meaningful common symbols, or to promote integrative mechanisms or co-operation, was considered as the first option in two of the republics (63.3% in Kazakhstan, 67.4% in Kyrgyzstan) (see Figure 3). Respondents from Uzbekistan gave it a lesser preference (38.8%).

In Kazakhstan, the second most supported view was the 'Eurasian Bridge (neither Europe, nor Asia)', an idea that was


actively promoted by President Nazarbayev (63.3 per cent of respondents chose this option). The third most supported choice there was 'Asia': 38.8 per cent of those questioned selected this option. The 'Turkic World' was next (33.7 per cent of respondents) followed by the 'Muslim World' (14.3 per cent of respondents). 'Eastern Europe' and the 'West' both received the same level of support (9.2 per cent of respondents). 'East and South-East Asia' and the 'Middle East' received only marginal support.

In Kyrgyzstan, the second most supported option was 'Asia,' chosen by 54.3 per cent of respondents. The third choice was 'the Turkic World' (35.9 per cent), followed by 'the West' (21.7 per cent); 'East and South-East Asia' (15.2 per cent); 'Eastern Europe' (13 per cent); and the 'Muslim World' (12.0 per cent). 'The Middle East' received only marginal support as a national identification option.

In Uzbekistan, the second most supported option was also 'Asia' (37.1 per cent of respondents chose this option). The third choice was 'the West' (32.7 per cent). The idea of 'the Eurasian Bridge' was supported by 31.9 per cent of respondents, followed by 'Eastern Europe' (22.4 per cent); 'the Turkic World' (15.5 per cent); 'the Muslim World' (7.7 per cent); and 'the Middle East' (7.7 per cent).

**Figure 4.**

*Necessity of International Cooperation (%) 1999*



Respondents were also asked: *In your opinion, co-operation with which international organisations most closely reflects the interests of your republic?* Several options were given as answers to this question (see Questionnaire and Figure 4).

The survey found that, despite all the difficulties and problems of the previous years, cooperation with traditional partners within the framework of the CIS and CAEU remained the most favoured option for the overwhelming majority of respondents.<sup>18</sup> 81.6% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 81.5% in Kyrgyzstan, and 74.1% in Uzbekistan chose as an option that this cooperation was 'mostly reflecting the interests' of their respective republic. Despite quite serious conflicts and disagreements within CAEU, the Union was the second most supported option (65.3% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 78.3% in Kyrgyzstan and 60.3% in Uzbekistan). This

was followed by the OSCE (43.9% in Kazakhstan, 46.7% in Kyrgyzstan and 58.6% in Uzbekistan).

According to the results of this survey the 'Economic Co-operation Organisation' was in fourth place (23.5% of Kazakhstan's respondents, 27.2% of the Kyrgyzstan's respondents, and 37.9% of Uzbekistan's respondents). Co-operation with the 'Union of Turkic People' and 'the OIC' was considered by respondents in all three republics as least important.

### *Threats to Stability and Security*

For Central Asians, who have just started taking their very first independent steps on the international arena, the identification of priorities on the national and regional security agendas appeared to be the most important and challenging task. The *Alma-Ata Declaration* became the cornerstone of their post-Soviet security system. This concept of security is based upon five major principles: "assurance of territorial integrity and inviolability of national boundaries; creation of a politically-based system of security; creation of a military-based system of security, and the stabilisation of inter-ethnic relations within the former USSR."<sup>19</sup>

At the end of the 1990s, Central Asian policy makers could see rising threats to their countries' security from a variety of sources. For instance, Kazakhstan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Kasymzhomart Tokayev pointed towards the need to cooperate in "fighting against religious extremism, international terrorism, organised crime, the illicit drug trade, and weapon smuggling."<sup>20</sup>

The survey, the findings of which are described below, was conducted in February-March 1999. It coincided with a terrorist


bomb blast in Tashkent in February 1999, which was allegedly masterminded by so-called 'Islamic fundamentalists'. However, the survey was conducted before another important event of that year took place — the incursion of a group of Uzbekistan's guerrillas from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan's territory in August 1999. The guerrillas took several hostages, including foreigners, and for almost three months successfully resisted attacks from Kyrgyzstan's ill-prepared defence forces. Besides direct military confrontations, as described above, there have also been other new, non-military, security threats, like the cyanide spill in Issyk-Kul region of Kyrgyzstan (1998) and the on-going ecological disaster on the Aral Sea shores of Kazakhstan, which also affects large areas of Uzbekistan.

The 1999 survey had two questions; one dealt with the perception of threats to the security and stability in the region, while the other related to priorities in international co-operation with world and regional leading powers.

As Figure 5 demonstrates, perceptions of threats to stability and security in the region differed from republic to republic. In answering these questions the survey questionnaire gave respondents a list of options that included internal and external threats, as well as old and new threats.

**Figure 5.**

*Perception of Threats to Stability and Security in the Central Asian Region in 1999 (%)*



The survey found that Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's respondents were more concerned with internal threats such as 'economic crisis and economic problems' (75.5% and 81.5% respectively), and 'internal social and political problems' (53.1% and 68.5% respectively). These issues were seen as less threatening by Uzbekistan's respondents, although 48.3% of them

considered 'internal social and political problems' as a threat and 33.6% viewed 'economic crisis and economic problems' as threatening. 'Ecological issues' were perceived as less threatening in all three republics. These issues were of more importance to Kazakhstan's (33.6%) and Kyrgyzstan's respondents (23.9%), but were less important for Uzbekistan's respondents (7.8%). During the past decade the rise of 'religious fundamentalism' has been a concern to all CARs, especially in the context of the civil war between the government and the Islamic Revival Party-led opposition in neighbouring Tajikistan. Moreover, this concern has developed into a perception of threat after the February 1999 bombs exploded in Tashkent. Thus, the survey found that Uzbekistan's respondents were more concerned about the growth of 'religious fundamentalism' (92.2%) than respondents in other republics (39.1% in Kyrgyzstan and only 18.4% in Kazakhstan).

Historically, external threats to Central Asian states came from their large neighbours. Although the CARs have generally managed to resolve major issues in their bilateral relations with neighbouring states, such as territorial claims and border disputes, they consider maintaining good relations with major international actors as the major factor of security and stability in the region. In general, Uzbekistan's respondents were more concerned about 'external military threat' (57.8%) than those surveyed in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (19.6% and 13.3% respectively).

Respondents from Kazakhstan saw the most probable external threat as that arising from a complication of their country's relations with neighbouring China and Russia (44.9% and 24.5%). This was despite the fact that major problems with these states had already been resolved through the multilateral framework. Kyrgyzstan's respondents expressed concern about possible complications in

relations with Russia (18.5%), although their republic does not have common borders with Russia. They also expressed concern about possible complications in relations with neighbouring China (15.2%) and Afghanistan (14.1%). Uzbekistan's respondents perceived the threat as coming from a complication of relations with neighbouring Afghanistan as the most important of all external dangers.


### *Public Discourse on Developmental Issues*

During the first stage of economic reforms in Central Asia (1992-94) discussion of problems related to development issues was mainly focused on 'development models' that could accelerate the pace of economic transformation. In this period the CARs were still part of the 'ruble zone' and had no option but to follow Russia in pursuing a radical economic policy.<sup>21</sup> Unpopular decisions taken by Central Asian leaders at the time were often justified by references made to various macroeconomic 'models' of transformation.

In their internal policies, Central Asian leaders were pioneers in promoting an idea of 'social stability first'.<sup>22</sup> In the words of President Nazarbayev, a 'strategy of rapid development' based upon principles of 'equal opportunity' and 'progressive structural *perestroika* of the economy'<sup>23</sup> had to come first, while democratisation might follow these reforms later. Perhaps these references to a 'development model' were a Central Asian variation of the search for a 'national idea,' with its striving for the creation of a technocratic society — an idea that was widely acceptable, presented an appealing alternative to the growth of ethnic nationalism, and also helped to legitimise the dominant positions of the ruling elite.

From time to time Central Asian leaders would point out that in their 'model' countries, economic reforms came first and political changes later. Thus, in many South-East and East Asian countries democracy was still quite limited and political processes were often 'guided' by the state.<sup>24</sup> In trying to curb opposition Central Asian ruling elites often referred to South Korean, South East Asian or Turkish 'development models' that were also based on limitations imposed on democracy.

The survey questionnaire contained two questions that dealt with the existing perception of 'development models', and the perception of policy implications in the realisation of a chosen 'model'.

**Figure 6***Development Models 1999 (%)*

One of the questions was: *Which development model is the most appropriate for your republic? (Please indicate two options only)*. The respondents were given a selection of several choices (see Questionnaire and Figure 6).<sup>25</sup>

The responses to this question are presented in Figure 6. One of the most popular models among those listed was the 'Japanese model'. This was selected as the first choice by Kyrgyzstan's respondents (40.2%) and the second choice by Kazakhstan's respondents (30.6%), but was only the third choice of Uzbekistan's

respondents (25.8%). Surprisingly, the German 'development model' was the most popular among Uzbekistan's respondents (37.0%). This could be a reflection of several factors: the search for prosperity and order, two values that are highly promoted by Uzbekistan's politicians, and the high level of economic assistance that Uzbekistan is receiving from Germany. The 'South Korean model' was the second most attractive to Uzbeki respondents (26.7%), perhaps as a consequence of the high levels of South Korean investments in Uzbekistan, including car and electronic goods' assembly plants.

The study found that the 'Turkish development model' was considered the most attractive model by Kazakhstan's respondents (32.6%); it was also the third most attractive model in Kyrgyzstan (18.4%), and the fourth in Uzbekistan (22.4%). Despite the economic turmoil that followed the Asian financial crisis, South Korean and other NICs' 'models' remained attractive to all respondents (see Figure 6).

The 'Russian development model' was the fourth most attractive for Kyrgyzstan's respondents (17.4%), but least attractive for respondents in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A considerable number of Uzbekistan's respondents chose their 'own development model' (18.9%), which was probably a reflection of President Karimov's promotion of the idea of the republic's 'own development model' and Uzbekistan's strategy of self-reliance.

**Table 1**

*Factors that are important for realisation of an appropriate development model in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 1999 (%)*

<b>Factors important for realisation Of a development model:</b>	<b>Kazakhstan N = 98</b>	<b>Kyrgyzstan N = 92</b>	<b>Uzbekistan N = 116</b>
Temporary limitation of democracy	3.9	13.0	4.3
Strengthening of executive power	29.5	52.0	31.9
Temporary limitation of human rights, Mass media, freedom of faith	1.0	3.3	1.7
Development of market economy and Market institutions	59.0	54.3	39.6
Planned economy and the leading Role of the state	24.5	19.6	15.5
Strengthening social and political Stability by any means	25.5	33.7	18.9
Preservation of social equality	22.4	17.4	18.9
Strict compliance with the IMF And World Bank's recommendations	8.2	6.5	4.3
Other	12.2	5.4	0.8

In discussing 'development models' in relation to the Central Asian republics, it is also important to understand how respondents see ways and policies required for implementation of a chosen 'model'. The second question of the questionnaire in this section was: *In your opinion, what factors are most important for the realisation of an appropriate development model in your republic?* Respondents were given a selection of eight options plus an additional 'other', which they could fill in themselves (see Questionnaire and Table 1).

The results of respondents' replies to this question are presented in Table 1. Our findings were rather contradictory. Although respondents in all three republics selected as the most important factor 'development of market economy and market institutions' (59.0% in Kazakhstan; 54.3% in Kyrgyzstan; and 39.6% in Uzbekistan), they also chose as the second most important factor 'strengthening of the executive power' (29.5% in Kazakhstan; 52.0% in Kyrgyzstan; and 31.9% in Uzbekistan).

In conjunction with their governments' strategy towards preservation of the political status quo and social and inter-ethnic stability, respondents in all three states chose 'strengthening social and political stability by any means' as the third most important factor. This option was supported by 25.5% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 33.7% in Kyrgyzstan, and 18.9% in Uzbekistan.

A considerable number of respondents selected the option of 'planned economy and the leading role of the state' (24.5% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 19.6% in Kyrgyzstan and 15.5% in Uzbekistan).

In all three republics the majority of respondents turned out to be rather sceptical about the importance of recommendations coming from the IMF and the World Bank for their country's development. This was possibly a reflection of their disappointment in dealing with these two international organisations, where policy prescriptions from these bodies have received a rather negative response. The option of 'strict compliance with the IMF and World Bank's recommendations' was the least favourable option, supported by only 8.2% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 6.5% in Kyrgyzstan and 4.3% in Uzbekistan.

*International Co-operation and the Issue of Integration*

In the post-1991 period two factors have largely affected perceptions of the possibility of (re-) integration at the regional and supra-regional levels: the legacy of the Soviet era, and the way the USSR disintegrated. On the one hand, a very high level of economic integration and interdependency was developed within the Soviet system. Also, under the Soviet system a viable system of state administration and local institutions was created in Central Asia, a system that policy-makers in CARs knew well and with which they could deal. On the other hand, the former Soviet system of administration and management proved to be quite inefficient in providing services and consumer goods for the people, particularly during the second half of the 1980s, when a rising imbalance of supply and demand on the Soviet consumer market became too evident. However, during the same period the Gorbachev-Ryzhkov reforms gave a great level of independence to the Union republics, supplemented by the advantage of common currency, an inexpensive transportation network and low internal prices on a selection of goods and services.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the CARs were faced with a number of challenging problems stemming from the fact that Central Asian economies were designed and created for functioning within the former all-Union economic system but were practically unsustainable in the form of independent entities. They had to find an acceptable model for peaceful and sustainable economic, political and social transition, and create a new formula for relations with the Russian Federation, the international community and even between themselves. In many aspects these challenges were too difficult to resolve, which explains why the leaders of the three CARs were among the most enthusiastic

supporters of the idea of re-integration, both of the former USSR and within the region.

In 1993 the common Ruble zone ceased to exist and was followed by the introduction of national currencies in all CARs. Since that time leaders of the three republics started to revise their attitudes towards integration, eventually moving in different directions. The meaning of 'integration' was also now interpreted in a slightly different manner. Kazakhstan and, to some extent, Kyrgyzstan continued to support the idea of political and economic integration within the CIS (for example, through the Customs Union agreement). Meanwhile, Uzbekistan started to pursue the development of a fully autonomous economy. Although the government of Uzbekistan continued to pay lip service to CIS integration, its policy now concentrated more on the idea of regional integration within Central Asia. Views of the three republics also differed considerably on the issue of military integration. Kazakhstan was the only country that consistently supported military cooperation with Russia. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan moved slowly, but steadily, towards asserting full control over its borders and by March 1999 had signed an agreement with Russia on establishing full control over its borders. Russian border troops were to be sent back to Russia. From the start the Uzbekistani government has rejected any presence of Russian troops on its territory, although it did enter into limited military cooperation with Russia on the issues related to the escalation of conflicts and civil war in Afghanistan and Tajikistan in 1997-99.

By the end of the 1990s regional integration between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was on the brink of collapse due to disagreements and rising tensions between the three republics. The three Central Asian republics were in a state of so-

called 'customs war' that involved the imposition of different types of restrictions on imports and on the movement of goods from neighbouring states. This was an attempt to protect their national economies from the aftershocks of the Asian and Russian financial crises.

Our survey had two questions that dealt directly with the economic situation in the region and existing perceptions of issues of importance to regional integration and co-operation with various regional organisations.

**Table 2**

*How significant for your republic is regional integration in the following spheres? (means; where 1 = no influence and 4 = the highest level of influence)*

<b>Importance</b>	<b>Kazakhstan</b>	<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	<b>Uzbekistan</b>	
Political	3.03	3.03	2.98	
Economic	3.41	3.45	3.3	
Cultural	3.01	2.78	2.76	
Security	3.47	3.31	3.38	
Other	1.47	2.8	1.56	

Respondents were asked the following question: *In your opinion, how significant for your republic is regional integration in the following spheres? Please select one option only: 1) there is no need; 2) -not significant; 3) significant; 4) highly significant*). The results of their replies to this question are presented in Table 2.

Integration in 'security issues' was of highest importance to respondents in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (means 3.47 and 3.38), and was the second most important issue to those surveyed in

Kyrgyzstan (means 3.31). Integration of the 'economic sphere' was selected as the second most important area by respondents in Kazakhstan (means 3.41) and Uzbekistan (means 3.30), and as the most important by Kyrgyzstani respondents (means 3.45). Integration of the 'political sphere' was equally supported by Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani respondents (means 3.03), while with Uzbekistani respondents it was slightly less popular (means 2.98). Integration of the 'cultural sphere' was in last place for respondents in all three republics, although it remained quite high in importance.

**Table 3**

*Importance of co-operation with selected countries (means; where 1 = no influence and 4 = the highest level of influence)*

Co-operation with	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan
Afghanistan	1.96	1.87	2.15
China	3.36	3.1	2.67
Germany	2.79	2.78	3.1
India	2.13	2.34	2.14
Iran	2.5	2.3	2.24
Japan	2.89	3.1	3.02
Pakistan	2.02	2.19	2.06
Russia	3.61	3.59	3.27
Turkey	3.01	2.96	2.77
United States	3.26	3.08	3.31
Others *	--	--	--

\* 'Others' included the CIS, neighbouring Central Asian republics, Arab countries, Korea, the UK, and the East and South-East Asian 'tigers'.

Question: *In your opinion, how important is collaboration with the following countries to the interests of your republic? Please check each country according to the following scale: 1 - not important; 2 - moderately important; 3 - important; 4 - very important.*

This question was designed to test respondents' views on the issue of international co-operation and, more precisely, to see which countries would, in their opinion, make the best allies. At the same time other questions in the survey tested respondents' perceptions of what threats they considered as most serious to the security of their republics. Below is an analysis of their responses.

For respondents in Kazakhstan co-operation with Russia was in first place (mean 3.61) (See Table 3). China was next (mean 3.36), followed by the USA (mean 3.25), Germany (mean 2.79), Turkey (mean 3.01), Japan (mean 2.89), Iran (means 2.5) and India (mean 2.13). Afghanistan was in last place (mean 1.96).

Kyrgyzstan's respondents also put Russia in first place (means 3.34) (See Table 3). Next was Germany (means 3.30), the USA (means 3.59), Japan (means 3.1), China (means 3.1), Turkey (means 2.96), India (means 2.34), Iran (means 2.3) and Pakistan (means 2.19). Afghanistan was again in last place (means 1.87).

Uzbekistani specialists put co-operation with the United States in first place (means 3.31) (See Table 3). Russia was next (means 3.27). Japan was in third place (means 3.02), followed by Germany (means 3.1), Turkey (means 2.77), China (means 2.67), Iran (means 2.24) and Afghanistan (means 2.15). India (means 2.14) and Pakistan (means 2.06) occupied the last two places.

In general terms, analysis of the survey results revealed that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan experts considered co-operation with Pakistan, India and Afghanistan to be issues of secondary importance. Surprisingly, Central Asian experts did not show any significant interest in developing co-operation with Iran, in spite of the diplomatic and economic activities of the Iranian government in the region and the fact that in geographic terms Iran represents the natural and shortest passageway from Central Asia to world markets. It needs to be noted, though, that the cultural and linguistic closeness with Turkey also did not outweigh other considerations of the CARs' experts surveyed. They placed the importance of co-operation with Turkey far behind that with major Western countries. This, probably, was a reflection of the Central Asian elites' disappointment with the economic potential of Turkey.

### *Implications*

The results of the survey study demonstrate that respondents from each Central Asian republic perceived the larger part of foreign policy issues differently. This included issues of national self-identity, international co-operation and existing threats to the security of their country. Respondents also had quite different views on the issue of their countries' future foreign policy orientation.

The results of the survey, as presented in Figures 1 and 2, illustrated that foreign policy-making in CARs was relatively open to inputs and influences from various institutionalised and non-institutionalised groups and actors. Representatives of these three Central Asian republics had no considerable differences of opinion on the questions of the influence of various groups in foreign policy-making (see Figure 1). However, respondents' answers to an indirect question about groups of experts on which their

governments can rely in the process of the foreign policy-making (Figure 2) shows quite significant differences between existing perceptions in, on the one hand, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and, on the other, Uzbekistan. According to the survey, there were more diversified options of what expertise is in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while in Uzbekistan, in the view of respondents, two institutions — the 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs' and the 'Presidential Apparatus' — had an overwhelming influence in providing the necessary expertise for foreign policy-making.

The perceptions of national identities demonstrate how deeply elites in the CARs were split in their views on their own societies (see Figure 3). On the one hand, the survey shows a clear assertion of national pride after almost a century of restrictions and cultural modernisation. By the late 1990s Central Asian elites had left 'Soviet identity' behind, and no longer perceived themselves exclusively within the framework of the CIS or any associations of the past. In their attempt to (re-)construct national and international identities of their republics, the Central Asian elite appealed to the glory of the past (the Tamerlan State in Uzbekistan and the Great Silk Road in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). On the other hand, the survey also revealed that in their current perceptions elites were divided between the past and the present; between political, rational and imaginary worlds; between re-discovering their Asian roots and a still strong Soviet heritage as an (East) European entity. This also affected the extent to which the CARs' elites were willing to open their societies to external influences or to preserve the existing political and cultural status quo.

Our analysis of the evaluation of threats (see Figure 5) indicated that most respondents in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan saw

no major external threats to the security and stability of their region. Meanwhile, to Uzbekistani respondents an external threat was the second most serious after 'religious fundamentalism'. This reflected growing security concerns among policy-makers in Uzbekistan following clashes between their national security forces and militant opposition groups, and the explosions in Tashkent in February 1999. However, most respondents indicated that in their opinion major threats to stability and security in the three republics come from internal sources. The stable development of Central Asia was seen as to a large extent dependent on the success of profound economic reforms and an ability to maintain a balance between a variety of internal political, social and ethnic groups. In contrast to a view that is shared by many Western and Russian scholars, that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were more advanced in economic reforms than Uzbekistan, respondents from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan considered the threat of 'economic crisis and economic problems' as the most important among all listed threats. Meanwhile, Uzbekistani respondents had more confidence in their 'unreformed' economy, where the state had managed to protect industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as the social welfare system, from a collapse similar to the one experienced in neighbouring countries. This was done despite the severe criticisms and pressures that came from international aid and assistance organisations.

The results of the survey study, presented in Figure 6, illustrate that the Central Asian respondents preferred technocratic and dynamic 'development models' as an option for future development. It is important to note that there exist considerable differences in policy approaches to development among respondents from these republics (see Table 1). While those surveyed in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan considered development of market

economy and market institutions (Table 2) as crucial factors for realisation of their vision of 'development models', Uzbekistani respondents did not list these factors as important ones. Interestingly, Kyrgyzstani respondents put more emphasis on the 'strengthening of the executive power' than did their colleagues from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Assessment of views on integration and co-operation (see Tables 2 and 3) indicated that co-operation with Russia still seems to be seen as a high priority issue by all respondents. However, some shifts in opinion point to the fact that the Kremlin's role in Central Asia is declining. For instance, for respondents in Kazakhstan the importance of relations with China and Turkey has started to be a counterweight to the importance of relations with Russia. The Russian Federation did not occupy an exclusive position as the major international partner for Uzbekistan, while the importance of the United States, Japan and Germany together counterweighted the importance of relations with Russia. On the whole, relations with Russia were of much greater importance to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than to Uzbekistan. This, however, might be explained by the fact that Uzbekistan does not have geographical borders with Russia, but has a common border with Afghanistan. On the other hand, Kazakhstan does not have borders with Afghanistan or Iran, but it shares the longest part of its borders with the Russian Federation.

## **Conclusion:**

### **The CARs' Search for a Place in the Modern World**

This research project was initially based on an assumption that foreign policy processes in the CARs were decentralised and relatively open to input from various groups in society, institutions, and internal and external actors. Decentralisation occurred as a consequence of several factors. Firstly, due to the nature of the political process in the post-Soviet era and the peculiarities of post-Soviet political structures, internal and external policies in Central Asian republics are representative of a certain level of compromise between various groups in society. Secondly, due to the fragmentation of the ruling elite and the disappearance of the former Soviet *nomenklatura*, the unity of *nomenklatura* as a well-disciplined and organised group was broken, although its representatives have largely managed to survive the turmoil of post-Soviet changes. Thirdly, due to a high level of competition between major institutionalised and non-institutionalised groups in these societies, policies are often driven by internal political factors and are often a consensus between various actors rather than a direct reflection of external pressures and inputs. The results of our survey study have largely supported these assumptions.

Respondents in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan indicated that they believed that foreign policy making was open to influences from different actors. However, this did not imply that foreign policy-making was open to inputs from the public, political parties or parliamentarians. According to the findings of the survey these have the least influence (see Figure 1), moreover, respondents noted that in their view it was unlikely that these actors would ever be asked to provide expertise and advise for their government (see Figure 2). What seems to be the case is that

various institutionalised groups and governments are competing for influence in the formation of foreign policy in this or that republic.

Following the collapse of the all-Union central government, public debate on the issues of future directions and priorities in foreign policy became quite intense in the CARs. However, even the ruling elite often had very contradictory views on issues such as the national interest and the orientation of foreign policy. Debates were centred around a number of issues ranging from the priorities that the CARs should take in their bilateral and multilateral relations, to issues of security and what should be their responses to external and internal threats to the stability and independence of Central Asia. This was clearly reflected in the identity and 'development model' debates.

After 1991 governments of the CARs could choose from a number of different approaches to reforms, in regard to both political development and economic transformation. These included the economic development models of the East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, and those of the western liberal democracies and market economies. Almost seventy years of Soviet modernisation created a strong belief among Central Asian leaders in the positive aspects of social and political engineering, triggering attempts to construct new national identities on a highly rational basis. Some intellectuals have a deep resentment of Russia's long-lasting domination and instead would like to see their countries embracing Anglo-American materialism and eventually becoming part of the Western world. Others are calling for a return to 'civilisational roots', emphasising the importance of traditional values to their societies and calling for restoration of 'historical ties' with Turkey and other Muslim countries. The results of our survey study support a presumption that although there has been a considerable shift

within Central Asian societies' ruling elites towards acceptance of the realities and challenges of the post-Soviet era, the majority still preferred to keep the status quo intact. This might have been the reason why most Central Asians (perhaps with an exception of the Uzbekistanis) have not made any radical moves aimed at deconstructing their former Soviet identities and building their own new national identities on the basis of opposition to their former 'colonial master', Russia.

The other explanation is that debates on issues of identity and 'development models' were strongly interrelated with the need to respond to various speculations about future prospects of the region. Central Asian leaders have managed to come up with a simple outline of their vision of the future, thus rebutting the speculations of international experts and Russian intellectuals who suggested 'fundamentalist' Iranian or 'secular' Turkish 'models' as two possible future development paths for the CARs.<sup>26</sup>

The restructuring of the security system in Central Asia has become the most important issue for the Central Asian republics. Vulnerability to the Kremlin's foreign policy, and the rise of Russian nationalism, have forced Central Asian leaders to seek a new security regime that would not rely solely upon Russian security guarantees, but would include guarantees from neighbouring states and some other important international players as well. The search for a new security regime in Central Asia is also reflective of the growing shift in the region's security orientation characterised by the diminishing economic and political role of the Russian Federation and the increasing economic and financial influence of the USA, France, Japan, UK, Germany, China and South Korea. By the mid 1990s, the CARs had developed a basic framework for a multilateral security system<sup>27</sup> which reflected the multilateral

approach of the Central Asian republics' co-operation with OSCE, NATO's Partnership for Peace and the USA. Military exercises that were held in the region in 1997 and 1998, involving military personnel from the USA, Russia, Turkey and the CARs, might be viewed as the first step towards the creation of this new security system.

Since the USSR collapsed, the most divisive issue among Central Asian elites was how to promote social and economic policies in a stable environment and at the same time to maintain a high level of regional security, without the intervention of any major world actors. Central Asian leaders have shown significant differences in their approach to this problem. Nevertheless, practically all of the Central Asian republics, with the exception of Tajikistan, have managed to stabilise their political situation and to conduct a relatively steady transformation of their national institutions. However, our survey revealed that respondents in Central Asia still had quite contradictory views on what the changes and post-communist reforms should be (see table 1).

Another issue where respondents' views varied greatly was that of international co-operation. While relations with Russia continued to form the basis of foreign policies of all three republics, this was accompanied in the 1990s by a steady decline of Russia's influence in the region. However, forecasts that cultural or other factors would eventually dominate the CARs' foreign policies did not materialise. Neither Turkey, nor Iran nor Pakistan became exclusive foreign partners of the CARs. Instead, the foreign priorities of Central Asian states became centred around the development of their relations with China and leading Western powers<sup>28</sup> — this despite the fact that their initial expectations about the levels of foreign economic and humanitarian assistance and investment

were rather exaggerated. In the end the CARs came up with a foreign policy that accommodated both the role of Russia and the necessity to diversify their international relations.

On the whole, it can be stated that during the first transitional period the foreign policies of the three CARs were relatively cohesive, although they should still be considered to be at the formative stage. The Soviet-trained elites have kept a firm grip on executive power in all three republics and it is their technocratic and pragmatic approach that has had an overwhelming influence in foreign policy formation.

## APPENDIX 1

### Research Project: Formation of Foreign Policy in Central Asia

This questionnaire is administered as part of a study conducted within the framework of a research project on foreign policy formation in the Central Asian republics. The main purpose of the project is to analyse problems of foreign policy formation in the three republics of Central Asia. The questionnaire is administered in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Respondents were selected randomly. Since the questionnaire is anonymous there is no need to indicate your surname, name and patronymic. Results of the questionnaire will be analysed with the help of a statistical computer programme. The questions have been translated into Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek languages. Please select the language that is most convenient for you. It would be appreciated if you could answer all of the questions.

### QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What is your opinion of how successfully foreign policy was formed and is realised in the following regions?

*Please check all the options according to the following scale: 1 poor; 2 moderately; 3 good; 4 excellent*

Region	1	2	3	4
Kazakhstan				
Kyrgyzstan				
Uzbekistan				
Russia				
Central Asia				
CIS				

2. In your opinion, which of the following groups have the greatest influence on the formation of foreign policy in your republic?

*Please check each group according to the following scale: 1 does not influence; 2 influences insignificantly; 3 influences significantly; 4 influences greatly*

<b>Group</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
Mass media				
Presidential office				
Ministry of Foreign Affairs				
Parliament				
Academy of science, universities (scholars and researchers)				
Public opinion				
Private business				
Foreign business				
IMF, World Bank				
Military and Security forces				
Political parties and organisations				
Non government organisations				
Other ( <i>Please indicate</i> ) .....				

3. What are your main sources of information on the foreign policy of your republic and Central Asian region as a whole? Please check only three options.

- Mass media
- Parliament's hearings
- Presidential speeches
- Speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Foreign mass media
- Friends/colleagues
- Other (*please indicate*) .....

4. In your opinion, how do the following qualities of the leader of the republic affect the formation of foreign policy of your republic?

*Please check all the options according to the following scale: 1 does not affect; 2 affects insignificantly; 3 affects significantly; 4 affects greatly*

Quality	1	2	3	4
Leadership abilities				
Theoretical knowledge of foreign relations				
Long experience in international relations				
Ability to synthesise theory and practice				
Ability to logically analyse a situation and find the only true solution				
Intuition				
Other ( <i>please indicate</i> ) .....				

5. In your opinion, your republic should develop its foreign policy and form its identity in the international arena as a part of what region of the world? Please check only 3 options.

- Eastern Europe
- Asia
- Middle East
- West
- CIS
- East and Southeast Asia
- Eurasian Bridge (Neither Europe nor Asia)
- Turk World (Turk-speaking countries)
- Other (*please indicate*)  
.....

6. Which of the following obstacles do you regard as the most salient in the process of foreign policy formation? Please check only 3 options for each column:

<b>Obstacle</b>	<b>In republic</b>	<b>In Central Asia</b>
Lack of theoretical knowledge of international relations		
Too much theory and lack of practical actions		
Lack of information on foreign policy		
Lack of coordination among the Central Asian republics		
Lack of professionals in the field of international relations		
Absence of experience in international arena		
Scholars and experts do not involved enough		

7. Which of the following problems do you think are likely to threaten the stability and security in your region? Please check only 3 options:

- internal social and political problems
- economic crisis and economic problems
- environmental issues
- threat of war
- possibility of complications in relations with the United States
- possibility of complications in relations with Russia
- possibility of complications in relations with China
- possibility of complications in relations with Iran
- possibility of complications in relations with Afghanistan
- possibility of complications in relations with Turkey
- religious fundamentalism
- other (*please indicate*) .....

8. Which development model is the most appropriate for your republic?

Please indicate only 2 options:

- Turkish
- Japanese
- South Korean
- Russian
- German
- Newly Industrialised States (NISs) (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, etc.)
- Iranian
- Other (*please indicate*) .....

9. In your opinion, what factors are most important for the realisation of an appropriate development model in your republic?

- temporary limitation of democracy
- strengthening the executive power
- temporary limitation of the human rights, mass-media, freedom of faith, etc
- development of the market economy and market institutions
- planned economy and the leading role of the state
- strengthening of social and political stability by any means
- preservation of social equality
- strict following of IMF's and World Bank's recommendations
- Other (*please indicate*) .....

10. How important do you think regional integration of the Central Asian republics is? Please check only 1 option.

- highly important
- important
- integration is possible but not so important
- not important
- other (*please indicate*) .....

11. In your opinion, how significant for your republic is regional integration in the following spheres?

*Please check each option according to the scale: 1 -there is no need; 2 - not significant; 3 - significant; 4 - highly significant*

Sphere	1	2	3	4
Political				
Economic				
Cultural				
Security issues				
Other				

12. In your opinion, cooperation with which international organisations most closely reflect the interests of your republic? Please check only 3 options.

- Commonwealth of Independent States
- Organisation of Islamic Conference
- European Security and Cooperation Organisation
- Economic Cooperation Organisation
- Union of Turkish Nations
- Central Asian Economic Union
- Other (*please indicate*) .....

13. In your opinion, how important is collaboration with the following countries to the interests of your republic?

*Please check each country according to the following scale: 1 - not important; 2 - moderately important; 3 - important; 4 - very important*

Country	1	2	3	4
Germany				
Russia				
The USA				
Japan				
Turkey				
China				
Iran				
Pakistan				
India				
Afghanistan				
Other ( <i>please indicate</i> ) .....				

14. In your opinion, what measures are needed for improvement of the process of foreign policy formation in your republic? Please check only 3 options:

- improve education and training of personnel involved in the field of international relations
- intensify control from the Parliament
- increase openness (*glasnost*)
- involve more scholars and experts
- increase number of publications on international relations issues in mass media
- conduct more studies on foreign policy
- increase coordination between theorists and practitioners
- involve foreign consultants

15. In your opinion, who are the main experts upon which your government can rely in the process of foreign decision making? Please check no more than 3 options

- Mass media
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- International Department of the Presidential Office
- Scholars and researchers
- Private business
- Parliament
- Public
- Military and Security officials
- The government makes its own decisions
- Foreign advisors (UN, IMF, World Bank, etc.)
- Other (*please indicate*) .....

16. How do you assess the attitudes of foreign policy making organisations towards the following professional groups?

*Please check all options according to the following scale: 1-unsatisfactory; 2 -satisfactory; 3 - good; 4 – excellent*

<b>Groups</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
Mass media				
Ministry of Foreign Affairs				
International Department of the Presidential Office				
Scholars and researchers				
Private business				
Parliament				
Public				
The Military and Security				
Other ( <i>please indicate</i> ) .....				

**Now please tell us about yourself:**

17. Where do you live?

- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Uzbekistan

18. Gender:

- Male
- Female

19. Age:

- 20 and below
- 21-30
- 31-40
- 41-50
- 51 and above

20. Your ethnic origin:

- Kazakh
- Kyrgyz
- Russian
- Tajik
- Uzbek
- Other (*please indicate*) .....

21. Your highest education:

- secondary / secondary special
- incomplete high
- undergraduate (institute/university)

- graduate (aspirantura)
- postgraduate (doktorantura)
- high special (in the field of international relations)
- high special (continuing education courses)
- high special (overseas continuing education courses)
- other (*please indicate*)

.....

22. Your occupation/profession:

- journalist (mass media)
- personnel of the Foreign Affairs Ministry
- personnel of International department of the Presidential Office
- scholars/researcher
- member of the Parliament
- other (*please indicate*) .....

\*\*\*

*Thank you for your help and co-operation.*

## APPENDIX 2

### Respondents' Profile

The study population consisted of 1800 staff members of different organisations and institutions whose work was related to the field of international relations. They were from three Central Asian newly independent countries: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan.<sup>29</sup> The population of the study consisted of (1) experts, academics, scholars and researchers; (2) members of the parliament, political parties and mass media; and (3) the personnel of the CARs' Ministries of Foreign Affairs and government. The sample size of 19 per cent (around 360) was selected with the help of a computer programme capable of generating random samples.

The questionnaire-based survey study was conducted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in March-April 1999 and in Uzbekistan in the summer of 1999 with the assistance of the Centre for Social Research (Kyrgyzstan). Around 206 questionnaires were received back immediately and 130 questionnaires were sent by the Centre for Social Research later by mail. Thirty of the received questionnaires were incomplete and, therefore, were considered to be invalid. Total 306 (or 85%) questionnaires were prepared for analysis. The collected data was analysed by using *SPSS for Windows* for descriptive statistics like frequencies, means and cross tabulations.

In figure and tables below we present the respondents' profile in greater detail.

Figure 1.

***Respondents' Profile by Republics***

N=306




Table 1.

***Age Groups of the Respondents***

N=306

Age Groups	Frequency	Percent
up to 20 years old	34	11.1
21-30 years old	101	33.0
31-40 years old	81	26.5
41-50 years old	57	18.6
above 51 years old	30	9.8
Missing	3	1
Total	306	100.0

Table 2.

***Ethnic Representation***

N=306

<b>Ethnic Group</b>	<b>Frequen cy</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Kazakhs	86	28.1
Kyrgyzs	74	24.2
Russians	37	12.1
Tajiks	2	0.7
Uzbeks	67	21.9
Tatars	10	3.3
Koreans	4	1.3
Ukrainians	4	1.3
Missing	7	2.3
Others	15	5.9
Total	306	100

Table 3.

***Educational Level of the Respondents***

N=306

<b>Level of Education</b>	<b>Frequenc y</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Not completed high education	34	11.1
Institute, university	117	38.2
Aspirantura	77	25.2
Doktorantura	27	8.81
High education in foreign relations	13	4.2
Continuing or professional courses	21	6.9
Continuing or professional courses completed abroad	10	6.6
Missing		
Total	306	100

Table 4.

***Occupation of the Respondents***

N=306

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Frequenc y</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Journalists	16	6.2
Staff of Ministry of Foreign Affairs	23	7.5
Presidential office	9	2.9
Scholars / Researchers	174	66.9
Member of the Parliament	9	2.9
Students	35	11.4
State administration	8	2.6
Entrepreneurs	17	5.6
Other	28	11.7
Missing		
Total	306	100

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> See for example Hannes Adomeit, 'Consensus Versus Conflict: The Dimension of Foreign Policy,' in Seweryn Bialer, ed., *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 49-83. Also: H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

<sup>2</sup> For a comprehensive coverage of the history of the Soviet diplomacy see: James P. Nichol, *Diplomacy in the former Soviet Republics* (Westport, Co: Praeger, 1995).

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, a critical assessment of Kazakhstan's participation in the foreign policy decision-making during the Soviet era: Mikhail Isinaliev, 'Diplomacy of Kazakhstan,' *International Affairs (Moscow)* (April 1989), pp. 51-58.

<sup>4</sup> See for example, Article 78 section 3 of the Uzbekistan constitution, *The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted on 8<sup>th</sup> December 1992* (Tashkent: 1992), pp. 24.

<sup>5</sup> On theoretical aspects of the role of academic expertise and 'problem representation' see: Michael Girard, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Kaith Webb, eds, *Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy Making: National Perspectives on Academic and Professionals in International Relations* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994); Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds, *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>6</sup> J. Rosenau, 'Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in B. Farrel, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-93.

<sup>7</sup> David V. Edwards, *International Political Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969), p. 23.

<sup>8</sup> This selection of three Central Asian countries out of five was for the following reasons: (1) these republics are integrated into the Central Asian Union; (2) these republics have promoted the most active foreign policies in the region; and (3) these republics are the largest countries in the region.

<sup>9</sup> The concept was introduced by Gabriel A. Almond in: Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 139-43.

<sup>10</sup> For the concept of 'problem representation' see: Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds., *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>11</sup> See for example: D. Satbayev, and M. Spanov, 'Natsional'naiia bezopasnost' Respubliki Kazakhstan: Opyt Opredelenia' (The National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan: A Definition), *Evraziiskoe Soobchestvo: Obchestvo, Politika, Kultura*, No. 4 (24) 1998, pp. 54-84.

<sup>12</sup> Presented in this paper are the results from the second survey in the process. The first survey was conducted in 1997 and its results were published in: Rafis Abazov, *Formation of the Post-Soviet International Politics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan*, Paper No. 21 (University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 1999). The 1999 questionnaire-based survey was designed to be as close as possible to the 1997 survey and was conducted among the same group of respondents.

<sup>13</sup> The author has chosen three core Republics, namely the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, which play the most active and important role at the regional level. Tajikistan was excluded because throughout the 1990s it was engaged in Civil War, while Turkmenistan was excluded due to its governments' isolationist policy.

<sup>14</sup> Askar Akayev, 'Kyrgyzstan v Tsentralnoi Azii i SNG: Problemy i Perspektivy (Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia and the CIS: Problems and Perspective)', in: *God Planety, Vypusk 1994* (Moscow: Respublika, 1994), pp. 29-30.

<sup>15</sup> See for details: Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Evrasiiskii Soiuz: idei, praktika, perspektivy* (*The Eurasian Union: Ideas, Experience, Perspectives*) (Moscow: Fond sodeistviya razvitiyu sotsial'nykh i politicheskikh nauk, 1997).

<sup>16</sup> The Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) brings together Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and the CARs.

<sup>17</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Sociopolitical Environment Conditioning the Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States', in Adden Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp.193-98, and Bruce Vaughn, 'Shifting Geopolitical Realities Between South, Southwest and Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, No. 2, vol.13, 1994, pp. 305-15.

<sup>18</sup> The Central Asian Economic Union (CEAU).

<sup>19</sup> *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* (Alma Ata), 24 December 1991, p. 1.

<sup>20</sup> For Kazakhstan's views on military and non-military threats see text of the speech made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in: K.K. Tokayev, 'Kazakhstan v meniaiushchemsia mire', *Mysl'* (*Kazakhstan*), No. 3, 1999, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> Richard Pomfret, *The Economies of Central Asia* (Princeton: Princeton Uni. Press, 1995), pp. 131-51.

<sup>22</sup> *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* (Alma Ata), 16 May 1992, pp. 2-12.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>24</sup> During an official visit to Indonesia in 1992, President of Uzbekistan Karimov was impressed by the political experience of Indonesia, especially by Indonesia's concept of 'guided democracy' and state ideology called 'panchasila'. He then called for 'studying and applying' the experience of Indonesia to his republic. See: Cassandra Cavanaugh, 'Uzbekistan Looks South and East for Role Model', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 1, No. 40 (October 1992), pp. 12-13.

<sup>25</sup> The models of development that were included in the questionnaire were chosen because of frequent references in the mass media and in academic publications in the CARs. The basic difference between the NICs' and the South Korean models is that the NICs were rich in natural resources and structured their policies around a balanced utilisation of these resources, while South Korea was poor in natural resources and its development placed an emphasis on new technologies and export-oriented high-tech sectors of the economy.

<sup>26</sup> See: *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (Moscow), 24 September 1991, p. 3; *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* (Moscow), 14 August 1992, p. 3; and *Moscow News* (Moscow), No. 22, 1992, p. 3.

<sup>27</sup> Stuart Parrott, 'Central Asia: The Future Requires a Multilateral Security System', *RFE/RL*, 20 November 1997 (available at <http://search.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/11/F.RU.971120132121.html>).

<sup>28</sup> For an evaluation of the Chinese approach to relations with Central Asia see Gungcheng Xing, 'China and Central Asia: Towards a New Relations', in: *Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1998), pp. 32-49.

<sup>29</sup> See endnote 13.

## **About the Author**

Rafis Abazov is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at La Trobe University. He has published numerous journal articles on economic transition, migration, ethnic conflict, and foreign policy in Central Asia.

## CERC WORKING PAPERS SERIES

	Price	+ postage within Australia	International orders (airmail)
M. Piquet, <i>Cold War in Warm Waters: Reflections on Australian and French Mutual Misunderstandings in the Pacific</i> , (1/2000), (41 pp)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$10.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$11.50	<input type="checkbox"/> \$13.00
R. Davison, <i>Re-evaluating EU Integration</i> , (2/2000), (48 pp)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$10.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$11.50	<input type="checkbox"/> \$13.00
A. Elijah, P. Murray and C. O'Brien, <i>EU-Australia Relations</i> , (49 pp)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$10.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$11.50	<input type="checkbox"/> \$13.00
R. Abazov, <i>Foreign Policy Formation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan</i> , (4/2000), (62 pp)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$10.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$11.50	<input type="checkbox"/> \$13.00
R. Dossi, <i>Italy's Invisible Government</i> , (1/2001), (50 pp)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$10.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$11.50	<input type="checkbox"/> \$13.00
D. Lockwood, <i>Russia/China Border Trade</i> , (2/2001), (35 pp)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$10.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$11.50	<input type="checkbox"/> \$13.00
M. Longo, <i>EU's Search for Constitutional Future</i> , (3/2001), (76 pp)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$10.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$11.50	<input type="checkbox"/> \$13.00
<b>Complete Set of CERC Working Papers Series, 2000-2001</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> \$50.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$65.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$80.00

\*\* All prices are in Australian dollars and are GST-inclusive.

---

### PERSONAL DETAILS:

Title: \_\_\_\_\_ Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Company/Institution: \_\_\_\_\_

Postal address: \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone: \_\_\_\_\_ Email: \_\_\_\_\_

### PAYMENT DETAILS:

I enclose a cheque for \$ \_\_\_\_\_ made payable to 'The University of Melbourne'.

Please invoice me/my company/institution

Please charge \$ \_\_\_\_\_ to my credit card.

Type (Visa/Mastercard/Bankcard only): \_\_\_\_\_

Account No \_\_\_\_\_ Exp: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

## **CERC Working Papers Series**

The CERC Working Papers Series aims to provide a forum for the publication of high quality original research, based on work in progress, on issues relating to Europe.

### **Guidelines for contributors**

1. Papers should be approx. 12,000 words long.
2. Papers should be typed and double-spaced on A4.
3. Endnotes rather than footnotes should be used.
4. Authors' names and affiliations should appear only on the cover of the manuscript.
5. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of 150-200 words.
6. The Harvard referencing system is preferred.
7. Endnotes should be kept to a minimum.
8. Please indicate word length and inclusion of any diagrams or tables.
9. All references should be listed alphabetically at the end of the paper.
10. For journal articles, the volume and issue number, and month and year of publication should be provided.
11. Please submit 3 copies of your paper with a disk in Word or convertible format.
12. The Working Paper may be work in progress, which you are considering submitting elsewhere at a later stage (though you should refer to this earlier version in your finalised paper).
13. All papers will be evaluated, normally by 2 anonymous referees. The Editors act on the basis of referral reports, but retain final discretion in the decision to publish.
14. Authors receive 4 free copies of the Working Paper. Further copies may be purchased by authors at a discounted price.

**For more information, please contact the Editors:**

#### **Dr Philomena Murray**

Director  
Contemporary Europe Research Centre  
The University of Melbourne  
Victoria 3010, Australia  
Tel: (61-3) 8344 5151  
Fax: (61-3) 8344 9507  
e-mail: [pbmurray@unimelb.edu.au](mailto:pbmurray@unimelb.edu.au)

#### **Prof. Leslie Holmes**

Deputy Director  
Contemporary Europe Research Centre  
University of Melbourne  
Victoria 3010, Australia  
Tel: (61-3) 8344 7293  
Fax: (61-3) 8344 9507  
e-mail: [leslieth@unimelb.edu.au](mailto:leslieth@unimelb.edu.au)

#### **A/Prof. Peter Shearman**

Department of Political Science  
The University of Melbourne  
Victoria 3010, Australia  
Tel: (61-3) 8344 6559  
Fax: (61-3) 8344 7906  
e-mail: [shearman@unimelb.edu.au](mailto:shearman@unimelb.edu.au)

**Contemporary Europe Research Centre**  
**The University of Melbourne**  
Level 2, 234 Queensberry Street  
Carlton, Vic 3053, Australia  
**tel:** (61 3) 8344 9502  
**fax:** (61 3) 8344 9507  
**e-mail:** [cerc@cerc.unimelb.edu.au](mailto:cerc@cerc.unimelb.edu.au)  
**website:** <http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au>