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GLOBALISATION:

**The Multi-Faced
Enemy?**

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The only true opponents of the globalization are the nationalists, who already for years denounce the ongoing process that has led to globalization being a fact today.

Committee Nationalists against Globalization¹

Probably the two most debated issues in European politics in the past decades are 'globalization' and 'national populist parties.' They have another thing in common: both terms are more easily used than defined. Consequently, many (academic and non-academic) observations obscure both the meaning and the significance of the phenomena. If everything is linked to globalization, how can one ever prove its specific influence? And if we don't know exactly who the national populists are, how can we determine their success or failure?

This all notwithstanding, both globalization and national populism are undoubtedly significant phenomena in the European politics of the 21st century. Moreover, the two are connected in various ways. On the one hand, globalization is one of the main causes of the recent rise of national populism in Europe (e.g. Minkenberg 1998; Kitschelt 1995; Betz 1994; Ignazi 1992). On the other hand, national populist groups are among the most vocal opponents of globalization. It is the latter that will be the focus of this chapter, i.e. on the various forms of globalization and the national populist opposition to them. However, before getting to that, a few words on national populism.

National populism – a conceptual framework

The phenomenon that I label 'national populism' in this paper goes by many names in the academic and non-academic literature:

extreme right, radical right, neo-fascism, right-wing populism, etc. (see Mudde 2006). Unfortunately, many authors devote more time to coming up with a new term than with providing (clear) definitions for that term. Yet in this jungle of competing terms and lacking definitions a remarkable consensus exists on which political parties are the main representatives of the phenomenon on hand.

By the term 'national populist parties' I refer to those political parties that share an ideology consisting of *the combination* of the following four core features: nationalism, xenophobia, authoritarianism, and populism. In short, nationalism entails a political doctrine arguing the convergence of state (the political unit) and nation (the cultural unit); xenophobia refers to the fear of anything alien (including people, ideas, habits); authoritarianism denotes a strict belief in law and order (yet not necessarily an anti-democratic attitude); and populism refers to (see, more elaborately, Mudde 2006).

Drawing up an exhaustive list of national parties goes well beyond the scope of this paper; and is in fact impossible given the lack in detailed studies of the ideologies of many political parties in Europe, most notably in the East. To give some indication, we are speaking here about parties like the Australian One Nation Party (ONP), the Belgian *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Block, VB), the French *Front national* (National Front, FN), or the Slovak *Slovenská národná strana* (Slovak National Party, SNS). Unlike some colleagues, I do not include 'right-wing populist' parties, like the Dutch *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (List Pim Fortuyn, LPF) or the Italian *Forza Italia* (Go Italy, FI), which are not nationalist.

¹ "De enige ware tegenstanders van de globalisering zijn de nationalisten, die al sinds jaar en dag het aan de gang zijnde proces aan de kaak stellen dat ertoe geleid heeft dat vandaag de mondialisering een feit is" (CNTG n.d.).

In the following, the position on globalization of national populist parties will be the key concern of the analysis. However, at times I will also include references to parties that share their nativism (roughly defined as xenophobic nationalism), but for various reasons are not national populist. In most cases this will be parties that are elitist (rather than populist) or that are more or less openly hostile to democracy. In those cases I will explicitly make use of other labels, such as the more broad term 'nativist' or the more narrow label 'neo-Nazi'.

The many faces of globalization

Is there anything these days that is not caused by globalization? Global warming, Americanization, terrorism, unemployment, bad television, good music... everything is allegedly the result of that one, overpowering process. But what does globalization really mean? What *is* globalization?

As so often, many definitions and meanings are offered, and no consensus is to be found. According to the well-known British social scientist David Held (1999: 340)

Globalisation today implies at least two distinct phenomena. First it suggests that many chains of political, economic and social activity are becoming world-wide in scope and, second, it suggests that there has been an intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states and societies.

To a certain extent then, one could even speak of *globalizations* (e.g. Berger & Huntington 2002), referring to the various dimensions of the process, most notably the economic, the cultural, and the political.

Obviously, globalization is neither neutral nor random. Not all political entities play a similar role in world politics. British youth are not copying the culture of, say, Ecuador, while Uganda is not setting the agenda for economic cooperation. According to most accounts of globalization, be they positive or negative, the whole process is dominated by the United States. Political globalization is linked to a monopolar world system under American dominance, economic globalization is believed to be ruled by US-based multinational corporations and US-controlled/dominated institutions like the World Bank, and cultural globalization has led to the dominance of 'the American way of life' of Coca Cola, McDonalds, etcetera.

Throughout the world, globalization has led to a multitude of oppositions; ranging from the Zapatista's in rural Mexico to squatters in European inner cities, from indigenous people in Asia to Islamic fundamentalists in Africa (see Starr 2000). This battle for hegemony has been captured pervasively in the title of Benjamin Barber's famous 1995 book *Jihad vs. McWorld*. Simply stated, the struggle is between an imperialist mono-cultural 'West' (*McWorld*) and a 'non-Western' fundamentalist backlash or defense (*Jihad*). But within the Western world there is opposition too. Not only from the anti-globalization 'movement,' which has organized some colorful and eventful demonstrations against meetings of 'institutions of globalization' in cities like Seattle, Prague or Gothenburg. Political parties, most notably national populist (though also green and 'radical left'), are also opposed to various aspects of globalization.

In what follows I will describe the above mentioned three forms of globalization and the main points of opposition of the national populist parties.

Economic Globalization: Opposing Neo-Liberalism and Immigration

The main aim of the process of economic globalization is the creation of a capitalist world market. Clearly, this aim and process is not new: the origins of the European Union (EU) lie in a similar idea, if somewhat less ambitious in scope. Moreover, world trade existed even before the birth of Jesus Christ. What makes the current process of economic globalization different is the level or intensity of integration and cooperation. In addition to the simple trade, international actors and states are nowadays bound by a variety of rules, and organizations that uphold those rules – such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The rise of global capitalism has led to vehement protests in the streets of cities worldwide. Obviously, many radical left organizations oppose this project as part of their anti-capitalist struggle. In electoral terms, however, these groups remain without much significance in Europe, as they are still scarred by the collapse of 'real existing socialism' in the East (see March & Mudde 2005). Rather, it is generally national populist parties that lead the struggle against economic globalization in the parliaments of Europe.

Initially, in the 1980s, most national populist parties used neo-liberal rhetoric, which has led various commentators – including leading scholars (e.g. Schain, Zolberg & Hossay 2002; Kitschelt 1995) – to mislabel them as neo-liberal or right-wing in economic terms. However, systematic analysis of the ideologies of these parties showed that their economic policy was far from (neo-) liberal. Rather, it was based on economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism: i.e. the economy should serve the nation and should be

controlled by it, while a welfare state is supported, but only for the 'own people' (Mudde 2000).

Consequently, these parties are very critical of economic globalization. First and foremost, because a global market means that foreigners could influence the national economy. István Csurka, leader of *Magyar Igazság és Élet Párt* (Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIÉP), said it short and simple: "The global market obstructs everything that is national" (in Eibicht 1997: 260). Or, in the words of the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD), "(t)he essential core feature of globalization is the destruction of national and social control mechanisms. Therewith globalization destroys the political capabilities of states (...)" (NPD 2002: 12).

Second, because the national populists consider economic globalization harmful for the national interests. For example, the British National Party (BNP) states: "Globalisation, with its export of jobs to the Third World, is bringing ruin and unemployment to British industries and the communities that depend on them" (BNP, n.d.). Also, a special place is reserved for the protection of the agricultural sector, which is considered to be 'the backbone of the nation.' In the words of the Finnish *Isänmaallinen Kansallis-Liitto* (Patriotic National Alliance, IKL): "(...) the position of agriculture and food-stuff production have to be secured in such a way that self-sufficient food supplies can be guaranteed in all circumstances in the country" (IKL, n.d.)

That said, (economic) globalization itself is not a major issue in the propaganda of most national populist parties. Indeed, some parties seem to try and accommodate it with their nationalist ideology, obviously at the cost of increased confusion. In the

election program of the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Austrian Freedom Party, FPÖ) the word 'globalization' is mentioned only once, and than mainly as a challenge to the youth. Article 2.4 of chapter 16 ("The right to an education") states:

Tougher competition, globalization and new technologies mean ever growing challenges for our youth. To master these challenges freedomite politics aims to educate young people in a modern and practical way as they are our future" (FPÖ 1997: 32).

Of the more relevant political parties, it is particularly the French FN that, in the past decade or so, has put the anti-globalization theme at the centre of its larger struggle (see most notably Simmons 2003; also Betz 2002) – a reflection of the greater importance of anti-globalization in French politics in general.² Similarly, the FN-split *Mouvement national républicain* (National Republican Movement, MNR) has devoted special studies to economic globalization, calling it "the new menace (...) which strengthens the mortal risks that threaten a large number of [our businesses]" (MNR n.d.).

Even in the French speaking part of Belgium more attention seems to be paid to globalization than in the non-French speaking world. The short program of the tiny *Front nouveau de Belgique* (New Front of Belgium, FNB), for example, explicitly mentions (economic) globalization, though in a fairly vague sense: "Globalization and collectivism are two stumbling blocks that have to be avoided" (FNB n.d.).

² One commentator even argues: "Globalization helps us understand the results of the [first round of the 2002 French presidential] election because it further reinforces something that has been going on for years: There seems to be a new cleavage emerging from the blurred lines of French politics that we could call the globalization cleavage. (...) This new split has been confirmed by the recent elections: Almost 50 percent of the entire electorate voted for overtly anti-globalization candidates, whether on the far right or the far left" (Meunier 2002).

Outside of Europe, opposition to economic globalization is more central to national populist politics. The (now defunct) Australian party *One Nation* of Pauline Hanson strongly opposed the international free market, and even argues that "Australia should seek industrial self-sufficiency."³ While for Pat Buchanan one of the main differences between Bush/Gore and himself, in the 2001 presidential election, was their support of economic globalization versus his protectionist stand. According to Buchanan, "what is failing the world is not capitalism but globalism" (Simmons 2003: 2). This is because globalization is not simply a process or policy, but one of the most evil anti-American conspiracies around. In his tellingly titled lecture "A Den of Thieves", delivered to Boston University, he said about a recent rise in gas prices in the USA:

Friends, this price explosion is not the result of the free market forces. It is the work of a global price-rigging conspiracy, by oil-exporting nations, to hold oil off the market, to force prices to the sky, to loot America. (...) Friends, this is the dark side of globalization. This is the hidden price of "interdependence" (Buchanan 2000).

In addition, various extreme right *groupuscules* oppose economic globalization. This is strongest among the various 'neo-Nazi,' 'national revolutionary,' 'national Bolshevik,' and (International) Third Position movements, which all declare themselves to be anti-capitalist (e.g. PoP 2002). The NPD, one of the least irrelevant among them, expressed its opposition in the following terms: "The NPD rejects the free-market extremism of the EU and GATT" (NPD 2002: 14)

There are two topics through which economic globalization does feature at the core of national populist campaigns (though

³ The program of One Nation can be found in various parts in the forums of its website <<http://www.onenation.net.au>>. This particular quote is taken from the sub-section at <<http://forums.onenation.net.au/index.php?act=ST&f=6&t=131&s=7345bacc615fe7d9071eac7e5e333f06>>.

often implicitly): immigration and the EU. Particularly since the 1980s immigration has become a major issue in European politics and a key issue for national populists (e.g. Betz 1994; Von Beyme 1988). While their xenophobic language directs much of their hatred at the immigrants themselves, most parties agree that mass immigration is a consequence of economic globalization.

Some parties even go so far as to see the immigrants as victims of international capitalism (without truly feeling or expressing solidarity or compassion). This is particularly strong among parties with an anti-capitalist tradition, such as the former *Movimento sociale italiano* (Italian Social Movement, MSI) and, to a lesser extent, its successor, the *Alleanza nazionale* (National Alliance, AN) (e.g. Ter Wal 2000). Some national populist groups are even calling the mass immigration (of guest workers) to Western Europe a form of 'modern slavery' (see Mudde 2000).

For most Europeans, including those in the member states, the European Union was a non-issue for decades. This only changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and, even more importantly, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. While various national populist parties had been moderately pro-European integration and the European Communities in the first years of their existence, such as the German *Republikaner* (Republicans, REP) or the Dutch *Centrumpartij* (Centre Party, CP), this changed radically in the 1990s (see Mudde 2000). Confronted by an "ever closer union" (Dinan 1994), national populists started to see the EU as a major threat to the sovereignty of their nation.

To be sure, *economic* integration was generally a minor concern, although the introduction of the Euro led to some of the most radical anti-European campaigns within the EU. These were

not always dominated by national populist parties, however; for example, in Britain the Conservative Party's "Keep the Pound" campaign completely overshadowed the similar "Keep our Pound" campaign of the national populist BNP.⁴ A similar fate befell the NPD's "*Retter die DM*" (Save the Deutsch Mark) campaign.

Cultural Globalization: Resisting Americanization

In part because of economic globalization, in part because of technological innovation (e.g. satellite, Internet), cultures have become more and more interconnected and open to foreign influences. Whether one watches the Flemish television channel *VT4* or the Czech channel *Nova*, foreign series and movies fill a large part of the programs of television channels in much of Europe.

Nowadays, most television programs are made with the aim of selling them in various countries; this ranges from programs like *Big Brother* or *The Weakest Link*, which have local versions in various countries (respectively 20 and 14), to the series *Baywatch*, which was/is aired (either dubbed or subtitled) in no less than 140 countries with a combined potential audience of about one billion viewers! Similarly, Japanese and British designers are a hit on the catwalks of Paris and Milan, while various Internet-only radio channels play music to audiences around the globe. My own most remarkable experience with cultural globalization was when I was kept awake one night in a hotel in Erdenet, a small city in the north of Mongolia, by the music of the 1980s German pop-duo *Modern Talking*.

⁴ More recently, the single-issue U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) has stolen the thunder of anti-EU sentiments in the United Kingdom, more specifically in England, polling a staggering 16.1 per cent (and 12 seats) in the 2004 European elections.

Within this new 'global village,' American culture is clearly dominant. Trends that spring up in the cities of the United States develop with ever decreasing time delay in the cities (and even rural areas) of Europe, Latin America, or Asia. This does not only apply only to the entertainment industry, but also to the media (see the recent rise in 24-hour news television channels throughout the world), and even eating patterns. For many the hamburger fast-food chain McDonalds epitomizes as much cultural as economic globalization (e.g. Ritzer 2004; Smart 1999).

Not surprisingly then, that in European countries with traditionally strong anti-American sentiments, such as France or Greece, the struggle against 'American cultural imperialism' is particularly strong (e.g. Fabrini 2001). Again, the national populists are certainly not the only opponents, and not always the most relevant; for example, in Greece anti-Americanism is traditionally strong in the extreme left *Kommounistiko Komma Ellados* (Communist Party of Greece, KKE); one of the few unreformed communist parties in Europe that still has parliamentary representation.

In most European countries, however, national populist groups are at the fore of the fight against cultural globalization. Most notably, because they believe that globalization leads to the homogenization of culture(s) around the world. They fear that the 'ancient' European cultures will fall victim to 'Americanization' or, in the words of parties like the VB and FN, "Cocacolonization", and that there will be no cultural differences left. The Italian *Lega Nord* (Northern League, LN), for example, believes that globalization (*mondialismo*) is a plot to construct an "anglophone and totalitarian Global Village on the ruins of the peoples" (in Betz 2002).

Some groups are clearly inspired by the ideology of 'ethnopluralism' as developed by the intellectual *nouvelle droite* movement of Alain de Benoist. They argue that they are the true defenders of multiculturalism. The French neo-fascist groupuscule *Group d'Union et de Défense* (Unity and Defense Group, GUD), for example, argues: "One-worldism is thus essentially the enemy of multiculturalism in the sense that it treats the world as a single human community, while true multiculturalism stems from the existence and celebration of different human communities" (in Griffin 1999).

In addition, 'one-worldism' does not only lead to cultural homogenization, it also creates the *wrong* culture! The (now banned) Dutch *Centrumpartij'86* (Centre Party'86, CP'86) used to describe this new, Americanized culture as materialist and hedonist, full of "consumer slaves who are devoid of culture" (*Centrumnieuws*, Vol.2, 1992). Other parties also show anti-materialist sentiments in their rejection of American(ized) culture; an important ideological feature among the right-wing extremists of the pre-war times (see Fennema 1996). For example, LN leader Umberto Bossi considers Americans to be "superficial" and "men [*sic!*] who only value money" (in Betz 2002).

In addition to moral concerns, various parties fear the increasing use of English terminology, particularly among youngsters. The *Deutsche Volksunion* (German People's Union, DVU), for example, wants to counter "the mass copying of foreign words" by introducing a state protection system modeled on that of the *Académie française* (DVU n.d.). In Flanders, the Dutch speaking part of Belgium, language issues have traditionally been at the heart of the concerns of Flemish nationalists. While the initial enemy was the French language, in recent times the continuing spread of

English is considered at least as threatening. Militants of the VB and other groups, notably the *Taal Aktie Komitee* (Language Action Committee, TAK), have been active with spraying the text "*Nederlands*" (Dutch) over billboards with English language advertisements throughout Flanders.

Political Globalization: Fighting the NWO

The process of globalization that has given rise to the most extreme reactions is the political, which has led to a variety of bizarre conspiracy theories centered on the 'New World Order' (NWO). National populists around the globe fear the ever growing international political cooperation between states, in particular the growing involvement of the United Nations (UN).

Undoubtedly, the UN has become more active since the end of the Cold War, which had often crippled the decision-making in the Security Council. In the 1990s the UN was involved in peace operations in fourteen different countries, ranging from Haiti to Tajikistan. Although the number of peacekeepers actually decreased sharply during that period (CLW 1999), operations like those in Iraq⁵ and Kosovo showed an increasingly pro-active course of the UN, even infringing on the sovereignty of established states.

Within Europe, the development of the European Union has been the clearest example of supranational political cooperation. Indeed, Jean-Marie Le Pen has described the EU as a "link to one-worldness" (1992: 206). Particularly since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has become more and more (seen as) a political, rather than merely an economic project. Whereas many

⁵ Obviously, I refer here to the first military campaign against Iraq (1990-91), following that country's invasion of Kuwait. The more recent second campaign showed instead a weakening of the importance of the UN, which might turn out to be structural rather than temporal.

national populists used to mock the EU for its incompetence and preoccupation with details (for example, determining the correct shape of a banana) in the 1980s, since the 1990s the organization has become associated with attempts to design common policies on such far-reaching issues as border patrols and immigration. In short, the EU has become a serious player in European politics, much to the dismay of the national populists.

Most national populist parties are not against European cooperation *per se*, they are against the form of cooperation that the EU stands for. Or, as the slogan goes: "Europe, Yes – EU, No!" Speaking for many, the Danish *Fremskridtspartiet* (Progress Party, FRP) believes that with the Maastricht Treaty, "the E.U. has taken a significant step further towards becoming an intrusive supranational body inspired in many fields by command economics, mercantilism, and socialdemocrat doctrines" (FRP 1998). The German REP, originally a pro-EC party, even described the Maastricht Treaty as "Versailles without weapons," indicating that the treaty signified another capitulation of Germany (*Der Republikaner*, Sonderausgabe I, 1989). In a similarly bizarre twist, Bruno Mégret, leader of the MNR, called the EU "the Trojan Horse of the Americans" (in Bastow 2000: 8).

Instead of the current EU, the national populists do want European cooperation, but without the loss of sovereignty, and limited only to the economy and (if necessary) defense. This is particularly to make Europe less dependent on the US, if not to make it an outright counterforce to the US, and to fight perceived international threats (most notably Islamic fundamentalism). The shape of this new Europe leads to a variety of different terms and visions, in part expressing the various underlying forms of

nationalism (e.g. Fennema and Pollmann 1998; Hafeneger 1994; for a more historical overview, see Griffin 1994).

Some of the national populist parties speak of a 'Europe of Regions,' though most prefer a 'Europe of Nations' or *Europa der Völker*. This model would unite the nations or 'ethnic communities' of Europe, rather than simply the existing states, and fits the ideology of parties like the VB. Other parties, most notably the French parties FN and MNR, prefer Charles De Gaulle's *Europe des Patries* (Europe of Fatherlands) model, which is based on the existing 'nation-states.'⁶

Virtually all national populists agree, however, that the current EU is both too extensive (in competencies) and too limited (in territory). Most parties argue that 'Europe' should include all the 'Christian nations' of Eastern Europe, while there is some disagreement about the inclusion of the Orthodox countries, most notably Russia. On the exclusion of Turkey, then again, is full consensus. The MNR even campaigns with a special pamphlet "Europe, Yes – Turkey, No!," and calls for a "European Europe."

The NWO and the UN seem to be a preoccupation mainly of the national populists in the USA. An alliance ranging from the militias to the Christian Right, and from the right-wing of the Republican Party to the neo-Nazis, believes in a multitude of interlinked conspiracy theories of black helicopters, secret concentration camps, and world domination (e.g. Tuominen 2002; Herman 2001; Rupert 2000). The European populists tend to be

⁶ In practice the distinctions are not set in stone and the various terms are often used interchangeably; for example, the Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN) in the European Parliament includes ethnic nationalists like the *Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish People's Party, DFP), state nationalists like the *Alleanza nazionale* (National Alliance, AN), and even non-nationalists like the Portuguese *CDS-Partido Popular* (CDS-Popular Party).

less paranoid, though also overall negative towards the increased activity of the UN and the idea of the NWO (which gained prominence mainly after a speech of former US President George Bush in 1991).

Still, conspiracy theories can be found in the propaganda of some groups. The tiny *England First* organization, linked to the infamous International Third Position (ITP) movement, holds a position on "internationalism" which is almost identical to that of many of its American brethren:

We are opposed to all ventures, such as the EU, NATO and the UN, which seek to make England an impoverished province in the New World Order. We also oppose Big Business, Freemasonry and other NOW vested interests (EF n.d.).

Among national populist political parties, the CP'86 believed that all major international organizations (like the UN, IMF, Council of Churches, etc.) "are manipulated also by the American CFR (Council for Foreign Relations) which wants to bring about a one-world government" (*Voor een veilig en leefbaar Nederland!* 1990: 29.2). For other parties, such as the DVU or MIÉP, political globalization and the NWO are simply the newest actors in an age-old Jewish conspiracy (e.g. Bock 2002; Mudde 2000).

Conclusion

Though the national populist parties are electorally the most successful opponents of globalization, at least in Europe, they are normally not associated with the anti-globalization 'movement.' There are two reasons for this: first, the anti-globalization movement that has made the headlines in the media in recent years generally considers itself as 'left-wing' or 'progressive,' and significant elements within it, most notably the anarchist 'Black Block,' are even explicitly 'anti-fascist'. Therefore, even if national

populists (or other nativists) would like to join in, there is a fair chance that this would lead to a hostile reception of the (other) *anti-globs*.⁷ This was felt, for example, by Czech skinheads who tried to join the anti-globalization demonstrations in Prague in September 2000, but where instead chased through the city by (mainly German) anti-fascists.

The second reason is that for most national populists (anti-) globalization is not (yet) a central issue in their ideology and propaganda. The term itself is scantily used in the party programs, and not much more in the internal party papers. While issues like mass migration and the decreasing sovereignty of their nation are at the core of these parties' propaganda, they are seldom linked to the process of globalization.

This might be a conscious decision. After all, globalization has something deterministic about it; 'globalization can't be stopped, so we simply have to make the most of it!' National populists reject this (economic) determinism, and instead propagate the return of the primacy of the political. By largely ignoring (if not denying) globalization, they do not have to address the issue whether mass immigration and loss of sovereignty *can be* countered in the era of globalization. In a sense, their whole world vision – seen in its European version through the model of the 'Europe of Nations' – clearly defies the inevitability of globalization.

But will the national populist parties continue to profit from the consequences of globalization? It is clear that they won't be able

⁷ Recently, however, Flemish nationalists of the *Comité Nationalisten tegen Globalisatie* (Committee Nationalists against Globalization) have joined larger anti-globalization demonstrations without major problems. Moreover, there have also been voices within the anti-globalization movement that call for a rapprochement with the nationalists (e.g. Starr 2000). For a more traditional, hostile view, see Hari (2003).

to stop globalization – indeed, it is doubtful whether there has been a period without globalization in the past two thousand years (e.g. Keohane & Nye Jr. 2000). However, this is mainly relevant for the few national populists that are in government. Those kept in permanent opposition, often because of a so-called *cordon sanitaire*, most notably the FN and VB, can continue claiming that they could solve it, if only given the chance.

More important is what the other political parties will do, i.e. the centre-right and the centre-left. Currently most European centre parties are either explicitly pro-globalization, or they see the process as inevitable and unstoppable. Particularly among the more conservative (including some Christian democrats) and the more socialist parties one would expect an increasing unease with the consequences of globalization, both national and global. In time, they could steal some of the thunder of the national populists.

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