



**CERC WORKING
PAPERS SERIES**

No. 2 / 2006

Michael Kelly

**THE ITALIAN
RESISTANCE IN
PIEDMONT:**

The Myth of Unity

CERC WORKING PAPERS SERIES INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Philomena Murray (CERC Director)
Leslie Holmes (CERC Deputy Director)
Peter Shearman (CERC Principal Fellow) (**Editors**)

Wladimir Andreff (University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)
Michael Bradshaw (University of Leicester / University of Birmingham)
Renaud Dehousse (Institute of Political Science, Paris / European University Institute, Florence)
Maurizio Ferrera (University of Pavia / Università Bocconi)
Stephen Fortescue (University of New South Wales)
Graeme Gill (University of Sydney)
Paul Hainsworth (University of Ulster)
Simon Hix (London School of Economics)
Robert Horvath (University of Melbourne)
Elizabeth Meehan (Queen's University of Belfast)
Andrew Moravcsik (Harvard University)
Kirill Nourzhanov (Australian National University)
Marko Pavlyshyn (Monash University)
William Tompson (University of London)
J. H. H. Weiler (New York University)
Stephen Wheatcroft (University of Melbourne)

The Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) was established in 1997 as an interdisciplinary centre located within the University of Melbourne's Faculty of Arts. The Centre draws upon a broad pool of expertise from the University of Melbourne and beyond, bringing together specialists on all aspects of contemporary Europe, east, central and west. The Centre produces and coordinates quality academic and applied research, with a particular focus on interdisciplinary, comparative and transnational projects.


The CERC Working Papers Series is peer-reviewed.

Copyright © 2006 by the Contemporary Europe Research Centre


All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission from the Contemporary Europe Research Centre, Level 2, 234 Queensberry Street, The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia.

ISSN 1447-0071

Published by the Contemporary Europe Research Centre in August 2006



Map 1: Italy and Piedmont



Map 2: Piedmont

Introduction

In September 1943, following the collapse of the Italian army and state and the German intervention in Italy, bands of Italian partisans began to form in opposition to the Fascist and German forces. Thus began a war of national liberation between the Resistance and Axis forces which would culminate in spring 1945 with the defeat of Fascism and the death of Mussolini. From the beginning of the war of liberation, patriots from the northwestern region of Piedmont played a prominent role in the leadership of the Resistance: figures such as Ducio Galimberti, Dante Livio Bianco, Vincenzo 'Cino' Moscatelli and Pompeo Colajanni (better known as 'Barbato') would take on legendary status as leaders of the movement.¹ Rank and file patriots were also prominent in Piedmont. By 15 September 1943, that is, only one week after the collapse of the Italian army, there were already approximately 2,000 partisans in the hills surrounding the Piedmontese town of Boves, alone. This was the nucleus of what would later become known as the *Autonomi*—the politically independent partisans.² By the end of the year (1943), there were an estimated 9,000 partisans active throughout the entire territory of Italy.³ Thus a mere week after the Armistice, Piedmontese partisans already numbered almost a quarter of all combatants in Italy for the entire year of 1943. This trend continued and by the summer of 1944 of the 82,000 partisans

in Italy, 25,000 were active in Piedmont.⁴ While it is true that political control of the northern Resistance was located in Milan under the auspices of the Committee of National Liberation for Upper Italy (CLNAI), it was in Piedmont that the greatest number of partisans was active and where support for the Resistance was most widespread.

The following paper analyses one aspect of the Piedmontese Resistance: the unity of the movement. Much of the material was drawn from a series of interviews conducted with former Piedmontese partisans in the small and not so small population centres of Piedmont. Forty-five men and women were interviewed between November 2000 and February 2002, and sixteen of these interviews have been utilised in this paper. The interviewees were contacted through the auspices of the Piedmontese regional offices of ANPI (the National Italian Partisan Association) and with the assistance of the *Istituto Piemontese per la Storia della Resistenza e della Società Contemporanea*. Both bodies provided contact information for potential interviewees but all were contacted independently by the interviewer. With the exception of a few outstanding individuals who had military or political command, the majority of testimony comes from ordinary partisans. The various brigades of *Garibaldi*, *Matteotti*, *Giustizia e Libertà* and *Autonomi* as well as political representatives of the Action Party (PdA) and the

Liberal Party (PLI) are represented in the interviews. While not all participants are of Piedmontese origin (although the vast majority in fact is) all participated in the Resistance in the region of Piedmont.

On 31 August 1944 the Resistance commander Angelo Prete (aka 'Devic') arrived at the Cortemilia bridge in the province of Cuneo, northwestern Italy. He had come to arrest, try and most likely execute Giovanni Abbindi (aka 'Biondino'). Prete confronted Abbindi face to face and asked for his weapon. Instead, unexpectedly Abbindi opened fire, killing Prete on the spot.⁵ All in all this seemed a commonplace event in the murderous partisan war which raged throughout the northern region of Piedmont in the summer of 1944. But Abbindi was no Fascist. He was instead a detachment commander of the 16th *Garibaldi* Brigade and Prete was his Brigade commander. Following the shooting, Abbindi led the 200 men of his detachment over to the Autonomous forces of Major Enrico Martini (aka 'Mauri').⁶ In an epilogue to this brutal incident, after recovering Prete's body, the *Garibaldini* of Onorino Nosenghi (aka 'Folgore') captured the squad of the *Autonomo* 'Speranza,' believing them to have played a part in the death of Prete. Their capture was not easy and was achieved only after throwing hand grenades at them. They were later released after negotiations with the *Garibaldi* commander Giovanni Latilla (aka 'Nanni'). Abbindi, instead, was never found. It was believed he had been captured and

executed by the Germans.⁷ This episode was, surprisingly, not unique. On many occasions throughout the partisan war individuals and groups from rival formations used the threat of violence and at times—such as in the case of Prete and Abbindi—actual violence against one another. This contradicted one of the great myths of the Resistance: the myth of 'unity.'

On many occasions the Resistance forces attempted to emphasise the case for 'unity.' On 8 November 1944, for example, Headquarters of the Committee of National Liberation for Upper Italy (CLNAI/CVL) sent a letter to all partisan formations concerning the functions of the political commissar. The letter explained the importance of political discussion within the formations. It was stressed that politics did not divide the Italian people, but instead political discussion taught unity against the enemy. This unity was the policy of the Committee of National Liberation (CLN).⁸ Similarly, in a circular from the V Justice and Liberty (GL) formation Headquarters, it was stressed that although GL was an Action Party (PdA) initiative, those who fought were not bound to any particular party. They were bound instead to the CLN.⁹ The message in these, and hundreds of other letters, circulars and orders was that above all, the forces of the CLN were unified. In essence, the CLN itself was the representation of national unity. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) stated explicitly that this was the case. In theme two of

material for the Communist *Scuole Provinciali*, entitled 'The Policy of National Unity of the PCI,' Party Secretary Palmiro Togliatti himself affirmed that '[u]nity is cemented and reinforced in the CLNs and in the partisan movement.'¹⁰ In a military sense unity was reinforced first in Piedmont in early October 1943 with the creation of the unified Piedmontese Regional Military Command (CMRP),¹¹ which from November was under the command of General Raffaello Operti.¹² Then in June 1944 the Supreme Military Command of the Corps of Freedom Volunteers (CG/CVL) was created, which unified all partisan formations in Italy.¹³ Under the aegis of the CG/CVL, military unity would be established and developed. Military unity was completed the following year when on 29 March the CLNAI transformed the partisan formations into regular military units, thereby dissolving the General HQs of the individual formations and placing them under one unified command.¹⁴

The Historiographical Debate

This ideal of the unity of the movement would become one of the most impervious myths of the Resistance. This was particularly true among Marxist historians. These historians have stressed the fact that the Resistance embraced all factions of the anti-Fascist spectrum. While the Communists dominated the Resistance as the natural leaders of anti-Fascism, all other parties of the CLN

demonstrated a sense of unified purpose of action and objectives. From a Marxist perspective, it was not until the onset of the Cold War that this war-time unity was destroyed. Historians such as Roberto Battaglia, for example, were convinced of the veracity of unity. Battaglia claimed that when the CLNAI declared itself the rightful provisional government of northern Italy in January 1944, it affirmed the pact of mutual support and democratic unity between the five CLN parties.¹⁵ Even the most difficult of partisan relations—that between the political brigades and the nominally apolitical Autonomous brigades—was governed by the concept of unity. Battaglia claimed that the strength of the identification of the partisans with the ideals of the Resistance could be seen in the pact between the GL brigades of Cuneo and the *Autonomi* of the Langhe and Monregalese of 7 August 1944.¹⁶ According to this pact the ultimate objective of the partisan army was 'the radical reconstruction of the political, moral and social life of our country...we are fighting for democracy, freedom in the fullest sense of the word, justice and the dignity and respect that are due to man.'¹⁷ Battaglia pointed out that the *Autonomi* were reactionary and loyalist (in the sense of loyalty to the monarchy and Prime Minister Badoglio), yet had signed this pact, proof of the desire for, and reality of, unity within the Resistance.¹⁸

Other Marxist historians concurred. Giuliano Procacci, too, was convinced that the unity of the Resistance was paramount until it was swept away by the Cold War¹⁹ and in his chapters concerning the Resistance and the period of post-war reconstruction Paul Ginsborg highlighted the sense of unity of action of the various anti-Fascist parties. While highlighting Communist leadership, Ginsborg conceded that the early partisan bands were very mixed, with some members fighting for ideological reasons, others to escape the call-up of the Republic of Salò, some ex-POWs and radical middle-class youths and workers escaping persecution.²⁰ In Ginsborg's opinion, the PCI's commitment to unity also strengthened the Resistance and placed the party at the centre of national politics.²¹ In the 1990s Claudio Pavone reiterated the Marxist account of the Resistance in a book which would become the most influential of the decade. Pavone not only stressed unity of action, but even unity of political inspiration. According to Pavone, all the forces of the Resistance took the traditions of the *Risorgimento* as their inspiration for the sense of a 'new' nation. They often saw the partisan movement as a 'second *Risorgimento*,' although each political faction within the Resistance used the Risorgimental stereotypes (Monarchists, *Garibaldini*, Mazzinians, as well as others) to support their particular ideological position. The Risorgimental motif also gave a sense of unity to the otherwise divergent elements within the anti-Fascist forces.²²

The concept of unity was not, however, the exclusive domain of left-wing historians. Even liberal moderates, such as the historian Martin Clark, concurred on the unity of the Resistance. Clark claimed that while the central CLN represented no popular mandate, it did represent an idea of 'national unity founded on anti-Fascism' and the Resistance as a whole achieved a new national unity based on anti-Fascist terms.²³

Not all historians agreed, however. Within Italy, the most outspoken critic of the case for unity was Renzo De Felice. In De Felice's opinion, the Resistance was far from unified and its activities were better defined as a 'civil war' rather than a war of national liberation and unification. Following this civil war the anti-Fascists, led by the Communists, had destroyed Italian national identity by disseminating an anti-history of falsity and myth, thus preventing Italy's spiritual reconstruction.²⁴ Further to the right, the theorist Adriano Romualdi also attacked the unity of the Resistance. In his posthumous book, *Il fascismo come fenomeno europeo*, Romualdi judged the Resistance as little more than a fabricated 'myth' constructed by Communists and backed by a timid, fearful bourgeoisie. He insisted that the partisan war was in reality predominantly a Communist war, with Stalinist methods and aims.

In the words of Romualdi, the bourgeoisie 'thus gave a badge of heroism to the Communist killers.'²⁵

Roger Absalom was among the first of the Anglo-Saxon scholars to question the unity of the Resistance movement. He claimed that most Italians did not want to join the armed struggle, nor participate in political upheavals, but preferred simply an end to trouble.²⁶ In contrast to the conventional Marxist historical interpretation, Absalom believed that the mass of the population supported the liberation movement only in the sense that to survive was itself to resist.²⁷ In Absalom's view, the political failure of the Resistance was caused by several factors. He particularly stressed the existence of major divisions and tensions within the Resistance movement itself.²⁸ The Resistance was profoundly divided ideologically, and this led to a fatal disunity of the innovative forces which hoped to reshape Italy's social and political order in the post-war period.²⁹

Within the historiographical strand which specifically dealt with the Piedmontese Resistance experience, however, there was little critique of the notion of unity. The post-war Partisan Association's, *25 aprile: la Resistenza in Piemonte*, formed the model for future regional publications.³⁰ The *25 aprile* consisted of a collection of accounts from prominent figures in the Piedmontese

Resistance. They praised the merits of the heroic partisans and founded the concept of the Resistance as a collective movement incorporating all the people of Piedmont.³¹ The initial popular assistance given to the partisans was based on human charity and pity, but soon the necessity to form a common front against 'Nazi-Fascism' under the guidance of the 'political' anti-Fascists would politicise the movement.³² A distinct sense of self-sacrifice permeated many of the accounts, noting the 'contribution in blood' towards liberation,³³ as well as identifying the transforming, historic mission of the movement in re-establishing liberty to Italy and Italians.³⁴ The concept of unity, which other, non-Marxist historians would later regard as mere myth, was woven around the two strands of the Resistance: those who saw the struggle as a duty of Italians to fight alongside the United Nations and those who saw it as a 'continuation, a new phase of the old struggle against tyranny.'³⁵ In 1946 the ex-partisan, Dante Livio Bianco, for example, released *Venti mesi di guerra partigiana nel Cuneese*. Bianco had been regional commander of all GL forces in Piedmont and a member of the CMRP (the Piedmontese Regional Military HQ) and saw things much as had other veterans of the Resistance. Bianco emphasised the popular nature of the movement in the Cuneese. As Bianco eulogised:

In these operations in Valle Gesso, once again the profound fraternity between partisans and the population is manifested in moving episodes: among these, young girls and women carry bombs on their shoulders to the mortar positions, they replace partisans at the telephone and other services, while the valley's men, even the aged, rush to join in the fighting.³⁶

Thus, the partisan war was transformed into a people's war, in which the Piedmontese played a heroic, patriotic role.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s ex-partisans and left-wing historians (some, such as Mario Giovana, were both) continued to publish sympathetic accounts of the Resistance experience in Piedmont.³⁷ These histories continued to underline the heroism of the partisans and their links with the local population. Mario Giovana emphasised the heroism and stoicism of the partisans of the GL group *Italia Libera*. During the *rastrellamento* (military comb-out) of March 1944 in Valle Maira Giovana claimed that their spirit was such that they emerged from the devastating combat reinvigorated rather than broken.³⁸ Of equal importance was the support of the peasantry. In Valle Maira between 25 and 30 August 1944 Giovana reported how local villagers fought with the partisans. The peasants were heroic figures who fought without fear, even toasting one another's prowess with the local wine while under constant enemy fire.³⁹ In a similar vein, Nuto Revelli, a GL partisan

and commander of the fifth zone of Piedmont during the insurrection, wrote of incidents such as the German *rastrellamento* of 17 August 1944 at Pianche in Valle Stura. According to Revelli, the youths of the town fought side by side with the partisans of the 'Rosselli' brigade as a sign of solidarity.⁴⁰ Giampaolo Pansa, in his book *Guerra partigiana tra Genova e il Po*, also supported the concept of local Piedmontese unity and support, suggesting that there was a worker-peasant nexus in the Resistance. In the Basso Monferrato, for example, he claimed that the majority of partisans were of peasant origin and worked against the Nazi and Fascist interests in the agricultural sector.⁴¹ In works such as these, the national, patriotic, popular character of the Resistance was continually emphasised.

Only one voice seemed to recount a more critical interpretation and even this was only mildly unfavourable. Raffaele Cadorna, who had been the military commander of the CVL, raised some concern over the political implications of the Resistance in his 1948 publication *La riscossa*. Cadorna claimed that during the partisan war the Communists and Actionists wanted a unification of partisan formations which would not only guarantee national liberation, but would also politicise all components of the Resistance and would absorb even those groups not yet politically aligned.⁴²

Cadorna, the military choice of the government in Rome and the Allies, saw dangers in this eventuality.

Nevertheless, the historiography of the Resistance, both as a national and regional phenomenon, overwhelmingly endorsed the concept of the unity of the Resistance forces. As the Prete case demonstrates, however, the myth of the unity of the Resistance movement does not stand up well to historical scrutiny. Instead, the expressions 'division' or 'disunity' might better represent the reality of the Resistance: for tensions and fractures permeated the Resistance at almost all levels. Tension existed within individual brigades and between different formations. There were political conflicts at the formation level, within the various parties of the local and regional CLNs and even at the national level between the CLN of Rome, the CLNAI and the Piedmont CLN (CLNRP). Formations squabbled over supplies, jurisdictional control and political influence, while the parties of the various CLNs fought internecine battles for control of the positions of power. They were united only in their desire to defeat the Germans and Fascists and to implement a generic democracy, whose exact nature was unclear. In order to achieve these common goals the various parties were prepared to accept an operational unity, but little else. As Paul Ginsborg pointed out, while the parties were divided ideologically, they maintained a 'precarious unity of action.'⁴³ In the post-war

period this would result in a movement racked by internal division and dissent. ANPI—the post-war partisan association—would suffer from the discord among the various formations and would eventually fragment into a series of formation-based representative bodies. The single, unified partisan voice which ANPI embodied would be lost after July 1948.

Political Divisions in Piedmont

Clearly many of the problems which the various formations faced were predicated on the political nature of the formations themselves. Their links to the political parties of the CLN, in conjunction with a natural development of an *esprit de corps* within the various formations, exacerbated tensions. The political disputes developed primarily among the leadership groups within the formations, as they did not share the apolitical nature of the ordinary partisans. Giovanni Gerbi of the 101st detachment of the IX *Garibaldi* Division explicitly stated that the tense relations between formations developed '[n]ot at the personal level, but at the level of the commanders.'⁴⁴ The tension was linked directly to party affiliations. The Communist-organised *Garibaldi* Brigades, Action Party GL Brigades (Justice and Liberty), Socialist-coordinated *Matteotti* Brigades and the so-called 'apolitical' brigades of the *Autonomi*—although frequently monarchist and linked to the Italian

Liberal Party—all developed rivalries with, and at times outright hostility towards, one another. Yet according to Renato Testori it had not always been so. Testori had been an officer in the Italian IV Army and was barracked in Cuneo on 8 September 1943. He left for the mountains with a group of other junior officers where he was given responsibility for liaison between the partisan forces of the mountains and the plain. He worked in collaboration with many formations, particularly with the *Giellisti* (as members of GL were known). He fought with Vian at Boves and with Captain Cosa's formation in Valle Pesio, as well as liaising with the CLN and the CMRP in Turin. Then, in the final phase of his activities he collaborated with the Autonomous formations of 'Mauri' in the Langhe. For his efforts he was decorated with the military Bronze Medal. He was therefore in a position to understand both the evolution of the partisan forces in Piedmont and the nature of political tensions which emerged. As Testori recalled:

At first there weren't any political formations. It began as an 'unorganised' movement. There were either ex-soldiers who had sworn allegiance to the homeland...to Badoglio and the King, or civilians who were anti-Fascist. It was a spontaneous movement. In my opinion it was the best period of the partisan history because, I repeat, I collaborated with GL, the PdA, who were of liberal origins, but without [my] thinking [along political lines]—look, it was a movement of resistance. The early movement was also a little militaristic and poorly organised...Then, other formations began to organise: 'party' formations, the *Garibaldini*, Vian at Boves, Captain Cosa

in Valle Pesio, 'Mauri.' They intended fighting the Fascists and Germans. Then instead, in my opinion, first the *Garibaldini* were formed, and then fatally there developed competition and there were some disloyal episodes. Not clashes between formations. Then the province of Cuneo was divided in three zones...as to jurisdiction, one went to the *Garibaldini*, another to—there were attempts at unification. Some operations were carried out collaboratively, in truth. But as to 'Mauri,' for example, in the Langhe, when he became great—his zone went practically from Liguria to Bra—the other formations decided to send groups—the *Garibaldini* sent one, the Action Party sent another—in order to have a presence in the Langhe—which was predominantly a political presence. It was an affirmation that they too were present. Then there were the *Matteotti* brigades, the Socialists...so in my opinion the initial movement was perverted.⁴⁵

This 'perversion,' as Testori called it, led to politically inspired tension, which at times verged on outright hostility. It was not simply restricted to conflict between formations of the left (the *Garibaldini*, GL and *Matteotti* brigades) and the *Autonomi*—although this was notable—but pervaded the relations between all formations.

The first of these difficulties was between the *Garibaldini* and the GL formations. Incidents were often provoked by an underlying ideological breach between the leadership cadre of the two groups and disputes over regional jurisdiction in their zones of operation.

On Saturday 17 March 1945, for example, near Dusino, a small town between Turin and Asti, partisans belonging to the detachment 'Angelo' of the 4th *Garibaldi* Brigade stopped a van belonging to a Mr Chiampo of Castelnuovo. When he exhibited the safe-conduct pass that he had received from the IX GL Division HQ, the partisans began insulting the GL formations. They claimed that GL was composed of 'lords and masters' and that the formation's goal was to protect the privileged: those the *Garibaldini* termed 'lords.' They claimed not to recognise passes issued by the GL and eventually confiscated the vehicle without issuing a requisition receipt or giving their brigade identity. The following day, after the intervention of the 4th *Garibaldi* Brigade HQ, the vehicle was returned. In a letter of protest from the commander of the IX GL Division it was noted:

There remains, however, the villainous behaviour of elements who, with their actions, have displayed that they are not worthy of serving in the partisan ranks...There are continuous complaints from the commander of the 'Tamietti' Brigade concerning the behaviour of Commander 'Angelo' and his men.⁴⁶

In ominous tones the letter requested the intervention of the commander of the 4th *Garibaldi* Brigade before these problems led to 'unpleasant, unedifying clashes between partisan formations.'⁴⁷ These problems were not limited to the Astigiano. There were also

difficulties between GL and *Garibaldini* to the west of Cuneo. Leo Scamuzzi, political commissar of the II GL Alpine Division, reported political problems with the *Garibaldini* in the Maira and Varaita Valleys. He wrote:

I find myself involved in a continuous, exhausting guerrilla war against the political commissars of the *Garibaldi* formations who, after having completely emptied the Valle del Po, send their best political elements to this sector in order to ward off the danger represented in the Varaita by our formations. So far I have been able to improve notably the relations between our formations and the *Garibaldini*, at least from a superficial, visible point of view. The risk of the worst happening [firefights] has been avoided and the valley inhabitants see us as clearly superior to our neighbours, but I have to deal with elements like 'Ezio,' 'Dario,' 'Franco' and 'Vanni' as political commissars and with 'Zama' as military commander, whom you know well, because they left our formations in bad faith in Val Pellice and now they have it in for me.⁴⁸

The problem of the transfer of partisan elements from one formation to another, as mentioned by Scamuzzi, as well as the poaching of partisans, was endemic in the early stages of the partisan war and naturally caused great tension between rival formations. Arturo Colombi (aka 'Alfredo'), the PCI representative for Piedmont, reported one such incident in the Val di Viù. The detachment commanders of the *Garibaldi* 'Giambone' Brigade had asked to transform the brigade into a GL formation following the

dismissal of their commander 'Rolandino' after *Garibaldi* Divisional HQ had learnt that he had established a ceasefire with the enemy. Colombi called this 'a rather serious political failure for us' but more ominously he claimed that '[t]he GL had probably been secretly working at this for some time.'⁴⁹ Whether this was in fact the case is less relevant than the suspicion with which the Communists regarded the GL of the Action Party. While both formations were ostensibly coordinating efforts to fight the common enemy, it is evident that there was a great deal of mistrust between the two groups.

Tensions, however, were not isolated to the relations between the *Garibaldini* and the *Giellisti*. The *Garibaldi* Brigades also had problems with the Socialist *Matteotti* formations, although it would appear not to the same level as with the GL. Federico Gèrello was a *Garibaldino* in the zone near Saluzzo when the 13th *Matteotti* Brigade formed in the town of Manta. Apparently there were minor political differences between the two brigades:

The *Matteotti* were Socialists. Here there was a little resentment at that time but it's not like anything happened...There were also many men from the Langhe who came here to organise themselves...however, there was something [tension] but we didn't have any major disagreements.⁵⁰

The most contentious issue, however, concerned the political tension and lack of unity between the Autonomous brigades and all other formations. These relations were perhaps the most difficult and damaging of the partisan war. Ostensibly the *Autonomi* were apolitical, but many partisans from both outside and within these formations disagreed. Mario Giovana of the II GL Alpine Division in Valle Varaita, for example, claimed the *Mauri* in the Langhe 'were monarchical, with a majority of monarchical officers and [thus] the *Garibaldini* had very difficult relations with them.'⁵¹ Eugenio Banfo, a Piedmontese who actually fought in Emilia, was himself with the Autonomous brigade the 'Cento Croci.' Of his own brigade he stated that '[i]t wasn't linked to any party'⁵² but more critically he claimed:

that instead, in other zones, especially where there were the *Franchi*,⁵³ who were real monarchists, there was rancour but, more than anything else, as also happened in Friuli, because there was already a strong anti-Communism at play. Instead among us there wasn't any anti-Communism. That arrived much later.⁵⁴

Angelo Bottero was also with the *Autonomi*, in the 'Monferrato' Division. He himself was not a monarchist, having joined the division, instead, as his friend was commander. In his own words he defined the 'Monferrato' 'a "*Badogliano*" division because they followed the monarchy. There were even monarchists among the partisans.'⁵⁵ This pejorative reference to the '*Badogliani*'

was particularly common among the *Garibaldini*, who saw the officer class which made up much of the *Autonomi* leadership as loyal to the House of Savoy and its Prime Minister, Pietro Badoglio. In Communist eyes Vittorio Emanuele III and Badoglio were both discredited because of their links to the Fascist past and their role in the collapse of Italian resistance after 8 September 1943. Thus, while the *Autonomi* leadership claimed to be apolitical, partisans of all brigades believed them to be formations loyal to the Italian monarchy and hostile to Communism. This did not bode well for relations between the *Autonomi* and the forces of the left, particularly the *Garibaldini*.

Relations between the *Garibaldini* and the *Autonomi* rarely ran smoothly. The partisan Domenico Ballarino saw events from both sides. He would eventually fight in the ranks of the *Garibaldini*, but initially went into the Valli di Lanzo where he fought with an Autonomous group. He described his commanding officer there, a Lieutenant Fugalli, as 'a partisan because of his loyalty to Badoglio and the King—a question of the oath of loyalty.'⁵⁶ At first Ballarino encountered some suspicion, as he had been in prison for political reasons during the Fascist period and the ex-army officers were wary of him. In the end, however, he was accepted. Then towards November-December 1943 other groups began to form around his group and in his words 'the Valli di Lanzo became predominantly

Communist.⁵⁷ Immediately there were problems: 'We didn't have armed conflict but rather a hostile attitude between this commander and the Communist commanders.'⁵⁸ To add to these difficulties Lieutenant Fugalli's brother—also an army officer—had joined the neo-Fascist Italian Social Republic (RSI). This brought about a crisis of loyalty for the commander, and in turn precipitated action on Ballarino's part. As he recalled, 'partly for fear that we would end up in a firefight with the Communist groups...my friend and I...returned to Turin.'⁵⁹ By August 1944 he had joined the VI *Garibaldi* Division 'Langhe.'⁶⁰ Ballarino's experience of extreme hostility between the *Autonomi* and the *Garibaldini* would be repeated elsewhere. Giovanni Gerbi reported similar experiences while he was with the 101st detachment of the IX *Garibaldi* Division. He operated in the Oltre Tanaro, the zone to the south of Asti, and also in the Langhe. He described relations with other formations as 'a little tense, really...I don't like to say it, but there was also sectarianism.'⁶¹ The root of this sectarianism, he claimed, was the extremely aggressive nature of the *Garibaldini*. They, unlike their allied partisan formations, actively sought combat with the Germans and Fascists. This bred jealousy on the part of others and a certain disdain among the *Garibaldini* for the other, less active formations. Then there was the problem of the character of the two formations. Gerbi claimed that the *Autonomi*:

were more military orientated...We called them the '*Badogliani*.' They were almost all ex-army officers, and therefore in their detachments there was this militarist attitude which separated officers from men. Among us [*Garibaldini*], no. Among us relations were egalitarian.⁶²

This difference in character created hostility, particularly on the part of the *Garibaldini*: 'we were ruder than them...declaring that they were sons of Mary—you know, Mary had that sky blue head covering [the *Autonomi* wore light blue neckerchiefs] and so we called them so.'⁶³ Gerbi added that this hostility continued after the war, eventually causing a split in the partisan organisation ANPI. The vitriol took on political overtones, with the *Autonomi* declaring all *Garibaldini* to be Communists. Gerbi defended the *Garibaldini*, stating that '[a]part from the fact that the Communists were the most active in the Resistance—they had the most dead, etcetera. However, it wasn't so—they [the *Garibaldini*] weren't all Communists.'⁶⁴

This militarist attitude of the *Autonomi* was confirmed by the *Garibaldino* Bruno Pasquali (aka 'Toc'), who fought with Pompeo Colajanni (aka 'Barbato') in the 4th and 19th Brigades in the Monferrato region. He remembered that the *Autonomi* 'were militarised...yes sir, no sir...they were soldiers. Not Fascists, but soldiers.'⁶⁵ Yet according to some partisans, this militarism did not necessarily translate into bellicose behaviour. Matilde Di

Pietrantonio of the GL Division C in Turin remembered the 'problem' of officers. She claimed that:

There were some, even many, career army officers... If you had seen the figure that the army officers cut, you would still be laughing today. They didn't care about showing their fear. The fear of losing mattered even less—to desert from the army. It was all like this. If you didn't find something to send to them to eat, the most they did was hide.⁶⁶

The question of the ex-army officers was certainly problematic for Di Pietrantonio. While she admitted that not all were cowards, she was convinced that they cared more about form rather than substance. Her attitude towards the military officers can be summed up in one particular anecdote:

there was one [officer] who lived near where I live now, hidden in an apartment with a wife and children. We used to take him money in order for him to survive and one day he told us, 'There are some small arms...near Avigliana...I left them with some peasants and if you go there they would give them to you.' 'Let's go get them then' [I said]. 'Oh no, but what if...' [he replied]. 'Stay at home then, I'll go.'...He was a Lieutenant, no a Captain, in the *Alpini*, with the feather. But I had to say, 'I'll go!'⁶⁷

The connotations of the *Alpini* and the feather, of course, refer to the courage and daring of the elite Alpine divisions of the Italian army, who were particularly instrumental in gaining Italian victory

in the First World War. Yet in this anecdote, a woman must fulfil a dangerous mission alone, as the *Alpino* is too afraid to act. This attitude, while perhaps not reflecting reality, underlines the widespread feeling among many partisans that the performance of the officer class was less than glorious and that in general they followed the line of the *attendisti*—or those who preferred to avoid combat and adopt a 'wait and see' attitude—particularly in the eyes of the Communists.

The heightened sense of suspicion, which often bordered on open hostility, between *Garibaldini* and *Autonomi* was a reciprocal affair, however. Giorgio Boggia (aka 'Bubo') fought with the Autonomous formations of Captain Piero Cosa in Valle Pesio, where the majority of commanders were ex-officers. According to Boggia, relations with other formations were normally acceptable. There were, however, some episodes of friction, in particular with the neighbouring *Garibaldini*. As Boggia recalled: 'We didn't share their ideas on the treatment of the local population in our zone. The *Garibaldini* followed a guerrilla line which we accepted only to a certain point. There was some friction, some episodes. But we overcame them.'⁶⁸ Angelo Bottero in the Autonomous Division 'Monferrato' claimed that he did not have any particular problems with the *Garibaldini*, but in his zone '[t]he Communist formations were well identified. My formation...Many were for the monarchy.

They were against Communism.⁶⁹ This hostility to the *Garibaldini* was present among other Autonomous formations elsewhere. As Bottero continued, 'then there were those of Sogno [the *Franchi*]. All that zone there of Sogno, you know Sogno got the Gold Medal, a great partisan, etcetera, and he was strongly anti-Communist.'⁷⁰

While tensions could even spill over into firefights between formations, as Giovanni Gerbi of the IX *Garibaldi* Division recalled, relations between *Garibaldini* and *Autonomi* were not always hostile. Following the great enemy comb-out and manhunt—*rastrellamento* in Italian—of 2 December 1944, for example, many *Autonomi* withdrew from the Langhe and the mountains in an attempt to escape the German encirclement and passed over to the *Garibaldini*. According to Gerbi '[t]hose who were the most anti-Fascist, the most combative' did so.⁷¹

Of all the Autonomous formations in Piedmont, none suffered greater inter-formation tensions, nor were as problematic as the *Mauri*. Ex-army officer Major Enrico Martini (aka 'Mauri') commanded 6,000 partisans in the southeastern zone of Piedmont, known as the Langhe.⁷² Here he encountered numerous problems with the neighbouring partisans. The *Garibaldini*, in particular, looked upon the *Mauri* with suspicion and hostility. They were especially concerned with Martini's alleged monarchist outlook and

were prepared to act accordingly. The PCI's Arturo Colombi reported on 27 October 1944 that:

We are going to have to deal with this individual ['Mauri'] for quite some time and we will need to show our teeth and to break his teeth, if necessary...['Mauri'] has a representative of Alexander with him, Major Temple, and through him he makes reports denigrating the *Garibaldini*, painting us as bandits and looters without any military efficiency. A liberal officer from here, an anti-Communist, naturally, will apparently leave soon for Rome.⁷³

As so often, however, dissident voices challenged the view that relations were strained to breaking point. Domenico Ballarino with the VI *Garibaldi* Division 'Langhe' noted that suspicion certainly tainted the relationship between the *Garibaldini* and the forces of 'Mauri,' but that there were no really serious incidents. So much so that on the evening of 15 November 1944, 'I was in the town of Feisóglio...and 'Mauri' and his staff officers suddenly arrived and we received them and took care of them. I remember...our leaders had a meeting and discussion with 'Mauri' [concerning operational collaboration].'⁷⁴ Notwithstanding these operational agreements—and similar arrangements between 'Mauri' and the GL forces in August 1944—by 1945 relations had deteriorated to such a point that the *Garibaldini* began accusing Major 'Mauri' of reaching accords with the Germans. In March 'Mauri' wrote in his defence: 'I

declare that I never went to Lombardy to make contact with the German or Fascist command in order to stipulate accords for any reason.⁷⁵ 'Mauri' then went on to deplore such accusations within the CLN and asked that those responsible be identified and given exemplary punishment.⁷⁶ The CLNRP called on the CMRP to instigate an immediate investigation into the alleged meeting two months previously between 'Mauri' and a German SS Command at Maderno in Lombardy.⁷⁷ The CLNRP eventually cleared 'Mauri' of the charges and established an investigation into the matter in order to protect the integrity and prestige of its commanders.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the damage to unity had been done and Communist charges of *attendismo* would hang over 'Mauri's' head for the duration of the partisan war.

Resupply and Jurisdictional Problems

While many of the fractures and divisions between the partisan formations were caused by cadre-driven political and ideological factors, other more prosaic concerns about military jurisdiction and access to weapons, supplies and ammunition also played a role. Mario Giovana of the II GL Alpine Division in Valle Varaita explained, '[a]nd as always happens in war, there was the problem of jurisdiction.'⁷⁹ Giovana explained that much of the inter-brigade tension derived from problems of funding and disputes over military

authority in a given zone. He insisted, however, that 'naturally in the acute phases, in combat, we always acted in collaboration.'⁸⁰ These problems of jurisdiction were often overcome, however, by negotiated settlements. Domenico Ballarino of the VI *Garibaldi* Division 'Langhe' recalled how in the winter of 1944-45 GL detachments moved from the mountains into the Langhe. As he remembered:

Before this they came to meet us to inform us of their intentions. Even here there were negotiations to decide where they would deploy. There were meetings at the CLN in Turin and also locally for the details. Following these negotiations, we made room for them and they communicated the secret messages to receive airdrops. And so we took some of the airdrops destined for them...This was the agreement with them. I didn't participate at the negotiations but I know this was the outcome.⁸¹

Thus, critically, problems of deployment and jurisdiction were settled at the political level by the CLN. Importantly, Ballarino's testimony also raised the vexed issue of resupplying the partisan formations. Resupply was generally carried out by Allied airdrops to the partisans and caused innumerable disputes between the various formations. Many partisans on the left were convinced that the Allies favoured the more politically conservative formations to the detriment of the *Garibaldini*, in particular. Giovanni Gerbi of the IX

Garibaldi Division was typical of many such partisans. He was certain that the tension between formations was due to political factors. As he stated, '[t]he *Garibaldini* were not the only ones to play politics: so did the English. Even this fed the [problem].'⁸² The lack of airdrops to the *Garibaldini* forced them to capture weapons from the Germans and Fascists, and in Gerbi's opinion this had a negative impact at the psychological level. It drove a wedge between the *Garibaldini* and those groups favoured by the Allies.⁸³ Giovanni Torre of the 4th *Garibaldi* Brigade concurred with Gerbi. Although he insisted that the majority of *Garibaldini* were not in fact Communists, the Allies and other partisan forces labelled them as such, and therefore the Allies did not make airdrops to the *Garibaldini*.⁸⁴ Like Gerbi, Torre believed that this had a negative impact on inter-formation relations. During the *rastrellamento* of August 1944, for example, Torre's formation, like many others, withdrew into Valle Maira from various locations. On moving back into the Valle del Po his unit passed a group of GL partisans. Torre recalled that they 'were sitting eating...and we were starving. We said "*Buon appetito*" and they didn't offer us a thing.'⁸⁵ Such attitudes led to exasperation and embitterment among the *Garibaldini*. In October 1944 Arturo Colombi reported that:

The allied formations are well furnished with arms, clothing, boots, food and money and yet they let the *Garibaldini* be attacked without firing a

shot in support. Instead, when they find the *Garibaldini* without shoes, worn-out and hungry they try to compromise them, offering them 'tranquillity,' equipment, food, money, weapons. Lots of all the 'allied' parties are trying everywhere to corrupt our men, achieving some success among the tired and the '*attendisti*.' Today, there is a lot made of the fact that the other formations are never attacked (they are paid better, they eat better, they receive weapons, clothes and money) and above all, they are not ordered to attack. Note some transfers of our detachments (in Valle di Susa) to the '*Matteotti*.' They are making manoeuvres of this type in Valle d'Aosta and a little everywhere. In the Canavesano and in Valli di Lanzo ours have reacted energetically...it is we who fight, we who have a sincerely unitary policy, we who do not receive help, or we receive it in an inadequate measure. It is understandable that our comrades become embittered.⁸⁶

In a report three weeks before this, Colombi had also accused the allied formations of *attendismo*, as well as attempting to bribe his men with money in order to defect from the *Garibaldini*, although they were unprepared to share funds with the *Garibaldini* when this was asked of them. Alarming, Colombi had stated that '[i]t is evident that we will react with energy, and even with force, if necessary.'⁸⁷

As Colombi's report indicated, the embitterment of the *Garibaldini* could lead to the verge of violent encounters between formations. Giovanni Torre's *Garibaldini*, for example, moving from

Valle Maira to Valle del Po, encountered the local GL commander, 'Spartaco,' who accused the Communist *Garibaldini* of being thieves. The *Garibaldini* commander took offence at such an accusation and demanded it be withdrawn. He intimated that otherwise his men would take armed action against the *Giellisti*.⁸⁸

Such accusations of theft were frequently made, admittedly with some justification. Chiefly they revolved around the theft of airdrops. Giorgio Diena of the V GL Division, for example, accused the *Garibaldini* of 'Barbato' (Pompeo Colajanni, commander of the *Garibaldi* brigades in the Monferrato region) of regularly stealing airdrops destined for his GL formation.⁸⁹ The *Garibaldini* saw these episodes as something other than 'thefts,' however. Luciano Manzi of the VIII *Garibaldi* Division 'Asti' explained them so:

let's say sometimes it happened that when the Allies dropped supplies—which they predominantly made...to the GL and the *Badogliani* more than they did to us—and so sometimes a part of these drops didn't go where they thought they would and perhaps the *Garibaldini* took them because they landed outside the target area and the others protested. However, in the end it finished up okay because the drops were destined for you but they landed in my zone and I took them because the zones were well defined.⁹⁰

Thus, in the opinion of the *Garibaldini*, jurisdictional control of military zones legitimised the 'capture' of misdirected airdrops.

The struggle over airdrops was not the only problem concerning supplies. The *Garibaldini* were also accused of more evident forms of theft, verging at times on banditry. Giorgio Boggia of Piero Cosa's Autonomous formations in Valle Pesio recalled an incident with the *Garibaldini* of neighbouring Liguria. Following a *rastrellamento*, a group of his comrades, including a telegraph operator, had been forced to withdraw into Liguria. Boggia and three or four other partisans crossed the mountains in search of their lost comrades. They arrived in a *Garibaldini*-occupied town, but when the *Garibaldini* saw that Boggia's group was armed with Sten submachine guns, they immediately disarmed them and confiscated their weapons. In fact, the *Garibaldini* took possession of all Boggia's equipment and then ordered his group back to Piedmont. As Boggia phrased it, '[t]hey had a hunger for arms.'⁹¹ Ferruccio Ferro of the IX GL Division encountered a similar situation in January 1945. He was transporting weapons and ammunition towards the town of Gallareto when he was stopped at gunpoint at the Pieia crossroads by the *Garibaldini* of Commanders 'Max' and 'Mario.' He was given a pass for the roadblock at Gallareto on condition that he gave weapons and ammunition to the *Garibaldini*. He did this and continued his journey. When he arrived at Pino

d'Asti he realised that the *Garibaldini* had also stolen a package of five Sten guns. After making enquiries, Commander 'Max' promised to return the missing package.⁹²

The *Matteotti*, too, were short of arms and materiel. Occasionally they also resorted to unorthodox methods in order to resupply themselves. Following an airdrop to the Autonomous Division 'Monferrato' on 22 February 1945, elements of the *Matteotti* Brigade took possession of the material by threatening violence. The Allied liaison officer in charge, Captain 'Morristown' wrote in protest: 'Such methods are not tolerated by me. On the orders of General Alexander I was to divide the weapons among the formations of the Monferrato. But to patriotic formations, not to predators.'⁹³ 'Morristown' then suspended airdrops to the *Matteotti* and before he would again give arms to them he wanted their American liaison officer, Captain 'Jonstown,' to conduct an investigation.⁹⁴

This 'hunger' for weapons and equipment, principally deriving from a lack of Allied airdrops, was satisfied not only by stealing weapons from other formations, but also by taking weapons from the Germans and Fascists and then bartering with other formations. Luciano Manzi described how his formation would capture weapons from the enemy and then trade them, particularly for ammunition:

We had very good relations with the GL formations who were in the zone near us, and were called '*Gruppo Mobile Operativo*' of 'Nando.' I visited them on numerous occasions to make exchanges. We had taken weapons from the Fascists and Germans and they were interested in these weapons and they gave us ammunition. Above all we had a particular hunger for ammunition. And especially for calibre 9.1 which was the calibre of our principal weapons. Except for a few weapons, all the others were 9.1: the English Sten, the Italian sub-machine gun, the German machine pistol, the American machine pistol and even for the pistols.⁹⁵

At times the division of airdrops was determined not by barter, but by negotiated accords between partisan formations. In the Langhe, the commands of the XIV and VI *Garibaldi* Divisions and the I and II GL Divisions agreed to divide all airdrops in the following manner:

1. All clothing goes to the GL formations until 300 men are completely supplied.
2. Weapons and ammunition are divided 60 percent for the GL formations and 40 percent for the *Garibaldini*.
3. Cigarettes, etcetera, half per formation.
4. Parachutes fifty-fifty per formation.⁹⁶

Yet these local agreements were themselves contentious. In response to the agreement made in the Langhe above, for example,

the GL HQ responded that '[s]uch an accord does not seem to conform to the directives of the Allies and the CMRP...we ask you to suspend the accord until instructions are received from the Allies and the CMRP.'⁹⁷ It seems that GL HQ was particularly concerned that airdrops directed to the *Giellisti* be used exclusively for their needs.

Whether local accords succeeded or not, it seems evident—as Eugenio Banfo of the Autonomous 'Cento Croci' Brigade pointed out—that the Allies discriminated in favour of the Autonomous formations in terms of airdrops and that this undermined relations between brigades. In Banfo's zone, in particular, the *Autonomi* were able to reach an agreement with the *Garibaldi*, GL and *Matteotti* brigades and were thus able to exchange supplies.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the perception among partisans that Allied policy favoured the resupplying of the '*Badogliani*' formations to the detriment of the left-wing units led to tension between the rival forces. Angelo Bottero of the Autonomous Division 'Monferrato' stated specifically that '[w]e were a so-called "Badoglian" brigade and so they dropped supplies to us...The *Garibaldi* groups got less than us,'⁹⁹ and Carlo Ferrero of the 4th *Garibaldi* Brigade claimed that 'there was a little jealousy because other formations—GL and *Mauri* (which was an Autonomous formation)—received airdrops of weapons, clothing and food. Instead we had to capture our weapons from the Germans.

That's the story.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the tension which the political cadres had generated among the partisan formations was exacerbated by problems of military jurisdiction and the supply of arms and equipment. Thanks to these practical problems, political tension was thus transferred from the cadres to the entire brigade.

The Problem of Inter-Brigade Violence

While tensions clearly existed between formations, the exact extent of the deterioration in relations is a vexing and controversial issue. It is important to note that while almost all partisans mention various tensions between formations, none of their testimony refers explicitly to armed clashes between formations. Federico Gèrello stated that there was a little resentment between the *Garibaldini* and the *Matteotti* in the area around Saluzzo, but in his words, 'it isn't like anything happened...we didn't have any major disagreements.'¹⁰¹ Matilde Di Pietrantonio recalled that there was tension between the *Giellisti* and the *Garibaldini* in Turin but there was no overt manifestation of this tension other than contempt.¹⁰² Mario Giovana, also a *Giellista*, claimed that his formation had argumentative, tense, even exasperating, relations with the *Garibaldini*, which he defined as 'dialectical.'¹⁰³ Yet he claimed that in combat, all formations always acted in collaboration. The *Autonomi* Angelo Bottero and Giorgio Boggia, respectively operating

in the Monferrato and Valle Pesio, also downplayed the tension between formations. Bottero claimed that there was no tension at all as '[w]e were all young men there for the same idea,'¹⁰⁴ while Boggia admitted that although there was some friction, it was easily overcome.¹⁰⁵ Domenico Ballarino stated that in the Langhe there was suspicion between the *Garibaldini* and the forces of 'Mauri' but no really significant episodes of tension.¹⁰⁶ Renato Testori, who was in the Langhe with the *Mauri*, denied that there were any clashes between formations there,¹⁰⁷ and Giovanni Gerbi, also in the Langhe, while admitting that armed clashes may have occurred elsewhere, denied categorically that such incidents took place in his zone of operations.¹⁰⁸ Therefore it appears clear that partisan testimony denies the incidence of armed clashes between rival formations. Contemporary documents, however, would seem to cast some doubt on the validity of this testimony, particularly official letters and reports from brigades and CLNs.

One such report, from Giacomo Cerutti, the PCI representative in the CLN of San Giusto Canavese and mayor of the junta, reported violations by Piero Urati (aka 'Piero Piero') of the *Matteotti* Brigade during August and September 1944. The first report stated that 'Piero''s men entered Cerutti's house and stole tobacco on 23 August. The following day Cerutti was called to the old 'Cantina della Regina' by 'Piero.' There he was beaten by

'Piero''s men as well as by 'Piero' in person and accused of illegally profiting from the sale of the town's wheat. At 1.30 am on 25 August, 'Piero''s men searched the house of another PCI member, Carlo Boggio. They failed to find him but were successful later in the morning, when they maltreated him. On the same morning a comrade Ozzello was stopped in the main square and slapped. Other Communist Party members were later threatened that day. All were members of the 49th *Garibaldi* Brigade. 'Piero' ordered all members to withdraw and cease activities in the zone as he alone was in command. 'Piero' remarked that '[h]e [Cerutti] deserved to be shot rather than beaten as we have done. Why does no one pay attention to me any more when I come to these towns like they used to?'¹⁰⁹ In a second report from Cerutti the problems between PCI members and 'Piero' intensified. On 1 September the partisan 'Notu' and other men of 'Piero''s group arrived in the town from neighbouring Foglizzo. On this occasion they shot at Cerutti with machine guns, wounding him in the right foot and left thigh. Rumour had it that they had also intended to shoot a number of other Communists in the town but had been unable to locate them. Cerutti made the following appeal to the PCI: 'With everything that has happened in San Giusto, please send some weapons so that we can confront even worse problems.'¹¹⁰ An attached report of the Turinese Federation of the PCI stated that 'Piero' had given Cerutti

twenty-four hours to resign as mayor.¹¹¹ On 27 October Arturo Colombi, regional representative of the PCI, noted that:

In San Giusto a unit of sixteen *Matteotti* partisans, composed entirely of ex-Fascists, are at work in the town committing abuses of power and violence against our comrades and in particular to the damage of small peasant proprietors of the town.¹¹²

This incident in the Canavese between partisans of the Socialist *Matteotti* brigades and local CLN Communist members underscores the hostility which could develop between political factions. Only good fortune prevented a slaughter of the local *Garibaldi* group. The tension between the two parties can be seen in Colombi's claim that these *Matteottini* were all ex-Fascists, an accusation that was made only against the worst offenders. Incidents such as that at San Giusto also helped to inculcate an atmosphere of mistrust which could manifest itself in the wildest of rumours. In fact, Colombi's report concluded on just such rumours in the liberated area around Nizza and Alba. He wrote: 'The voices that say there were serious incidents between the *Mauri* and *Garibaldini* are not exactly correct.'¹¹³ Thus, the incidence of actual inter-brigade violence spawned rumours of exaggerated numbers of such incidents, and further heightened tensions.

This is not to suggest, however, that the episode at San Giusto was an isolated case. In autumn 1944, for example, the CMRP-authorized Autonomous band 'Santorre Santarosa,' which was active in the zone of Baraggia di Rovasenda, made contact with the group of *Garibaldi* detachments 'Variara,' as they had operational jurisdiction in the zone. Initially relations were cordial. On 23 October, however, twenty *Garibaldini* led by Commander 'Max' and political commissar 'Ferro' arrived and disarmed the band 'Santorre Santarosa.' They were apparently following orders from the command of the 50th *Garibaldi* Brigade. The orders labelled the 'Santorre Santarosa' '*Badogliani*.' The men and officers were arrested but after an agreement with the command of the 50th *Garibaldi* Brigade, they were released. Eight days later the band was again disarmed and arrested, again on the orders of the 50th *Garibaldi* Brigade. They claimed not to recognise the legitimacy of the band, even though it was officially endorsed by the CMRP. The men were pressured to join the *Garibaldini* and those who refused were ordered to leave the zone immediately.¹¹⁴ In a letter of protest from the representative of the Autonomous forces in the CMRP, the *Garibaldini* were warned, 'relying on a decision of the CMRP on forced disarming, [the Command of Autonomous Formations] has given categorical orders to its dependent formations.'¹¹⁵ The implication was clear. From this moment on the *Autonomi* would resist such acts using whatever means necessary.

These incidents where one formation forcibly disarmed another did in fact sometimes lead to the use of arms. 'Primo il Biondo' the commander of Group HQ of the Autonomous Division 'Monferrato' reported one such episode. On Sunday 21 January 1945 two partisans of his division were disarmed at the cinema of Tonco by numerous partisans of the local GL formation. The two partisans were insulted—as was their division—and they were pressured to join the GL by the squad leader 'Arturo.' They were threatened with torture should they disagree. Irrespective of this, they refused and after many threats were released. They were told not to report the incident on penalty of death and reprisals against their families. After learning of the incident on 25 January, a detachment Commander 'Binda' and the partisan 'Leone' went to Tonco with the intention of disarming the GL detachment and arresting commander 'Arturo.' 'Arturo' and his men defended their conduct, claiming they were drunk at the time of the incident. They asked to be released and promised to present themselves at the town of Montiglio the following day to settle the episode. They did not, however, keep their word. Instead, 'Arturo''s GL detachment killed the *Autonomo* 'Monferrato' partisan 'Marino' at Tonco. 'Primo il Biondo' then requested a military tribunal to try 'Arturo' on charges of murder.¹¹⁶

This was not the end to problems between the 'Monferrato' and other formations. There were also difficulties with the *Matteotti*. The commander of the 1st *Matteotti* Brigade (of the I Division 'Italo Rossi') complained of difficulties with their neighbours. In March 1945 elements of the 'Monferrato' allegedly stole thirty litres of wine from the *Matteottini* as well as stealing a pair of sunglasses from the commander himself. But much more seriously, the commander reported that on 23 March 'some men of the 1st detachment of the 1st Brigade while re-entering camp singing *The Red Flag* were shot at by elements of the "Monferrato." My men did not return fire.'¹¹⁷ He appealed to the 'Monferrato' Division HQ to intervene in order 'to make these unpleasant incidents cease.'¹¹⁸ Apparently this request went unheeded. Three days later the *Matteotti* commander wrote to the 'Monferrato' HQ:

The day before yesterday [25 March 1945] at around one p.m. near Cortiglione, elements of the 'Monferrato' again fired at our men. Once again our men, demonstrating superior discipline, did not respond to such provocation. However, I warn you that we are now tiring of this situation. If it happens again, we will give immediate orders to our men to do likewise and I am sure that the 'Monferrato' will then learn to respect us.¹¹⁹

Thus, in the region of the Monferrato relations had deteriorated to the point of armed conflict between at least the three formations of

the *Autonomi* 'Monferrato,' GL and the *Matteotti* Brigades. Undoubtedly much of this violence—the unofficial requisitioning of weapons, arrests of personnel and sporadic firing—was the work of individual partisans acting on their own discretion. The official documentation, however, suggests that some acts of violence, such as the arrest of the 'Santorre Santarosa,' were condoned at higher levels and reprisals in response to acts of violence were threatened from at least the brigade command level, and sometimes even from the level of the CMRP—such as the *Autonomi* reaction to the 'Santorre Santarosa' incident.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly how widespread inter-brigade violence was. While operational unity, and at times unity of action in combat, was certainly the norm, the above cases were not rare, isolated episodes. There were other cases of violence reported in the Valle di Susa, to the west of Turin in December 1944. Here, the Socialist PSIUP accused the *Garibaldi* detachment 'Bruno Peirola' of the 42nd Brigade of violence against the local population and warned the PCI and *Garibaldi* HQ to take matters in hand or, as the PSIUP Commissar for ValSusa put it, 'we will take it upon ourselves to organise an "armed beating" to heal the rotting wound.'¹²⁰ Similarly, the III *Garibaldi* Division accused the *Matteotti* in the town of Ramà (probably the hamlet of Ramàts) of denigrating the name and honour of the *Garibaldini* and warned: 'Either you begin to act like

true Italians and really work for the glorious cause of liberation, or we will take into consideration your past "merits" and act as *Garibaldini*.¹²¹ This was an undisguised threat of armed action. Acting in the 'manner of the *Garibaldini*' ('*alla Garibaldina*') was a euphemism for armed action. Further problems existed in the zone of Solero near Alessandria. Here, the General HQ of the *Garibaldi* Brigades itself ordered units to intervene against the Communist bands of 'Tetè,' 'Tom' and 'Lilì' in order to stop their acts of banditry and threats against other formations.¹²² 'Piero Piero's *Matteotti* formation was again involved in violent action, this time against the VIII Autonomous Division 'Vall'Orco.' In October 1944, following similar incidents at Salassa and Cere, his forces disarmed the *Autonomi* at Sale, threatening them with torture and death. Commander 'Roberto' of the Autonomous Division intimated that unless something was done at higher levels, it would be necessary to respond with armed action.¹²³ The VIII Division 'Vall'Orco' also had problems with the *Garibaldini* of the 47th Brigade led by Commander 'Nino.' Elements of the Autonomous 'Tamietti' detachment at Salassa were captured by 'Nino' and a squad leader was shot through the shoulder while trying to escape. Commander 'Casella' demanded action from the Autonomous Formation of Piedmont HQ in order to avoid 'the beginning of justice and counter-justice between partisans.'¹²⁴ This reference to justice and counter-justice related specifically to the killing of the *Garibaldi* partisan

Giovanni Aprato (aka 'Ratulin') by members of the Autonomous brigade 'Canavese' two months earlier.¹²⁵ There were suggestions that 'Nino's' action was in reprisal for the death of 'Ratulin.' Furthermore, even the CVL commander of the Autonomous Formations suspected that the brigade 'Canavese' was openly anti-Communist and perhaps this had contributed to the events surrounding the killing.¹²⁶

There were many other incidents such as these throughout Piedmont. They generally followed the same pattern of forced disarming of partisans, threats and beatings, cases of firefights—although more often murder—and various threats of action from local commanders all the way up to regional headquarters. Yet astonishingly, none of the partisans interviewed mentioned these problems. All recalled an elusive 'tension' or 'friction,' but never tangible armed clashes. Undoubtedly, many partisans never personally encountered violent clashes between formations, but it seems unlikely that they had never heard of such incidents. Arturo Colombi, in fact, referred to 'the voices' which spread rumours of such conflicts near Nizza and Alba¹²⁷ and Giovanni Gerbi hinted as much when he admitted that such things as clashes may well have happened in other zones.¹²⁸ Explaining this phenomenon is not easy but it is perhaps linked to the development of the myth of 'unity' within the Resistance. In this particular case, contemporary reports,

unlike the re-created recollections of the partisans, are untainted by the five and a half decades of ideological debate over the sense of 'unity' within the Resistance. As Guido Quazza emphasised, the 'unity' of the Resistance, with the passage of the years, acquired three distinct meanings. For decades the Communists used 'unity' as the most eloquent proof of their sacrifice of the opportunity of revolution in order to favour instead national liberation from Fascism. 'Unity,' therefore, became a symbol of the Communist sacrifice, as well as their entry into the legitimate political life of the Italian republic following their rejection of the concept of the revolutionary seizure of power. Counterposed to this was the claim that the Resistance was nothing more than a civil war and that the concept of 'unity' was merely an instrument of Communist strategy. Finally, 'unity' was the catch phrase for those who wished to see the Resistance as purely a war of liberation which restored the representative parliamentary system.¹²⁹ For many partisans, this debate has undoubtedly taken on significant meaning for their own sense of self-identity and for their understanding of their contribution to national history. 'Unity' is a concept which validates the importance of the Resistance in the remaking of the Italian nation after 1945. For those partisans on the left it fosters the image of a national, popular movement which was led by the progressive forces of the Communists, Socialists and Actionists. For those partisans with more conservative political leanings, 'unity' in

the Resistance led to 'unity' in the new, democratic republic, championed and dominated by the Christian Democrats. Only the opponents of these forces—and ultimately of the Resistance itself—could see in 'disunity,' a politically useful weapon. In many instances, therefore, the self-denial of the existence of deep, even violent, fractures within the partisan movement was (and is) a mechanism for avoiding the shattering of the illusion of 'unity.' For many partisans and historians alike, 'unity' has taken on the aura of the sacrosanct. Yet the rejection of this myth is not the rejection of the Resistance itself nor of its importance in modern Italian history. It is simply a method for understanding more precisely the forces which motivated the partisan movement, and clearly, it is part of the explanation of the political failure of the Resistance forces in the early post-war period.

Operational Unity and Ideological Division in Piedmont

If it is a fact that deep divisions permeated the partisan forces, even to the point of reciprocal violent action, then it is also evident that deep divisions existed within Piedmont between the political forces of the CLN. This is not to suggest that a general operational unity did not exist, but unity of action did not disguise the fact that ideological differences in essence defined the parties of the CLN. Operational unity—the common political effort to isolate and defeat

the Germans and Fascists—was noted by many. Naturally, unity of action was simpler between the left wing parties. In the Astigiano, for example, discussions between the provincial representative of the Astigiano Communist Federation and the I *Matteotti* Division HQ centred on the formation of committees of understanding between the Socialist and Communist parties in the *Matteotti* and *Garibaldi* divisions, as well as in the individual dependent brigades present in the zone. The Divisional political commissar noted that in the opinion of the Astigiano Communist Federation:

the formation of such committees is the indispensable basis for cementing the unity of politico-military action to insurrectional ends, as well as proletarian unity between the two great proletarian parties, and to promote from the base itself the fusion of the two parties in a great Marxist-Leninist party.¹³⁰

In the Astigiano in early 1945, therefore, not only were the PCI and PSIUP concerned with common political and military action, but were even discussing the possibility of unification of the two parties.

While operational unity was clearly easier to achieve between parties with similar ideological policies, it was also possible for ideologically divergent groups to cooperate successfully. The story of Lucia Boetto is a case in point. Boetto worked as a *staffetta*

(courier) and liaison officer for most of the Resistance forces. She operated in the mountains of the Cuneese, in Liguria and in liaison with the Allied supply effort. Later she worked between Turin and Milan carrying reports between the CLNRP and the CLNAI. She spent practically the entire period after 8 September 1943 working with the partisans. At the time of demobilisation she was an Inspector, which carried the rank of Major, and she was awarded the Bronze Medal for her efforts. Boetto stressed that she was always attached to civil society, in the sense that she never lived with the partisan bands. As such, she claimed never to have had political conflicts with anyone. Although she was firmly rooted in the Liberal tradition of Piedmont (her entire family supported the Liberal Party), the Communists were often the ones to praise her activities in the CLN 'orders of the day.' She was convinced that although there were ideological differences between her position and the Communists, they recognised her contribution and respected her.¹³¹

While this was clearly a positive sign of operational unity, there were also many difficulties which plagued relations between the political forces of the CLN. At the heart of nearly all such problems was the question of ideology: an issue which may not have bothered the rank and file, but which was paramount in the minds of the political leadership. No problem was more perplexing than the relationship with the Communists. Even the relationship

between the Socialists and Communists could prove problematic. In October 1944 Arturo Colombi reported on such problems from Turin. On 10 September 1944 the Agitation Committee (CdA) of the Turin Section of the railway workers had decided to strike. According to the CdA their enemies engaged in intense sabotage against the strike. Among those accused of engaging in sabotage at the railway workshops was a certain Michele Goia, a self-confessed Socialist. Claiming to represent the PSIUP, Goia declared that the CLN disapproved of the strike, as it was immature. In fact, he distributed a leaflet signed by the CLN calling for a return to work. The CdA alleged that this made an extremely negative impression on the railway workers. The reaction of the PCI representative Colombi is telling. He reported this type of activity by the Socialists as 'usual' behaviour and continued:

With what kind of state of mind can one negotiate the unified front with dogs [the Socialists] such as these! We need to make a great effort to help these good but inexpert lads [the strikers] overcome their state of depression...We will also have to try and make the CLN intervene. But these people, now that they have approved the leaflet, will not do much else. They are too busy dividing up positions of power among themselves and plotting against us to worry about the struggle!¹³²

Colombi's report underlined not only the appalling state of relations with the Socialists in Turin, but also the Communist

disdain for the activities of the CLN. The accusation of anti-Communist sentiment among the other parties of the CLN may or may not have been an accurate assessment, but more importantly it highlighted the level of mistrust and division at the political and ideological level in the committee. Colombi was convinced that '[t]he reactionary forces are manoeuvring against us in Turin.'¹³³ He accused the Liberals of 'absorbing' certain Fascist republican army officers and policemen in a manoeuvre supported by the industrialists of the city. The Liberals made a 'natural bloc' with the Christian Democrats, who, according to Colombi, were 'reactionary to the core.' He further accused the Socialists of being in alliance with this conservative bloc and claimed that they were manoeuvring 'obscenely.' These 'manoeuvres' concerned the struggle for positions of power within the local and regional administrations. Colombi charged the Liberals and Catholics with insisting that a Liberal must have the Prefecture in homage to the tradition of the *Risorgimento* and the power of the industrialists, while they were prepared to leave the post of mayor to the 'workers' parties.' Only the Action Party maintained a defensible attitude. Colombi even charged that the Liberals had not hesitated to speak of turning to the use of arms in the case of the other parties refusing their demands. Colombi concluded that:

It is necessary to take a decisive position and to show our teeth...It is our intention to denounce publicly the manoeuvres of the reactionary forces and Socialists and to appeal to the masses. To be too conciliatory will not earn us anything. These people will shamefully exploit the situation. They think that our unitary position will make us accept anything. It is better not to have any illusion about the democratic spirit of collaboration of these people and to be on guard even in the future. If the Socialists disregard the commitment taken, we will need to act decisively without regards to the consequences.¹³⁴

There were problems too between the Liberals (PLI) and the PCI within the CLNAI. In September 1944 the executive of the Piedmontese Regional Federation of the PLI refused to accept the *Comitato di Difesa della Donna* as the official representative for women's concerns in the CLN, as in their opinion it was a pre-existing organisation which was monopolised by the PCI. The executive demanded that the CLNAI constitute a committee in which women of the five parties of the CLN could participate in a condition of parity. Furthermore, the Piedmont Federation requested that its representative 'preannounce the withdrawal from the organism "*Comitato per la Difesa della Donna*" as the PLI does not intend—with its presence—to validate the legality of a representation it wholly opposes.'¹³⁵

Finally, there were also difficulties with the Christian Democrats (DC). Arturo Colombi reported in October 1944 that the DC of Chieri had refused to collaborate with the PCI because they lacked faith in the Communist program, and according to Colombi, '[t]he anti-Communist tendency is strong even in various CLNs of the Valli di Lanzo.'¹³⁶ Therefore, although there was certainly concerted action to maintain a perception of unity among the forces of the CLN, it is clear that ideological issues and pragmatic politics undermined this unity. The Communists, in particular, struggled to maintain a unified position with the Liberal Party, the DC and even at times with the Socialists of the PSIUP.

National and Regional Tensions and Divisions

The divisions within the forces of the CLN were not restricted to the Piedmontese organisms. There were also problems in relations at the level of the CMRP, CLNRP, CLNAI and the Central CLN of Rome (CCLN). During meetings between the CLNRP and representatives of the Italian government from Rome (the Undersecretary of State for Occupied Italy) held in Turin on the 26, 27 and 28 March 1945, the CLNRP released an official declaration which underscored some of the tensions that existed between North and South. In point two of the declaration it was stressed that after liberation the CLNRP would pass all powers requested of it to the Allied Military Government

(AMG) and would recognise and make others recognise and respect all announcements, proclamations and decrees emitted by the AMG.¹³⁷ This stemmed from the central government's fear of the CLNRP's alleged autonomy of action, something which had also troubled the CLNAI. At point three the document also stressed that a regional consultative junta would be established and that as well as the CLNRP, it would include a representative of the Ministry of Occupied Italy (from Rome) and technical representatives from various sectors such as agriculture and industry.¹³⁸ In this manner the government of Rome would guarantee its control over the regional body. This was perhaps a wise manoeuvre, as the declaration—while in general conciliatory towards the CCLN—also stressed the full agreement of the CLNRP with the government 'except where the CLNAI might differ on the points above' as 'the CLNRP reaffirms its own links of dependency and solidarity...[towards the CLNAI].'¹³⁹ Thus, there were clear tensions in relations concerning legitimate authority in northern Italy in general, and Piedmont in particular. The CCLN mistrusted perceived Piedmontese autonomy, and the CLNRP claimed it depended on the CLNAI in Milan for its authority, not on the CCLN of Rome.

At the military level there were also tensions. In October 1944 the CMRP, responsible for coordinating military operations in Piedmont, complained of problems in achieving its military goals in

the region. The tone of their report to the CLNRP and CG/CVL obviously condemned those bodies for an inadequate supply of resources. The CMRP charged that 'where one does not want the resistance to degenerate...it is necessary to provide money, weapons, liaison.'¹⁴⁰ The implication was that this had not been done. The CMRP, however, did not escape criticism itself. In the same month in which it had criticised the CLNRP and CG/CVL, it was itself attacked by the PCI for its lack of fighting spirit. The PCI, in a letter to Arturo Colombi, asked:

What is our representative doing in such a committee? We would like to hope that even we are not being influenced by the *attendista* spirit which drives the CMRP...we must...fight against any attitude, orientation or proposal of this nature when they appear in the heart of the CMRP.¹⁴¹

Finally, from Turin, the PCI also condemned the CLN for its inaction. In Colombi's report of 1 October 1944 he lamented that '[f]or months the CLN has not made its voice heard; two posters in total...they employ the tactic of passive resistance.'¹⁴² Thus, accusations and counter-accusations, condemnations and ill will permeated the relations between the leading political and military organisms within, and outside, Piedmont.

Conclusion

The 'myth' of unity within the Resistance is strongly held by many historians and by even more partisans. But the weight of evidence does not justify such a historical view. While operational unity certainly existed—the unification of command, combat operations fought in common by various formations, the diverse organisations of the CLN—these should not disguise the evident fractures and divisions within the Resistance movement. These divisions permeated the Resistance at many levels. There were tensions within individual brigades and between different formations. Many of the problems which the various formations faced were caused by their links to the political parties of the CLN, although disputes over supplies and jurisdictional control over zones of operation also exacerbated tensions. While partisan testimony denies it, these problems could and did lead to violence and armed clashes between rival formations. Beyond the formation level, there were also deep divisions between the political forces of the CLN in Piedmont. Ideological differences between the parties of the CLN played a key role in the development and continuation of these divisions. In particular, the PCI maintained problematic relations with almost all the political forces of the CLN. Of course there were pragmatic political issues, especially the struggle for control of administrative posts, which exacerbated tensions between the parties. Finally, at

the regional and even national level suspicion, tension, and sometimes hostility undermined the unity of the various political and military organisms of the CLN. Thus, the Resistance, far from being homogeneous and unified, suffered instead from division and dissent, which at times fractured the movement itself.

Endnotes

-
- ¹ Roberto Battaglia, *The Story of the Italian Resistance*, trans. P. D. Cummins (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1957), 62.
- ² *Ibid.*, 60-61.
- ³ Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 16.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.
- ⁵ Mario Giovana, *Guerriglia e mondo contadino: i garibaldini nelle Langhe, 1943-1945* (Bologna: Cappelli Editore, 1988), 88; and Laurana Lajolo, *Intervista a Onorino Nosenghi ('Folgore')*, 5/6/1984, ISRAT, Fondo Santa Libera, Busta 1, 9.
- ⁶ Giovana, *Guerriglia e mondo contadino*, 88.
- ⁷ Lajolo, *Intervista a Nosenghi*, 10.
- ⁸ General HQ CLNAI/CVL, *La Guida del Commissario*, 8/11/1944, Doc. B12e088-090, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 12, fasc. Interno e, s.f. Sogno: lettere dal carcere S. Vittore, 2. Hereafter *GdC8/11/1944*.
- ⁹ Formazione 'Giustizia e Libertà' 5th Comando, *GL Circular*, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 29, fasc. Interno b.
- ¹⁰ Palmiro Togliatti, *La politica d'unità nazionale dei comunisti*, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Seconda Sezione, H, Cartella 60, fasc. Interno a, 1. Hereafter *Pold'unità*.
- ¹¹ Città di Torino and IPSRSC, *Torino 1938/45: una guida per la memoria* (Turin: Città di Torino and IPSRSC, 2000), 65.
- ¹² Giorgio Bocca, *Storia dell' Italia partigiana: settembre 1943 - maggio 1945*, 4th ed. (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1995), 119.
- ¹³ Charles Floyd Delzell, *Mussolini's Enemies: the Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 370.
- ¹⁴ Il Comando Generale CLNAI/CVL, *Scioglimento del Comando Generale BG e delle Delegazioni Comando BG*, 31/3/1945, Doc. prot. N. 576, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 59, fasc. Interno c, s.f. OM/B: III - d; and Comando Generale per l'Italia Occupata, *Ai Comandi Dipendenti, Oggetto: Unificazione*, 3/4/1945, Doc. Prot. No. 242, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 59, fasc. Interno c III, s.f. OM/B III d.
- ¹⁵ Battaglia, *The Story of the Italian Resistance*, 85-86.
- ¹⁶ Battaglia dates this agreement erroneously (perhaps a misprint) as 17 August 1944. For details see Giovanni De Luna et al., eds., *Le Formazioni GL nella Resistenza: Documenti* (Milan: Franco Angeli Libri, 1985), 126-27.
- ¹⁷ Battaglia, *The Story of the Italian Resistance*, 184-85.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ Giuliano Procacci, *History of the Italian People* (Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1968, Reprint, 1978), 457.
- ²⁰ Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*, 16.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 46-47.
- ²² Claudio Pavone, *Una guerra civile: saggio storico sulla moralità nella resistenza.*, 1st ed. (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991), 179-80.
- ²³ Martin Clark, *Modern Italy, 1871-1982* (London; New York: Longman, 1984), 307, 315.
- ²⁴ Renzo De Felice, *Rosso e nero* (Milan: Baldini & Castoldi, 1995), 31-2.
- ²⁵ Adriano Romualdi, *Il fascismo come fenomeno europeo*, 2nd ed. (Rome: Edizioni Settimo Sigillo, 1984), 138.
- ²⁶ Roger Absalom, *A Strange Alliance: Aspects of Escape and Survival in Italy 1943-45* (Florence: L.S. Olschki Editore, 1991), 305.
- ²⁷ Roger Absalom, *Italy since 1800: a Nation in the Balance?* (London: Longman, 1995), 180.
- ²⁸ Absalom, *A Strange Alliance*, 79.

-
- ²⁹ Absalom, *Italy since 1800*, 169.
- ³⁰ ANPI, *25 aprile* (Turin: ANPI Comitato Provinciale di Torino, 1984; reprint, *25 aprile: la Resistenza in Piemonte*, Turin: Orma, 1946).
- ³¹ See for example Renzo Rovaretto's account in ANPI, *25 aprile*, 97.
- ³² See Giovanni Dolini in ANPI, *25 aprile*, 107-08.
- ³³ For example ANPI, *25 aprile*, 129.
- ³⁴ See Faustino Dalmazzo's claims for the partisans of the Cuneese in ANPI, *25 aprile*, 155.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 237.
- ³⁶ Dante Livio Bianco, *Venti mesi di guerra partigiana nel Cuneese* (Cuneo: Panfilo editore, 1946), 141.
- ³⁷ For example see AA.VV., *Aspetti della Resistenza in Piemonte* (Turin: Book's Store, 1977); Anna Bravo, *La repubblica partigiana dell'Alto Monferrato* (Turin: Giappichelli, 1965); Marisa Diena, *Guerriglia e autogoverno: Brigate Garibaldi nel Piemonte occidentale 1943-1945* (Parma: Guanda, 1970); Mario Grato Ferraris, *La formazione del C.L.N. Vercellese: organizzazione politica della resistenza nel Vercellese* (Vercelli: Tip. Editr. "La Sesia", 1963); Mario Giovana, *La Resistenza in Piemonte: storia del C. L. N. piemontese*. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962); Mario Giovana, *Storia di una formazione partigiana: resistenza nel Cuneese* (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1964); Luigi Longo, *Un popolo alla macchia* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1965); Anello Poma, *La Resistenza nel Biellese* (Parma: Guanda, 1972); Nuto Revelli, *Il Mondo dei Vinti* (Turin: 1977); Nuto Revelli, *La guerra dei poveri* (Turin: Einaudi, 1962); and G. Vaccarino, C. Gobetti, and R. Gobbi, *L'insurrezione di Torino* (Parma: Guanda, 1968).
- ³⁸ Giovana, *Storia di una formazione*, 88.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 246-47.
- ⁴⁰ Revelli, *La guerra dei poveri*, 309.
- ⁴¹ Giampaolo Pansa, *Guerra partigiana tra Genova e il Po: la Resistenza in provincia di Alessandria* (Bari: Laterza, 1967), 145-46.
- ⁴² Raffaele Cadorna, *La riscossa* (Milano: Rizzoli, 1948), 191-92.
- ⁴³ Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*, 16.
- ⁴⁴ Giovanni Gerbi, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Asti: 12/2/2002), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁴⁵ Lucia Boetto and Renato Testori, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Turin: 7/12/2000), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁴⁶ Il Comandante la IX Divisione GL, *Letter to Comando IV Brigata Garibaldi*, 20/3/1945, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 42, fasc. interno g.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ Leo Scamuzzi ('Leo'), *Report to Direttorio del Partito d'Azione*, 24/6/1944, Doc. c36d146, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 36, fasc. Interno d.
- ⁴⁹ Arturo Colombi ('Alfredo'), *Rapporto di Informazione Torino*, 14/9/1944, IGdiR, PCI, Direzione Nord, Piemonte 1944, fasc. Settembre, 10-9-14, 2. Hereafter *RIT14/9/1944*.
- ⁵⁰ ANPI Verzuolo, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Verzuolo, 4/11/2000). Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author
- ⁵¹ Mario Giovana, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Cuneo: 21/2/2002), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁵² Eugenio Banfo and Angelo Bottero, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Chivasso: 13/1/2001), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁵³ The *Franchi* were members of the Autonomous Liberal-monarchist intelligence service led by Captain Edgardo Sogno. See Edgardo Sogno, *Guerra senza bandiera. Cronache della "Franchi" nella resistenza*, 2nd ed. (Milan: U. Mursia, 1970); and Edgardo Sogno, *La Franchi: storia di un organizzazione partigiana* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996).
- ⁵⁴ Interview with Banfo and Bottero.

-
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Domenico Ballarino, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Turin: 13/2/2002), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ⁶¹ Interview with Giovanni Gerbi.
- ⁶² Ibid.
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ⁶⁵ Bruno Pasquali, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Turin: 18/2/2002), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁶⁶ Matilde Di Pietrantonio, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Turin, 19/2/2002), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ⁶⁸ Giorgio Boggia, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Cuneo: 21/2/2002), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁶⁹ Interview with Banfo and Bottero.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid.
- ⁷¹ Interview with Giovanni Gerbi.
- ⁷² Delzell, *Mussolini's Enemies*, 294.
- ⁷³ Arturo Colombi ('Alfredo'), *Rapporto di Informazione: Torino, 27/10/1944*, IGdiR, PCI, Direzione Nord, Piemonte Torino e provincia 1944, fasc. Ottobre 1944, 11-1-20, 2. Hereafter *RIT27/10/1944*.
- ⁷⁴ Interview with Domenico Ballarino.
- ⁷⁵ Mauri, *Dichiarazione*, 31/3/1945, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 55, fasc. Interno h, s.f. OP/C - VI a.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Il CLN Regionale Piemonte, *Letter to CMRP - Oggetto: Inchiesta Magg. Mauri*, 25/3/1945, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 55, fasc. Interno h, s.f. OP/C - VI a.
- ⁷⁸ Il CLN Regionale Piemonte, *Letter to Comandante Mauri - Tramite il CMRP*, 19/4/1945, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 55, fasc. Interno h, s.f. OP/C - VI a.
- ⁷⁹ Interview with Mario Giovana.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid.
- ⁸¹ Interview with Domenico Ballarino.
- ⁸² Interview with Giovanni Gerbi.
- ⁸³ Ibid.
- ⁸⁴ Interview with ANPI Verzuolo.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Colombi ('Alfredo'), *RIT27/10/1944*, 6.
- ⁸⁷ Arturo Colombi ('Alfredo'), *Rapporto di Informazione Torino, 1/10/1944*, IGdiR, PCI, Direzione Nord, Piemonte Torino e provincia 1944, fasc. Ottobre 1944, 11-1-2, 4. Hereafter *RIT1/10/1944*.
- ⁸⁸ Interview with ANPI Verzuolo.
- ⁸⁹ Giorgio Diena, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Turin, 14/12/2000), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁹⁰ Luciano Manzi, interview by Michael C. Kelly (Collegno: 20/1/2001), Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.
- ⁹¹ Interview with Giorgio Boggia.
- ⁹² Ferruccio Ferro, *Relazione sui fatti avvenuti il giorno 28/1/1945, 31/1/1945*, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 42, fasc. interno g.

-
- ⁹³ Captain Morrystown, *Letter to Comandante La Brigata Matteotti del Monferrato*, 2/3/1945, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 49, fasc. interno a, s.f. Brigata Matteotti Comando Monferrato: Corrispondenza Interformazioni, 20.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid.
- ⁹⁵ Interview with Luciano Manzi.
- ⁹⁶ GL and Garibaldi commanders Zone I, *Accordo per gli aviolanci*, February 1945, Doc. c36a099, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 36, fasc. Interno a.
- ⁹⁷ Il comando GL, *Al comando delle I e II Divisioni GL*, 9/2/1945, Doc. c36a003, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 36, fasc. Interno a.
- ⁹⁸ Interview with Banfo and Bottero.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰ Interview with ANPI Verzuolo.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰² Interview with Matilde Di Pietrantonio.
- ¹⁰³ Interview with Mario Giovana.
- ¹⁰⁴ Interview with Banfo and Bottero.
- ¹⁰⁵ Interview with Giorgio Boggia.
- ¹⁰⁶ Interview with Domenico Ballarino.
- ¹⁰⁷ Interview with Boetto and Testori.
- ¹⁰⁸ Interview with Giovanni Gerbi.
- ¹⁰⁹ Giacomo Cerutti, *Relazione*, 2/9/1944, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Seconda Sezione, H, Cartella 60, fasc. Interno a.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹¹² Colombi ('Alfredo'), *RIT27/10/1944*, 4.
- ¹¹³ Ibid., 8.
- ¹¹⁴ Il membro del CMRP per le FA Piemonte, *Al comandante delle Formazioni Garibaldine per il Piemonte*, 6/11/1944, Doc. n. 715 op, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 27, fasc. Interno f, 1.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid., 2.
- ¹¹⁶ Primo il Biondo, *CVL Divisione Autonoma 'Monferrato' II^a Brigata Gruppo Comando*, *Letter to Comando Divisione Monferrato*, 26/1/1945, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 42, fasc. interno g.
- ¹¹⁷ Il Comandante la 1^o Brigata, *Letter to Comando Settore BR. Matteotti*, *Oggetto: Incidenti*, 24/3/1945, Doc. Prot. 115: A, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 49, fasc. interno a, s.f. a.
- ¹¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁹ Il Comm. Politico e Il Comandante la 1^o Brigata, *Letter to Comando Divisione Monferrato*, 27/3/1945, Doc. Pr. 214/4, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 49, fasc. interno a, s.f. a.
- ¹²⁰ Il Commissario del PSI per la ValSusa, *PSIUP Commissariato per la Valle di Susa*, 26/12/1944, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 9, fasc. Interno c.
- ¹²¹ Il Comandante, *Oggetto: Avvertimenti*, 30/1/1945, Doc. 3169/OP, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 9, fasc. Interno c.
- ¹²² Il Comando Generale delle Brigate d'Assalto Garibaldi, *Oggetto: Atti di banditismo di presunte formazioni Garibaldine*, 8/9/1944, Doc. N. Prot. 67, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 1, fasc. Interno a, s.f. aIII.
- ¹²³ Il Comandante Roberto, *Al Comando Formazioni Autonome*, 22/10/1944, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 49, fasc. Interno c, s.f. cII.
- ¹²⁴ Il Comandante Casella, *Al Comando Formazioni Autonome del Piemonte*, October 1944, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 49, fasc. Interno c, s.f. cII.

¹²⁵ See the month of August in Centro Etnologico Canavesano, *Calendario della Resistenza* (Romano Canavese, Piedmont: Stabilimento Tipografico Ferrero, 1987).

¹²⁶ Il comandante della formazioni autonome A. Elle, *Oggetto: Uccisione del Garibaldino Ratulin*, 24/9/1944, Doc. N. 0192, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 49, fasc. Interno c, s.f. cII.

¹²⁷ Colombi ('Alfredo'), *RIT27/10/1944*, 8.

¹²⁸ Interview with Giovanni Gerbi.

¹²⁹ Guido Quazza, *La Resistenza italiana: appunti e documenti* (Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore, 1966), 6.

¹³⁰ Il Commissario Politico, *Esercito di Liberazione Nazionale Brigate Matteotti - Comando Monferrato I^a Divisione 'Italo Rossi' Comando*, 23/5/1945, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 49, fasc. interno a, s.f. Varie. Note that the date of this document is probably erroneous. The document speaks of the continuing popular struggle, suggesting that it was written before 25/4/1945.

¹³¹ Interview with Boetto and Testori.

¹³² Colombi ('Alfredo'), *RIT14/9/1944*, 3.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ L'Esecutivo della Federazione Regionale Piemontese del PLI, *Letter to CLNAI*, 15/9/1944, IGdiR, PCI, Direzione Nord, Piemonte 1944, fasc. Settembre, 10-9-16.

¹³⁶ Colombi ('Alfredo'), *RIT27/10/1944*, 4.

¹³⁷ CLNRP, *Il CLN per il Piemonte*, 28/3/1945, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, C, Cartella 55, fasc. Interno d, s.f. CLNP : Riunioni del Mese di Marzo 1945, 1.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁴⁰ Il CMRP, *al CLN del Piemonte, al CG per CVdL, Oggetto: Funzionamento del CMRP*, 14/10/1944, Doc. n. 11/P, IPSRSC, Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione, B, Cartella 59, fasc. Interno A, s.f. OM/B I - b, 2.

¹⁴¹ PCI Northern Command, *per Alfredo*, 24/10/1944, IGdiR, PCI, Direzione Nord, Piemonte Torino e provincia 1944, fasc. Ottobre 1944, 11-1-16, 1-2.

¹⁴² Colombi ('Alfredo'), *RIT1/10/1944*, 4.

Bibliography

Archival Material

Istituto Gramsci di Roma:

Archivio Partito Comunista. Fondo Federazioni.

PCI, Direzione Nord.

Istituto Piemontese per la Storia della Resistenza e della Società Contemporanea.

Fondi Originari: Prima Sezione.

Fondi Originari: Seconda Sezione.

Interviews

ANPI Verzuolo. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Verzuolo, 4/11/2000. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Ballarino, Domenico. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Turin, 13/2/2002. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Banfo, Eugenio, and Angelo Bottero. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Chivasso, 13/1/2001. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Boetto, Lucia, and Renato Testori. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Turin, 7/12/2000. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Boggia, Giorgio. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Cuneo, 21/2/2002. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Diena, Giorgio. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Turin, 14/12/2000. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Di Pietrantonio, Matilde. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Turin, 19/2/2002. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Gerbi, Giovanni. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Asti, 12/2/2002. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Giovana, Mario. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Cuneo, 21/2/2002. Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Lajolo, Laurana. *Intervista a Onorino Nosenghi ('Folgore')*. Asti, 5/6/1984. Transcript at ISRAT, Fondo Santa Libera, Busta 1.

Manzi, Luciano. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Collegno, 20/1/2001.
Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Pasquali, Bruno. *Interview by Michael C. Kelly*. Turin, 18/2/2002.
Tape Recording. Tape in possession of author.

Published Books and Articles

AA.VV. (Various Authors). *Aspetti della Resistenza in Piemonte*.
Turin: Book's Store, 1977.

Absalom, Roger. *Italy since 1800: a Nation in the Balance?* London:
Longman, 1995.

———. *A Strange Alliance: Aspects of Escape and Survival in Italy
1943-45*. Florence: L.S. Olschki Editore, 1991.

ANPI. *25 aprile*. Turin: ANPI Comitato Provinciale di Torino, 1984.
Reprint of *25 aprile: la Resistenza in Piemonte*, Turin: Orma,
1946.

Battaglia, Roberto. *The Story of the Italian Resistance*. Translated
by P. D. Cummins. London: Odhams Press Limited, 1957.

Bianco, Dante Livio. *Venti mesi di guerra partigiana nel Cuneese*.
Cuneo: Panfilo editore, 1946.

Bocca, Giorgio. *Storia dell' Italia partigiana: settembre 1943 -
maggio 1945*. 4th ed. Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore,
1995.

Bravo, Anna. *La repubblica partigiana dell'Alto Monferrato*. Turin:
Giappichelli, 1965.

Cadorna, Raffaele. *La riscossa*. Milano: Rizzoli, 1948.

Centro Etnologico Canavesano. *Calendario della Resistenza*. Romano
Canavese, Piedmont: Stabilimento Tipografico Ferrero, 1987.

Città di Torino and IPSRSC. *Torino 1938/45: una guida per la
memoria*. Turin: Città di Torino and IPSRSC, 2000.

Clark, Martin. *Modern Italy, 1871-1982*. London; New York:
Longman, 1984.

De Felice, Renzo. *Rosso e nero*. Milan: Baldini & Castoldi, 1995.

-
- Delzell, Charles Floyd. *Mussolini's Enemies: the Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- De Luna, Giovanni, P. Camilla, D. Cappelli, and S. Vitali, eds. *Le formazioni GL nella Resistenza: documenti*. Milan: Franco Angeli Libri, 1985.
- Diena, Marisa. *Guerriglia e autogoverno: Brigate Garibaldi nel Piemonte occidentale 1943-1945*. Parma: Guanda, 1970.
- Ferraris, Mario Grato. *La formazione del C.L.N. Vercellese: organizzazione politica della resistenza nel Vercellese*. Vercelli: Tip. Editr. "La Sesia", 1963.
- Ginsborg, Paul. *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990.
- Giovana, Mario. *Guerriglia e mondo contadino: i garibaldini nelle Langhe, 1943-1945*. Bologna: Cappelli Editore, 1988.
- . *La Resistenza in Piemonte: storia del C. L. N. piemontese*. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962.
- . *Storia di una formazione partigiana: resistenza nel Cuneese*. Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1964.
- Longo, Luigi. *Un popolo alla macchia*. Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1965.
- Pansa, Giampaolo. *Guerra partigiana tra Genova e il Po: la Resistenza in provincia di Alessandria*. Bari: Laterza, 1967.
- Pavone, Claudio. *Una guerra civile: saggio storico sulla moralità nella resistenza*. 1st ed. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991.
- Poma, Anello. *La Resistenza nel Biellese*. Parma: Guanda, 1972.
- Procacci, Giuliano. *History of the Italian People*. Translated by Anthony Paul. Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1968. Reprint, 1978.
- Quazza, Guido. *La Resistenza italiana: appunti e documenti*. Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore, 1966.
- Revelli, Nuto. *La guerra dei poveri*. Turin: Einaudi, 1962.
- . *Il mondo dei vinti*. Turin, 1977.
- Romualdi, Adriano. *Il fascismo come fenomeno europeo*. 2nd ed. Rome: Edizioni Settimo Sigillo, 1984.

Sogno, Edgardo. *La Franchi: storia di un organizzazione partigiana*.
Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996.

———. *Guerra senza bandiera. Cronache della "Franchi" nella
resistenza*. 2nd ed. Milan: U. Mursia, 1970.

Vaccarino, G., C. Gobetti, and R. Gobbi. *L'insurrezione di Torino*.
Parma: Guanda, 1968.

List of Abbreviations

AA.VV.	Various authors.
AMG	Allied Military Government.
ANPI	National Association of Italian Partisans.
BG	<i>Garibaldi</i> Brigade(s)
CBAG	Garibaldi Brigades Central Command.
CCLN	Central Committee of National Liberation, Rome.
CdA	Workplace Agitation Committee.
CG/CVL	Supreme Military Command of the Corps of Freedom Volunteers.
CLN	Committee of National Liberation.
CLNAI	Committee of National Liberation for Upper (Northern) Italy.
CLNRP	Committee of National Liberation Region of Piedmont.
CMRP	Military Command for the Region of Piedmont.
CVL	Corps of Freedom Volunteers.
DC	Christian Democrat Party.
GL	Justice and Liberty.
IGdiR	Istituto Gramsci di Roma.
IPSRSC	Istituto Piemontese per la Storia della Resistenza e della Società Contemporanea.
ISRAT	Istituto Storico della Resistenza di Asti.
PdA	Action Party.
PCI	Italian Communist Party.
PLI	Italian Liberal Party.
PSIUP	Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity.
RSI	Italian Social Republic (the Republic of Salò)

Glossary

'Alla Garibaldina': a *Garibaldini* euphemism for decisive armed action.

The *Alpini*: Italian Alpine troops.

Attendisti: those partisan groups accused—especially by the Communists—of playing a passive role and refusing to engage the enemy in combat.

Autonomi: the politically neutral, autonomous partisan groups. In reality they were often pro-Liberal and monarchist.

Badogliani: a disparaging term for the Autonomous brigades, deriving from the left-wing accusation that they supported Pietro Badoglio and the Monarchy.

Comitati/Gruppi di difesa delle Donne: Communist dominated anti-Fascist Women's Defence Groups.

The *Franchi*: members of the Autonomous Liberal-monarchist intelligence service led by Captain Edgardo Sogno.

Garibaldi Brigades/Garibaldini: Communist sponsored partisans.

Giustizia e Libertà/Giellisti: the anti-Fascist movement 'Justice and Liberty' founded by Carlo and Nello Rosselli. Also the name of the partisans sponsored by the Action Party.

Gruppo Mobile Operativo: Mobile Operational Group. A highly mobile guerrilla squad specialising in hit-and-run raids.

Matteotti Brigades/Matteottini: Socialist sponsored partisans.

Maurini/Mauri: the Autonomous formation led by Major Enrico Martini. The group adopted Martini's *nom de guerre* ('Mauri') as their formation name.

Rastrellamento(i): German and Fascist anti-partisan comb-out(s) and manhunt(s).

Risorgimento: the nineteenth century movement for the unification of Italy.

Staffetta(e): partisan courier(s) responsible for communications, administration, the transportation of arms and supplies behind the lines and even the collection of intelligence.

About the Author

After careers in IT, ESL teaching and Management, Michael C. Kelly completed a PhD in modern European history—with a specialisation in modern Italy—at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He lectured and tutored in the History Department at the University of Melbourne and in the School of Social Sciences at Victoria University, before joining National University of Singapore as an Assistant Professor in 2006. His teaching and research interests include: modern Italian history and politics, with an emphasis on Italian fascism, anti-fascism and resistance, as well as Risorgimental studies; modern European history; nineteenth and twentieth century British history; twentieth century military history; war and gender; the comparative study of fascism; labour and social history, both in Britain and Italy; oral history—particularly the relationship between memory and history; migration history (especially Italian settlement); European nationalism; and the history of civil and human rights. He has recently been accepted as a CERC Fellow.

CERC PUBLICATIONS

	Price (AUD, Incl CST)	+ postage within Australia	International orders (airmail postage)
2006			
Michael Longo, 'The Global Challenge of Europe's Constitutional Evolution: What's in it for us?'	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
2005			
Jonathan Clarke, 'Language and the Construction of Identity in Russia'	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
Peter Lentini, 'Campaigning Under the Shadow of Martyrdom? The 2004 Chechen Presidential Elections and the Cult of Kadyrov'	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
Thomas Bamforth, 'Bely and the Mongols: Geopolitical Visions in Andrey Bely's <i>Petersburg</i> '	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
2004			
Dietmer Braun, 'Delegation in Territorially Divided Polities: Lessons for the European Union?'	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
Cas Mudde, 'Globalisation: The Multi-Faced Enemy'	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
Natalie Chaban and Jessica Bain, 'Peripheral and Invisible? The European Union in the New Zealand Media 2000-2002'	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
Richard Sakwa, 'The Australiasian Contribution to Soviet, East European and Russian Studies', <i>CERC Working Paper</i> no.1/2004, (33 pages)	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
2003			
Zoe Knox, 'Russian Orthodoxy and Religious Pluralism: Post-Soviet Challenges', <i>CERC Working Paper Series</i> , no.1/2003 (65 pages)	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
Yuri Tsyganov, 'Russian Policy Toward Northeast Asia: In Search of a New Approach', <i>CERC Working Paper Series</i> , no.2/2003 (67 pages)	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
Andrea Benvenuti, 'Australia's Policy towards Britain's Second Application to the European Economic Community, 1966-67', <i>CERC Working Paper Series</i> , no.3/2003 (42 pages)	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00
Stefanie Kleimeier and Harald Sander, 'Towards a Single European Banking Market? New Evidence from Euroland on the Role of the Euro', <i>CERC Working Paper Series</i> , no.4/2003 (33 pages)	☐ \$10.00	☐ \$11.50	☐ \$13.00

* All prices are in Australian dollars and are GST-inclusive.

PERSONAL DETAILS:

Title: _____ Name _____

Company/Institution: _____

Postal
address: _____

Telephone: _____ Email: _____

PAYMENT DETAILS:

I enclose a cheque for \$ _____ made payable to 'The University of Melbourne'.

Please invoice me/my company/institution

Please charge \$ _____ to my credit card.

Type (Visa/Mastercard/Bankcard only): _____

Account No _____

Exp: _____

Signature: _____

CERC Working Papers Series

The CERC Working Papers Series aims to provide a forum for the publication of high quality original research, based on work in progress, on issues relating to Europe. The Series is fully refereed.

Guidelines for contributors

1. Papers should be approximately 8,000 - 12,000 words long.
2. Papers should be typed and double-spaced on A4.
3. Endnotes rather than footnotes should be used.
4. Authors' names and affiliations should appear only on the cover of the manuscript.
5. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of 150-200 words.
6. Endnotes should be kept to a minimum.
7. Please indicate word length and inclusion of any diagrams or tables.
8. All references should be listed alphabetically at the end of the paper.
9. For journal articles, the volume and issue number, and month and year of publication should be provided.
10. Please submit 3 copies of your paper with a disk in Word or convertible format.
11. The Working Paper may be work in progress, which you are considering submitting elsewhere at a later stage (though you should refer to this earlier version in your finalised paper).
12. All papers will be evaluated by two anonymous referees. The Editors act on the basis of the referees' reports, but retain final discretion in the decision to publish.
13. Authors receive 4 free copies of the Working Paper. Further copies may be purchased by authors for half price.

For more information, please contact the Editors:

A/Prof. Philomena Murray

Director
Contemporary Europe Research Centre
The University of Melbourne
Victoria 3010, Australia
Tel: (61-3) 8344 5151
Fax: (61-3) 8344 9507
e-mail: pbmurray@unimelb.edu.au

Prof. Leslie Holmes

Deputy Director
Contemporary Europe Research Centre
University of Melbourne
Victoria 3010, Australia
Tel: (61-3) 8344 7293
Fax: (61-3) 8344 9507
e-mail: leslieth@unimelb.edu.au

A/Prof. Peter Shearman

Department of Political Science
The University of Melbourne
Victoria 3010, Australia
Tel: (61-3) 8344 6559
Fax: (61-3) 8344 7906
e-mail: shearman@unimelb.edu.au