POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA AND ASIA-PACIFIC:

CHANGING THREAT PERCEPTIONS*

Prof. Alexander Sergounin

Introduction

To understand the nature and predict the future of a country's foreign policy it is very important to examine how this state identifies challenges to its security and national interests - worldwide or in a particular region. In other words, the perception of threat is a sort of 'litmus test' for examining a country's foreign policy making and behaviour.

It is commonplace to ascertain that the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is of vital and growing concern to Russia. According to the official foreign policy doctrine (1993), it ranked sixth on a list of fifteen priorities (Asia-Pacific follows the CIS, arms control and international security, economic reform, the United States and Europe). In March 1996, a new Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov elevated Asia-Pacific to the third position in his system of priorities (the region follows the CIS and East Europe). The Russian leadership has repeatedly emphasised that Russia had always been a Eurasian country, with regard not only to its territory but also its interests, policies, and even psychology.

A number of particular Russian economic, political and strategic interests can be highlighted. Moscow is very interested in developing the Russian Far East through co-operation with the neighbouring countries (albeit the federal centre often simply eliminated local problems). The APR is one of the largest Russian trading partners. The region represents an extremely important market for Russian civilian and military products. Russia's annual trade with China, Japan and South Korea amounts to $5-7 billion, $6 billion and $3 billion respectively. In the 1990s, Russia has been selling arms to the Far Eastern nations to a value of $1 billion a year.

Asia-Pacific also holds enormous strategic significance for Russia. It remains an area of immense concentration of military power, including many of the largest armies in the world. There are a number of unsettled territorial and ethno-religious conflicts which have the potential to cause, or are already causing, instability in the entire region. It should be noted that Russia itself is a party to some unresolved territorial disputes such as the Kuril dispute.

Factors such as NATO and the EU enlargement, the failure to make the OSCE a backbone of a new European security system, and tense relations with some East European countries has meant that an unfavourable geopolitical situation in the West has developed. As a result of this, Moscow turned eastward in a hope to form a new system of strategic and economic alliances in the APR in order to counterbalance the above-mentioned negative developments.

For these reasons, Moscow views its endeavours in the APR as critical to the success of Russian strategy in the post-Cold War era. Moscow needs an effective strategy toward the region to serve its economic, security, political, and other interests.

The main problem for Moscow with regards to the region is staying engaged and remaining an important player in the future development of Asia-Pacific. This has been made difficult for two reasons. Firstly, Russian military power has been dramatically reduced in the area. Russia simply can no longer afford to maintain the same level of military presence in the region as it did with the Soviet Union. Secondly, because of the dire economic conditions that now prevail in Russia, it currently has little to offer other Far Eastern countries and this being at the very time that economic strength has become the manifestation of a country's power and significance.

To overcome its own weakness and to counterweight American and Japanese influences in Asia-Pacific, Moscow has continued to push forward an idea of creating a multilateral security system in the region. The second part of Russian strategy in the area is a much more intense effort to develop better bilateral relations with the APR countries including defence ties.

A number of questions inevitably emerge with regard to Russia's threat perceptions in the post-Cold War epoch. How does Russia assess present and future challenges in the region? Do such challenges create a serious threat to Moscow's security or is the situation in the region more or less benign? Does any hierarchy of Russian threat perception exist? How well grounded are Russian security concerns? Has reality been distorted in some cases through misperceptions? These and related questions should be addressed both by policy makers and academics in order to understand Moscow's policy in the APR and engage Russia in the regional processes in a constructive way. The research below deals with some of the above issues.

Depending on the research interest of a scholar and available sources, threat perceptions of a country can be studied from different perspectives. One can be interested in historical evolution of threat perceptions. Others prefer to focus on factors affecting their formation. A third would examine functional dimensions of the problem. This study focuses on three inter-linked questions: What is an official doctrinal/conceptual framework for Russian threat perceptions in the APR? What sort of approaches to the regional security problems do different Russian foreign policy schools offer? What are the major regional security issues highlighted in the Russian post-Communist foreign policy discourse?

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (1997)

The adoption of the National Security Concept (December 1997) marked a fundamental change in Russian post-Communist security thinking.

First of all, the concept rather realistically assesses Russia's status and role in the contemporary world. Despite the fact that the document mentions a couple of times en passant the need for retaining Russia's great power status, it does not insist on Russia's global responsibilities and interests (as did some Russian previous doctrines). On the contrary, the paper acknowledges that Moscow's capacity to influence the solution of cardinal issues of international life has greatly diminished.

The paper points out the changing nature of world power in the post-Cold War period. 'While military force remains a significant factor in international relations, economic, political, scientific-technical, ecological and information factors play a growing role.' The document notes that some prerequisites have been created for the demilitarisation of international relations, strengthening the role of law in the conflict resolution, and that the danger of a direct aggression against Russia has diminished. There are some prospects of greater integration of Russia into the world economy, including some Western and Asia-Pacific economic and financial institutions. Russia shares common security interests with many states in areas such as nuclear non-proliferation, conflict resolution, combating international terrorism, environmental problems and so on. At this point, the paper arrives at an important conclusion that nowadays Russia's national security may be ensured by non-military means.

The doctrine completely redefines the sources and nature of threats to Russia's security. It asserts that Russia faces no immediate danger of large-scale aggression, and that, because the country is beset with a myriad of debilitating domestic problems, the greatest threat to Russia's security is now an internal one. The document states: 'An analysis of the threats to the national security of the Russian Federation shows that the main threats at present and in the foreseeable future will not be military, but predominantly internal in character and will focus in the internal political, economic, social, ecological, information and spiritual spheres'. This is a distinct departure from the previous doctrines. For example, the military doctrine of 1993 was based on the assumption that the main threat to Russia's security was posed by external factors such as local conflicts or territorial claims. The new concept clearly suggests that today's relatively benign international climate affords Russia the opportunity to direct resources away from the defence sector and toward the rebuilding of the Russian economy.

Along the lines of the concept, Russia's military presence in the APR has been significantly diminished and force configuration has become more defensive. In 1992, Moscow completed the withdrawal of troops from Mongolia initiated by Gorbachev in 1987. In 1986-96 the number of Russian divisions in the Far Eastern Strategic Theatre decreased from 57 to 23, the number of tanks fell from 14,900 to 10,068, the number of surface-to-surface missiles decreased from 363 to 102, the number of attack helicopters fell from 1,000 to 310, the number of combat aircraft decreased from 1,125 to 425. The number of submarines in the Pacific Fleet fell from 109 (32 strategic and 77 tactical) to 45 (14 strategic and 31 tactical), and the number of principal surface combatants decreased from 82 to 45.

The national security doctrine focuses in particular on the dangers posed by Russia's economic woes, which are described frankly and at length. The concept highlights a number of major threats to economic security such as a substantial drop of production and investments; destruction of the scientific-technical potential; disarray in the financial and monetary systems; shrinkage of the federal revenues; growing national debt; Russia's overdependence on export of raw materials and import of equipment, consumer goods and foodstuff; 'brain drain', and uncontrolled flight of capital.

The document also points to internal social, political, ethnic, and cultural tensions that threaten to undermine both the viability and the territorial integrity of the Russian state. Among these, social polarisation, demographic problems (in particular, the reduction of the birth rate, average life expectancy and population), corruption, organised crime, drug-trade, terrorism, virulent nationalism, separatism, deterioration of the health system, ecological catastrophes and disintegration of the 'common spiritual space' are singled out.

Along with the internal major threats to Russia's security, the document identifies a number of dangers stemming from the international dynamics. The doctrine highlights the following sources of external threat: territorial claims; attempts of foreign countries to use Russia's domestic problems for weakening its international positions or challenging its territorial integrity; local conflicts and military build-up in the country's vicinity; mass migration from the troubled CIS countries; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism and drug-trafficking and growing activities of foreign intelligence services. In some regions, the document maintains, traditions of the 'bloc politics' are still strong and attempts to isolate Russia could be identified (the paper refers to NATO enlargement and Asia-Pacific). External challenges, however, are of less significance than internal threats.

This radical change in threat perceptions had a number of important implications for Moscow's security policies. Russian national interests in different regions of the world have been redefined in a more realistic way. Russian security concerns have shifted from the so-called 'hard' (military issues) to the 'soft' security domain (economic, social, demographical, environmental, information, cultural problems). In sum, with the adoption of a non-aggressive military strategy and clarification of Russia's national security interests, Moscow may become a more attractive and predictable international partner (albeit Russia's internal instability still frightens foreign countries and diverts them from co-operation with Moscow).

Foreign policy schools

There are several foreign policy schools in post-Communist Russia which differ both by their theoretical foundations and approaches to particular regional problems. The analysis below examines the views of the most important paradigms on Asia-Pacific issues.

Liberal institutionalism/Atlanticism

This school believes that in the present-day interdependent world international institutions rather than nation-states matter. Liberal institutionalists recommend Russian diplomacy to focus on activities within multilateral organisations and regimes such as UN, ASEAN, ARF, APEC, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and so on. According to the liberal perspective, these institutions can effectively meet major security threats stemming from the APR. This is particularly important to prevent the rise of resurgent regional powers such as China and Japan. Moreover, liberals maintain, international institutions could form an embryo of a new co-operative security system where national security interests could be reconciled and harmonised.

However, many liberal institutionalists regard Asia-Pacific as less important for Russia than trans-Atlantic region. The Atlanticists believe that Russia should be oriented to the West and its institutions rather than to the East. With the help of the West, Russia can complete its domestic reforms and create a stable and just world security system. They see Asia-Pacific countries as less reliable and promising partners compared to the US or the EU member-states. The liberals are discontent with Russia's co-operation with those APR countries that reluctantly accept multilateralism (China) or even disrespect some international regimes (India, North Korea). They consider Moscow's policy as short-sighted and predict unpleasant surprises in the near future.

This school was dominant in early 1990s and the former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was its recognised leader. However, by mid-1990s liberals/Atlanticists lost their former influence and turned to a marginal current. To avoid an intellectual and political isolation some liberal institutionalists slightly revised their views with regard to Asia-Pacific. First of all, they recognised the growing importance of the APR in world politics. They also admitted that time perhaps is not ripe for far-reaching multilateral initiatives and Russia should not forget about its national interests. They also had to acknowledge that Russia was not always a welcome guest at the Asia-Pacific 'table' and regionalisation dynamics in this area sometimes facilitated Russia's marginalisation and isolation rather than inclusion into the regional processes.

At the same time, liberals favour trans-border and trans-regional co-operation in Asia-Pacific because they believe that it can further the rise of real regionalism and interdependency. For example, they point out that intensive trade between the Russian Far East and China stimulated other forms of Sino-Russian co-operation and was conducive for confidence-building in the security domain.

Geopolitics/Eurasianism

The Yeltsin-Kozyrev pro-Western line in the early 1990s evoked painful reactions from many Russian politicians and intellectuals who tried to elaborate some alternative concepts of security. Eurasianism has been the first serious alternative to the pro-Western theories that were dominant in Russian security thinking during the late 1980s (under Gorbachev) and early 1990s.

This school which drew heavily upon the geopolitical theoretical principles emphasises Russia's Eurasian identity. At the same time, it stresses the uniqueness of the country. One of its key postulates being that in civilisational terms Russia has never been part of Europe. Hence, it should choose a 'third way' between the West and the East. Globally, Russia should be a bridge between these civilisations.

The 'Eurasianists' believed that the government had paid too much attention to the Western direction of its foreign policy, while Russia's most compelling needs were in the South and in the East. They saw eastern countries such as China and India as Russia's 'natural' allies which could help to counterweight the West's growing geopolitical influence. In addition, economic co-operation with Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN could compensate the lack of substantial assistance from the West. Eurasianists underlined that if Russia missed the chance to secure its positions in the APR Moscow would be doomed for a global geopolitical defeat.

Realism

Eurasianists with their emphasis on national interests and geopolitical rivalry between East and West paved a way for the geopolitical school's 'relative' - realism. The latter became a dominant foreign policy school since the mid-1990s. Along with the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, the leading Russian think tank, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov can be counted among the followers of this school.

Contrary to liberal institutionalism which highlights the role of multilateralism and interdependency, realism considers the nation-state a key unit of analysis in international relations. Respectively, national interests, national security, and national sovereignty are central categories for this school. Realists acknowledge the necessity to form a new system of alliances in the APR but do not believe that it can last forever. They are quite sceptical as regards the possibility of establishing a just and stable multilateral security system in the region. They think that a more or less stable system could result from the compromise between the most powerful regional players rather than from the agreement between all Asia-Pacific countries. However, even such a system could be easily broken with the rise of a revisionist power or alliance.

It should be noted that, as their foreign 'colleagues', contemporary Russian realists are distinct from the classical Morgenthau-type realists. The present-day realists do not oppose regionalism either in the Russian Far East or in the APR generally. For example, Primakov is keen on the development of the 'Greater Mekong' project which is in essence a multilateral initiative. He also supports a package of confidence and security-building measures proposed by the ARF. Realists do not deny the importance of multilateral institutions but they believe that these organisations are mainly a venue for pursuing Russia's national interests, an instrument for strengthening Russia's role in the emerging multipolar world, including Asia-Pacific. However, given current weakness of Russia and the lack of military and economic instruments, realists admit that Moscow should be active in multilateral diplomacy. This means that, in theoretical sense, the Russian realists moved closer to neo-realism, a modern version of realism. The Russian National Security Concept of 1997, which acknowledged a multidimensional nature of security, confirmed such a shift.

To sum up, despite a number of important theoretical differences between the Russian foreign policy schools which still remain in force, there are some signs of an emerging consensus. This compromise seems to be based on acknowledgement of the APR's significance for Russia as well as the need for more assertive Russian policy in the region based on protection of Russian national interests and with the use of multilateral institutions.

Major security problems

The Russian leadership believes that both the Chinese and American military threats have disappeared for the foreseeable future and Moscow no longer plans for a general war to preserve its territorial integrity against potential Chinese or American attack. The post-Cold War international environment, however, appears chaotic and unpredictable to Russian leaders. Moscow remains vigilant against some potential threats to its security stemming from turbulent processes in Asia-Pacific.

Resurgent Regional Powers

Russia is concerned about the future strategic orientation of some its neighbours, particularly Japan. Russian security elites see Japan's economic and technological capability as being easily transformed into cutting-edge indigenous military production that would provide the economic and military strength required for regional pre-eminence.

Following the US military drawdown in East Asia and the Western Pacific, similar to Beijing Moscow believes that an 'unbridled Japan... [might] seek to transform its enormous economic power into military strength.' If the US military drawdown continues, Japan will have the largest number of major surface combatants in Asia, and with the most modern capabilities. It will also have the most effective anti-submarine warfare capability and most modern air force. Russian security specialists often express genuine concern about the future regional strategic balance in the 21st century.

For Russia as well as for many countries throughout the APR, there is no doubt that the most significant aspect of the Japan-US security alliance is that it serves to limit and constrain any Japanese sense of insecurity or impulse to develop an independent security role, with all of its undesirable regional consequences. However, Japan-US security co-operation sometimes worries rather than calms down regional actors. For example, a US-Japan military accord concluded in June 1997 raised security concerns in Russia and many East Asian capitals despite American and Japanese assurances that these arrangements were not aimed at a particular country. In its note the Russian Foreign Ministry required Japan provided more details on the document and explained its new strategy.

It should be noted that Russia's temptation to play the 'Chinese card' against Tokyo and Washington could be partially explained by Moscow's semi-isolation from the principal economic and security institutions gradually being developed in Asia-Pacific. Moscow believes that it could influence regional power balance through its defence ties with China. Given Russia's weakening economic, political and military position in the APR, Moscow views a strong China as a counterweight to Japan and the United States.

However, in some Russian political quarters China rather than Japan is seen as potential geopolitical threat. For instance, some politicians and experts close to Yabloko party perceive the PRC as a revisionist power. Arbatov suggests that China may represent the greatest external security threat to Russia in the long run. He and other moderate liberals do not approve of too quick a military rapprochement with the PRC and warn of the possibility of Russia's one-sided dependence on Beijing. They have three main concerns. First, they fear that in the distant future Chinese military build-up could be directed not only against Taiwan, Japan and the United States but against Russia as well. Second, they point out that Sino-Russian military rapprochement makes the West nervous and could damage Moscow's relations with the latter. They suggest more cautious and consistent arms sales policy in the region. Third, they stress that technology transfer will enable China to export Chinese versions of Russian weapon systems, thus undercutting Russia in the global arms bazaar.

Along with moderate liberals, right extremists (in particular, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy) raised some concerns about Sino-Russian rapprochement. Zhirinovskiy considers China as a main global threat to Russia in East Asia. He is against arming China with Russian weapon and especially is concerned with technology and production rights transfer. The Liberal Democrats insist on global China's 'containment' instead of its 'appeasement'. The LDPR also fears Chinese 'ethnic aggression' against the Russian Far East and favours using tough economic, administrative, and military methods to stop Beijing.

However, anti-Chinese sentiments are rather marginal among the Russian political and military elites. Despite the covert or overt opposition of certain political groups the vast majority of Russian politicians and experts are strongly in favour of military co-operation with China.

Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

Moscow also indicates proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a major threat to its security and that of other friendly nations.

North Korea's development of nuclear weapons perceived by Russia as a serious challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In addition to the immediate security threat it posed, this development created the potential for an even larger and more far-reaching threat: that of driving other regional powers into their own development of weapons of mass destruction, thereby threatening to unravel the entire global non-proliferation framework. For these reasons, Russia, along with China, played a rather important role in mediating the IAEA/North Korea and US/North Korea conflicts in 1993-94 which resulted in the 21 October 1994 US-North Korean framework agreement.

Similar to the US, Russia is also deeply concerned about the potential for countries who are advancing economically and technologically, to engage in weapons and technology transfers to regimes in the Middle East and South Asia. China is a subject of primary concern. Although throughout the 1980s China professed opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, its rejection of the NPT hampered its credibility on proliferation issues among the members of the international community. Russia was particularly anxious about China-Pakistan nuclear co-operation. However, Moscow kept a low profile in this issue because it did not want to complicate its relations with Beijing. Russia carefully avoided making Sino-Russian disagreements public. Moreover, Russia tried to capitalise on Sino-American tensions originated from US discontent with China's nuclear policies in South Asia.

Beijing acceded to the NPT as late as in March 1992. As mentioned, China facilitated US-North Korea dialogue on nuclear issues. However, in contrast to its position regarding North Korea, China's approach to proliferation in South Asia has been more ambiguous. Beijing favoured the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. At the same time the PRC insisted that its provision of nuclear-power plants and technology to Iran and Pakistan was entirely for peaceful purposes and that such technology transfers came under IAEA supervision.

In 1992, China agreed to cancel the supply of some nuclear equipment to Iran in response to US lobbying. Nevertheless, the US maintained pressure on China to restrain its nuclear exports to Iran and Pakistan because of persistent reports that the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) continued questionable technology transfers. Moscow tacitly supported the US efforts and was very happy when the PRC has adopted nuclear export control regulations in 1997.

Islamic Fundamentalism

As mentioned, Russia shares with China a number of common security interests in the area. Along with other security concerns the two countries fear of Islamic fundamentalism. While Moscow is afraid of Islamic threat to its southern borders, officials in Beijing suspect that Iran or the Central Asian republics might attempt to export Islamic fundamentalism to western China. Xinjiang province is considered to be particularly susceptible to such influences.

Some reports suggest that China's April 1996 strategic accord with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan aimed at preventing military clashes along its frontiers, may also restrict the flow of arms from Afghanistan to Muslim separatist rebels in Xinjiang. Separatists' activities, combined with Tibetan unrest, force China to maintain 16 divisions on alert in the neighbouring Lanzou region. Arms smugglers start from Talogan, the mujahideen/Tajik headquarters in Afghanistan, then slip past Russian guards on the Afghan-Tajik frontier. They traverse the high Pamirs, cross the Chinese frontier and arrive at Kashgar in Xinjiang. China hopes that the treaty will bring about increased Russian and Tajik co-operation with its frontier guards in policing the border against unlawful elements.

Territorial Disputes

There is a number of historical and territorial disputes in East Asia which undermine the regional security system. Russia is involved to territorial disputes with China and Japan. While the Sino-Russian border demarcation problems are almost resolved, the Russian-Japanese conflict over four Kuril Islands still poisons the regional security environment albeit the two parties agreed to postpone its resolution for a while.

China-Taiwan conflict which engages the Russia's 'strategic partner' into dangerous confrontation is also a subject of particular security concern for Moscow. On a number of occasions such as the private visit of the Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to the United States (June 1995) and the presidential elections in Taiwan (March 1996) Beijing and Taipei were very close to military confrontation. This also might involve the United States which traditionally supports Taiwan militarily and politically.

Russia is also interested in resolving conflicts between two Koreas. Given the uncertainties surrounding the ongoing political transition in Pyongyang after the death of Kim Il Sung, anything from internal collapse to desperate aggression is possible. Russia tries, on the one hand, to prevent an outbreak of military hostilities on the peninsula, on the other hand, to maintain good relations with both parties. Similar to China-Taiwan conflict Moscow is worried about the US involvement in the conflict. Russia is not happy with the fact that Washington provides Seoul with significant military assistance and 36,000 US troops are stationed in South Korea.

Economic Security

Present-day Russian security thinking does not limit the notion of security only to strategic-military issues ('hard' security). Rather, it acknowledges that in the contemporary world 'soft' security may matter more than security in traditional sense. As Primakov put it in his speech at the Fourth ARF, the Asia-Pacific countries (including Russia) are facing new economic challenges such as uneven development, depletion of non-renewable natural resources, trade wars, competition for markets and sources of raw materials, environmental degradation, food shortages and so on. In his statement at the Fifth ARF (July 1998) Primakov implicitly acknowledged that East Asian financial crisis can affect Russian economic security because the country had joined the interdependent world economy. Moscow repeatedly emphasised that it considered protection of Russia's economic interests in Asia-Pacific as an important foreign policy objective.

For this reason, Russia aims at creating favourable conditions for developing its foreign economic relations with the countries of the region and eliminating any barriers to such a co-operation. Moscow is more or less satisfied with its relations with Beijing. A number of Russian and Chinese regions have developed very close economic relations. In fact, the southern part of the Russian Far East and China's Dongbei formed an interdependent and complimentary economic organism.

Moscow pushes ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) to promote free trade principles in the APR. Moscow was pleased with the APEC's decision to admit Russia as a full-fledged member in November 1998. At the 3rd session of the ARF (July 1996) Primakov suggested an ambitious programme of economic co-operation between Russia and the APR countries including joint projects on development of the Russian Far East and 'Greater Mekong', as well as establishment of a space research and monitoring centre and a Russia-ASEAN Business Council. At the Fourth ARF he noted that Russian was interested in implementing the project of a Transcontinental Railway Mainline. Russia also calls for international co-operation to fight piracy which endangers trade interests of many countries in the APR.

At the same time, Moscow is anxious about a possibility that as a result of its active participation in international economic co-operation the Russian Far East could eventually fall under influence of foreign powers. Given economic decline in Russia and disruption of economic ties between different parts of Russia and the CIS member-states, economic co-operation with foreign countries is much more profitable for the Russian Far East than with partners at home. For instance, in 1994, the South Korean firm Yu Kong has promised to provide Kamchatka with every kind of fuel at an acceptable price. Canada offered the Far Easterners wheat which is twice as cheap as that from the Stavropol Province. The same year, the Chukchee Peninsula has bought food stuff for the first time in the United States. Australia was ready to supply inexpensive high-quality coal, and Vietnam was positioned to sell oil to the Far East. In exchange, the Asia-Pacific countries were interested in timber, fish, ore, and other raw materials as well as some finished products. In 1992 the Russian Far East could survive in a 'foodstuff crisis' only due to the barter trade with China.

To prevent this dangerous trend the Russian leadership tries both to encourage the region's foreign economic relations and keep them under its control. Moscow becomes especially nervous when the Far Eastern provinces demonstrate any signs of separatism. For instance, the federal centre tried several times to oust the governor of the Maritime Province Yevgeny Nazdratenko who conducted a rather independent course both in domestic and foreign policies.

Migration

The Russian Far East and Moscow are the two main Russian regions which faced the problem of migration from the APR driven by economic rationales. In 1993, the Russian Ministry of Interior has registered thousands illegal migrants in Moscow: 50,000 Chinese, 23,000 Indians, 15,000 Afghans, 10,000 Iranians and Iraqis. The Ministry was unable to count the Vietnamese and the Mongols who outnumbered illegal migrants from the above countries.

Chinese migrants is a matter of particular concern for the Russian Far Eastern provinces. According to some accounts, there are 2,000,000 Chinese in the Russian Federation (from 300,000 to 1,000,000 in the Far East). The Chinese migrants were suspected in buying up real estate, vouchers and shares as well as were charged with a spread of organized crime. Many Russian experts were afraid of further Chinese mass migration because of overpopulation of the northern provinces of the PRC. "All of us here fear the Chinese," said one Russian expert from the Maritime Province, "On one side of the border there is population of 2.5 million, and on the other there are 120 million who are beginning to feel they have too small an area to live in."

However, other sources with a closer knowledge of the subject disagree with existence of a 'Chinese threat'. According to official statistics, the daily number of the Chinese visited the Maritime Province fluctuated from 40,000 to 150,000 in 1993. On 29 January 1994 the Russian authorities established the visa regime for the Chinese. Over the period of 1994-95, 6003 illegal migrants were deported from the Maritime Province (this figure included not only Chinese citizens). The number of the Chinese who became permanent residents in the Russian Far East is insignificant: 87 persons in the Amur Region and 170 in the Khabarovsk Province. The number of the Chinese contracted for the work in the Far Eastern provinces was quite modest as well: 10,000 workers in 1990 and 17,000-18,000 migrants in 1992-93. There were 10,000 Chinese workers in Chita Region, 1,000-2,000 workers in Maritime Province and Amur Region, and 1,560 in Khabarovsk Province in 1993. Comparing to the period prior to the year 1937, when the Chinese and Koreans were deported from the Russian Far East, the level of the Chinese migration is unimportant: these two ethnic groups comprised 20 per cent of the local population in the past and nobody was anxious about this.

Contrary to the 'alarmists', some Russian experts consider a limited migration of the Chinese and Koreans could contribute to the positive development of the Russian Far East. Migrants can compensate the lack of the labour force and bring some investments to the troubled economy of the region.

Non-traditional Threats

Drug-trade and ecological issues are essential for Russian security as well. Some of the Far Eastern countries are involved in international drug-trafficking which could potentially spread to Russia. Lack of proper ecological standards in many Asian countries, industrial pollution, and burial of radioactive waste on the seas pose another kind of threat to Russian national interest. Finally, evidence grows by the day that AIDS epidemic may run rampant, like the bubonic plague of medieval Europe.

Conclusion

Russian threat perceptions in the APR underwent dramatic changes from the Cold War stereotypes to more or less realistic assessments. The most important change was that Russia no longer expects a military aggression from this region. Moscow also believes that internal rather than external problems pose a challenge to the country's stability and security. The ongoing economic and political crisis in Russia fully confirmed this apprehensions.

At the same time, Russian strategists identify a number of threats originating from the post-Cold War uncertainties in Asia-Pacific: potential rise of resurgent powers, nuclear and other mass destruction weapon proliferation, Islamic fundamentalism, territorial disputes, economic disparities and instability, illegal migration, piracy, ecological catastrophes, drug-trade, and mass diseases.

Despite the seeming number of threats, most of Russian politicians, military and analysts assess the above mentioned challenges optimistically rather than pessimistically. They view Asia-Pacific as a region that really is not burdened with major security threats. These threats mainly originate from the 'soft' rather than from the 'hard' security domain. Such threats could be successfully met by developing economic and humanitarian co-operation and creating interdependency mechanism rather than by traditional means such as military build-up or alliance-formation.

Endnotes

* This paper has been prepared with the assistance of the fellowship research grants from the Global Governance Fellowship Programme, Department of Politics, La Trobe University, Australia, and the United States Institute of Peace.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 'Kontseptsiya Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii' [The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation], Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, Special Issue, January 1993, pp. 3-23 (in Russian).

² Izvestiya, 6 March 1996 (in Russian)

³ A.D. Bogaturov, M.M. Kozhokin, and K.V. Pleshakov, 'Vneshnyaa Politika Rossii' ['Russia's Foreign Policy'], USA: economics, politics, ideology, no. 10, 1992, p. 31 (in Russian); Anita I. Singh, 'India's Relations with Russia and Central Asia', International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, p. 71.

⁴ Rajan Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China', Survival, vol. 39, no. 2, Summer 1997, p. 104; Mary Jordan, 'Russia Signals a New Status with Japan', International Herald Tribune, 2 June 1997, p. 4; Literaturnaya Gazeta, no. 45, 6 November 1996, p. 14 (in Russian).

⁵ Izvestiya, 22 September 1994 and 15 March 1997 (in Russian).

⁶ 'Kontseptsiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi Federatsii' [The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 December 1997, p. 4 (in Russian).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ 'The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation', Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report, January 1994, pp. 6-12.

⁹ The Military Balance 1986-1987 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), pp. 45-46; and The Military Balance 1996-1997 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 115, 118.

¹⁰ See, for instance: Grigory Karasin, 'Developing Relations with ASEAN', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 44, no. 1, 1998, pp. 53-57.

¹¹ Vladimir Petrovsky, 'Cooperation-Based Security in Northeast Asia: Russia's Potential Role', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), vol. 40, no. 2-3, 1994, pp. 15-26.

¹² NATO Review, February 1993, p. 3.

¹³ On the evolution of the Russian post-Communist security discourse see in detail Alexander A. Sergounin, Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997) (COPRI Working Paper No. 4 1997).

¹⁴ David Kerr, 'Opening and Closing the Sino-Russian Border: Trade, Regional Development and Political Interest in North-east Asia,' Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 6, 1996, pp. 934-939.

¹⁵ Konstantin Pleshakov, 'Russia's Mission: the Third Epoch', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 39, No. 1, January 1993, pp. 17-26; Elgiz Pozdnyakov, 'Russia Today and Tomorrow', International Affairs, (Moscow), Vol. 39, No. 2, February 1993, pp. 22-31.

¹⁶ Sergei Stankevich, 'Toward a New "National Idea"', in Stephen Sestanovich (ed), Rethinking Russia's National Interest (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), pp. 24-32.

¹⁷ Vladimir P. Lukin, 'Russia and Its Interests', in S. Sestanovich (ed), Rethinking Russia's National Interests, pp. 106-115; Konstantin Sarkisov, 'Russia and Japan', Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World (Washington/London: Brassey's, Inc., 1994), p. 262.

¹⁸ Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, 'A Security Concept for Russia', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 39, No. 10, October 1993, pp. 10-19.

¹⁹ Alexei Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests,' in Blackwill and Karaganov, Damage Limitation or Crisis?,

p. 73; 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, No. 11-12, 1995, p. 22.

²⁰ V. Larin, 'Rossiya I Kitay na Poroge Tretyego Tysyacheletiya: Kto Zhe Budet Otstaivat Nashy Natsionalnye Interesy' [Russia and China on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: Who Will Protect Russia's National Interests?], Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, no. 1, 1997, pp. 15-26 (in Russian).

²¹ Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, August 1996, pp. 38-40 (in Russian). See also Primakov's statements at the Fourth and Fifth ASEAN Regional Fora 27 July 1997 and 1998.

²² See interview with Igor Rogachev, the Russian Ambassador to China, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 April 1997, pp. 1,4 (in Russian).

²³ A. Brick, 'The Asian Giants: Neighborly Ambivalence', Global Affairs, Fall 1991, p. 84.

²⁴ P. Godwin, J. Schulz, 'China and Arms Control: Transition in East Asia', Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 8.

²⁵ Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2 October 1997, p. 7 (in Russian).

²⁶ Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests,' p. 72.

²⁷ Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests,' p. 72; Menon, p. 112; S. Trush, 'Prodazha Rossiyskogo Oruzhiya Pekinu: Rezony I Opaseniya' [Russian Arms Sales to Beijing: Pro and Contra], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 April 1996; Dmitry Trenin, 'Kak Prikryt Vostochniy Geostrategicheskiy 'Fasad' Rossii?' [How to Protect the Easter Geostrategic 'Facade' of Russia?], Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, no. 17, 1997, p. 4 (in Russian).

²⁸ Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Poslednyi Brosok na Yug [Last Dash for South] (Moscow: Pisatel, 1993) (in Russian); 'Election 1995: Parties' Foreign Policy Views', pp. 13, 15-16.

²⁹ Evan S. Medeiros, 'China, Russia Plan to Go Ahead with Nuclear Reactor Sales to Iran', Arms Control Today, May 1995, p. 23.

³⁰ See the Russian Foreign Ministry's statement in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2 October 1997, p. 7.

³¹ B. Rumer, 'The Gathering Storm in Central Asia', Orbis, Winter 1993, p. 90.

³² Jane's International Defence Review, August 1996, p. 13.

³³ Opening Statement by Yevgeny M. Primakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 1997.

³⁴ Opening Statement by Yevgeny M. Primakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Fifth ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila, 27 July 1998.

³⁵ Kerr, 'Opening and Closing the Sino-Russian Border', pp. 934-939.

³⁶ Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, August 1996, pp. 38-40 (in Russian).

³⁷ Opening Statement by Primakov at the Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum, 27 July 1997.

³⁸ Simon Saradzhyan, 'Russia: Border Chief Says Illegal Immigrants 'Invading' Russia', RFE/RL Features, 12 February 1997.

³⁹ Yelena Matveyeva, 'Russia's Far East: Tired, Cold and Ready for Independence', Moscow News, 30 September-6 October 1994, p. 13.

⁴⁰ Vladimir Portyakov, 'Kitaytsy Idut? Migratsionnaya Situatsiya na Dalnem Vostoke Rossii' [Are the Chinese Coming? The Migration Processes in the Russian Far East], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, vol. 42, no. 2, February 1996, p. 80 (in Russian).

⁴¹ Alexander A. Sergounin, Russia's Regionalisation: The International Dimension (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997) (COPRI Working Papers; No. 20, 1997).

⁴² Natalya Kutepova, 'Gruppy Riska I Problemy Zastoynoi Bezrabotitsy' [Risk Groups and the Problem of Stagnant Unemployment], Chelovek I Trud, no. 10, 1993, p. 7 (in Russian).

⁴³ Portyakov, 'Kitaytsy Idut?', p. 83.

⁴⁴ Dmitry Balburov, 'Maritime Population Wants No 'Fair Frontier' with China', Moscow News, no. 15, 18-24 April 1996, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Portyakov, 'Kitaytsy Idut?', p. 83.

⁴⁶ Portyakov, 'Kitaytsy Idut?', p. 83; Saradzhyan, 'Russia: Border Chief Says Illegal Immigrants 'Invading' Russia'.