

This paper provided the basis for Prof. Rotfeld's Jean Monnet Public Lecture,
delivered Monday 5th October 2009 at
The Contemporary Europe Research Centre
University of Melbourne
www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au

Talking points
presented by Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld*
(Australia, 25 Sept.-6 Oct., 2009)

Whither the World? Shaping a New Security System

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

A great number of outstanding intellectuals and experts on international affairs answer the question *Where is the World Heading?* by saying that the world is heading in the wrong direction. From this answer, it may be inferred that the authors know how the world should progress and which direction is the right and desirable one. I have to confess with humility that I have neither certainty nor clarity in this matter. Clear and unequivocal answers usually contain value judgments. Such judgments are influenced by many factors: the knowledge, experience, intuition, and value system guiding the person who formulates a specific prognosis. In matters of international security, who answers the question about where the world is heading, and why, are of key importance.

Researchers who make prognoses in this manner proceed on the assumption that 'tomorrow begins today'. In fact, the future (i.e., our expectations addressed to the future) determines our activities today. This type of thinking has several shortcomings, however: it presupposes that progress is linear in character and is based on 'laws of history.' Such a presupposition lies at the heart of the doctrine of historical determinism, in which a phenomenon is unequivocally ordained by an appropriate assessment of the circumstances in which it arises. In a word, similar circumstances give rise to similar phenomena.

In essence, a given reality forms the point of departure for formulating prognoses, but under no circumstances does it determine the direction or the tempo of further developments.

A simple projection into the future of what constituted reality in the second half of the 20th century has turned many medium- and long-term prognoses into testimony to how truly misguided many researchers' assessments were. Only a few thinkers perceived that the mono-party political system that held sway in the Soviet Union and was imposed on the countries of East-Central Europe had found itself at a dead end and was leading those countries nowhere. Not one of the countless centers for Soviet studies in the West (so called sovietologists) predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 20th century. Turbulence of a social, political, and economic nature and inter-ethnic tensions were predicted by many.¹ No one, however, predicted the rapid break-up of the Soviet empire.² In fact, only a small number of thinkers, and even fewer politicians, have the audacity to raise fundamental questions about the essence of the changes taking place in the world and what could be the consequences of qualitatively new phenomena for the world as a whole.

DIFFICULTIES IN FORMULATING PROGNOSES

As a rule, the deliberations of researchers are fragmentary in nature and concern demography, technological development, deposits of resources, climate change, the future of specific regions and powers, and international, multilateral institutions and structures. Development trends can be predicted rationally in the area of economics, demography, and the environment. On the other hand, phenomena, events, and the influence of individuals in power have an unpredictable role in the development of specific nations, states, and regions. At the end of the 19th century, the Polish thinker Jan G. Bloch predicted the probable catastrophic economic consequences of a great armed conflict with such precision that after the end of the First World War he was recognized as something of a prophet. However, neither his prophetic work,³ nor his organizational efforts, which led to the convening of the first Hague Conference at the turn of the century and the adoption of many conventions, prevented the outbreak of the war.⁴ In the late 1920s, no one thought that the Bolshevik coup in Russia (later called the 'Great Socialist Revolution') carried out in October 1917 by a handful of fanatics, would change the world for over 70 years.

No methodology exists which makes it possible to predict the emergence, in different regions of the world, of charismatic fanatics such as Lenin and Stalin in Russia, Hitler in Germany, Mao Zedong in China, Peron in Argentina, or Castro in Cuba, able to impose their will on millions of people.

There is an additional reason why prognoses are difficult in our day: the need for decision-makers to have scenarios for the future development of the world has been, and continues to be, connected with states' security requirements and defense planning 20-25 years in advance.

Answering the question of how to adapt armaments and means of defense so as to effectively counteract future threats requires time to elaborate new technologies and to move them into production. This is a particularly complex task when the risk and threats are of an unconventional nature. With a few exceptions, if judgment is to be made on the basis of the almost 20 years that have elapsed since the end of the 'Cold War,' conflicts and wars have had an asymmetrical character as a rule; in the last 20 years risks and threats did not originate with other states, but with various types of terrorist organizations and structures, referred to as 'non-state actors.' For the fourth consecutive year no interstate conflict was recorded in 2007. Only 3 major armed conflicts were fought between states during the entire period 1998-2007. The remaining 30 major armed conflicts recorded for this period were all fought within states.⁵

The main sources of threat and destabilization are to be found today among weak and failed states, and not among strong, aggressive military powers, as used to be the case in the past. Today, these powers often use weak states in order to conduct wars *in procura*, while terrorist criminal organizations are instruments in the destabilization of the states against which their activities are directed. Hezbollah, by attacking Israel from the territory of south Lebanon, has posed a significantly greater threat to Israel than the neighboring Arab powers, including Syria. The support given to Hezbollah by Iran is an open secret. In the future, the global situation and international relations will be affected by relations within states far more than by relations between them. This simple truth is making its way, slowly and onerously, into the minds of decision-makers, observers, and security and defense analysts. It cannot be denied that, on the scale of the past 300 years, this is a qualitatively new phenomenon. In Europe, similar threats last existed in the 17th century, during the religious wars. This chapter was definitively closed by two treaties concluded in 1648 in Münster and Osnabrück. The treaties have gone down in history as the Peace of Westphalia, which for 350 years established an international order based on recognition of the state as the sole responsible subject of international relations. The end of the 1990s ushered in the beginning of the breakdown of this system in which states – and only states – bore exclusive responsibility for the armed acts committed from their territories against other states.

In this new situation, the old system has been subject to erosion and is no longer adequate for resolving conflict situations, while a new system has not yet taken shape. As a result, public opinion has aimed its criticisms about the system's ineffectiveness at international multilateral institutions, especially the UN, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. A conviction has taken hold that the incompetence of multilateral institutions has been caused by their weaknesses, crisis and organizational ineffectiveness. This has given rise to attempts to find ways of increasing the efficiency of multilateralism: a new international order would thus be based on effective multilateralism, as postulated by Javier Solana in the European Security Strategy, adopted by the EU on 12 December 2003.⁶ Similar documents were drawn up in many other international institutions, including the UN and the OSCE.⁷ The guiding principle behind these reports was the conviction that improving structures and institutions is the appropriate answer to the new risks and threats.

Difficulties in defining the new international system are manifold. **Firstly**, existing institutions emerged as a result of the Second World War and post-war development. They have existed longer than the conditions and circumstances in which they were called into being. The point is that international relations are, by their very nature, a dynamic process, whereas organizations, structures, mechanisms and procedures are static in character and tend to petrify solutions which slowly become less and less adequate in the face of changing realities.

Secondly, global international security during the era of the Cold War was organized around the ideas of mutual 'deterrence' and 'containment.' This state of affairs determined the main global lines of division (East-West) and an ideological, political, and military confrontation whose consequence was the political philosophy of 'exclusiveness.' Upon the end of the Cold War and the adoption of new common values, principles, and norms, deterrence was replaced by concept of cooperativeness and mutual engagement. The new situation revolves around the philosophy of 'inclusiveness,' of overcoming division, and of cooperation. This shift has led not only to enlargement of existing institutions (such as NATO and the EU, for example), but also to a whole new network of ties such as Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and various regional or sub-regional institutions revolving mainly around the Mediterranean (the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Initiative) and Central Europe (the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative, etc.).

And thirdly, the world finds itself in a period that can be defined by using the term ‘Inter-era’ or ‘Inter-epoch’. It is telling that immediately following the end of the Cold War, there was no appropriate expression to define the essence of the new state of international relations. The term used was ‘post-Cold War period,’ but the shaping of a new type of relations in the world meant that this term no longer reflects the essence of the matter. In a way, it only defines the new situation by negation: ‘the Cold War era belongs to the past.’ In no measure does it define the essence of the new period. Moreover, the extension of old structures and the establishment of new ones have led to the institutionalization, so to speak, of the new ‘post-Cold War type relations’, which have been partially tried and verified by the course of events.

The Great Transformation did not take place as a result of a war or of a victory following which the vanquished party accepted the conditions and rules imposed by the victors, as was the case following the Napoleonic Wars, at the Congress of Vienna (1815); after the unification of Germany (1871), and the end of the Balkan Wars at the Congress of Berlin (1878); after the Great War, when the victorious powers dictated the conditions of the new legal and political order in the Treaty of Versailles (1918); and, finally, after the Second World War and Germany’s unconditional surrender, when the powers of the great anti-Nazi coalition defined the global principles and norms enshrined in the UN Charter in San Francisco and the new political and territorial order in Europe in the Potsdam Agreement (1945). The end of the Cold War had a different genesis, a different course, and different consequences. The hegemony and dominance of the superpowers and the division of Europe and the world into East and West was overcome. The bipolar system belongs to the past. The old system has definitely broken down, whereas the new one has not yet taken shape.

SEARCHING FOR A NEW SYSTEM

The conviction that the international system can be shaped in a model way is widespread and ensues from the need to impose order on a complex subject matter perceived as a world of chaos, uncertainty, and instability. In effect, after the breakdown of the bipolar system, two diametrically opposed concepts emerged: **the model of unipolarity**, which in essence constituted an attempt to describe the new role of the United States as the dominant and hegemonic power in the contemporary world, and **the model of multipolarity**, which implicitly presupposed the division of the world into spheres of influence among global

powers'. In other words, in place of two centers of gravity (Washington and Moscow) the new model presupposed either a unipolar system with a hegemonic position for the United States, or a multipolar system with specific privileges for the great powers, who pretend to impose their will upon states within their sphere of interests and influence. This constituted a search for a kind of a new directorate – a sort of concert of powers that would rule the world. Such searching is based on the premise that polarity is, in its essence, an eternal or immemorial idea ordering the international community. In reality, the bipolar world was an exception to the rule. It was merely a reflection of a specific historical situation that took shape following the Second World War, when the two largest victorious powers (the United States and the Soviet Union) not only relied on enormous nuclear arsenals sufficient to assure mutual destruction, but also formed the center of gravity for two opposite social and political systems. The concept of mutual deterrence, whose premise had been the high probability that a nuclear conflict would break out, was also accompanied by a high degree of stabilization. The 'armed peace' presupposed the maintenance of the territorial and political status quo in the regions dominated by the two political and military blocs.

The new international political and military environment differs fundamentally from the situation that was the cause and source of the Cold War between East and West. The new reality is incomparably more complex, and attempts to steer or 'manage' the world in keeping with a political philosophy of rival power centers ('multipolarism') are not adequate in terms of the changes that are taking place in the contemporary world. In military terms, the United States and Russia (as the successor-state to the Soviet Union) have long since lost their nuclear monopoly. Furthermore, a serious erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime has taken place, and nuclear weapons are now in the hands not only of the five great powers – members of the UN Security Council – but also in those of India, Pakistan, and Israel which is universally considered a 'nuclear state' though it has never declared itself a 'nuclear state' and has not yet conducted any nuclear tests.

A significant destabilizing factor is provided by states that are contesting the established international political and legal order (North Korea and Iran) and which, their official declarations and obligations notwithstanding, have made attempts, with varying degrees of success, to set in motion their own nuclear programs. The construction of nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea is initiated under the pretext of building nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes; nearly 20 other states are sufficiently advanced technologically to allow them to acquire their own nuclear weapons in a relatively short time.

In essence, the only effective means of preventing the proliferation of such weapons is the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. Even if such a program does not seem feasible from our perspective, we should not forget that conventions on the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction (such as that on bacteriological and toxic weapons of 1972 and that on chemical weapons of 1993) testify to the fact that, given favorable conditions, the denuclearization of the world in the 21st century might also be possible.⁸

Such a premise has been adopted by two former U.S. secretaries of state, George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, as well as by a former secretary of defense, William Perry, and a former senator, Sam Nunn, who have published a joint appeal to American leaders, urging them to take steps to free the world from nuclear weapons.⁹ The authors did not stop with this appeal, however, and with the participation of some leading U.S. experts, have initiated work on specific political steps to bring the project to life. A similar attempt was taken up by some former British politicians.

In this context, a not often mentioned general observation comes to my mind. In the final stages of the Cold War, rather considerable and effective military instruments of confidence building and of arms reduction and limitation, as well as measures to eliminate some weapons, were successfully adopted. Together, they amount to over 35 conventions, arrangements, and protocols, which form the political and legal international base for arms control on a regional and global scale.¹⁰ Following the breakdown of the bipolar system, it was expected that the understandings that had already been negotiated and signed (such as, for example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT) would be quickly ratified and implemented, whereas others, concerning difficult matters connected with, for example, the non-proliferation of new dual-use (civilian and military) technologies, would be quickly completed, without the obstacles and difficulties that such negotiations entailed in the past.

It came as a surprise to many observers and security analysts that not only is there no progress in talks on arms limitations and disarmament, but that some regress can be observed in the implementation of obligations adopted during the Cold War. The most glaring example is the erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation system: a successive review conference, called under UN auspices in 2005 for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), failed for the first time in 35 years to draw up a single common document confirming all previously adopted understandings and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime. Fortunately, the review

conference called in 1995 had adopted a stipulation stating that the NPT is to be in force without time limitations. Had this not been the case, the absence of agreement in 2005 could have led to the practical end of this arguably most important of all universal documents, which had established a global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Another example is the nearly 30-year-long deadlock at the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Furthermore, we are seeing both great powers (the United States and Russia) moving away from the treaties concluded earlier (the ABM treaty, for example) either through common agreement or by unilateral decision to ‘suspend’ the application of agreements, such as that on the limitation of conventional weapons in Europe (the CFE treaty).¹¹ At the same time, informal agreements, negotiated outside of the UN system – and often more effective than international legal instruments – have been concluded: for instance, the Proliferation Security Initiative – PSI (known as the Cracow Initiative), presented by U.S. president George W. Bush in Cracow in 2003. This initiative for reinforcing security by counteracting proliferation gained the support of the main nuclear and non-nuclear powers and has turned out to be an effective instrument for arms control. There are more examples of such attempts to find a way out of seemingly insoluble situations: e.g., the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use (civilian and military) goods and technologies.

Other attempts to meet the new challenges include initiatives of a global character, such as the Global Threat Reduction (GTR) initiative, The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, or the informal Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). But even though these and similar initiatives mean that the world is safer and is not irretrievably steeped in chaos and disorder, and even if they provide some degree of stability and a limited measure of predictability in states’ conduct, they do not form a cohesive new system. The most important institution established outside the UN framework is the G8 club, a group formed by the eight most affluent industrialized countries of the world, including France, Japan, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the United States, and Russia. This institution was established by an informal group of powers to seize the initiative in matters which, by their nature, should have been the subject of deliberations by the UN Security Council, and to meet the expectations of the international community, which had been disappointed by the ineffectiveness or the dysfunctional nature of institutions established within the framework of the existing international legal order based on treaties and conventions concluded under international law.

THE NEW ROLE OF THE STATE

We are witnessing the erosion of the institution of the state. The role it has played for over 350 years as part of the Westphalian system is being changed in a fundamental way. The classic definition of the state includes three elements: a defined territory, a population, and effective authority (government).¹² According to the law, whose foundation in international relations is the United Nations Charter, territorial sovereignty and the principle of the sovereign equality of states prevent any interference in matters of the internal competence of any state.¹³ In reality, during the 60 years that have passed since the signing of the United Nations Charter, there have been several significant changes, which are not adequately reflected in either theory of international law or in the practice of international relations. The three classic criteria forming the definition of a state should be – and in essence have been, through the adoption of treaties and conventions – amended to include some additional requirements: a) state authority has to be not only effective, but its execution pursuant to internal law has to rest on rules and norms arising from obligations under international law (this applies particularly to the respect of human rights and the rights of minorities); b) states are subject to appraisal and accountability by their own societies and international institutions (such as the UN Human Rights Council on the global scale or the OSCE and the Council of Europe on the regional scale) and are accountable to them. State authorities cannot circumvent this obligation by reference to the principle of non-interference into internal affairs). In other words, the World in Transition is based on new principles: it is ruled by additional mechanisms and procedures which form an important complement to the classic legal order of the Westphalian system. Developments leading to the world of the future are determined by three main processes: **globalization, the modernization which it entails, and democratization, preceded by the shaping of the rule of law.** These processes unfold simultaneously; they are supra-national in nature and encompass the entire international community – even if not to the same extent or the same degree.

Awareness of this state of affairs is making difficult headway among those leading elites that wish to maintain the status quo and try to counter the unfolding changes and among significant segments of the population in various countries and regions where these changes are undermining the sense of certainty and stability within the traditional organization of society. In many regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, such changes are even viewed as attempts to impose Western values on these societies (‘Westernization’ and ‘Americanization’). In effect, the globalization process leads to fragmentation at times and in

many parts of the globe modernization calls forth resistance and defense of the traditional and conservative way of life. In turn, democratization is presented as a historically-shaped means of exercising power in highly-developed and affluent Western societies, a means which is not adapted to the culture, mentality and traditions of other parts of the world. This forms a breeding ground for populism, which in certain parts of the world, especially in Latin America, has taken on the form of Anti-Americanism, and is fast gaining the support of wide masses and could lead to threatening consequences in the sphere of regional and global security (an illustration of this is the support enjoyed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran, or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and in many other Latin American countries). The difficulties in defining the future course of events in the world are leading many theoreticians and politicians to look for analogies in the past and, on this basis, to formulate a new idea for ordering the world in the 21st century.

A SYSTEM OF NEW BALANCE

In this context, interesting new ideas were presented in the summer of 2005 by the American quarterly, *International Security*.¹⁴ The debate which thus began was a response to the security strategy of George W. Bush's administration, which justified the right of the United States to take preemptive action against states that supposedly constituted a threat to American interests, even should the American position fail to secure wider support from other participants in the international system. Robert A. Pape, a professor at the University of Chicago, questioned this new 'doctrine' and expressed the view that it would lead to a fundamental transformation of the international system. The essence of the transformation would be the 'soft-balancing' of the United States, in which other global powers would not 'directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies.'¹⁵ Should this approach on the part of the major players on the international stage fail to temper the policies of the United States, the increasing 'soft' balancing would form the basis for a 'hard' version directed against the United States. Pape argues that the United States should 'renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy on the use of force – a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits.'¹⁶ In his opinion, 'soft balancing' of American policy by the other major powers has already begun. 'Global powers are reacting to their own anxiety at the intentions

of the USA, not to American ability [to respond].’ In other words, nothing has been determined: the reaction of America’s partners is dictated by anxiety rather than by a negative attitude towards the USA. This is particularly true for Germany, France, and the EU as a whole. However, America is expected to take steps that will lastingly alter the perception of the United States amongst its allies. This is a new approach to security policy as understood by the U.S.’s partners. In the last 15 years, international security analysts have come to believe, not without reason, that **the theory of balance of power** in an international system dominated by the American superpower has lost its meaning. Second-tier world powers (such as China, France, and Russia, or India, Germany, and Brazil) would rather avoid taking steps, single-handedly or even as part of changing alliances, that could be interpreted as building a counterweight to the United States. In no circumstances would they acquiesce to the limitation of their sovereignty or to making the pursuit of their interests subordinate to, or dependent on, America’s goodwill. Following the United States’ intervention in Iraq, there have been tendencies, particularly at the UN, to create temporary coalitions aimed at the curtailment or ‘containment’ of the United States.¹⁷ In this context, four potential ‘alliances’ were considered:

- 1/ a strategic partnership between Russia and China;
- 2/ Russian assistance in the development of Iran’s nuclear program;
- 3/ efforts on the part of the EU to expand its own defense potential; and finally,
- 4/ opposition of the powers to America’s intervention in Iraq. None of these options provides grounds for formulating the thesis that ‘soft-balancing’ is a preliminary stage in a return to the concept of balance of power in the world.¹⁸

Security in the 21st century world will most probably not rest upon traditional, classic alliances and counter-alliances. Nothing seems to indicate that the global powers are about to assault one another. On the other hand, the growing sense of uncertainty and anxiety connected with an unpredictable course of events set off by internal developments in one of the world’s sensitive regions (the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, or the Korean peninsula) is a challenge and a threat. Both internal political forces and external powers could easily lose control of such developments. Preventing this is in the interests of the main powers and will induce them to cooperate rather than to take advantage of the situation militarily (a good illustration of this is the reaction of the powers to the course of events in Pakistan following

the assassination of Benazir Bhutto or joint negative assessment by the UN Security Council of the Iranian nuclear program).

Efforts should be made to seek a balance of interests, rather than a balance of power, even though the establishment of such a balance of interests – should it be limited to the world powers – would lead to natural opposition and resistance on the part of medium-size and small states fearing the potential harm to their own interests. From the Central European perspective, a good illustration of such an understanding of the balance of interest between Russia and Germany is the decision to build the northern gas pipeline (North Stream). This project gives rise to two questions: why have Russia and Germany chosen to lay a gas pipeline at the bottom of the sea – an option that is by its nature more costly and environmentally harmful than the land route – and what is the future of the gas pipelines running, for example, through Polish territory? The answer to these questions contains several elements: firstly, Russia is using its monopolist position as the producer and exporter of energy resources in order to secure economic leverage to exert political influence on Europe; secondly, the choice of Germany as Russia's principal partner and distributor of gas for all of Europe institutionalizes Germany's privileged treatment in this matter, to the detriment of the energy security interests of Central Eastern European countries; thirdly, realization of the project will hamper the shaping of a common European strategy to provide energy security for the entire EU.

A peculiar understanding of the concept of the major powers' balance of interests was presented in September 2007 by Russia's minister for foreign affairs, Sergei Lavrov: 'Conditions of freedom dictate the necessity of collective leadership by the key states of the world. This may be called a "concert of the powers for the 21st century." [...] It wouldn't hurt the part of the world customarily known as the Euro-Atlantic region to have a triple understanding – between the US, Russia and the European Union. [...] I agree that such a "troika" could "steer the global boat into untroubled waters." Within this "triangle" there are things on which Europe is closer to the US, but on a number of strategic issues it has more similarity with Russia. Take the theme of using force and other forms of coercion, and also the attitude to international law. Despite differences in the "troika," we must seek to arrive at the highest-possible common denominator. Anyway, if some people think that it's impossible to do without a concept of containment, then this kind of "triple concert" is the best – and most importantly – a non-confrontational and non-cost form of mutual containment. Perhaps it is time to think of a new definition of Atlanticism that does not exclude Russia.'¹⁹ Thus

Lavrov. This concept was later developed by Vladimir Putin and recently presented by the new Russian President Dimitri Medvedev at the Evian Global Security Conference (8 Oct. 2008).

The political philosophy behind Russian policy is based on a new interpretation of the old concept of the balance of power, which, according to the Russian foreign minister, has not changed: 'Russia has now borne a considerable share of the burden of maintaining the balance of power in European and world politics for 300 years.'²⁰ According to Russia's head of diplomacy, the element of continuity in Russia's foreign policy has greater significance than the fundamental changes that have taken place on the European and world stage. The formula of the balance of power in international politics is based, according to Lavrov, on 'peaceful coexistence, reliance upon international law, collective security, and the political-diplomatic settlement of conflicts.'²¹ Such a wide view of the balance of power concept does more to blur than to explain the essence of the new role to which Russia aspires in its relations with the outside world. In this respect, the statements of President Vladimir Putin were more overt. Their guiding motive was not the search for a balance of interests as much as recognition of the new Russia as a global power – with a position in the world equal to that of the United States. In other words, it is a policy aimed at Russia's recovery – in a radically changed world – of the rank once occupied by the Soviet Union in the bipolar system. In reaching these aims, the decisive factors that have influenced Russia's changing approach to global issues have not been world developments in themselves so much as the changing situation in Russia itself. Two factors are of key importance in Russia's new approach to resolving current and future problems in the world and in Europe: its possession of the world's largest nuclear-weapon arsenal and delivery system²² along with the United States, and its enormous resources of energy raw materials (gas and oil), for which world demand is rising. These resources are not renewable. Increased demand, along with increasingly difficult access to these strategic resources, has caused their prices to skyrocket (fivefold in five years), but additionally, access to these resources is becoming an important lever in the security policy of states, as well as an instrument of pressure and blackmail.

On 10 February 2007, at the Munich Security Policy Conference, Russian president Vladimir Putin declared: 'I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.'²³ The principal aim of the Russian president was to question the United States' dominant position in the world in all possible spheres – political, economic, and military. He also used the opportunity to criticize

institutions that have significant achievements to their account in the process of the peaceful transformation of the international system. Thus, he accused Western countries of transforming the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) into a 'vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries' at the expense of others.²⁴ He questioned the rationale behind the deployment in Europe of the U.S. missile defense shield. Several months later, on 4 June 2007, in a conversation with journalists from G8 member states, President Putin predicted a new arms race,²⁵ while at the same time rejecting Russian responsibility for 'improving [Russian] strategic nuclear weapons.' Missile defense, Putin explained, disrupts the strategic balance. 'In order to restore that balance without setting up a missile defense system we will have to create a system to overcome missile defense, and this is what we are doing now.'²⁶ The draft of the new European Security Treaty presented by President Medvedev in Evian does not represent a new concept. It recalls rather Gustav Stresemann's way of thinking reflected in the Locarno Pacts of 1925. Stresemann, the Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic intended to re-establish the position of Germany after defeat in the First World War. To some extent this is the main motive behind Russia's recent initiative: to institutionalize the global power position of Russia after defeat in the Cold War.

This thinking is based on the anachronistic concept that a return to the doctrine of mutual deterrence can ensure security. One consequence of this doctrine is an unavoidable arms race. A missile defense system common to the United States and Europe, with the participation of Russia, would be far more promising. However, such an alternative will not be the result of a decision-making process in which the decisive voice will be that of military officers or general staffs, but will rather be the expression of a new political philosophy corresponding to the needs of the 21st century. It would neutralize present and future potential threats to Russia, which do not originate from the West, but from the South. It can not be ruled out that the sharper tone and the confrontational rhetoric are dictated by domestic needs and do not express Russia's new long-term assertive strategy in its relations with the outside world. A notable improvement in Russia's economic situation could equally favor an increase of belligerence and even arrogance, or a calm and rational calculation of the costs and benefits of a policy of distrust, tensions, confrontation, and an arms race. Russia's desire to improve its position in the world is natural and understandable. It remains to be seen which option will be chosen by the political elites in power. In matters of internal development, there has been a clear reorientation: from democratic choice initiated at the time of Mikhail Gorbachev's

perestroika and continued by Boris Yeltsin following the breakup of the Soviet Union, to an authoritarian regime which has a long tradition in the country: beginning with the despotism of Ivan the Terrible at the end of the 16th century, through the policies of Peter the Great and the opening to the West in the 17th century, to the building of empire in the 18th century by Catherine the Great. Modernization attempts by the reformist governments of prime ministers Sergei Witte and Piotr Stolipin in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century were not accompanied by either democracy or the building of a state under the rule of law. Autocracy was dominant.

Robert Cooper was right when he wrote that ‘This is a new world, but there is neither a new world order (...) nor is there a new disorder.’²⁷ There is a safe Europe and a safe North America, but there are areas from which threats emanate, not only for individual regions (the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula), but for the world as a whole. There are also areas of chaos, lack of prospects for development, uncertainty, poverty, famine, and disease (Africa, and many countries of Asia and Latin America). In Cooper’s view, we live in a divided world, but divided quite differently from the days of the East-West confrontation. There are three parts of the world: pre-modern (with post-imperial chaos); the second part is the modern world (with the classical state system); and the states of the post-modern world, the affluent and highly developed North – most of Europe, the United States and Canada – and Japan, Australia, and New Zealand can also be added to this group. Modern states are on the whole well organized, and they have entered the industrial stage, mainly in Asia, Latin America and parts of Africa (including the new global powers of China, India, Russia, and Brazil who also belong to this group). Finally, the pre-modern states, in which chiefs of tribes, leaders of clans, or great families exercise authority; and simple people exist at a level of poverty that is unimaginable for Europeans and Americans. This group of states form a zone of chaos, conflict, and unpredictable developments.

In the opinion of a classic practitioner of *Realpolitik*, there are two paths to stability: hegemony or equilibrium.²⁸ Such thinking about challenges reflects a time that belongs to the past. In the diversified yet interdependent world of the 21st century, it is futile to refer to the simple schemes and logical thought patterns that corresponded to the needs of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th. Their application, while failing to address present problems, creates new ones instead.

Unconventional problems and situations call for unconventional solutions. In practice this requires awareness of the fact that just as the world is diversified, the methods for neutralizing risks and threats are complex. International security necessitates a holistic approach, encompassing not only the political and military dimension (as was the case in the past), but also taking into account economics, information technology, and civilizational issues, and allowing nations to protect and cultivate their identities. Because the 21st-century world is made up of countries belonging to three categories (pre-modern, modern, and post-modern), which do not accept dominance and hegemony, the organizing principle for the new global system cannot be reduced to one mono-casual decisive factor, such as, in the past, *mutual deterrence* based on a balance of fear. For the United States, under the governance of the Republican George W. Bush administration, such an organizing idea was **the promotion of democracy**. In an extreme version – **regime change**. For countries of the European Union, the key criterion is respect for *the rule of law*. For the world as a whole, the organizing idea for global security is *interdependence*. The fundamental challenges, defined 40 years ago by Karl Deutsch,²⁹ remain significant: mutual relations between nations and states on the one hand, and between societies and the international community on the other.

For Europeans, international relations in the next 15-20 years will mainly be perceived through the role that the European Union plays on the world stage. In the past 15 years, two countries, Ireland and Finland, which were formerly poor, backward, and peripheral, have come to symbolize the possibilities created by membership of the European community, correlated with deep internal transformations and an effective participation in globalization and modernization processes.

The organizing principle in the global system will be growing **interdependence**. An increasing number of spheres of life will be regulated in consideration of common global threats connected with climate change and the lack of fresh water in many regions of the world. The legitimacy of the new world order will not rest on great new treaties under international law, but on political agreements whose effectiveness will depend on the convergence and balance of various interests. International life will be subordinated not so much to great strategies as to pragmatic understandings and functional needs.

The main determinants of the international security in the world by 2020-25 are to great extent predictable: the emergence of new global powers; the heterogenic nature of values in three main parts of the world (pre-modern, modern and post-modern states),

accompanied by decline of universal values; the return of the use of force as a means of settling conflicts between states and an attempt to establish 'zones of privileged interest' for global and regional powers; new threats posed by populism, ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism; the increased role and significance of multilateral institutions who will not be able to meet high expectations either in constructing a global security system or in reducing economic imbalances and overcoming the line of division between the rich North and poor South. The future crisis situations, imbalances and instability will require a coordinated response of the community of democratic nations. It will be reflected in new type of institutionalized relationship between the United States and Europe (one of the possible instruments will be broad political transatlantic arrangement between the European Union and NATO with the aim of reducing imbalances and stabilizing global security).

Military and economic aspects will remain significant, particularly in the policies pursued by the global powers, but the significance of other non-military factors will increase; a special role will be played by intellectual and scientific potential and the ability to implement innovative solutions quickly, especially in the sphere of information technology and bio- and nanotechnologies.

In Karl Birnbaum's view two developments are of particular importance in defining the challenges of the 21st century: 1. the increasing mutual dependence between all the nations; 2. the increasing striving for emancipation and self-assertion on the part of individuals, groups and nations.³⁰ The synergy of these two developments, argued Birnbaum, is one of the main reasons for the multiplication and escalation of conflicts within and between nations. Such an attempt to explain and interpret the complexity of present and future challenges and threats by two factors, although attractive for researchers and security analysts is in fact based on determinants which are known. The collision of interests and possible future conflicts will result in a multiplicity of new actors and factors which cannot be reduced to two important developments. One has to take into consideration the simple assertion that each and every generation is defining a new set of values, political priorities and security requirements. The ethical moral approach and political attitude of future generations is unknown. One thing is for certain: the political philosophy and morality of the post-modern world differs from that pursued by societies in the modern world. The German philosopher Hans Jonas argued that our age 'requires *anticipatory ethics* which presuppose the capacity to empathically visualize the distant consequences of our actions'.³¹

Three processes will define the heterogenic nature of the international political system. Firstly, the old and new world powers will strive to secure a dominant role in the decision-making process and in the manner of addressing global problems. Secondly, the United States will increasingly confine itself to a policy of self-limitation, particularly in regions and in matters which will not be priorities in terms of U.S. national interests. The world will respect the position and role of the United States as an 'indispensable power' in the resolution of the most important problems. Even though, in their rhetoric, the global powers will increasingly often make reference to the 'common interests of the international community,' in practice they will be guided by their own national interests, often to the detriment of medium- and small-sized countries.

Thirdly, the number of weak, declining, and failed states who are unable to provide for the basic needs of their own societies will rise. A new phenomenon is the fact that countries of the poor South no longer acquiesce in their destitute condition and direct their anger at the world of the affluent North. This will be the principal source of future conflicts, especially in Africa, and partially in Asia and in Latin America.

The European Union will be seen as a reference point and a model to be emulated in other parts of the world. The main axes of opposition and rivalry on the global scale will be defined by tensions between the rule of law and democracy on the one hand, and aggressive religious fundamentalism, a peculiar form of theocracy and autocracy, on the other. Security in the world of tomorrow will be a function of harmonizing the interests of states and nations with those of societies and the international community.

***Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld**

former Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

At present: Chairman of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (ABDM) and Co-chairman of the Polish-Russian Task Group for Difficult Matters.

¹ Notably the work of H el ene Carr ere d'Encausse, *L'Empire  clat *, Flammarion, Paris 1978.

² Two years after Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power, the scholar Paul Kennedy published a book entitled *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, Random House, New York 1987.

³ J. Bloch, *Przyszła wojna pod względem technicznym, politycznym i ekonomicznym* [The Future War in Technical, Political, and Economic Terms] (6 volumes), Gebethner & Wolff, Warsaw 1899

⁴ The causes of this state of affairs were competently explored by Grzegorz P. Bąbiak in his introduction to the summing up of Bloch's 6-volume work, which was written in order to avert war. In his *Kroniki tygodniowe* weekly column in *Kurier Warszawski*, one of the best Polish novelists, Bolesław Prus summed up Bloch's arguments in following way: 'thanks to improvements in armaments, war will bring losses to all, and benefits to none'. The following words were also prophetic: 'As a result of all these circumstances, the "future war", instead of leading to victory on the outside, could produce a catastrophe on the inside the like of which history has not yet witnessed'. Quoted in the introduction to Jan G. Bloch, *Przyszła wojna pod względem technicznym, politycznym i ekonomicznym*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warsaw 2005, p. 17.

⁵ Only three of the 60-or-so armed conflicts in the years 1991-2007 had the 'classic' character of inter-state war. Those were the armed confrontations between Pakistan and India about sovereignty over Kashmir; the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia following the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia; and the U.S. intervention in Iraq. See 'Major Armed Conflicts', in *SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press 2007, p. 72-86.

⁶ See www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

⁷ See *Report of the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, United Nations, New York 2005. A similar report was drawn up under OSCE auspices by the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE: *Common Purpose. Toward a More Effective OSCE*, Vienna 2005.

⁸ The convention on the absolute ban on biological weapons came into force on 26 March 1975, while the ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and the obligation to destroy them came into force on 29 April 1997. The parties to the convention undertook to destroy their chemical weapons and production capabilities by 29 April 2012.

⁹ *The Wall Street Journal* of 4 January 2007. The unusually positive reactions inclined the authors to develop this project. See *The Wall Street Journal* of 15 January 2008.

¹⁰ N. Bodell (ed.), 'Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements – Annex A', *SIPRI Yearbook 2007. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, p. 667-691.

¹¹ Such was the fate of the ABM treaty on missile defence concluded between the USA and the USSR. On 13 December 2007, Russia decided to suspend the application of the agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) which was concluded in 1990 and came into force in 1992 r. In response to the question of the UN Secretary General: 'How to advance the disarmament agenda?', the author presented a critical assessment of the situation and proposed measures countering its further deterioration during the 48th session of the Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (*Food for Thought* – working paper distributed at the ABDM), New York, 16-18 July 2007.

¹² Karl Doehring, State, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, Volume IV (2000), p. 601.

¹³ Such a protection of State follows from article 2, section 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, in keeping with which 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter'.

¹⁴ In *International Security* 2005, no. 1.

¹⁵ R. A. Pape, 'Soft Balancing against the United States', *International Security* 2005, no. 1, p. 7-45.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 3 and 45

¹⁷ For more on this subject, see T.V. Paul, 'Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primary', *International Security* 2005, no. 1, p. 46-71.

¹⁸ See S.G. Brooks, W.C. Wolforth, 'Hard Times for Soft Balancing', *International Security* 2005, no. 1, p. 72-108.

¹⁹ Speech given by Russia's foreign minister, S. V. Lavrov at the inauguration of the new academic year at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, 3 September 2007. For full text of the speech, see http://www.sras.org/sergey_lavrov_speaks_at_mgimo.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² In 2007, nuclear states had a total of over 26,000 nuclear warheads, of which the United States had about 10,000 (including 5,045 issued to the army and kept in a state of readiness), Russia about 15,000 (including

about 5,700 issued to the army, and 9,300 kept in warehouses and destined to be destroyed). See *SIPRI Yearbook 2007*, Appendix 12 A, table 12A.1. At the beginning of 2008 eight nuclear weapon states possessed almost 10,200 operational nuclear weapons. Among the total number of deployed warheads Russia has 5,189 and the U.U. – 4,075. See – *SIPRI Yearbook 2008*, Chapter 8. The United States and Russia undertook to reduce their strategic nuclear potential to the level of 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012. The destruction of the Russian nuclear potential (and of other weapons of mass destruction) is financed from a special fund within the framework of the international GTR – Global Threat Reduction program, to the amount of 20 billion USD; 10 billion were provided by the United States, the other 10 billion by other Western states).

²³ See <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ ‘[...] we will absolve ourselves from the responsibility of our retaliatory steps because we are not initiating what is certainly growing into a new arms race in Europe.’ See: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article17855.htm>

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ See R. Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, Atlantic Monthly Press, London 2003, p. 55.

²⁸ Such an opinion was expressed on 29 March 1995 by Henry Kissinger at the conference *Britain in the World*, quoted by R. Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

²⁹ K.W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (chapter 1 – ‘Ten Fundamental Questions’), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1968.

³⁰ Karl Birnbaum, *Meeting unprecedented challenges of the 21st Century*. SIIA Papers, No 3, 2008.

³¹ Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age*. Chicago and London, 1984, p.31. Quotation after K. Birnbaum, *ibidem*, p.16.