The Russian Far East occupies a curious position within the Russian Federation.(1) Located on the Pacific Rim, eight time zones from Moscow, the Russian Far East epitomises the eternal Russian question of whether it is a European or an Asian power. At the beginning of this century, the Russian Far East was a cosmopolitan and bustling area. Due to the great distance from the central government, many Far Easterners believed that they had a special identity of their own. There were great expectations of economic development through interaction with Japan, China, Korea and the United States. The Soviet years ruined these dreams as the Far East was turned into a fortified border zone. The end of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Far East to the outside world has again rekindled hopes of a bright future. The Russian Far East, however, faces many obstacles. Despite its great size of more than 66 million square kilometres, it has a population of less than eight million.(2) Much of the land is uninhabitable, and many natural resources are difficult to extract. Soviet industrial planning forced the Far East to send much of its raw materials to European Russia for processing while remaining reliant on outside supplies. Moscow's view of the Far East has traditionally been defined by strategic concerns. Its relationship today with the Far East is uncertain. The latter's location suggests a future orientated toward the Asia-Pacific Rim, but traditional suspicion towards foreigners and economic reliance on Moscow mean that the Far East is unable to fully integrate itself into either the Russian or the international economy.
1996 marked the tenth anniversary of a speech given by the then Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in the city of Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, known as "the Vladivostok speech".(3) Gorbachev used the occasion to mark a major official Soviet reassessment of its relations with its Asia-Pacific neighbours. He paid particular attention to estranged Communist neighbour China, offering concessions on the issues which China named as obstacles to an improvement in relations.(4) Being delivered in Vladivostok, which was at the time a closed military city, the speech also meant that greater attention was to be paid to the economic development of the then Soviet Far East.
Ten years after the Vladivostok speech, it is timely to assess the nature of political and economic change in the Russian Far East during that time. Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives resulted in a significant improvement in relations with neighbours in Asia. The Far East itself experienced change at the end of the 1980s as its borders became porous and there was an influx of foreigners. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 meant both a change of name from Soviet to Russian Far East and the blossoming of a "Wild East" capitalism. The symbol of the new Far East was the bustling port city of Vladivostok which was only opened in 1992. The appearance of regionalism, in which political elites sought greater autonomy from Moscow, meant that relations with Moscow were also reassessed.
In 1996 the Russian Far East has many problems, including inadequate economic infrastructure, declining production, and crime. The downturn in the Russian economy during the 1990s struck the Far East particularly hard. Economic output was lower than for the country as a whole, although by 1996 there were signs of improvement, particularly in the fishing industry. Other industries which experienced increases in production were coal production in the Republic of Sakha and oil production in Sakhalin oblast'. (5)
Although the major economic resource of the Russian Far East is its considerable natural resources, the economic structures of the respective administrative units of the Russian Far East differ from one another:
- Primorskii krai focuses on both fishing and industry. It has the most diverse economy in the area.
- Khabarovsk krai contains much of the heavy industry in the Russian Far East. For many years it housed the only oil refineries in the Far East.
- Sakhalin oblast' produces timber and fishing and is the only source of oil and gas in the area.(6) There is a hope that the anticipated exploitation of oil and gas deposits of the Sakhalin shelf by a foreign consortium and Russian partners will bring riches to the region.
- Amur oblast' specialises in agriculture. It is also developing cross-border trade with China. There is a plan to build a bridge between the regional capital, Blagoveshchensk, and the Chinese city of Heihe.
- The far northern regions of Magadan oblast' and Kamchatka oblast' specialise in mining and fishing respectively.
- The Republic of Sakha (formerly Yakutia) is Russia's leading diamond producer, as well as the major gold and tin producer.
Such diversity, however, is only relative. Not enough value-added processing takes place in the Far East, and resources are shipped to European Russia. Until this pattern is rectified, the Russian Far East is likely to remain in a subordinate economic position.
The Soviet Far East
In 1986, the Soviet Far East was a troubled area. Much of it was closed to foreigners and Soviet citizens due to the strategic importance Moscow attached to it. The cult of the inviolability of the Soviet borders was strong. It had reached its apotheosis in 1983 when Soviet forces shot down a South Korean airliner which had strayed into Soviet air space. The Soviet Far East faced considerable economic problems, many of which were exacerbated by Moscow itself. In the on-going battle for investment between the western and the eastern parts of the Soviet Union, Moscow reduced the portion sent to the Far East.(7) The dependence of the Far East on the import of a wide selection of basic goods was even then a well-developed pattern. Balanced development had been sacrificed to the needs of the mining industry and the military-industrial complex. The Far East was unable to process many of its own resources. The construction of the Baikal-Amur railway (the BAM), was not complete. Built to the north of the militarily vulnerable and overtaxed Trans-Siberian railway, the BAM was meant to develop the role of Siberia as a land bridge. Such expectations were uncertain. Container shipments had fallen between 1981 and 1984.(8) During the Gorbachev era [1985-1991], the BAM came to be seen as a colossal waste and a symbol of the stagnation of the Brezhnev period.
Moscow's apparent renewed commitment to the Far East was the result of both strategic and economic factors. Moscow sought an improvement of relations with countries in North East Asia, and the potential investment in the deteriorating Soviet economy that could result from this. In 1987, Moscow adopted a plan for the economic redevelopment of the Far East up to the year 2000.(9) Self-sufficiency in food production and energy was envisaged. There was also a desire to transform the area from a supplier of raw materials to a processor of these materials by changing the regional industrial basis. Population growth was also envisaged.(10) The plan was very ambitious, but it remained unfulfilled. Due to the severe budget deficit, it was scrapped in 1989.
The Economic Problems of the Russian Far East
The economic reality for the Russian Far East in 1996 is one of crisis. The proportion of the economic contribution of the Russian Far East to the national economic output fell from 5 per cent in 1991 to 3.8 per cent in 1995.(11) The military-industrial complex in the Russian Far East was severely affected. The end of the Soviet Union meant a decline in military orders of between 20 and 60 percent, depending on the enterprise.(12) This strongly affected both the military production enterprises, and the cities that relied upon them, many of which were in the two most populated regions, Khabarovsk and Primorskii kraya.
The increase in prices for the transportation of goods and resources dramatically affected the energy producing industries. Shortages of electricity were particularly common in Primorskii krai. This was closely linked with the nationwide problem of non-payment between enterprises. The power generating industry was unable to pay for the supply of coal due to the inability of many of its customers to pay their bills.
Living conditions in the Russian Far East became progressively harder. Food prices in Sakhalin oblast' were among the highest in Russia. Unemployment was greater than the Russian average while the level of real incomes fell. This situation was even more difficult in the northern areas of the Russian Far East which suffered dramatic cuts in central funding. The Far Eastern Coefficient, a salary bonus devised during the Soviet era to attract workers to the Far East, no longer existed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many non-Russian workers left the Far East to return to their newly independent countries. There was also much migration within the Far East from the northern to the southern areas, which placed greater stress on facilities. Despite the high cost of transport, 17,000 people left Sakhalin oblast' in the first four months of 1994. Had this rate continued, Sakhalin would have lost a tenth of its population in a year.(13) There was also a drop in births and a rise in the rate of mortality.
The Development of a Market Economy
Despite the many problems facing the Russian Far East in 1996, the beginnings of a market economy are evident. As in other parts of Russia, the results of the embrace of capitalism, privatisation, and the increased openness of the Russian economy, are evident. There has been a proliferation of small shops, kiosks and goods, although much is imported due to the drop in domestic production. A stock exchange was established in Vladivostok in 1993. As elsewhere in Russia, banking has grown rapidly. Marketisation in the Far East, however, has also been characterised by lawlessness and the growth of organised crime. This "Wild East" variant of capitalism includes strong links between regional administrations and the developing commercial class, many of whom were former members of the Soviet ruling elite. Many of these new capitalists have been able to use their contacts with the regional administration to benefit from privatisation. Some new owners sold their enterprises and deposited the money overseas, bringing little benefit to the Russian economy and perpetuating the view that capitalism was no more than speculation and profiteering. Privatisation, however, also developed a class of property owners who had an interest in developing the rule of law to protect their holdings. Privatisation also raised mental and physical hurdles to a restoration of Communism by preventing near total state control of the economy.
A major hurdle for the development of a market economy in the Russian Far East is the still considerable presence of the state sector which is reliant on subsidies from Moscow to survive. Many of these enterprises are part of the military-industrial complex and have been unable to carry out the process of conversion from military to non-military production. For some enterprises, remaining military producers has proved to be more lucrative as Moscow has remained one of the world's major arm sellers.
The change in fortunes for the Russian Far East since the end of the Soviet Union was most evident in the fate of the Pacific Fleet. Once the strongest arm of the Soviet navy, the need to update equipment became pressing during the Gorbachev era. After 1992, most of the fleet remained in port due to lack of fuel. Many turned to business such as the importation of second-hand cars.(14) Shootings at Japanese fishing boats were attributed to Japanese intruding on illegal commercial ventures of the Pacific fleet and the border guards.(15)
One major hope of the Far Eastern economy which has not been fully realised is the development of Free Economic Zones (FEZs). As sites of special economic development and activity, the zones enjoyed economic privileges such as tax concessions and favourable operating conditions. The aim of these zones was to attract foreign capital which would act as sites of capitalist development within the economy as a whole. The first FEZs were established in 1990 as a political act in the battle between the Gorbachev's Soviet regime and Yeltsin's Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. Many regions thought a declaration of themselves as FEZs sufficient to attract a flood of foreign capital. Despite all the hyperbole, only one FEZ was operational in the Russian Far East in 1996, at Nakhodka in Primorskii krai.(16) The initial FEZs lacked both funding and infrastructure necessary to attract outside investment. They were also vulnerable to unfavourable decisions by Moscow such as the introduction of the 1993 customs code which cancelled all former tax and customs concessions.(17) The liberalisation of the Russian economy also forced FEZs to rethink their role.
Politics in the Russian Far East
Politics in the Russian Far East must be seen within the historical and current developments that shape Russia as a whole. The post-communist project in Russia is ostensibly one of establishing democracy and a market economy. Both of these factors rest on private property and the rule of law, yet neither of these basic factors of modernity has deep roots in Russian culture. This means that the development of such institutions will be a long and difficult task, the success of which is not yet guaranteed. Absolutism characterised the Tsarist and the Communist States, and is still present in post-communist Russia. The notion of a state in which law is supreme over both sovereign and subject is relatively new in Russia. Although representative institutions have existed in Russia since the 19th century, their ability to act as a powerful restraint on absolute power has been circumscribed due to central control over the entire State.
Despite the historical factors that appeared to mitigate against the development of democracy in Russia, during the 1990s there were some signs that the development of democracy was occurring. These included Presidential elections in 1991 and 1996, parliamentary elections in 1990, 1993 and 1995, and the adoption of a constitution in 1993. Seeking legitimacy to rule through consent rather than inheritance or violence was a significant break with the past. Nonetheless, the new political order was not secure. Some yearned for a Stalin-like "firm hand" to create order out of the perceived chaos. Many politicians advocated anti-democratic and anti-market policies. They played on the deterioration in living standards, and the perceived loss of face by Russia due to the end of the Soviet empire.
Two themes characterise politics in the Russian Far East: a tense relationship with Moscow and the growth of authoritarian executive power at the expense of the legislature. Both were also nationwide trends. The first was due partly to the lack of a strong sense of Russian statehood. The Russian Federation was more a collection of 89 mini-fiefdoms than a cohesive state, and the ability of Moscow to impose its will over the federal units was uncertain. This was evident during 1992 and 1993, when many federal units did not transfer tax allocations to the centre.(18) The second trend reflected the attempt by Yeltsin to assert the primacy of presidential rule over that of parliamentary rule. This resulted in the violent closing of the Russian parliament in October 1993. In the Russian Far East, the regional governors became increasingly powerful, as Soviet era soviets [councils] were closed by Yeltsin and replaced by less powerful dumas. Several regional soviets had earlier managed to remove governors unfavourable to them. These included Kuznetsov in Primorskii krai, Fedorov in Sakhalin oblast' and Krivchenko in Amur oblast'.
The amount of taxes remitted to the federal budget caused considerable resentment in the Russian Far East. This was exacerbated by the advantages that the twenty-one ethnic republics appeared to enjoy. Sakha, the only republic in the Russian Far East, did not have to remit taxes to the central budget. It was able to develop a degree of self-financing due to its considerable reserves of diamonds. The regions of the Russian Far East sought concessions from Moscow in the form of subsidies and grants. Despite the rhetoric of integration with the Asia-Pacific region, the Russian Far East was still highly dependent on outside supplies. Reductions in tariffs and transport costs were a major demand. In addition, Moscow could not be relied upon to safeguard the interests of the Far East. After natural calamities in 1994, both Sakhalin oblast' and Primorskii krai had to turn to other countries for help. After the earthquake on northern Sakhalin island in May 1995, Moscow refused Japanese aid as it feared that Tokyo was trying to increase its political influence in the area.(19)
The question of the division of powers between the Russian Far East and Moscow contributed to regionalism, in which regional elites sought to gain greater powers for themselves at the expense of the centre. Regionalism in the Russian Far East has been closely linked with the political activities of the respective governors. Two examples of this were Valentin Fedorov, governor of Sakhalin oblast' (1990-1993) and Evgenii Nazdratenko, governor of Primorskii krai (1993-present). Both were able to exert political leverage over Moscow to ensure that regional interests were taken into consideration.(20) They also showed the increasing power of the governors over other political branches.
Fedorov, an economics professor from Moscow, gained national and international attention with his program to establish "capitalism on one island".(21) The results were ambiguous. Detractors said that the program had failed,(22) however, by the beginning of 1993, more than seventy percent of firms were privatised, which in turn were responsible for ninety-three percent of regional production.(23) Fedorov also gained prominence as leader of the opposition to the hand back of the Kuril Islands. Located in Sakhalin oblast', the islands had been seized by Stalin at the end of the Second World War,(24) but Japan demanded their hand-over as a pre-condition to an improvement in relations with Russia. To gain Japanese investment and to establish a new foreign policy, in 1992 Moscow appeared ready to transfer the islands. Although initially a "democrat", Fedorov became aligned with the patriotic-nationalist wing, so demonstrating the fluidity of post-soviet politics. Fedorov strongly lobbied Moscow to retain the islands. His policy of seeking economic development on the islands aggravated Japan.(25) Fedorov tried to abrogate federal powers to the regional level. He sought Japanese participation in the region, independent of Moscow. He proposed his 'fourth way' of a Foreign Economic Zone that would span the Kurils and the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido.(26)
Fedorov's regionalism was successful as he managed to gain extra resources. In December 1992, Yeltsin decreed the Kuril Islands to be a Special Economic Zone. This gave Sakhalin oblast' control over the fishing resources of the islands. In August 1993 Moscow then launched the federal program for the socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands for 1993-1995 and then to 2000. The long term viability of this program was uncertain. Moscow had pledged to pay an annual amount of 100 billion roubles ($US 35.7 million) in subsidies to Sakhalin oblast', but by September 1994 the oblast' had only received 5 billion rubles ($US 1.6 million).(27) Fedorov also pressured Moscow in an attempt to gain control of the considerable oil and gas deposits which were located on the Sakhalin shelf. He was vocal about which level of government had the right to determine who would exploit the Sakhalin-2 deposits. In 1991, Yeltsin granted control of the shelf to Sakhalin oblast' but retained control over oil and gas exports.(28) Fedorov countered Moscow's attempt to control the tendering process by concluding his own arrangements with foreign firms. This contributed to Yeltsin's decision not to support Fedorov when the regional soviet sought his removal in early 1993. The consortium eventually chosen was not that preferred by Fedorov.
The most overt form of regionalism in the Russian Far East was in Primorskii krai under Evgenii Nazdratenko. An authoritarian leader, he suppressed all opposition. He removed the mayor of Vladivostok, Viktor Cherepkov, by force in February 1994.(29) Nazdratenko also capitalised on resentment against Chinese, introducing restrictions on their movements. Primorskii krai differed from other regions in the extent to which it was able to successfully demand greater economic assistance from Moscow.(30) This regionalism was closely connected with safeguarding the interests of the traditional political elite. These former senior Communist Party officials, directors of industrial enterprises and state agricultural concerns, and senior military personnel formed an organisation, PAKT.(31) They smoothed the path to power for Nazdratenko. The latter ensured that PAKT benefited from privatisation at the expense of outsiders. This regionalism also served the interests of Moscow. Although the exact nature of the links between Moscow and the lower levels of government is not fully clear, it is evident that regionalism developed in Primorskii krai because many officials in Moscow supported the presence of a hardline governor on Russia's periphery. Although the support that Nazdratenko enjoyed was conditional, it ensured that regionalism continued to develop with relative impunity. Only in 1996, following the removal by Yeltsin of many of Nazdratenko's supporters in the Presidential apparatus, did the governor's position appear shaky.
The regionalist policies of Nazdratenko took several different forms. These included demands for economic assistance in the form of subsidies and soft credits, calls for the creation of a special economic regime and for governors to be elected rather than appointed by Yeltsin, attempts to take control of the Kuril Islands away from Sakhalin oblast', and the undermining of Russian foreign policy toward China. Nazdratenko first gained national attention through his support of the declaration by the regional soviet on 8 July 1993 that the status of the region be raised to that of a national republic. Nazdratenko sought both greater political and economic autonomy. His economic demands were the most successful. Moscow regularly allocated new subsidies to the region, despite the problems this could create for the federal budget.
A distinguishing factor of such regionalism was that the interests of individual regions were paramount over the Far East as a whole. Primorskii and Khabarovsk kraya, for example, were not averse to seizing for their own use oil bound for Sakhalin oblast'. Nonetheless there were signs of a Far Eastern regional consciousness. The Far Eastern Republic, which existed between 1920 and 1922 as a buffer state between Soviet forces and Western interventionist powers, served as an attractive regionalist symbol. As the power of the Soviet state declined, the idea of an independent Far East proved attractive to many. In the longer term, however, the Far Eastern Republic proved to be a chimera. Regional elites were more intent on following their own interests than pursuing joint demands. A Far Eastern Regional Association of Economic Cooperation was established, but it did not have the influence of its prominent neighbour, the Siberian Agreement.(32) Its first director, Nikolai Daniluk, complained that the major problem was that the regions followed their own interests rather than joined forces.(33) Nonetheless, there were signs of a common cause. In February 1995, deputies from regional legislatures of the Russian Far East demanded that Moscow improve their situation through regulation of the tariffs on fuel and energy, grant compensation for the cost of transport of goods, grant payments to the military industries for state orders from 1994, and adopt a state program to rehabilitate contaminated areas.(34)
Foreign Trade and the Russian Far East
Foreign trade is important for the development of the Russian Far East. Gorbachev focused on the foreign trade of the Far East as part of the program for developing the Far East Economic Region by improving raw material extraction and production. In the Vladivostok speech he envisaged the development of trade with China and Japan. Joint ventures were first established in 1987. The end of the Soviet Union saw the liberalisation of foreign trade regulations. Nonetheless, in 1994 Moscow was still trying to regulate Far Eastern trade via the imposition of special regional quotas on exports. Far Eastern regions have been trying to win the right to higher export quotas. However, the high export and import tariffs and the obligatory sale of all hard currency earnings serves to discourage foreign trade.(35)
Between 1986 and 1996, the direction of Russian Far East trade focused even more strongly on the Asia-Pacific region [see table 1 in hard copy of Bulletin]. The overall figure moved from 78 percent to over 90 percent.(36) This is a pattern that is likely to continue due to geographical proximity. While Germany was the major trading partner of the Russian Federation as a whole, Japan and China were the major economic partners of the Russian Far East. Other major trading partners were South Korea and the USA. In 1993, 46 percent of regional exports went to Japan, and 33 percent to China. In the case of imports, this was reversed, with 48 percent of imports coming from China and 18 percent from Japan.(37) Trade with China then fell dramatically in 1994 due to anti-Chinese policies in the Russian Far East and Moscow's decision to follow cash rather than barter trade. The local market also became saturated with Chinese goods, which were perceived as being of poor quality. The increase in Far Eastern trade in 1995 suggested that the fall in trade with China was temporary.
The principal trading regions of the Russian Far East are those in the south: Amur and Sakhalin oblasti and Khabarovsk and Primorskii kraya. Primorskii krai enjoyed the largest foreign trade turnover of any region [see tables 2 & 3 in hard copy of Bulletin]. Unofficial and illegal trade plays an important role in the Far Eastern economy. Unofficial estimates of all foreign trade put the figure as being three times as much as that of the official trade figures. In 1994 this was estimated to be US$1.5 billion.(38) In the illegal sphere, the drug trade was the second most profitable activity after gun running. Hemp production in the Far East was widespread.(39) Long-term ecological considerations, particularly in the logging industry, were often subordinated to foreign trade interests. The lack of value-added processing in the Russian Far East brings little long-term economic or ecological gain.
Summary
By 1996, only part of the vision set out by Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech in 1986 had come to fruition. Russia's relations with its neighbours in North East Asia had greatly improved since 1986, although there was still tension with Japan over the Kuril Islands. The expectations regarding the Russian Far East were not so positive. Despite its position on the Asia-Pacific rim, and considerable natural resources, the Russian Far East still finds itself in a severe economic situation. Soviet era development which designated the industrial profile of the area to be a raw materials appendage of European Russia, still prevents the Russian Far East from fully integrating into either the Russian or foreign economies. Despite the growth of regionalism in the Far East, as regional elites seek more autonomy from Moscow, the Russian Far East still remains reliant on European Russia for the supply of many necessary goods and services. The gleaming future that was predicted for the area over a century ago will remain unfulfilled for the foreseeable future.
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Brown, Kathryn (1992), 'Sakhalin's Valentin Fedorov Makes Nationalist Allies', in Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 1, no. 38, 25 September, pp.33-38.
Busigina, I (1995), 'Rossiskii Dal'nii Vostok, (Russian Far East) in Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdynarodnie otnosheniya, No.7. pp.106-117.
Christoffersen, Gaye (1994-1995), 'The Greater Vladivostok Project: Transitional Linkages in Regional Economic Planning', in Pacific Affairs, Winter. pp:513-531.
Chugov, Sergei, 'Russia and Japan: Drifting in Opposite Directions', in Transition, 22 September, vol.2, no. 19. pp:12-16.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (1996), Pacific Russia: Risks and Rewards, Canberra: East Asia Analytical Unit.
Goldman, Marshall (1992), 'Sakhalin: Russia's Success Story', in World Monitor, December. pp.30-36.
Handelman, Stephan (1994), Comrade Criminal. The Theft of the Second Russian Revolution, London: Michael Joseph.
Hughes, James (1994), 'Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of the Siberian Agreement', in Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, no.7. pp:1133-1161.
Kirkow, Peter (1995), 'Regional Warlordism in Russia: The Case of Primorskii Krai', in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No.6. pp:923-947.
Kirkow, Peter & Hanson, Philip (1994), 'The Potential for Autonomous Regional Development in Russia: The Case of Primorskii Krai' in Post-Soviet Geography, Vol.35, No.2. pp.63-88.
Lapidus, Gail W. & Walker, Edward W. (1995), 'Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia', in Lapidus, Gail W. (ed) The New Russia. Troubled Transformation, Boulder CO: Westview Press. pp.79-114.
Mann, Dawn (1990), 'Valentin Fedorov: An Economist becomes a Politician', in Radio Liberty Report, No. 25, 22 June, pp.6-7.
Miller, Elisa & Karp, Alexander [eds] (1994), Pocket Handbook to the Russian Far East: a reference guide, Seattle: Russian Far East Update.
Minakir, P.A. (ed.), (1993) Dal'nii Vostok Rossii: Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie, [The Russian Far East: An Economic Overview], Moscow: Progress-Kompleks Ekopros. 2 Volumes.
Nimmo, William F. (1994), Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
Sagers, Matthew (1995), 'Prospects for Oil and Gas Development in Russia's Sakhalin oblast', in Post-Soviet Geography, Vol.36, No.5, May. pp.274-290.
Rodgers, Allen (1990). The Soviet Far East: Prospects for Development, London: Routledge.
Schiffer, Jonathan. R (1989), Soviet Regional Economic Policy:The East-West Debate over Pacific Siberian Development, New York: St. Martin's Press.
Stephan, John J. (1974),The Kuril Islands, Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Stephan, John J. (1987), 'Siberia and the World Economy: Incentives and Constraints to Involvement', in Alan Wood [ed.], Siberia: Problems and Prospects for Regional Development, London / New York / Sydney: Croom Held. pp:213-230.
Stephan, John J. (1993), 'The Russian Far East', in Current History, October, pp.331-336.
Stephan, John J. (1994), The Russian Far East - A History, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wade, Richard (1989), Gorbachev's Asia Initiative: "New Thinking" in North East Asia, An unpublished thesis for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours, Department of Politics, University of Melbourne.
Wade, Richard (1996), "Regionalism and the Russian Federation, The Far Eastern Perspective: Primorskii krai and Sakhalin oblast'", in V. Tikhomirov [ed.], In Search of Identity: Five Years Since the End of the Soviet Union, Centre for Russian and Euro-Asian Studies, forthcoming.
NOTES
(1) The Russian Far East is referred to by some sources as Pacific Russia. [see DFAT, 1996] It comprises six non-ethnic regions and three ethnically based autonomous districts. The ethnic republic of Sakha is also counted as being in the Russian Far East, having been included within the Far East's jurisdiction in 1963. The non-ethnic regions are Primorskii krai, Sakhalin oblast', Khabarovsk krai, Amur oblast', Magadan oblast' and Kamchatka oblast'. The three ethnic districts are the Jewish Autonomous District which was created by Stalin, Chukotsk national district and Koryak national district. See Miller & Karp, 1994, Minakir, 1993, and Stephans, 1994.
(2) [Rodgers, 1990:3]
(3) Pravda, 29 July 1986:1-4.
(4) These issues were the question of the Soviet military presence along the Chinese border, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.
(5) DFAT, 1996:6
(6) see Sagers, 1995
(7) Schiffer, 1989:124-185
(8) Stephen, 1987:224
(9) Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 September 1987:95
(10) Rodgers, 1990:4
(11) DFAT, 1996:6
(12) Busigina, 1995:110
(13) Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 September 1994: 28
(14) By the mid-1990's much of the armoury of the Pacific fleet was obsolete. This was a problem which was already evident in the late 1980's [Wade, 1989:84-86]. The disposal of ordanance was a major problem. One solution devised by the Pacific Fleet, albeit an unsatisfactory one, was to simply throw the ordanance into the Sea of Japan [Lord of the East, BBC Films, 1994].
(15) Kirkow, 1995:925
(16) FEZs were a form of political friction between Moscow and regional administrations. In 1992 and 1993, the then governor of Primorskii krai, Vladimir Kuznetsov (1991-93) advocated an FEZ in southern Primorskii krai, the "Greater Vladivostok" project, which enjoyed Japanese support, while Moscow favoured the Tumen Delta River project which was supported by China [see Christofferson, 1994-95].
(17) Busigina, 1995:110
(18) Lapidus & Walker, 1994:97
(19) Chugov, 1995:14
(20) See Wade, 1996
(21) Mann, 1990, Brown, 1992, Goldman, 1992, Stephan, 1994:289. Fedorov's long term aim was to establish a market economy in different regions of the Soviet Union parallel to the existing centrally planned economy.
(22) Initially food and oil shortages continued [Moscow News, no. 31, 2-9 August 1992:16,The Times, 17 July 1992:12], as did the drop in agricultural and industrial output [Moscow News, 25 December 1991:18].
(23) Kommersant Daily, 24 February 1993:10
(24) See Stephan, 1974
(25) Fedorov approved the development of a tourist complex on the islands, [Komsomolskaya Pravda, 23 October 1992:2-3, Nimmo, 1994:152-154], a deal which was later cancelled under strong pressure from Japan. Relations between Japan and Russia were becoming increasing strained. In September 1992, Yeltsin had cancelled his first ever visit to Japan.
(26) Delovaya Zhizn', no. 23, December 1991:7-10, Literaturnaya Gazeta, no. 9, 26 February 1992:7. This would include South Korean participation to balance the presence of the Japanese.
(27) Several officials in Moscow favoured Nazdratenko's proposal to merge Sakhalin oblast' and Primorskii krai in order to strengthen Russia's position in the area, and to reduce the amount of subsidies that Moscow had promised to pay [Kirkow, 1995:945, note 117].
(28) Stephen, 1993:333
(29) Cherepkov challenged various vested interests when he exposed offences in the distribution of Vladivostok's lands, operations with real estate and distribution of assets.. Moscow's response was mixed. Yeltsin approved of the action, whereas a working group of deputies of the State Duma declared the dismissal illegal and recommended Moscow's intervention [RIA, 25 March 1994].
(30) Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin strongly supported the granting of subsidies to ensure that the price of electricity remained low. Primorskii krai requested and received the freezing of a large part of tax transfers to the federal budget [Kommersant-Daily, 30 July 1994:3].
(31) Primorskii Joint Stock Corporation of Commodity Producers
(32) See Hughes, 1994.
(33) Russian Far East Update, March 1993:10
(34) Izvestiya, 3 February 1995:1
(35) Kirkow & Hanson, 1994:73
(36) Minakir, 1993, vol. 1:107
(37) DFAT, 1996:3
(38) Russian Far East Update, May 1995:12
(39) Handelman, 1995:184