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**RUSSIAN  
ORTHODOXY AND  
RELIGIOUS  
PLURALISM:**

**Post-Soviet  
Challenges**

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## **Introduction**

The Soviet regime's cessation of the repression of individual believers and religious communities in the late 1980s allowed unprecedented religious freedom. The demise of materialist Marxism-Leninism and the collapse of the USSR permitted the advent of ideological pluralism. The new pluralism in the religious sphere challenged the Moscow Patriarchate, the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church, to reclaim its pre-revolutionary position at the centre of Russia's religious life. This paper examines the obstacles the Patriarchate encountered during the first post-Soviet decade.

The Orthodox Church was highly visible in the new Russia. The Church's resurgence was buoyed by renewed consideration of Russian identity. Russians have long regarded the Church as the protector of national interests and the defender of national traditions. In the uncertain socio-economic conditions of post-Soviet Russia, many Russians looked to the Orthodox Church for guidance. Consequently, the Church was frequently invoked in discussions of national identity and in deliberations over the country's future. Orthodoxy's resurgence encouraged leading political figures to identify the Patriarchate as an important ally. The Church's influence was further bolstered by politicians' recognition of the utility of appeals to national identity and tradition.

Thus, from the weak position of a faith tolerated by an atheist regime, the Orthodox Church secured a powerful and prominent position in postcommunist Russia. Although the Church had rivals in schismatic Orthodox groups, other traditional faiths, and in western and, to a lesser extent, Asian denominations, the Orthodox Church benefited from the new freedoms more than any other faith. The

Moscow Patriarchate reclaimed Orthodoxy's preeminence in Russian religious life. Indeed, the Patriarchate directed considerable effort toward securing a heightened influence in the pluralist religious sphere.

The number of self-identified Orthodox believers is testimony to the Church's foremost position in Russian national consciousness. In the Soviet period, western researchers could offer little more than educated guesses about the number of Orthodox adherents. Soviet researchers were not able to broach the subject of religious belief with the objective analysis of independent scholars. The first objective examinations of religious life in the post-Soviet period revealed that the number of self-identified Orthodox believers had risen sharply. At the close of the first post-Soviet decade, estimates of the number of self-identified Orthodox believers ranged from 50 million, which amounts to roughly one third of the population, to 70 million, or one half of the population.<sup>1</sup>

The Church's activities in the post-Soviet period are of great political and social significance. The success of the Patriarchate's campaign to implement legislation limiting the activities of foreign missionaries and religious bodies is demonstrative of Orthodoxy's leverage on matters that extend beyond its purview and into that of political governance. The campaign, which resulted in the passage of the controversial law 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations' in October 1997,<sup>2</sup> gained support from nationalist and conservative politicians, from Orthodox believers, and from representatives of other major religions, who also felt threatened by the perceived interlopers. The 1997 law reduced the rights of foreign religious bodies and presented legal hurdles for most religions and denominations except the Russian Church. The Russian Orthodox Church was the only faith mentioned in the law's

preamble, which affirms that Russia is a secular state, but also refers to the 'special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia and in the establishment and development of its spirituality and culture'. The Church's domestic political significance was also illustrated by a leading newspaper's list of Russia's most influential political figures; the Patriarch consistently ranked in the top fifteen.<sup>3</sup>

Given the large number of Orthodox adherents and the tangible authority of the Patriarchate in the social and political arenas, the Church was poised to reclaim its position at the forefront of national spiritual life. The Church figured prominently in various discussions as the driving force behind Russia's renewal and recovery. In 1990 Vladimir Poresh, a former prisoner of conscience and Orthodox dissident, wrote of the Church's challenge: 'Never has so much been expected from it by so many people'.<sup>4</sup> It soon became clear that the Church leadership could not meet these challenges, and there was increasing disaffection with the leadership for not keeping in step with the needs and wishes of its congregation.<sup>5</sup> In many ways the course of the Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet period has been one of struggle between competing visions of how to meet the challenges of post-Soviet realities.

These challenges are best understood in the context of Russia's religious boom. This paper begins by outlining major developments in the religious sphere, including legislative changes and the activities of non-Orthodox denominations. It identifies five key challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate in the post-Soviet decade. The first of these is financial shortages, which have frustrated the Church's attempts to regain its former position. The second is schismatic movements, which have split the Church and fragmented the Moscow Patriarchate's support base. The third is the so-called 'war for souls', a result of the rise of indigenous religious

bodies and the influx of foreign missionaries. The final two challenges are posed by pluralism within the Church: activism opposed to the Patriarchate's official line within Church structures, and Orthodox activism outside official Church structures. This dissent has revealed a prominent, and ever-widening, division within the Church, among both clergy and laity. The paper concludes by considering the implications of the Moscow Patriarchate's responses to these five challenges.

### **Russian Orthodoxy in the Soviet Union**

As the Church's postcommunist challenges are essentially a product of the Soviet experience, the status of Russian Orthodoxy in the Soviet Union should be surveyed. The Bolsheviks implemented a policy of unequivocal hostility toward Orthodoxy, fuelled by atheist Marxist-Leninist doctrine and also by the Church's legacy as defender of the Imperial government. Initially, religious policy was solely directed toward reducing the Orthodox Church's potential to challenge the new regime.<sup>6</sup> Bishops, priests, monks, nuns and laypersons were persecuted on any pretext; later this extended to other denominations.

The Church was equally hostile to the Bolsheviks. Patriarch Tikhon pronounced an anathema on the communists.<sup>7</sup> The sustained persecution of believers made it apparent that if the Church wished to survive as an institution it must recant this hostile position. Tikhon retracted his opposition. In 1927 his successor, Patriarch Sergii, issued a statement on behalf of the Orthodox Church, a 'Declaration of Loyalty' to the Soviet Motherland, 'whose joys and successes are our joys and successes, and whose setbacks are our setbacks'.<sup>8</sup> Some viewed these efforts to ensure Orthodoxy's survival as an institution as spiritual corruption.

Regardless of whether this apostasy was justified, the persecution of Orthodox believers did not cease, as Tikhon and Sergii no doubt anticipated, but continued with increased intensity. The number of church closures confirms this. Before 1917, there were 50,000 functioning Orthodox churches in the Russian Empire; 80,000 including chapels and convents. In 1939, by which time some 80,000 Orthodox priests, monks and nuns had lost their lives, there were 200-300 churches open in the USSR. Of these, just 15-20 were in Moscow. When Stalin could benefit from the Patriarchate's cooperation in World War II, many churches re-opened, so that by 1947 the number of churches reached 14,000. A renewed wave of persecutions resulted in a drop in number by about 1,000 by the mid-1950s. Khrushchev's anti-religious drive resulted in 44 per cent of churches being de-registered, so that by 1966 there were just 7,466 churches operating in the USSR.<sup>9</sup>

Unofficial policy was ultimately directed toward achieving the liquidation of individual believers and religious communities. Despite Lenin's repeated emphasis that, as far as the state was concerned, religion was a private matter, Soviet authorities regarded worship as very much a political issue. Constitutionally-guaranteed religious freedoms were manifestly incompatible with atheistic scientific communism. While the Russian Church enjoyed a privileged position and a greater degree of freedom than other denominations, having an official representative body, for example, there were still restrictions on Orthodox activities designed to minimise the Church's influence, discredit its activities, and diminish its following. Though unofficial Soviet policy toward Orthodoxy vacillated between repression and toleration and, at times, even alliance, the regime's core objectives changed little. The objectives of religious policy were to reduce the influence, activity and following of Orthodoxy and, given the precarious nature of the Church's position, the Church

hierarchy acknowledged that opposition would ensure the loss of what few privileges they were accorded.

Despite the persecution of religious communities, Vladimir Kuroedov, President of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), the official body governing religious life,<sup>10</sup> dismissed accusations of state-sanctioned persecution of religious groups as western propaganda. In an interview with *Izvestiia* in 1976, Kuroedov maintained that all citizens enjoyed freedom of conscience:

Soviet legislation has established special legal norms, defending believers, religious associations and ministers of the cult [non-Orthodox religious denominations] from infringements of their legal rights. These norms make provision for accountability for obstructing the performance of religious rituals, inasmuch as they do not violate the social order and are not accompanied by infringements of citizens' rights. Any kind of discrimination against believers and any kind of violence to their consciences are categorically forbidden.<sup>11</sup>

Legislation guaranteeing freedom of conscience did exist.<sup>12</sup> Regardless, the flagrant violations of constitutional provisions by Soviet authorities are well documented. The constitutional status of religious bodies and individual believers, as well as official statements, can be disregarded as any indication of the conditions for believers in the Soviet Union.

The Orthodox Church was at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to other bodies vying to influence policy-making.<sup>13</sup> At the outset, it would be an anomaly to speak of Orthodox interests, as there was a profound divide between the concerns of the Patriarchate and those of the mass of Orthodox believers. Patriarch Sergii's expression of unconditional loyalty to the regime was incompatible with challenges to regime policies, and by extension

any agitation for change. The agenda of the Church was effectively set by the regime itself.

### ***Glasnost' and Perestroika***

Although Gorbachev acceded to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985, the initial years of his leadership did not produce any meaningful change in Soviet policy on religion.<sup>14</sup> In late 1987, Gorbachev introduced policies which marked the beginning of profound changes in many spheres of Soviet life, including the religious.<sup>15</sup> Between 1987 and 1991, Orthodoxy emerged as a potent social force. Gorbachev implemented *perestroika* in a bid to check corruption and other bureaucratic practices detrimental to the economy. It became clear, however, that reform measures could not be implemented within the framework of the existing economic and political system, and that the Soviet assemblage was in need of systemic change. Gorbachev introduced the policy of *glasnost'* to allow for critical thinking about the new processes and for the recognition and combating of social problems. Instead of empowering society to eradicate the barriers to economic performance and social progress and to move closer to achieving communism, *glasnost'* ultimately contributed to the Soviet system's destruction. The new openness highlighted the USSR's economic problems, exposed political corruption and publicised the regime's control of all aspects of life. Moreover, it became clear that the existing system was inadequate to meet the challenges set by Gorbachev himself.

The CPSU's redefinition of the boundaries of the permissible and the proscribed facilitated Orthodoxy's reinstatement. Religious themes, particularly Orthodox ones, were reflected in literature,

cinema, the media and politics. Judith Devlin argued that 'the recovery of national identity, through the rediscovery of the country's cultural and historical heritage' was one of the ways in which *glasnost*, which represented the 'rebirth of public opinion and of public life', was achieved.<sup>16</sup> The Orthodox faith was central to this recovery of identity, since any revalidation of the past could scarcely fail to incorporate the Russian spiritual tradition. The policy of *glasnost* therefore restored Orthodoxy's position at the fore of Russian national identity and the nation's cultural consciousness.

### **Legislative Changes**

During the 1988 millennial celebrations Soviet authorities repeated that they were drafting a new law on freedom of conscience. There followed a great deal of discussion and debate about its provisions: the Supreme Soviet received more than 1,500 comments and suggestions on the law from citizens.<sup>17</sup> The law 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations' was adopted in October 1990. The preamble stated four objectives: to guarantee citizens' right to express their attitude toward religion, to guarantee the right to exercise religious rites, to guarantee equality regardless of religious conviction, and to regulate the activity of religious organisations.<sup>18</sup> Western commentators commended the USSR for formalising the new religious freedoms and fulfilling its international human rights obligations.<sup>19</sup> The law, however, was short-lived. The dissolution of the USSR two months later meant that the laws of the new republics superseded Soviet laws.

In the case of the Russian Federation, a religious law had already been drafted. Viacheslav Polosin, in his role as a member of the Committee on Freedom of Conscience, Religions, Welfare and Charity, formulated a law that guaranteed even greater freedoms.

'On Freedom of Belief' was adopted on 25 October 1990.<sup>20</sup> It was widely regarded as more liberal than its Soviet predecessor. It included provisions against any form of discrimination based on religious belief or practice (Arts 1-7, 17, 22, 25, 29).<sup>21</sup> It reiterated that state and religious associations were separate and should not interfere with or finance state elections, secular public education, or other political affairs (Art. 8).

Most significantly for the shape of religious life, the Russian law guaranteed freedom of worship for indigenous religious associations and foreign religious associations (Art. 4).<sup>22</sup> The significance of the law lay in the definition of 'worship', which comprised a wide range of activities:

Worship and promotion of faith shall be understood to include the performance of rites, the dissemination of one's beliefs in society directly or via the mass media, missionary work, acts of charity, religious instruction and education, ascetic establishments (monasteries, retreats, etc.), pilgrimage and other activities as defined by the appropriate system of beliefs and provided for by the statutes (regulations) of the given association (Art. 17).

The 1993 Russian Constitution endorsed these extensive freedoms.<sup>23</sup> Both Russian and foreign religious bodies benefited from the new freedoms, demonstrated by the dramatic increase in the number of registered religious associations and the visibility of religious activity in the immediate post-Soviet period.

It was not long, however, before there were calls to revise 'On Freedom of Belief'. Criticism focused on its hasty drafting and contradictory statutes.<sup>24</sup> Soon after, the influx of foreign missionaries and the rise of new religious movements, both native and foreign, prompted the criticism that the freedoms guaranteed therein were too extensive. The influx of foreign missionaries

aroused suspicion and resentment among many Russians, particularly Orthodox, who were affronted by their ubiquity, evangelical vigour and opulence. There were calls to regulate and to monitor, and, in some cases, to outlaw their evangelism and proselytism. The Moscow Patriarchate led the campaign. Patriarch Aleksii stated in an address in Kostroma:

The work of the Russian Church for the rebirth of society is threatened by the expansion of foreign missions in Russia. Hundreds and thousands of very different preachers have invaded Russia. There is great tension in our country owing to divisions between people on political and nationalistic issues. There is a danger of similar division on religious grounds, the Patriarchate wants to prevent this and to help our society to be stable. So the Patriarchate has suggested to the parliament that it pass a law proclaiming a moratorium on religious propaganda from outside.<sup>25</sup>

Evidently 'On Freedom of Belief' required significant revision before the Patriarch's proposals could be legally implemented. These restrictive proposals, which presented such an affront to the newfound freedoms in the religious sphere, were a response to the multifarious challenges faced by the Patriarchate in the post-Soviet period.

### **The Patriarchate's Post-Soviet Challenges**

Russia's traditional faith had more to gain from the new freedoms than any other denomination. There was a dramatic increase in the number of Orthodox parishes, educational institutes and monasteries. The number of parishes reached 14,000 by 1994.<sup>26</sup> Two priests explained how already by 1993 the new freedoms changed religious life in their region:

For a long period the Novgorod diocese, one of the oldest in the Russian Orthodox Church, had no bishop of its own and was governed by the Metropolitan of Leningrad. Only five years ago [1988] it hardly numbered 25 parishes; most of them were situated in remote villages. Recent years have brought many changes. Since July 1990 the diocese is governed by Bishop Lev (Tserpitsky) of Novgorod and Staraya Russia. The famous St. Sophia Cathedral, closed in 1929, is again opened for believers; dozens [of] churches are being restored and rebuilt. There are four cloisters, numerous Sunday schools and a children's choir in the St Sophia cathedral.<sup>27</sup>

By 1 January 1998 the number of registered Orthodox associations had reached 8,653, accounting for more than half of all religious associations.<sup>28</sup> This example of Orthodox life's invigoration was mirrored throughout Russia. The most significant growth was the number of Orthodox educational institutions. From 1993 to 1996, for example, the number of theological seminaries increased from 7 to 31, and continued to rise for the remainder of the 1990s.

There were dramatic changes within the institutions themselves. As theological education in the Soviet period was limited by ideological restrictions, the revival of monasteries and seminaries has been regarded as one of the Church's greatest successes.<sup>29</sup> Previously banned subjects, such as the history of philosophy, the history of religion and the history of Russian religious thought, were able to be introduced to theological academies. The training of priests is almost as important to Church life as the existence of congregations. Therefore, the large growth of monasteries, which increased from 81 in 1993 to 264 in 1996, is another significant development. Additionally, Orthodox religious societies grew from 4,357 to 6,709 in this period, reflecting the Church's involvement in education and a range of social and welfare services.<sup>30</sup> This brief survey of the reinvigoration of Orthodox life shows an impressive increase in the Church's activities. There were,

however, significant challenges to the Church's ambitions to regain a central position in Russia's religious life. The remainder of this paper examines five challenges.

### **1. Financial Shortages**

Financial shortages posed significant obstacles to the rebuilding of the basic structures to service the faithful. The most immediate of these obstacles was the shortage of priests to administer the new parishes. One scholar compared Patriarch Aleksii's statements in the official publication *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii* (*Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*) in late 1994 on the number of parishes and on the number of serving priests and concluded there was a deficit of some 4,000 to 5,000 Orthodox priests in Russia.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the training of priests was rudimentary, due to the low standard of monastic education in the Soviet era and the rapid training of priests to meet the new demand. A shortage of theological textbooks compounded this problem. According to an official at the Theological Academy:

We have not had time to train our priests properly. Monasteries are reopened, but we lack sufficient numbers of well-trained priests to serve in them. We have made priests of people who are poorly prepared, and this shortcoming is seriously affecting the internal life of the Church. It is crucial that the people in such positions have both an excellent education and a deep spiritual life.<sup>32</sup>

The phenomenon of young priests being ordained before they are adequately prepared is referred to in Church circles as *mlado-starchestvo* (youthful eldership), since they then instruct others.<sup>33</sup> In addition, aged and retired priests were encouraged back into service.<sup>34</sup> The poverty of theological scholarship in the post-Soviet period was also a problem.

There were shortfalls in other areas of Church life. In 1991, Patriarch Aleksii stated that although in three years the number of active churches in Moscow had risen from 45 to 130, 'many are in such a state that they must literally be rebuilt. And where are the craftsmen and architects capable of erecting a church to be found today? Unfortunately, their secrets and skills have been lost'.<sup>35</sup> The art of ringing church bells, for instance, has been largely lost due to the restrictions of the Soviet period. A low level of awareness of Orthodox doctrine and theology among its adherents, a legacy of the communist era compounded by inept preaching in the postcommunist era, also emerged as a major challenge to the Church's post-Soviet regeneration. The claims of Ioann Belliustin, a nineteenth century Orthodox priest, that Orthodox adherents did not have the 'remotest conception of anything spiritual'<sup>36</sup> was not remedied by seventy years of religious persecution. This incognizance has also been blamed for the prevalence of anti-Semitism among Orthodox laity.<sup>37</sup> Nonconformist priests' attempts to overcome the low level of knowledge are discussed later in this paper.

The lack of priests, their inadequate training, and the loss of essential skills were not obstacles that could be easily or quickly overcome, and they further strained the Church's financial resources. The seriousness of the lack of funds was highlighted by an appeal from the rector of the Smolensk Theological Institute in *Russkaia mysl'* in March 1994, which noted that the future of the Institute was threatened:

From the moment of its founding, it was financed almost entirely by the parishes of the diocese of Smolensk. Today the situation in the parishes is so difficult that one can categorise it as catastrophic. Galloping inflation ever more decisively curtails the scope of donations. Simply put, we have no means of feeding our students.<sup>38</sup>

The Institute's bank account number was provided to encourage donations. In order to raise funds clergy became involved in unlikely business ventures. In 1994 bottled water from the Kostroma Province on the Volga River was sold under the name 'Saint Springs' to raise funds for the restoration of churches and monasteries in the region. The label on the bottles carried a picture of an Orthodox church and a blessing from Patriarch Aleksii.<sup>39</sup> The attention that the clergy devoted to raising operational funds created the additional problem of their time and energy being consumed by efforts to secure financial help and church property rather than serving their congregations.

It should be noted that the Patriarchate has been involved in financial activities which have undoubtedly secured the Church leadership a great deal of money. The Patriarchate's funding comes from a variety of sources, including a bank it founded, a factory in Sofrino, a prestigious hotel at the Danilov Monastery and, the largest known earner, the joint-stock company International Economic Cooperation, an oil exporter, among other things.<sup>40</sup> While these budgetary contributions have long been public knowledge, a series of exposes in the media in the mid-1990s revealed hidden business activities and the state's role in according the Patriarchate financial privileges. These revelations began when dissident priest Gleb Iakunin leaked a document about the Patriarchate's import of chicken drumsticks, in which an Orthodox dignitary appealed to a government authority that the imports be given humanitarian aid status and therefore exemption from the usual customs duties.<sup>41</sup> Other instances where the Patriarchate has been accorded a privileged tax status have since been revealed, most notably on the import and sale of tobacco products.<sup>42</sup> There is little evidence, however, that this money filtered down to the parish level to construct the basic facilities required to service Orthodox adherents.

## ***2. Schismatic Movements***

The state-enforced unity of Orthodox jurisdictions ended with the demise of communist power. Orthodox schisms, driven underground in the Soviet period, emerged to challenge the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction. The Patriarchate had hostile relations with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA),<sup>43</sup> the émigré church which entered Russia in 1990 as the Russian Orthodox Free Church (ROFC). The ROCA continues to spurn the Patriarchate for its capitulation to the communists. As the ROFC, it has proselytised priests and parishes who, for a variety of reasons, are discontented with the Moscow Patriarchate.<sup>44</sup> This has resulted in open, even violent, conflict. One of the first instances when the ROFC gained a priest, a parish, and church property in Suzdal the local bishop wrote a letter to the city council denying that the ROFC had any claim over church property and condemning their militancy, provocation, lies, unauthorised prayers, and bigotry.<sup>45</sup> Despite this opposition, in 2001 the ROCA had 37 parishes in Russia.<sup>46</sup> Older schismatic churches, notably the True Orthodox Church, also present (albeit less threatening) challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction.<sup>47</sup>

The status of Orthodox churches in Ukraine, Moldova and Estonia remained a sensitive issue, one widely regarded as political rather than religious.<sup>48</sup> Patriarch Aleksii boycotted a gathering of representatives of the fifteen Eastern Orthodox churches in late 1995. He cited the differences between the Istanbul see and the Moscow Patriarchate on church politics in Ukraine and Estonia, and was critical of Istanbul for encouraging independent aspirations in these countries.<sup>49</sup> This not only emphasised differences within the Orthodox world, it also depleted the Russian Orthodox Church's resources. National churches claimed property and buildings that

had only recently been returned to the Moscow Patriarchate by Yeltsin's April 1993 decree 'On the Transferring of Religious Structures and Other Properties to Religious Organisations'.<sup>50</sup> In addition, much to the chagrin of the Moscow Patriarchate, disenchanted clergy have occasionally left its ranks and converted to the schismatic churches. Most notably, Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), disappointed that he was not elected Patriarch in 1990, became head of the schismatic Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate) after being defrocked by the Moscow Patriarchate for immoral behavior, abuse of power, and the extent of his KGB cooperation. It has even been alleged that Filaret has 'intimate links to the Kievan criminal mafia'.<sup>51</sup>

The schisms in Ukraine were most worrying for the Moscow Patriarchate. In 1989 the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was revived and direct confrontation between Patriarch Aleksii and the leaders of the Ukrainian Church ensued as they declared autocephaly in early 1992. At the centre of these tensions is the Moscow Patriarchate's concern over property seizure. This arises from the division of Orthodox prelates and clergy on the territory of Ukraine into the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). The Moscow Patriarchate regards the former as illegitimate. The division has led to conflicting claims for church property, which has resulted in the loss of parishes, as well as buildings and items such as icons, which exacerbates existing financial shortages.

### ***3. Competition***

The preeminence of the Russian Orthodox Church was also challenged by competition from non-Orthodox denominations. Though the emphasis of this study of Orthodoxy and religious

pluralism is on Christianity, it is essential to recognise the experiences of other religions and denominations in order to appreciate the diversity of postcommunist religious life. The perceived need to protect the Russian Church from these interlopers largely shaped the Patriarchate's responses to the new pluralism. Debate about the Church's relations with and reactions to these non-Orthodox faiths heightened the tensions between conflicting currents in Church life. This served to exacerbate the divide between traditionalist and reformist prelates and clergy (see below).

For the purposes of this paper, 'traditional' or 'established' refers to faiths that had a significant presence before the Gorbachev era. These include Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and Christianity. Christianity incorporates a large number of denominations, so the following examples from Christian denominations highlight common experiences, so that the broad strokes of religion are considered rather than confessional specifics.

Like the Orthodox Church, traditional religions experienced a significant growth in the number of registered associations.<sup>52</sup> There are a number of factors that set these faiths' post-Soviet experiences apart from the Orthodox Church. Russia's Muslim and Buddhist populations are heavily concentrated in certain republics. There are nine Muslim republics, which together have a population of some twenty million Muslims.<sup>53</sup> Moscow itself has a population of around one million, predominantly Tatars, the second largest ethnic group in the city. The Buddhist population is concentrated in Kalmykia and Buryatia, which border Mongolia. In 1993, 139,000, or 32 per cent, of Russia's 435,000 Jews resided in Moscow.<sup>54</sup>

The level of religiosity is an important consideration when assessing the activities and influence of traditional religions and their perceived threat to the Moscow Patriarchate. Donna Arzt contended:

In contrast to Russian Orthodox Christians, who tend not to self-identify as such unless they are firmly committed believers, or to Soviet Jews, who until recent decades were a predominantly assimilated population, a Muslim in Russia will usually profess to being Muslim, regardless of how loosely he or she adheres to Islamic precepts and practices.<sup>55</sup>

There are three inaccurate statements in this extract. It has been established that self-identified Russian Orthodox adherents are usually nominal believers; numerous studies, both by Russian and western researchers, support this conclusion. An influential study of Orthodox religious life by sociologist B.V. Dubin, published in late 1996 in *Informatsionnyi biulleten' monitoringa*, analysed data from surveys carried out between 1991 and 1996. Dubin reported that seven per cent of self-identified Orthodox believers attended church once a month or more; 17 per cent from one to several times a year, while 60 per cent replied that they did not attend church services at all.<sup>56</sup> A survey carried out in 1999 by the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Finland returned almost identical results.<sup>57</sup> There is thus a gulf between Orthodox self-identification and active worship.<sup>58</sup> It should be noted that though Orthodox adherence is widespread, active worship is the exception rather than the norm. While it is true that Russia's Jewish population is predominantly assimilated, emigration since the late 1980s means that the proportion of assimilated Jews has increased, not decreased, as Arzt suggests.<sup>59</sup> For most of the Soviet period, Jews were denied the right to emigrate, prompting the coinage *otkaznik* (refusenik). After the liberalisation of emigration policy,

over one million emigrated, chiefly to Israel and also to the USA.<sup>60</sup> Further, a sociological study concluded that 'Muslims go to mosques twice as often as Orthodox believers go to church, they pray more, and they are more diligent about observing religious rules and prescriptions'.<sup>61</sup> On the whole self-identifying believers of non-Orthodox confessions participate in religious life more actively than self-identifying Orthodox believers do;<sup>62</sup> in the case of Muslims, Jews and Buddhists, it is likely that this is because religion is a signifier of identity in a country where these are minority groups.

Like the Orthodox Church, traditional religions engaged in a wide range of activities at the first opportunity, and they, too, experienced significant challenges in the new conditions. They faced challenges as minority groups. Anti-Semitism was a significant problem.<sup>63</sup> Anti-Muslim sentiment was evident in the opposition to the erection of an Islamic cultural centre in Moscow, which mobilised thousands of residents, opportunistic politicians, and even Orthodox clergy.<sup>64</sup> The relationship between the Orthodox Church and individual faiths depends on a number of factors, principally the interests of the Patriarchate. For instance, the Patriarchate cooperated with Islamic leaders to lobby for a restrictive religious law. At other times, anti-Islamic statements by Orthodox clergy have soured this relationship. Traditional religions have also been affected by attempts to promote a privileged position for Orthodoxy. The Patriarchate particularly targets Protestant confessions; Baptists, for example, are stigmatised as a cult and invaders despite their presence on the territory of modern day Russia since the eighteenth century.<sup>65</sup>

Protestant confessions, such as Russia's Lutherans, were particularly threatened by the influx of nontraditional religious groups. The newcomers had modern evangelistic methods, and

similar theological tenets to Russian Protestants. In addition, there was a lack of dynamism characteristic of faiths subjected to prolonged repression. Traditional faiths also suffered from internal divisions.<sup>66</sup> In the Catholic Church there were tensions between Russian Catholic and Russian-Polish Catholic clergy; the former claimed that the latter were anti-Russian Polish nationalists.<sup>67</sup> Though these tensions are characteristic of modern religion, their significance derives from the specific context: many cleavages emerged only in the 1990s, at the first opportunity to openly discuss religious issues, and highlighted the significant philosophical and theological differences within these diverse communities. The revival of Catholicism was nevertheless a significant feature of Russia's post-Soviet religious boom.

In addition to the emergence of schismatic Orthodox churches in Ukraine, tensions resurfaced between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek Catholics (Uniates). These were evident during Pope John Paul II's visit to Ukraine in June 2001, in which the pontiff hoped to enhance ecumenical relations between Eastern Orthodoxy and Catholicism. While the independent Ukrainian Orthodox churches did not object, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) harshly criticised the Pope for his perceived confrontation and for attempting to proselytise in Orthodox lands.

For the purposes of this paper, 'nontraditional' refers to denominations that have developed a significant presence since Gorbachev's accession. The most conspicuous new arrivals were evangelical Protestant groups, predominantly from the USA, but also from western Europe and to a lesser extent South Korea. Reverend Billy Graham, who first visited the Soviet Union in the 1960s, had a highly successful tour in 1990, and was followed by innumerable American evangelicals. These preachers excited their

audiences in stadiums and concert halls throughout Russia, and also bought radio and television time which further spread their messages across the country, and into the homes of Russians who had conceivably not been much affected by *glasnost* in the religious sphere. Their messages were delivered in a very different way from the preaching familiar to most Russians.<sup>68</sup> Consequently these evangelical preachers received a great deal of media coverage, almost all of it negative.

Thousands of missionaries entered Russia at the first opportunity, recruited, trained and placed by sending agencies in the west. In 1995 missionaries under the jurisdiction of the 25 largest western sending agencies totaled 3,190 in the former Soviet Union, compared to just 1,716 in east and central Europe.<sup>69</sup> The overwhelming majority of these missionaries were placed in Russia and Ukraine, presumably because some post-Soviet states are predominantly Muslim and are culturally and geographically further removed from the west.

While Protestant individuals and groups had been translating, producing and distributing religious literature in the USSR since the 1960s, the new climate of tolerance in the late 1980s allowed such projects to be conducted openly – and in earnest. For instance, Bibles for Russia began operating in 1988 as ‘bible smugglers’. In late 1990 they expanded their activities to include a range of humanitarian projects as well as programs designed to establish new churches and train church leaders.<sup>70</sup> The Salvation Army, active in St Petersburg from 1913 until 1923, when the Bolsheviks forced it out of the country, resumed its work in mid-1991. *The Salvation Army Year Book (1993)* reported the Army’s initial activities:

In charge of the St Petersburg corps, Lieutenant and Mrs Geoff Ryan faithfully disciplined the new converts, established a corps programme with Bible studies, preparation classes, Sunday schools, open-air activities, community work, hospital and prison visitation, leading to the enrolment of the first soldiers some months later.<sup>71</sup>

By late 2000, there were 93 active officers, 32 cadets, 359 employees, 40 corps, 18 feeding centres, 6 senior care centres, 2 social centres, 1 village for homeless people, 1,969 senior soldiers, and 546 junior soldiers.<sup>72</sup> The Salvation Army's emphasis on community service and welfare provision is illustrative of the contribution to an ideologically pluralist society made by the new arrivals, or, in this case, the re-entry of previously forbidden religious bodies. The autonomous provision of services constitutes independent social self-organisation. In this instance, foreigners led the Russian division of the Salvation Army. The suspicion that surrounds these new arrivals is indicated by the liquidation of the Moscow branch of the Salvation Army in 1999. The Moscow Justice Department decreed that the Salvation Army is a para-military organisation. A Moscow court later reinforced this judgment.<sup>73</sup>

Denominations such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Church of Scientology, Unification Church and Hare Krishna also established a significant presence in the post-Soviet period. These confessions do not fit neatly into any category for this examination. They are generally mistrusted and condemned by mainstream denominations in both the west and Russia on the grounds that they are 'cults'. They have been and continue to be at the forefront of discussion about religious liberty, being the target of campaigns to restrict the access of foreign missionaries. Of these five, only Scientology arrived in the 1990s. The others were present either in pre-revolutionary Russia (Jehovah's Witnesses) or in the Soviet period (Mormonism, the

Unification Church, Hare Khrishna). Soviet authorities heavily persecuted both Jehovah's Witnesses and Khrishnaites. They are included in the 'nontraditional' discussion because they did not achieve a large number of adherents in the USSR, and have increased their following exponentially in the post-Soviet period.<sup>74</sup>

Initially the Moscow Patriarchate regarded Protestant missionaries as the chief threat to the Orthodox tradition. The scandal surrounding Aum Shinrikyo caused a re-evaluation of the presence and the threat of nontraditional religious associations, both foreign and indigenous. Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese apocalyptic cult that promotes the violent hastening of armageddon and the salvation of its followers alone, received a great deal of attention due to the extent of its Russian following and leader Syoko Asahara's contact with Russian authorities. Asahara's plans for world domination came to light in March 1995, after an attack on a Tokyo subway and the discovery of a stockpile of chemicals and other toxic agents. These events prompted the scrutiny of Aum Shinrikyo's activities in Russia. After meeting the head of Russia's Security Council in 1992, and sponsoring a Russian-Japanese University in Moscow, Asahara spoke at the Kremlin Palace, lectured at Moscow State University, and met with prominent politicians and representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate. Soon after Aum Shinrikyo was officially registered. It had regular timeslots on television and radio.<sup>75</sup> Aum Shinrikyo had offices in Moscow and an estimated following of 30,000 in Russia in 1995, compared with 10,000 in Japan.<sup>76</sup> Raids following the subway attack revealed a Russian military helicopter, a Russian-made military gas analyser, and suspicions that the expertise for creating noxious chemicals was sold to Aum Shinrikyo by Russian experts. Sensationalist media have since made much of the world-wide terrorist network apparently demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo-Russian connection.

The issue raised by Aum Shinrikyo's success in Russia was summarised by a journalist after relaying the findings of raids on Russian offices:

But the most important thing is not these details, nor even the fact that the sect has three times as many devotees in Russia as it does in Japan itself – what is important is that it was in Russia (and only there) that Aum Shinrikyo operated under conditions of almost absolute freedom, winning recognition in the highest echelons of Russian government structure and enjoying the patronage of influential people who gave the sect a “green light” in Russia's vast expanses.<sup>77</sup>

For those pushing for a more restrictive religion law, the Aum Shinrikyo scandal provided the ultimate justification for restricting the access of foreign religious bodies.

There were a large number of indigenous groups that fused neo-paganism, Christianity and eastern mysticism. Three in particular prompted widespread concern – The Great White Brotherhood (*Velikoe beloie bratstvo*), The Mother of God Centre (*Bogorodechnyi tsestr*), and the Vissarion Sect (*Visarion sekt*). The Great White Brotherhood, and particularly its leader Maria Devi Christos, received a great deal of attention for the predictions of the apocalypse and its pilgrimage to Ukraine. In addition, hundreds of children, some as young as eleven, joined the Great White Brotherhood, and worried parents wrote to newspapers and petitioned politicians.<sup>78</sup> A former monk established the Mother of God Centre in the late 1980s. Bereslavskii claimed that God has chosen to reveal himself through regular visions of Mary, including during the August 1991 coup, when the Virgin Mary appeared above the White House and attempted to save Russia. The Vissarion Sect came to public attention in 1995. It is based on the teachings of millionaire Sergei Torop, a former militiaman, who proclaims to be

'Vissarion-Christ'. Vissarionites live in accordance with doctrine based on the worship of the Earth and a return to nature. The followers live in settlements in the Altai taiga where they practise 'vegetarianism, accumulation of cosmic energy, extrasensoriness, urinothrapy, childbirth in the water and Zen Buddhism'.<sup>79</sup> They reject modern culture and urban living, and are building a 'Sun City' in the Siberian forest.<sup>80</sup> Though not unlike the guiding principles of hippies in the west in the 1960s and 1970s, the claim of Torop to be Christ, the complete isolation of the community, and the prevention of members from leaving the settlements illustrate a dogma that does not replicate the freedom of hippie ideals.

Faith Healers have long been regarded with credence in Russia. The influence of Grigory Rasputin over Emperor Nicholas II and his wife illustrates the widespread reverence for the *starets* (spiritual advisor). While a 1994 headline in *The Times Magazine* that claimed 'In America everyone has an analyst. In Russia they have a wizard' is overstated,<sup>81</sup> it is true that faith healing has experienced a resurgence. In 1998, Sabrina Ramet estimated there were 300,000 folk healers, witches, wizards and psychics in Russia. There is even a test designed by the Ministry of Health which, if passed, grants wizards and witches a certificate to practise, 'in effect, a witchcraft license'.<sup>82</sup> The degree of acceptance of these healing powers was highlighted by the success of Russia's most famous television psychic, Anatolii Kashpirovskii, in the 1993 elections to the Duma.<sup>83</sup> Kashpirovskii and fellow healers like Iuri Longo are widely known to the Russian public through their television appearances. In one instance Longo appeared in a 1990 documentary dancing around an unidentified corpse in a Moscow morgue, 'The body apparently responded to his bioenergy by raising first one hand and then the other, and finally rising jerkily off its slab'.<sup>84</sup>

Paganism is deeply embedded in Russian culture. Much has been written on this in recent years, particularly on the link between faiths which emphasise ecological concerns, such as the Vissarion Sect, and pagan groups.<sup>85</sup> Conscious adherence to pagan worship still exists, most notably in Siberia, and experienced a resurgence in the post-Soviet decade. In 1994 *Nezavisimaia gazeta* reported:

According to recent surveys by Mari sociologists, in Mari-El, 5 to 7 per cent of the population are “pure” pagans, 60 per cent are “dual believers” (that is how they identify themselves; dual believers go both to church and to sacred groves, believing that they are worshipping the same God in different ways), and only 30 per cent, most of them Russians, are Orthodox. The 200,000 Mari of the diaspora – in Bashkiria, Tataria and the Urals – are mainly descendants of refugees who fled Christianisation. Up to 90 per cent of the diaspora are pure pagans.<sup>86</sup>

In 1991 the Ministry of Justice registered Russia’s only official pagan organisation, *Oshmari-Chimari* (White Mari-Pure Mari), which has its own prayer books and priests. A republican law ‘On the Protection and Rational Use of the Natural Environment’ was adopted which stipulates that ‘trees may not be cut down nor any type of work done in traditional Mari worship sites’.<sup>87</sup> This law protects the sacred groves in which local pagans conduct their worship. The authors note: ‘Following the registration of Oshmari-Chimari, the aforementioned law essentially gave paganism semiofficial status’.<sup>88</sup> This case is a reminder that Russia’s regions are far different from the urban centres often cited as typical representations of the Russian population.

The re-emergence of traditional religions and denominations, the re-entry of previously banned religious bodies, and the arrival of a range of preachers and religious workers created unprecedented challenges for the Moscow Patriarchate, the most immediate of

which was defining the Church's role in the pluralist religious environment. The first task was to reduce the influence of perceived competitors in the 'new war for souls'.<sup>89</sup> Predictably, it was the Patriarchate's adoption of a position toward the changing conditions that created tensions within the Church itself. Three prerequisites of pluralism – tolerance, which, in the religious context, means the acceptance of other faiths; cooperation, which manifests as ecumenism and inter-confessional dialogue; and democracy itself, which takes the form of openness in both the religious sphere and within Church structures – underpinned the negotiation of the Church's new role. It is the implications of these external conditions on the internal life of the Church, and the subsequent rift between Orthodoxy as a formal institution, represented by the Patriarchate, and Orthodoxy as informal influence, represented by nonconformist clergy and lay activists, to which this paper now turns.

#### ***4. Reformists vs Traditionalists***

The division within the Church between traditionalists and reformists was a product of differing convictions about how to meet the multifarious post-Soviet challenges. In 1991 Veniamin Novik, an Orthodox priest, wrote, 'If one had to describe the spiritual condition of Russia in one word, that word would be 'schism', a deep inner schism of Russian society, and one that pierces every Russian who has lost his identity'.<sup>90</sup> The Orthodox Church itself has not escaped this imbroglio. Highly visible divisions have developed. Each faction within the Church has its own lay organisations, publications, journals and institutions. This is a result of different understandings of the Church's social and political role. The following section outlines the fundamental ideological and theological disagreements that underpinned this salient division in the post-Soviet decade.

Ralph Della Cava emphasises the importance of acknowledging internal Church dynamics:

Largely for its xenophobic, anti-Semitic and nationalist stand, an ultra-nationalist wing of the clergy has dominated the headlines. It alone has largely given shape to the currently dominant view of the Russian Church as a proponent, ally or pawn of broader conservative and nationalist forces. In contrast, other internal Church currents go largely unnoticed or have gotten short-shrift. Moreover, "in house" debates, especially those which on the surface seem to deal strictly with "religious matters", go for the most part unreported – in the erroneous belief that quarrels over doctrine and practise have little relationship or bearing on society as a whole.<sup>91</sup>

The salience of internal Church dynamics, and especially the convictions and activities of the reformist wing, is often overlooked in western analyses of Church life. As Della Cava points out, these generally focus on nationalist and conservative Orthodox clergy. A case in point is Victoria Clark's long chapter on Russia in her book on Eastern Orthodoxy in modern Europe. Each Orthodox adherent she encounters, from prelate to priest to *starets*, is a Russian national chauvinist, or anti-Semitic, anti-western or anti-Catholic, though usually a combination of these.<sup>92</sup>

A division in the Church became apparent when Gorbachev's concessions allowed open discussion of religious issues. Jane Ellis predicted a rift between hierarchs and dissidents.<sup>93</sup> This dichotomy lost currency when clergy became critical of the Patriarchate's position for reasons as different as those of former dissident priests Gleb Iakunin and nationalist Dmitrii Dudko. The cleavages became more complex. They were characterised as rifts between modernists and traditionalists,<sup>94</sup> reactionaries and progressives,<sup>95</sup> authoritarians and reformists,<sup>96</sup> and between the four factions identified by Della Cava: ultra-nationalists, ecumenists, institutionalists, and pastoralists.<sup>97</sup> The most useful terms for this discussion are

reformists and traditionalists. When the discussion surrounding a number of key issues is examined, these two opposed positions can usually be identified.

The first such issue to emerge, and one which engaged many commentators on Church life, including prelates, clergy and laity, was the cooperation of Church dignitaries with the KGB. One objective of Soviet religious policy was to protect the positions of collaborationist religious leaders. The extent of this was not clear until the demise of the communist regime, when the full extent of the KGB infiltration of the Patriarchate became known. The CRA appointed key Orthodox figures, and had the power to displace those who challenged Soviet rule. The regime and the Church each benefited by working together to annihilate schismatic groups and sects. The Church hierarchy assured the international community that accusations of religious persecution were merely anti-Soviet propaganda. In stark contrast to the Patriarchate's assurances, churches were destroyed, priests persecuted, and believers were beaten, imprisoned, raped and murdered. The accession of the Orthodox Church to the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1961, at the height of Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign, the most intensive of the post-Stalin years, indicates the success of this arrangement.

The degree to which the Patriarchate had been infiltrated led the institution to be derisively referred to as the *Mitropolitbiuro*, an amalgam of *mitropolit* (Metropolitan) and *Politbiuro* (Politburo).<sup>98</sup> Church collaboration with the KGB was first made an issue by the dissident journal *Glasnost'*, which published accounts of KGB meetings with Patriarch Pimen, Metropolitan Aleksii, and other hierarchs,<sup>99</sup> and an interview with a former KGB general confirming the collaboration.<sup>100</sup> The details were soon published. Three

researchers had access to KGB files on the Patriarchate: Gleb Iakunin, Viacheslav Polosin, and Aleksandr Nezhnii, a prominent journalist. They located files that detailed prelates' recruitment, trustworthiness, and the extent of their cooperation, and, after Nezhnii deciphered the thinly veiled code names, the collaborationist hierarchs were exposed in *Ogonek (Small Light)*, the newspaper at the forefront of *glasnost*.<sup>101</sup> There followed a great deal of public debate, published on the pages of *Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and Facts)*, *Russkaia mysl'* and *Posev*.<sup>102</sup> The Patriarchate responded by appealing to the 'accusers' to cease their denunciations and exposes. Round table discussions in *Ogonek* and *Stolitsa* represented a range of views on the issues of collaboration, including justifications of necessity (by Metropolitan Ioann and Deacon Andrei Kuraev) and outright condemnation (by Iakunin and Orthodox convert Zoia Krakhmal'nikova).<sup>103</sup>

The controversy was heightened by an interview with Patriarch Aleksii in 1991. When asked about the oath of loyalty that each Patriarch made during the Soviet period (he did not have to make the oath as he was elected in 1990) he replied: 'As I am a churchman, I must accept responsibility for all that happened in the life of my church: not only for what was good, but also for what was difficult, regrettable, mistaken'. He apologised for the resultant suffering,

Of those people who were pained by such concessions, by the failure to speak out, by the forced passivity and expressions of loyalty of the church leadership during that period, I ask forgiveness, understanding and prayers – not only before God, but before those people, too.<sup>104</sup>

This admission and apology was significant, and many believers, especially former dissidents, had been waiting for it for some time. It can be interpreted as Aleksii's recognition of the public support

for reformists on this issue and demands for making the leadership accountable to the laity. By comparison, the upper echelons of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church recognised that there could be no legitimate leadership unless repentance was sought for the collaboration with the communist security services. Consequently, in 1991, the Church's bishops publicly apologised.<sup>105</sup>

For some, the *modus vivendi* that began with Patriarch Sergii in 1927 was necessary for the institutional survival of the Church. Others were less forgiving. For Iakunin, acknowledgment and repentance were not enough. In an open letter to the Patriarch he asked:

Is it not time for all archbishops and priests who cooperated with the secret police to reveal to the people of the church the truth about our church's tragic history, and to put it to that same church to judge whether it has any further use for hierarchs who are CPSU and KGB collaborators, or whether the time has finally come for them to step down and for the people of the church to exercise their right to choose their own pastors freely?<sup>106</sup>

The contempt for past collusion is clear, and has been linked to the call for a more democratic and transparent leadership, and the expulsion of compromised prelates. The issue of KGB-Church collaboration has, more than any other, highlighted the gulf between the hierarchy and reformist clergy, and, moreover, there appears to be no prospect for reconciliation between the two positions.

The accessibility of Church doctrine was another key issue dividing reformists and traditionalists. The reformists called for changing the language of the liturgy from Old Church Slavonic, which cannot be fully understood by the average church-goer, to vernacular Russian, to make the service more accessible for the

congregation.<sup>107</sup> Georgii Kochetkov, well known for his evangelism and widely regarded as a leader of the reformist 'movement', introduced the reading of the gospel and other parts of the liturgy in Russian at his large Moscow parish, without the permission of the Patriarch. The Patriarch responded by moving Kochetkov to a smaller parish which could not accommodate his congregation. This prompted an open letter, published in *Segodnia*, by forty priests supporting Kochetkov and condemning the Patriarch's attempt to silence him.<sup>108</sup> The letter showed that there is support for Kochetkov's initiatives among his fellow clergy, though this is far more prominent in Moscow and St Petersburg than outside the largest cities. There has been widespread support for Kochetkov from diverse sources, including from Pospelovskii, who generally supports the Patriarch on doctrinal issues. Pospelovskii wrote in an appeal to Aleksii published in *Kontinent* (*Continent*), citing Kochetkov as the most prominent example, 'One's heart bleeds with each new report of persecution against the very best, the most evangelistically active and successful pastors of the Russian Orthodox Church and against the fruits of their spiritual, educational and missionary work'.<sup>109</sup>

Reformists placed primary importance on grassroots work in parishes. The work of slain priest Aleksandr Men' continues to inspire reformists. His emphasis on parish life and his inspirational preaching, which literally brought hundreds of thousands to the church, is regarded as a model for modern ministry.<sup>110</sup> Iakov Krotov, a frequent commentator on religious affairs who maintains a web site devoted to Men', noted:

The real meaning of Fr Alexander is his symbolical [*sic*] position in the mass media. Many of his parishioners, acquaintances, and readers still work as journalists. When they need to name someone as an exemplar of "good Christianity", they name Men. Who else? Yakunin

is too politicized a figure and he is still alive; so he is not as good for a myth. The majority of the intelligentsia is peacefully minded, and Men carries quite a peaceful name: he didn't struggle with the Patriarchy and didn't collaborate with the KGB either. So his name symbolizes for the audience of mass media... the non-aggressive, non-politicized, non-silly, non-ghetto, non-fundamentalist Russian Orthodoxy.<sup>111</sup>

Iakunin's initiatives stand in stark contrast to the non-politicised and non-confrontational nature of Men's initiatives. The radical changes that Iakunin believes would achieve greater accessibility were evident when he established the Orthodox Church of Resurrection in cooperation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate) and the True Orthodox Church. His initiatives included making fasting voluntary, replacing Old Church Slavonic (not necessarily with Russian; the language is determined by the language of the congregation), and making traditionally long services shorter. A greater level of accountability is guaranteed by Iakunin's decision to make the financial records of the Church public. These initiatives are all directed toward making Orthodoxy more accessible, including the radical move of shifting the altar to the middle of the worship room, closer to the congregation. The Church is to be open to other Orthodox denominations for dialogue and joint efforts to reform and revive the Orthodox tradition.<sup>112</sup> Traditionalists regard these initiatives as heretical. Moreover, in a highly controversial move, Iakunin 'canonised' Men'. This was criticised as unfaithful to Men's memory (Krotov commented 'Nothing could be farther from Men's spirit than his canonisation to spite "official Orthodoxy"'),<sup>113</sup> particularly as Men' emphasised the unity of the Church, and distanced himself from politics.<sup>114</sup>

The Patriarchate's stance on other Orthodox jurisdictions, and by extension on the status of ecumenical relations, also contributes to the division within the Church. Reformists regret the schism in

the Church that has emerged in the post-Soviet period, which priest Georgii Chistiakov believes has led to the 'loss of the most important virtue we [Orthodox] possess, the loss of the catholicity of our faith'.<sup>115</sup> This statement is of a tenor very different from that of the hostile statements toward other Orthodox jurisdictions by the Moscow Patriarchate. Reformists regard the disintegration of the Orthodox world into competing factions as a regrettable product of the Church leadership's competitive and pragmatist policies.

Reformists argue that relations with non-Orthodox denominations should also be strengthened. Chistiakov lamented:

Today Orthodox religiosity includes, as an almost inseparable component, a struggle against Catholics and Protestants, an attempt to expose them as enemies of our faith and of Russia, as well as complete rejection of ecumenism and of any openness towards other confessions. The very term 'ecumenism' has become pejorative and an accusation of affinity towards it is seen as evidence of a certain betrayal of Orthodoxy.<sup>116</sup>

Chistiakov continued to condemn religious intolerance and appealed to believers to embrace ecumenism and enhance inter-confessional understanding. He laments that self-righteousness and exclusiveness plague the Orthodox Church.<sup>117</sup> Though Patriarch Aleksii has experience in ecumenical bodies, including in his position as president of the Conference of European Churches,<sup>118</sup> his promotion of protecting Russia from other faiths has led reformists to regard the Church as hostile toward inter-denominational cooperation and dialogue. Tensions about the Moscow Patriarchate's membership in the World Council of Churches, over feminist and homosexual issues, led to a temporary lapse in the Orthodox Church's active participation in this body.<sup>119</sup> Reformists also argue for the relaxation of restrictions on women, such as the wearing of

headscarves, skirts and dresses in churches and for the adoption of the Gregorian calendar instead of the Julian calendar. Iakunin and Kochetkov's congregations continue to be markedly different in their demographics, characterised by younger and more intellectual worshippers. Their followers and supporters have contributed much to Orthodox life through lay activism.

The schism between reformist and traditional elements was highlighted in mid-1998 when books by Orthodox theologians, among them Aleksandr Men', were burned under order of the local hierarch in a theological seminary in Ekaterinburg. The books were denounced as 'heretical'. One commentator concluded: 'Now the appalling philosophy of schism within Orthodoxy is upon us and is taking hold in parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church.... Active efforts are underway to divide members of the Orthodox community into "clean" and "unclean".'<sup>120</sup> This tension is not restricted to prelates and clergy.

### ***5. Lay Activism***

For believers, the most profound changes accompanying the new pluralism lay outside the official Church structures. Religious issues were publicly debated and religious participation was no longer hazardous. For the purposes of this examination, lay activists are those persons identifying Orthodox precepts as central to their political cause. In addition, lay activism can include the political activities of clergy or their involvement in projects unrelated to Church life. This is explained by Fogarty: 'The 'laity' in this case includes members of the clergy who may, for instance, enter politics on the same footing as laymen, leaving behind for that purpose the special authority of their clerical office.'<sup>121</sup> This activity takes place outside official Church structures.

There was heated debate about the political involvement of clergy following the Holy Synod's November 1993 resolution that priests would not be permitted to stand for political office. This was inspired by events during the attempted coup of October 1993, when priests elected to the Congress of People's Deputies 'literally ended up on opposite sides of the barricades: Father Aleksii Zlobin was in the White House, and Father Gleb Iakunin was with the President'.<sup>122</sup> The involvement of priests in the debased world of politics prompted the Patriarch to put the choice to four clergy standing for the December 1993 Duma elections that they could retract their candidature or continue to run for election and be defrocked. Iakunin was the only priest to choose the latter option.<sup>123</sup> There followed the publication of a number of open letters: from Iakunin to Patriarch Aleksii arguing that his defrocking was uncanonical and condemning the Patriarchate's conservatism ('The church is cutting itself off from the life of society; it is ossifying, turning into a marginal, ritualised structure'); from Aleksii to the Duma chairman denouncing Iakunin's schismatic mission ('Members of the State Duma ought to know that G. P. Iakunin is actively working to create schism in the Russian Orthodox Church and thereby promote division in our society') and a number of other (increasingly bitter) correspondences.<sup>124</sup> The conflict turned violent when, in 1995, during a debate in the Duma, Nikolai Lysenko, a nationalist deputy, tore Iakunin's cross from his neck and swung it around his head, refusing to return it. A brawl ensued as other deputies defended the two men.<sup>125</sup> The Holy Synod's resolution that clergy cannot have political involvement makes the distinction between those acting with the official Church's censure and with its commendation clear.

Orthodox laity have been involved in a wide range of political projects. Some of the most well-known Orthodox activists, such as

the human rights activist Zoia Krakhmal'nikova and Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, have been involved in politics. In some instances, their claim to a political voice is based on the claim that Orthodoxy is the foundation of their political principles. They believe that Orthodoxy as a faith can and should aid the development of democracy in post-Soviet Russia, and lament that the official structures of the Church have not been able to facilitate this positive influence.

Iakunin has been described as the 'chief democrat in the Church',<sup>126</sup> a fair summation, except for the fact that Iakunin is no longer 'in the Church', having been defrocked by the Moscow Patriarchate for his political activities in 1994. He later joined the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate), under the leadership of the controversial Metropolitan Filaret. Iakunin's involvement in various radical democratic parties, election blocs and alliances testifies to the primacy he places upon the role of religion in the development of democracy. Likewise, Krakhmal'nikova has emphasised that religion can play a valuable role in increasing the prospects for democracy: 'We have to create ethical, religious and humanitarian programmes. This will help the democratic parties to produce people capable of becoming genuine democrats in action'.<sup>127</sup> Activists like Krakhmal'nikova have been involved in a range of overtly political activities, such as the political movement *Net* (No), which advocated boycotting the 1995 and 1999 elections to the Duma to protest the issues central to the electoral platforms of major parties.

A similar emphasis upon religious tolerance is evident in an interview with Krakhmal'nikova following the publication of her volume *Russkaia ideia i ievrei. Rokovoi spor. Khristianstvo, Antisemitizm, Natsionalizm* (1994) (*The Russian Idea and the Jews:*

*A Fateful Controversy. Christianity, Anti-Semitism, Nationalism*), which was a response to Igor' Shafarevich's influential anti-Semitic text *Rusofobiia*, which had been circulating in *samizdat* since 1982 and was published in *Nash sovremennik* in 1989.<sup>128</sup> Khrakmal'nikova explained:

The book was conceived ... as a Christian alternative to the threat of Russian fascism, which might don the uniform of the totalitarianism that Russia has not yet overcome, this time outfitted with an aggressive, nationalistic idea. It is no accident that this new type of fascism is trying to create a religious ideology. Its components are "patriotic Nazism", anti-Semitism and pseudo-Orthodoxy....<sup>129</sup>

The denunciation of 'pseudo-Orthodoxy' demonstrates her concern that nationalistic elements within the Russian Orthodox Church seek to use Orthodoxy for exclusive ends. Khrakmal'nikova is also concerned about its appropriation into a new chauvinistic formulation of the Russian Idea. She warns: 'a vast panorama of ominous signs of a new "Russian Idea" that is aggressive and anti-Orthodox is opening up before us'. Khrakmal'nikova's conception of Orthodoxy is one that is constructive. This translated into direct action when in September 1994 she was a founding member of the Committee For Democracy and Against Political Extremism, a response to the rising influence of neo-Nazi and other extreme right groups.<sup>130</sup>

Orthodox laity were principal voices in opposition to the restrictive legislation 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations'. This is the foremost issue sustaining debate about the Church's post-Soviet role. Khrakmal'nikova is a fierce defender of freedom of conscience and spoke out against the Patriarch and Yeltsin for supporting the legislation: 'Freedom of conscience... cannot be bought or sold, nor is it granted in exchange for certain

services. It is above any table of ranks. It is an absolute value'.<sup>131</sup> A number of clergy have been driven out of the official Church due to their opposition to this legislation. Veniamin Novik, dismissed from his teaching position at the St Petersburg Theological Academy for speaking against the 1997 law and other trespasses against the Patriarchate's doctrines, wrote:

The new law in spirit not only eliminates the possibility of ecumenism and religious reconciliation in Russia, but also further forces apart and separates a multi-confessional society. Only a rather low level of religiosity in society, and the social marginalisation of religion, can assuage the social consequences of this law.<sup>132</sup>

Novik, who mailed a letter of protest to the Yeltsin administration, was subsequently ordered to resign. The different approaches to this legislation have exacerbated existing divisions between reformists and traditionalists. The law pitted those who favoured an emphasis on ecumenism and inter-confessional dialogue against supporters of the restrictions. Iakunin, long outspoken against what he believed was fallacious religious legislation, stated that restrictive legislation would not rid Russia of dangerous cults and disruptive sects and ensure that the state had total control over the religious sphere. On the contrary, Iakunin argued that the 1997 law would damage the credibility of the Church and ultimately disadvantage it.<sup>133</sup>

Although opposition to the Moscow Patriarchate is not a defining characteristic of lay activists, many are hostile toward the Moscow Patriarchate, primarily for its reluctance to regard their concerns as important to the Church's role. Krakhmal'nikova published a number of articles called *Bitter Fruits of Sweet Captivity*, devoted to the problem of religion and the Church. The main focus of her writing is the struggle against fascism and anti-

Semitism in the Russian Orthodox Church, and the spiritual rebirth of Russia. Krakhmal'nikova is scathing in her criticism both of the compromises of the Patriarchate in the Soviet period and of the pragmatism with which contemporary politicians regard Orthodoxy.<sup>134</sup> Opposition to the Moscow Patriarchate has also to do with the dissident roots of many lay activists – Iakunin was in a labour camp from 1979 to 1987; Krakhmal'nikova was imprisoned from 1982 to 1987 for compiling a *samizdat* religious journal; and Ogorodnikov was imprisoned from 1979 to 1987 for his involvement with the discussion group the Christian Seminar.

The politically active clergy and laity mentioned here wish to see the Church leadership take a more active role in fostering tolerance and democracy, crucial to the development of pluralism. Some of the most respected rights activists identify themselves as Orthodox activists. For them, the Church's preoccupation with disciplining reformist priests and protecting Russia from the incursion of foreign missionaries denies Orthodox believers affirmative leadership, and removes the institutional Church from a positive stake in Russia's post-Soviet development. The overall effect of this lay activism has been to create internal fronts which further weaken the Church's claim to hegemony. The inability of the Patriarchate to meet post-Soviet challenges and to lead the country's recovery has led to widespread frustration, as noted by Dmitrii Pospelovskii, who opened his article 'Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church' with the animadversion: 'The Russian Orthodox Church has failed to find in itself the living force to lead Russian society morally or spiritually, as was hoped by both believers and nonbelievers when the collapse of the Soviet state had become obvious'.<sup>135</sup>

## Conclusion

The intensified religious activity during the 1990s forged a plurality that is essential for the development of democracy. However, this pluralism created significant obstacles for the Orthodox Church. The Patriarchate's lack of funds and its competitors in the 'war for souls' were significant barriers to its aspirations. Even more damaging were the splits, schisms and tensions within the Orthodox Church itself.

Dmitrii Gorin, a frequent commentator on Church affairs, points out the irony of the Church's existence in the post-Soviet period: though the state has ceased its anti-religious policy, and the Patriarchate is independent from state control, there has been heightened scandal and schism within the Church.<sup>136</sup> The discussion of the 1997 legislation demonstrated that Orthodox activists and reformist clergy have done much to encourage rights for believers of all denominations, and advocated an inclusive understanding of freedom of conscience that forged religious plurality.

There has been opposition to the Patriarchate as reformists and religious activists have taken directly opposing stances on key challenges the Church faces in the post-Soviet period. These forces have been pushing for *perestroika* within the Church since the first revelations of the extent of the leadership's collaboration with the KGB. Within Church structures, traditionalists have condemned all attempts to update Church practice; they viewed these initiatives as heretical and as attempts to destroy Church unity. Reformists view the Church as for the people, and argue that its clergy should be accessible in order to fulfil a meaningful social role. The latter regard the primary task of the Church as the

recovery of tradition, including the restoration of a privileged position in a secular state. Patriarch Aleksii is forced to negotiate between the two conflicting currents in Church life, and concessions to one inevitably lead to criticism from the other.

The assumption that there could be a singular understanding of Russian Orthodoxy is naive. Gary Bouma, a sociologist of religion, notes in his article on managing religious diversity that:

Diversity is now so pervasive that religious groups are internally diverse and many do not provide embracing, overarching, totalising meaning for their adherents. Their meanings have become one set among others, which is made even more complex by the rise of profound levels of internal diversity within religious groups.<sup>137</sup>

This religious diversity is characteristic of all modern societies. It is therefore not surprising that different visions of Orthodox life have emerged in postcommunist Russia, especially as there was limited opportunity to conduct dialogue about religious issues in the USSR. The growing strength of these unofficial currents in Orthodox life is testimony to the presence of a plurality of opinions within the Church itself. Though there is nothing as coherent as a grass-roots reform movement, criticism of the Patriarchate from a variety of sources, and support for these reformists from outside the Church, comprise disconnected dissent from the Patriarchate's line.

The implication of the Church's position for the institutionalisation of ideological pluralism in the post-authoritarian state is salient. The freedoms of the *perestroika* years brought these issues to the forefront of political and societal debate. The Moscow Patriarchate had the potential to become a powerful independent actor, which could contribute to the burgeoning civil

society and thus to the amelioration of some of the problems faced by Soviet (and subsequently Russian) society. This paper suggests some reasons why the Patriarchate did not rise to this challenge in the decade following its liberation.

The Church's sudden renaissance in the late Soviet period indicated that the Moscow Patriarchate would become a significant political and social actor. While many Orthodox dissidents dismissed the Patriarchate as a weakened and demoralised body, the majority of commentators – political, social and cultural – had great expectations of the Church. That Russia was a multi-denominational and secular state did little to dampen the widespread enthusiasm for the rehabilitation of the country's spiritual life, with Orthodoxy's regeneration at its core. The Church was expected to be a guiding force, not only in the religious sphere, but also in the political realm, despite the fact that the official line was that both prelates and clergy stand above the political fray. Moreover, a minority of Russia's population comprised active Orthodox believers who possessed a basic knowledge of Church canons. It thus emerged that self-identifying as an Orthodox believer was as much – if not more – a result of Orthodoxy's synonymy with Russian national identity than it was an indication of piety or adherence to the rules and practices of the Church.

In the post-Soviet period, the Church has attained a prominent and privileged position. Patriarch Aleksii is a highly visible national figure. Orthodoxy's elevated position is supported by the Patriarchate's close cooperation with the state on issues that are in the realm of governance, not of faith. The legislation 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations', the reconstruction of Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, financial privileges accorded by the state, and Church-state collaboration

under the Putin administration demonstrate that the Church enjoys a favoured status with the political leadership.<sup>138</sup> In the postcommunist period, the sudden liberation of religious communities and individual believers led to a 'new war for souls'. The freedoms guaranteed by the passage of liberal religious legislation in 1990 facilitated a religious boom, which inalterably changed the religious sphere. The new pluralism prompted a defensive response from Russia's traditional church.

This paper has examined the changes to religious legislation and the demise of atheist Marxism-Leninism, both of which facilitated dramatic changes in the religious sphere. The religious boom was characterised by the liberation of religious communities, the visibility of religious bodies and the increasing diversity of religious associations, including the rise of indigenous religious movements and the influx of foreign missionaries. These developments forged ideological pluralism in the religious sphere. These religious bodies constituted the independent social organisations that were crucial for the emergence of civil society. The Orthodox Church faced significant challenges in the pluralist religious sphere. While the alternative vision of Orthodoxy offered by reformist priests and lay activists aided the democratic project, there was a defensive response to religious pluralism from the Patriarchate. While the influx of new religious groups facilitated the expansion of civil society, the Patriarchate actively – and successfully – campaigned for limits on freedom and diversity in the religious domain.

When these attitudes are coupled with widespread negative attitudes towards non-Orthodox faiths, the new pluralism and diversity is threatened. The implications of the division in the Church and the contradictory nature of its contribution to the

democratic project have been explored throughout this paper. The importance of the Church's role lies in Russia's status both as a fledgling democracy and as a country that is instituting modern religious pluralism where it has no precedent. The activities of the institutional Church threaten this precarious balance. The efforts of the Moscow Patriarchate have been largely directed towards securing an advantageous position in the pluralist religious sphere.

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### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Mikhail Tul'skii, "Vakhkhabity v Rossii pobezhdaiut umerennykh musul'man?", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 19 June 2001, 8.

<sup>2</sup> For the full text see Rossiiskaia Federatsiia Federal'nyi zakon, "O svobode sovesti i o religioznykh ob'edineniakh", *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 1 October 1997, 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Aleksandr Kozmin, "100 vedushchikh politikov Rossii v mae", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 10 June 2001, 11.

<sup>4</sup> Vladimir Poresh, "Faith and Lack of Faith in Russia", *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 19, no. 1-2 (1991), 75.

<sup>5</sup> See Lyudmila Vorontsova and Sergei Filatov, "Religiosity and Political Consciousness in Postsoviet Russia", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 22, no. 4 (1994), 397-402.

<sup>6</sup> William C. Fletcher, "Reductive Containment: Soviet Religious Policy", *Journal of Church and State* vol. 22, no. 3 (1980), 503.

<sup>7</sup> Patriarkh Tikhon, "Poslanie Patriarkha Tikhona. Anafematstvovanie bol'shevikov (19.1.1918)" in *Ruskaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' v sovetskoe vremia*, ed. Gerd Shtrikker, Moscow: Propilei, 1995, 110-113.

<sup>8</sup> Patriarkh Sergii, "Poslanie pastyriam i pastve (Deklaratsiia mitropolita Sergiia) (29.7.1927)" in *Ruskaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' v sovetskoe vremia*, ed. Gerd Shtrikker, Moscow: Propilei, 1995, 268-72.

<sup>9</sup> Material for this paragraph is derived from Nathaniel Davis, *A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy*, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, 11-13; 23-27; 43. See further discussion of the extent of church closures and persecution in Michael Bourdeaux, *Religious Minorities in the Soviet Union*, London: Minority Rights Group, 1984, 26 and Dimitry V. Pospelovsky, *The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime 1917-1982*, Crestwood (NY): St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984. Their figures correlate closely with Davis'.

<sup>10</sup> The Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) and the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC) amalgamated to become the Council for Religious Affairs in 1965.

<sup>11</sup> Anonymous, "Sovetskii zakon i svoboda sovesti", *Izvestiia*, 31 January 1976, 5.

<sup>12</sup> Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, *Konstitutsiia (osnovnoi zakon) Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (7.10.1977)*, Moscow: Politizdat, 1977, 22.

<sup>13</sup> For more on interest groups see H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn W. Griffiths, eds, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971 and Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet Union: From Petrification to Pluralism?", *Problems of Communism*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1972), 25-45.

<sup>14</sup> In 1987, despite the pardoning of religious prisoners incarcerated under certain statutes of the criminal code, there remained some 296 prisoners detained for their activities or religious beliefs. See Keston College, *Religious Prisoners in the USSR*, London: Greenfire Books, 1987.

<sup>15</sup> See his political manifesto: Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, London: Collins, 1987.

<sup>16</sup> Judith Devlin, *The Rise of the Russian Democrats*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995, 60.

<sup>17</sup> I. Novikov, "Kak ponimaiut v parlamente svobodu sovesti", *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 27 September 1990, 1.

<sup>18</sup> Zakon Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, "O svobode sovesti i religioznykh organizatsiakh" in *Novye zakony SSSR*, Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia literatura, 1991, 4.

<sup>19</sup> See, for example, Stephen J. Roth, "The New Soviet Law on Religion", *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, vol. 20, no. 2-3 (1990), 36. For an analysis of the Soviet law in light of the 1929 decree and previous drafts, see Giovanni Codevilla, "Commentary on the New Soviet Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations", *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 19, no. 1-2 (1991), 119-45.

<sup>20</sup> For the full text of the law, first published in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 10 November 1990, see Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "On Freedom of Belief" in *Religion in the Soviet Republics: A Guide to Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Other Religions*, ed. Igor Troyanovsky, California: Harper San Francisco, 1991, 63-72.

<sup>21</sup> Notably the guarantee that '[p]ersons who on account of religious beliefs cannot serve in the armed forces in a combatant role shall... be permitted to serve in a capacity unconnected with the use of bearing arms' (Art. 7).

<sup>22</sup> 'Citizens of the RSFSR, foreign citizens, and stateless persons shall enjoy the right to freedom of worship on an individual or a shared basis, by way of founding appropriate public organisations'.

<sup>23</sup> Specifically Art. 28: 'Everyone is guaranteed freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, including the right to profess any religion individually or together with others or not to profess any religion, and freely to choose, hold and

disseminate religious or other convictions and to act in accordance with them'. B. El'tsin, *Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (12.12.93)*, Moscow: Prospekt, 1999, 10. See also Arts 14 and 19 (pp.8-9).

<sup>24</sup> Iuri Rozenbaum, "Nekotorye problemy gosudarstvenno-konfessional'nykh otnoshenii na sovremennom etape" in *Dia-Logos: Religii i obshchestvo 1997*, ed. Mark Smirnov, Moscow: Istina i Zhizn', 1997, 290.

<sup>25</sup> Cited in Jane Ellis, *The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness*, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, 175.

<sup>26</sup> Mezhdunarodnaia akademiia informatizatsii, *Novaia Rossiia informatsionno-statisticheskii al'manakh*, Moscow: Vsiia Moskva, 1994, 640.

<sup>27</sup> A. Bovkalo and A. Galkin, "Church Life in the Novgorod Diocese", *Religion in Eastern Europe*, vol. xiii, no. 6 (1993), 44.

<sup>28</sup> Anonymous, "Svedeniia o gosudarstvennoi registratsii ustavov religioznykh ob'edinenii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii (po dannym Ministerstva iustitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii)", *Religiia i pravo*, no. 1-2(4-5) (1998), 32-33.

<sup>29</sup> Philip Walters, "The Russian Orthodox Church and Foreign Christianity: The Legacy of the Past" in *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*, ed. John Witte and Michael Bourdeaux, New York: Orbis Books, 1999, 46.

<sup>30</sup> Unless otherwise indicated statistics in this section derive from Ministry of Justice figures published in Anonymous, "Kak idet religioznoe vozrozhdenie Rossii?", *Nauka i religii*, vol. 1 (1997), 35. See the table Anonymous, "Svedeniia o gosudarstvennoi registratsii", 31-32. The statistics for all years are as at 1 January.

<sup>31</sup> Nathaniel Davis, "The Russian Orthodox Church: Opportunity and Trouble", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 29, no. 3 (1996), 282.

<sup>32</sup> Professor Andrei Osipov, cited in Wallace Daniel, "Religion and the Struggle for Russia's Future", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 24, no. 4 (1996), 375.

<sup>33</sup> Alla Snegina and Evgenii Strel'chik, "Gde pliaska, tam i diabol", *Segodnia*, 6 October 1999, 6.

<sup>34</sup> Davis, Nathaniel. *A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy*. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, 122-123.

<sup>35</sup> G. Alimov and G. Charodeev, "Patriarkh Aleksii II: Priniimaiu otvetstvennost' za vse, chto bylo", *Izvestiia*, 10 June 1991, 2. This condition was a result of the Soviet practice of using church buildings for storage, miners' hospitals, and other uses which contributed to their decay.

<sup>36</sup> Italics removed. Belliustin, I. S. *Description of the Clergy in Rural Russia: The Memoir of a Nineteenth-Century Parish Priest (1858)*, translated by Gregory L. Freeze. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1985, 125.

<sup>37</sup> See the comments of Zoia Krakhmal'nikova and priest Aleksandr Borisov in Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, "Christianity, Antisemitism, Nationalism: Russian Orthodoxy in a Reborn Orthodox Russia" in *Consuming Russia: Popular Culture*,

*Sex, and Society Since Gorbachev*, ed. Adele Marie Barker, Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1999, 425.

<sup>38</sup> Cited in Davis, "The Russian Orthodox Church", 284.

<sup>39</sup> The 'Saint Springs' venture has, like other Church enterprises, been the subject of scandal. The profits have not been used to restore churches and monasteries in the Kostroma Province, as the label promises, but instead has been secreted away. Uzzell alleges that these profits almost certainly go to the Moscow Patriarchate, though his investigation has not confirmed exactly who receives these profits. Lawrence Uzzell, "Holy Water (2000)" (Web site). Accessed 1 February 2000 at <http://www.keston.org>.

<sup>40</sup> The International Economic Cooperation was co-founded by the Patriarchate's Finance Department, which owns 40 per cent of its shares, and has an estimated annual turnover of US\$2 billion. Mark Franchetti, "Russian Priests Get Rich on Back of Big Business", *The Sunday Times*, 17 January 1999, 28.

<sup>41</sup> Irina Rykovtseva, "Blessed Tobacco", *Moscow News*, 17-23 October 1996, 4.

<sup>42</sup> Mikolai Mitrokhin, "Church Corp.", *Moscow News*, 5-11 July 2000, 5; Maksim Shevchenko, "Kurit' - dushe ne vredit'", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 18 February 1997, 6.

<sup>43</sup> Also known as the Russian Orthodox Church (Outside Russia).

<sup>44</sup> For a summary of the tensions between the ROFC and the Russian Orthodox Church see Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993, 227-31.

<sup>45</sup> See Alexander Nezhny, "Something Bishop Eulogius has forgotten", *Moscow News*, 2-9 June 1991, 11.

<sup>46</sup> These are listed on the official web site of the ROCA. Anonymous. "Number of Parishes in Russia" (Web site). Accessed 28 June 2001 at <http://www.orthodox.net/directory/russia.htm>.

<sup>47</sup> On the little-understood True Orthodox Church see Vladimir Moss, "The True Orthodox Church of Russia", *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 19, no. 3-4 (1991), 239-50. On the Old Believers see Mikhail Shakhov, "Staroobriadchestvo segodnia: problemy i perspektivy" in *Dia-Logos: religija i obshectvo, 1998 - 1999*, ed. Nikolai Shaburov, Moscow: Istina i Zhizn', 1999, 57-66 and Roy R. Robson, *Old Believers in Modern Russia*, DeKalb: University of Illinois Press, 1995.

<sup>48</sup> Lev Mitrokhin believes 'purely political motives underlie the growing tensions...'. Lev Mitrokhin, "In Quest of Faith We Grope From the Opposite", *Social Sciences*, vol. 27, no. 4 (1996), 30.

<sup>49</sup> Marlise Simmons, "At a Crossroads, Rifts Pull at Orthodox Churches", *New York Times*, 5 November 1995, 3. These tensions are part of a wider issue of Istanbul regarding itself as the bastion of Orthodoxy in the communist period and the Moscow Patriarchate's attempts to regain its place at the centre of the Orthodox world.

<sup>50</sup> Dimitry V. Pospelovsky, "The Russian Orthodox Church in the Postcommunist CIS" in *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Michael Bourdeaux, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 45.

<sup>51</sup> Dimitry V. Pospelovsky, *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia*, Crestwood (NY): St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998, 371. For Filaret's biography, see Vladimir Ruban, "'Moscow Wants to subdue Ukraine Through the Church'", 19-26 July 1992, 14.

<sup>52</sup> In 1990, before the passage of the new legislation, there were 870 Islamic associations, 16 Buddhist associations, and 31 Jewish associations. Apparat Soveta Federatsii Federal'nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii analiticheskoe upravlenie, *Religioznye ob'edineniia rossiiskoi federatsii: Spravochnik*, Moscow: Respublika, 1996, 244. By 1 January 1996 there were 2,494 Islamic associations, 124 Buddhist associations, and 80 Jewish associations registered with the Ministry of Justice. Of the traditional Christian denominations, there were 677 Evangelical Christian-Baptists, 222 Seventh Day Adventists and 183 Roman Catholic registered associations in January 1996. Anonymous, "Svedeniia o gosudarstvennoi registratsii", 32-33.

<sup>53</sup> The Muslim republics are Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Adygeya, Chechniia, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Gasym Kerimov, "Islam and Muslims in Russia Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 24, no. 2-3 (1996), 183.

<sup>54</sup> Robert J. Brym and Rozalina Ryvkina, *The Jews of Moscow, Kiev and Minsk: Identity, Antisemitism, Emigration*, New York: New York University Press, 1994, 23. For discussion of the difficulties assessing the size of Russia's Jewish population, see Rozalina Ryvkina, "Jews in Modern Russia", *Social Sciences*, no. 1 (1997), 148-50.

<sup>55</sup> Donna E. Arzt, "Proselytizing and the Muslim Umma of Russia: Historical Heritage or Ethno-National Threat?" in *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*, ed. John Witte and Michael Bourdeaux, Maryknoll (NY): Orbis Books, 1999, 119.

<sup>56</sup> Dubin, "Pravoslavie v sotsial'nom kontekste", 15-18.

<sup>57</sup> The survey found that seven percent of Orthodox believers attended church services once a month; 19 per cent several times a year; 29 per cent once a year or less and 45 per cent never attend church. The authors conclude that church attendance in Russia is one of the lowest in Europe. Kimmo Kääriäinen and Dmitri Furman, "Religiosity in Russia in the 1990s" in *Religious Transition in Russia*, ed. Matti Kotiranta, Helsinki: Kikumora Publications, 2000, 38. See also Richard Rose, *Russia Elects a President, New Russian Barometer IX*, Glasgow: Centre for Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 2000, 53.

<sup>58</sup> Chinyaeva goes so far as to suggest that Russia 'remains among the least pious of the world's countries'. Elena Chinyaeva, "Russian Orthodox Church Forges a New Role", *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 7 (1996), 14. One Orthodox prelate also recognised the gulf between Orthodox self-identity and active worship: 'Today, if you stop people at random on the streets of Moscow and ask them if they consider themselves believers, perhaps half or even more would identify themselves as Orthodox. In most cases, however, they would not be regular churchgoers: They simply identify themselves with the Orthodox tradition and have only a limited relationship with the Church'. Hilarion Alfeev, "Reviving the

Russian Orthodox Church: A Task Both Theological and Secular" in *Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes: Voices of the New Generation*, ed. Heyward Isham and Natan M. Shklyar, Boulder: Westview Press, 2001, 238.

<sup>59</sup> See the sociological surveys Ryvkina, "Jews in Modern Russia" and Lyudmila Vorontsova and Sergei Filatov, "Religiosity and Political Consciousness in Postsoviet Russia", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 22, no. 4 (1994), 63; 64.

<sup>60</sup> See Brym and Ryvkina, *The Jews of Moscow, Kiev and Minsk*, 66-93.

<sup>61</sup> Department of Ethics and Law, "Religious Life in the Mirror of Statistics and Sociology (*Moskovskie novosti*, 17-24 March 1996, p.34)", *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 28, no. 13 (1996), 20.

<sup>62</sup> B.V. Dubin, "Pravoslavie v sotsial'nom kontekste", *Informatsionnyi biulleten' monitoringa*, vol. 6, no. 26 (1996), 15-18.

<sup>63</sup> See the publications of the Union of Councils of Soviet Jews, *Antisemitism in the Former Soviet Union: Report 1995 - 1997*, Washington: Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, 1997, 33-122 and Union of Councils of Soviet Jews, *Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia and Religious Persecution in Russia's Regions: 1999-2000*, Washington: Union of Councils of Soviet Jews, 2001.

<sup>64</sup> The discourse surrounding the debate over the cultural centre was saturated with racial stereotypes and references to the Islamic threat. Valerii Musin, "Pravoslavnye ne khotiat musul'manskoi kul'tury", *Segodnia*, 16 August 1994, 2. See also the articles in Various, "Planned Muslim Center Disturbs Muscovites", *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 96, no. 32 (1994), 1-4.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with Pavel Bel'kov of the Baptist Union, Moscow, 15 October 1999.

<sup>66</sup> In the case of Muslims it was largely because they originate from more than twenty different ethnic groups. For splits among Russia's Buddhists, see Geraldine Fagan, "Buddhism in Postsoviet Russia: Revival or Degeneration?", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 29, no. 1 (2001), 9-21. There was also a high profile split in the Jewish community over the election of a chief Rabbi. For interviews with rival candidates Adol'f Shaevich and Berl Lazar, see Maksim Shevchenko, "Dva Ravvina...", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 28 July 2000, 8.

<sup>67</sup> See the comments of a Polish prior of the Dominican community in Moscow, cited in Sergei Filatov and Lyudmila Vorontsova, "Russian Catholicism: Relic or Reality?" in *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*, ed. John Witte and Michael Bourdeaux, Maryknoll (NY): Orbis Books, 1999, 99.

<sup>68</sup> Bob Wilcox, an American evangelical preacher, reputedly called forth the sufferers in his audience at Moscow's October Theatre and shouted, 'I speak to back pain! In the name of Jesus, I command you to go!'. Cited in Serge Schmemmann, "Religion Returns to Russia, With a Vengeance", *New York Times*, 28 July 1993, A1.

<sup>69</sup> Pamela Meadows, "Missionaries to the Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe: the Twenty Largest Sending Agencies", *East-West Church and Ministry Report*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1995), 10 and Matt Miller, "Missionaries to the Former Soviet Union and East Central Europe", *East-West Church and Ministry Report*, vol. 3, no. 4 (1995), 3.

<sup>70</sup> Alfred McCroskey. *Bibles for Russia*. New England: Morris Publishing, 1998.

<sup>71</sup> Stanley Richardson, ed., *The Salvation Army Year Book (1993)*, Surrey: Unwin Brothers Limited, 1992, 87. For an explanation of the Salvation Army's militaristic language in the context of their Christian pacifist activities see the glossary in their year books.

<sup>72</sup> Margaret Sutherland, ed., *The Salvation Army Year Book (2001)*, Norwich: Page Bros, 2000, 191.

<sup>73</sup> In mid-2001, the Slavic Centre for Law and Justice (which works closely with the Institute for Religion and Law) launched an appeal on behalf of the Salvation Army in the European Court of Human Rights. See the Centre's press release: "ECLJ and SCLJ Ask the European High Court to Protect Moscow Salvation Army" (Web site). Slavic Centre for Law and Justice. Accessed 1 March 2002 at [http://www.sclj.org/news/pr\\_010712\\_protect\\_salvation\\_army.asp](http://www.sclj.org/news/pr_010712_protect_salvation_army.asp).

<sup>74</sup> The number of registered religious associations increased from 1 January 1993 to 1 January 1997 as follows: Jehovah's Witnesses 44 to 144; Mormons 1 to 11; Hare Khrishna 23 to 113; Unification Church from 1 to 10; Scientology 0 to 2. The small number of registered Scientology organisations belies the fact that the Moscow Scientology Centre is the largest branch office in the world. Anonymous, "Svedeniia o gosudarstvennoi registratsii", 32–33.. One 1996 survey cited Hare Krishna's as the largest new religious movement in Russia. Department of Ethics and Law, "Religious Life in the Mirror of Statistics and Sociology (*Moskovskie novosti*, 17-24 March 1996, p.34)", 20.

<sup>75</sup> Penny Morvant, "Cults Arouse Concern in Russia", *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 7 (1996), 20.

<sup>76</sup> Sergei Agafonov, "Strannye sviazi 'kremleuskikh mechtatelei' s iaponskoi sektoi 'Aum sinrike'", *Izvestiia*, 28 March 1995, 1-2., Sabrina P. Ramet, *Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia*, Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1998, 317. Sergei Filatov asserts that at its height in early 1995 Aum Shinrikyo had no more than 2,000 actual members, though he does not explain how he calculated this. Sergei Filatov, "Sects and New Religious Movements in Post-Soviet Russia" in *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*, ed. John Witte and Michael Bourdeaux, New York: Orbis Books, 1999, 166.

<sup>77</sup> Agafonov, "Strannye sviazi", 1.

<sup>78</sup> In 1993 the *Moscow Times* ran a story by a reporter intrigued by the success of these Russian cults in attracting children and the methods they used. For an account of their recruitment methods, see Svetlana Kolosovskaya, "Religious zealotry resurgence in Russia", *Moscow News*, 12 March 1993, 14.

<sup>79</sup> Alexander Soldatov, "From Moscow to the Taiga", *Moscow News*, 15-21 December 1995, 12.

<sup>80</sup> Serafim Kobyshev and Natal'ia Medvedeva, ""Serditse mira" na Tiber-Kule", *Ogonek*, no. 3 (1996), 27-29.

<sup>81</sup> Juliet Butler, "Magical Mystery Cures", *The Times Magazine*, 9 April 1994, 16. See also Borenstein's claim that the popularity of 'new age' movements means

that Russia is becoming 'the Southern California of Europe'. Borenstein, "Suspending Disbelief", 441.

<sup>82</sup> Ramet, *Nihil Obstat*, 320.

<sup>83</sup> Kashpirovskii was a candidate for Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party in the 1993 elections to the Duma. Anonymous, "Kandidaty v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy", *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 12 December 1993, 3.

<sup>84</sup> Butler continues: '[t]he performance won him instant adulation, in no way reduced when the corpse gave an interview to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* newspapers admitting the whole thing had been a set-up'. Butler, "Magical Mystery Cures", 17.

<sup>85</sup> See, for example, V. Krutous, "Novoiazychestvo v sovremennoi kul'ture", *Svobodnaia mysl'*, no. 7 (2000), 78-89, Boris Falikov, "Neoiazychestvo", *Novyi mir*, no. 8 (1999) and the chapter "Ekologicheskoe myshlenie. Novoe slovo dlia starogo iazychestvo" in Andrei Kuraev, *Okkul'tizm v Pravoslavii*, Moscow: Blagovest, 1998.

<sup>86</sup> Sergei Filatov and Aleksandr Shchipkov, "Sotaia eparkhiia: Poslednii iazycheskii narod Evropy", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 17 March 1994, 5.

<sup>87</sup> Filatov and Shchipkov, "Sotaia eparkhiia: Poslednii iazycheskii narod Evropy", 5.

<sup>88</sup> Filatov and Shchipkov, "Sotaia eparkhiia: Poslednii iazycheskii narod Evropy", 5.

<sup>89</sup> First used in the title of the edited volume *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*.

<sup>90</sup> Veniamin Novik, "Russia - Between Past and Future", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 22, no. 2 (1994), 138.

<sup>91</sup> Ralph Della Cava, "Reviving Orthodoxy in Russia: An Overview of the Factions in the Russian Orthodox Church, in the Spring of 1996", *Cahiers du Monde russe*, vol. 38, no. 3 (1997), 388.

<sup>92</sup> Victoria Clark, *Why Angels Fall: A Portrait of Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo*, London: Macmillan, 2000, 299; 301; 305; 306; 317; 322.

<sup>93</sup> Jane Ellis, "Hierarchs and Dissidents: Conflict over the Future of the Russian Orthodox Church", *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 18, no. 4 (1990), 307-18.

<sup>94</sup> Davis, "The Russian Orthodox Church", 280.

<sup>95</sup> James L. Haney, "Two Faces of Russian Orthodoxy: Reactionary and Progressive", *East-West Church and Ministry Report*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1995), 3-5.

<sup>96</sup> James H. Billington, "Orthodox Christianity and the Russian Transformation" in *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*, ed. John Witte and Michael Bourdeaux, New York: Orbis Books, 1999.

<sup>97</sup> Della Cava, "Reviving Orthodoxy in Russia", 387-414.

- <sup>98</sup> Mikhail Frankov, "Mysteries of the Holy Synod", *Moscow News*, 1992, 16.
- <sup>99</sup> Davis, Nathaniel. *A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy*, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, 95.
- <sup>100</sup> He stated: 'A part of the upper hierarchy of the church is on the KGB payroll'. Lev Yelin, "Demoted to the rank of... People's Deputy", *New Times*, no. 38 (1990), 15.
- <sup>101</sup> Aleksandr Nezhnyi, "'Tret'e imia", *Ogonek*, no. 4 (1992). 2-3.
- <sup>102</sup> See, for example, the interview with Shushpanovym, who worked in the Patriarchate's Department of External Church Relations, describing how he met with and provided information to the KGB, including on Iakunin. P. Luk'ianchenko, "Ispoved' byvshego agenta", *Argumenty i fakty*, February 1992, 5.
- <sup>103</sup> Aleksandr Nezhnii, "Kamo griadeshi, sviataia tserkov'?", *Ogonek*, no. 18-19 (1992), 12-13.
- <sup>104</sup> Alimov and Charodeev, "Prinimaiu otvetstvennost' za vse", 2.
- <sup>105</sup> Except for Patriarch Maksim. Michael Radu, "The Burden of Eastern Orthodoxy", *Orbis*, vol. 42, no. 2 (1998), 290.
- <sup>106</sup> Gleb Yakunin, "First Open Letter to Patriarch Aleksii II", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1994), 314.
- <sup>107</sup> See Kochetkov's argument for presenting the liturgy in Russian in Georgii Kochetkov, "Mertvovoe i zhivoe", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 14 January 1993, 5. At least one Church expert believes that:
- 'it is clear that as long as the Orthodox Church continues to use the poorly understood Church Slavonic and does not develop some simplified forms of worship for the beginner, supplement worship with catechisms for adults and make religious literature in modern idiom readily available, its missionary role with remain minimal'. Dimitry V. Pospelovskiy, "Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church: Its Problems and Its Theological Education", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 23, no. 3 (1995), 257.
- <sup>108</sup> See Pospelovskiy, "Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church", 257, n.75.
- <sup>109</sup> Dmitrii Pospelovskii, "Raznoe", *Kontinent*, no. 96 (1998), 392-95.
- <sup>110</sup> For an introduction to the work of Men', see the chapter by Michael M. Meerson, "The Life and Work of Father Aleksandr Men'" in *Seeking God: The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia*, ed. Stephen K. Batalden, Georgia, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993. On the mysterious circumstances surrounding his assassination, see Sergei Bychkov, *Khronika neraskrytogo ubiistva*, Moscow: Ingushetiia, 1996.
- <sup>111</sup> Yakov Krotov, "Fr Alexander Men (2001)" (Web site). Accessed 4 August 2001 at <http://www.earthlink.net/~amenpage/amenbio2.htm>. Krotov was converted to Orthodoxy by Men'.

<sup>112</sup> Iakov Krotov, "Aleksandr Men' i podrazhateli", *Segodnia*, 9 September 2000, 4, Konstantin Krylov. "Orthodox Church of Resurrection" (Web site). Accessed 1 December 2000 at [http://prcenter.nm.ru/11\\_sep\\_yakunin\\_-\\_myen.html](http://prcenter.nm.ru/11_sep_yakunin_-_myen.html)..

<sup>113</sup> Krotov, "Aleksandr Men' i podrazhateli", 4.

<sup>114</sup> Men's son issued the following statement condemning the canonisation: 'My father, Alexander Men, who died a martyr's death, gave his entire life to preaching the Gospel and to serving the Russian Orthodox Church. It is therefore with a feeling of deep misapprehension that I learned today about a canonization of my murdered father by an organised group of people having no relation to the Russian Orthodox Church. Keeping in mind that the people perpetrating this action are conducting an active propagandistic campaign against the Church's Hierarchy, I consider all that has taken place as a clumsy attempt to cover up their dubious undertakings by taking advantage of the reputation of my murdered father, who was always removed from any political nonsense, and I look on this as a provocation directed against all my family.' Cited by Iakov Krotov, "Michael Men Protests Against Attempts to Use the Name of His Father in an Anti-Church Campaign (2000)". (Web site). Accessed 1 December 2000 at <http://home.earthlink.net/~amenpage/imitator.htm>..

<sup>115</sup> First published in *Russkaia mysl'*, 28 September 2000, and available at: Georgy Chistiakov. "Moment of Truth for World Orthodoxy" (Web site). Russia Intercessory Prayer Network, accessed 24 September 2001 at <http://www.ripnet.org/strategies/church/dialogue.htm>.

<sup>116</sup> Georgi Chistyakov, "Whence the Anger?", *Religion in Eastern Europe*, vol. 17, no. 3 (1997), 9.

<sup>117</sup> 'We [Russians] did not elect Orthodoxy because it is the only correct teaching of faith, since correctness can only be demonstrated in the sphere of knowledge, but not in matters relating to faith which transcends into the realm of the indemonstrable'. Chistyakov, "Whence the Anger?", 9.

<sup>118</sup> For testimony of Patriarch Aleksii's 'background of genuine and deep-seated devotion to ecumenism', see John Arnold, "Patriarch Aleksii II: a Personal Impression", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 20, no. 2 (1992), 237-39.

<sup>119</sup> On tensions over WCC membership see Anonymous, "Schism Threatens Russian Orthodoxy", *The Christian Century*, vol. 115, no. 34 (1998), 1179.

<sup>120</sup> Maksim Shevchenko, "V Ekaterinburge szhigaiut knigi russkikh bogoslovov", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 29 May 1998, 1.

<sup>121</sup> Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe 1820-1953*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1957, 4.

<sup>122</sup> Aleksei Makarkin and Ol'ga Pashkova, "Delo tserkvi - molit'sia", *Segodnia*, 29 May 1999, 2.

<sup>123</sup> It has been argued that Iakunin's choice of politics over priesthood dismayed many of his supporters. Pospelovsky, "Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church", 249.

<sup>124</sup> See four documents related to the case in *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 22, no. 33, 9-21.

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<sup>125</sup> Vladimir Zhirinovskii entered the fray, leading to a fistfight between extremists and democrats. For a photograph and an account of the fracas see Anatolii Barkhudarov, "Draka na zasedanii Dumy N.L. Lysenko napal na Iakunina, a Zhirinovskii na Tishkovskuiu", *Segodnia*, 12 September 1995, 1.

<sup>126</sup><sup>126</sup> Judith Devlin, *Slavophiles and Commissars: Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia*, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, 62.

<sup>127</sup> Cited in Georgy Tselms, "The Angel of the Apocalypse has Already Sounded His Trumpet (*Novye Izvestiia*, 13 June 1999, p.4)", *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 51, no. 26 (1999), 8.

<sup>128</sup> See Robert Horvath, "The Specter of Russophobia", *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review*, vol. 25, no. 2 (1998), 199-222.

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Zoia Khrakmal'nikova, Irina Rishina, "S veroi i nadezhdoi", *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 28 September 1994, 3.

<sup>130</sup> Vladimir Guliev, "Demokraty namereny dat' boi fashizmu", *Rossiiskie vesti*, 13 September 1994, 2.

<sup>131</sup> Zoia Krakhmal'nikova, "Svoboda sovesti prevyshe tabelia o rangakh", *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 19 September 1997, 2.

<sup>132</sup> Veniamin Novik, *Pravoslavie, Khristianstvo, Demokratiia*, St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 1999, 361.

<sup>133</sup> Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. "Russian Orthodox Church Welcomes Passage of Law (22 September 1997)" (Web site). Accessed 19 August 2000 at <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/09/220997.html>.

<sup>134</sup> Rishina, "S veroi i nadezhdoi", 3.

<sup>135</sup> Pospelovsky, "Impressions of the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church", 249.

<sup>136</sup> Dmitrii Gorin, "Molchanie pastyrei", *Nezavisimaia gazeta - religii*, 3 November 1999, 11.

<sup>137</sup> Gary D. Bouma, "From Hegemony to Pluralism: Managing Religious Diversity in Modernity and Post-Modernity" in *Managing Religious Diversity*, ed. Gary D. Bouma, Surrey Hills: The Australian Association for the Study of Religions, 1999, 21.

<sup>138</sup> See Zoe Knox, 'The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate's Post-Soviet Leadership', forthcoming in *Europe-Asia Studies*, June 2003.

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**Zoe Knox** completed her PhD thesis, entitled 'The Struggle for Religious Pluralism: Russian Orthodoxy and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia', in the Centre for European Studies at Monash University in 2002. Her research interests include nationalism and national chauvinism in postcommunist states, civil society and dissent in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, and religious pluralism and civil society. Dr Knox is an Honorary Research Associate in the Centre for European Studies at Monash University.

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