The dramatic break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 had far-reaching implications for the republics of Central Asia. The newly independent Central Asian states have declared their allegiance to nationalist and democratic principles of governance, but a disturbing trend emerging in the region is the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, which has contributed in particular to the eruption of civil conflicts in Tajikistan. This article examines the legacy of Soviet rule in Tajikistan, and the significance of the continuing ties of dependence between Russia and Tajikistan.
After Tajikistan proclaimed its independence, many observers feared that it would be unable to consolidate its national identity and to engage in the necessary political, economic and social reforms. Tajikistan was the last of the Soviet republics to opt for independence. Moreover, it was headed by leaders strongly loyal to the Communist Party who saw continued association with Moscow as a means of maintaining political control. (1) The continuing integration of the Tajik government with the old political centre after the collapse of the USSR was remarkable. Former Communist Party officials continued to dominate every political institution from the presidency and the presidential council downwards. Their refusal to embrace nationalist reform led to the increased radicalisation of opposition movements and provided the opposition with the popular support that would bring about the resignation of three Tajik presidents in the post-Soviet era.
It had been predicted that the collapse of Soviet rule in Central Asia would lead to the demise of central planning along with its bureaucratic structures, and to the emergence of a market economy reliant upon price mechanisms. (2) However, specialisation in cotton production had created a monoculture in Tajikistan which left the republic dependent on other parts of the former Soviet Union for imports of foodstuffs, machinery, equipment and other goods. The effects of inflation, unemployment, food and fuel shortages after the Soviet collapse were felt more acutely in Tajikistan than elsewhere. (3) In this context, it should be noted that Graham Fuller has emphasised internal economic factors as having the greatest potential to push Islam in a more radical direction. (4)
Another major problem faced by Tajikistan and the other Central Asian republics in the wake of the collapse of the USSR concerns ethnic tensions. Under Soviet policies, Central Asian boundaries were deliberately drawn in such a manner as to create ethnic minorities; thus, for example, many Tajiks live in Uzbekistan, while a similar number of Uzbeks are located in Tajikistan. Minority nationalities from other parts of the Soviet Union, such as the Meshketians, were also re-settled in the region. The resultant unbalanced ethnic demography gave rise to differences and conflicts, and the subsequent quest for cultural identity has been articulated largely along religious, predominantly Islamic, lines.
One of the most critical factors of potential ethno-nationalist conflict in Tajikistan is the localised nature of identity and its specific connection with Iranian history. Given the close proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its radical Islam, some observers predicted that the strategic vacuum created by the Soviet withdrawal would lead to a revival of Islamic awareness and leave Tajikistan vulnerable to an Iranian-sponsored fundamentalism. (5)
Western political commentators have offered two opposing prognoses with regard to these regional considerations. The first assumed that post-Soviet Russia would be faced with so many of its own problems that it would swiftly withdraw from the region and allow these new states to cultivate their own independent identities. The second prognosis was that the newly independent states would in fact prove unable to consolidate their national identities and would continue to look to Russia for assistance.
This latter argument has found support among Russian leaders who have pointed to the continuing need for Russian economic advice and expertise, as well as the lack of indigenous armed forces and an adequate foreign policy apparatus.(6) Russia's continuing interests in the region cannot be ignored, particularly as there are some ten million Russians still resident in the Central Asian states (see Table 1 in hard copy). Some Russian politicians such as Zhirinovsky and Chernyshev have been insistent that post-Soviet Russia must protect its historical interests. The Central Asian states have accepted Russia's presence pragmatically as a temporary measure during their transition to independence, but this is unlikely to be sanctioned indefinitely. (7) In addition, it should be noted that the presidents of the newly independent states, while committed to defending the interests of their respective countries, give some precedence to Russia's interests over their own.(8)
The first section of this article will explore the nature of Russia's interests and policy development in Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with a specific focus on Russia's role in Tajikistan after 1991. The Tajik government has continued to rely on the support of Russia, and of Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and Russia's pre-1991 colonial relationship has in many ways continued unchanged - that is, it remains a relationship of dependence and exploitation.
After the break-up of the USSR, Russia had no clear policy towards its former republics in Central Asia. In general terms, Russia wanted a union of the former republics within the general framework of the CIS under Russian leadership.(9) By 1992, however, Russia had realised that its relative inactivity had caused a geopolitical vacuum that invited intervention by neighbouring Islamic states.(10) Countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Pakistan were planning regional economic and political links with the Central Asian states. The possibility of an Islamic political union on Russia's southern borders, stretching from Pakistan to Central Asia to Iran to Turkey, and the fear of spreading Islamic fundamentalism, gave rise to deep concern in Russia about Russian interests and development politics in the region.(11) According to Amin Saikal, Yeltsin realised that a failure to face the rise of Islam could pose serious security problems.(12)
The initial sources of the Islamic threat are identified by Malashenko as both internal and external. The internal sources, including Islamic opposition groups and parties, are connected to the external sources, especially Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.(13) Hence it seemed essential for Russia to protect its vulnerable southern flank and to secure those borders from regional actors planning to create an Islamic federation.(14)
Moreover, the Central Asian leaders themselves considered fundamentalism a potentially dangerous rival in the struggle for power, which might in turn encourage the involvement of other Islamic countries in the region, especially in Tajikistan. The notably authoritarian presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, respectively Islam Karimov and Saparmurad Niyazov, have cast anxious glances at Tajikistan's civil war, in which the ruling Communist government of President Nabiev was challenged by radical Tajik Muslims (with support from Afghan Islamic fundamentalists) and democrats.(15)
In response to the potential security threat from Tajikistan, the Central Asian leaders adopted two connected policy measures. The first aimed to reinstate the Communists in Tajikistan in order to check the spread of fundamentalism from Afghanistan. The second aimed to enlist Russia's more active participation in defence of the ex-Soviet Muslim republics by increasing Russian anxieties over the threat of regional instability.(16) The Central Asian leaders exerted pressure on Moscow to participate in a collective security system. As President Askar Akayev noted, this also involved shoring up Russia's position as a world power.(17)
Russia's fears also concerned the large outflow of ethnic Russians from Central Asia, a trend causing a shortage of skilled labour in the region as well as a serious refugee problem in Russia itself. Accordingly, a central facet of Moscow's foreign policy towards Central Asia has involved extending protection to some ten million Russians residing there. In fact, threats to the lives or well-being of the local Russian population are likely to be the determining factor in any decision by Moscow on military intervention.(18) The Yeltsin government and Russian public opinion have been especially concerned with the 300,000 Russians living in Tajikistan.(19) By the end of 1992 at least 100,000, and in 1993 over 200,000, Russians were reported to have fled from Tajikistan to Russia.(20)
Other factors, too, have contributed to the shift in Russian security policy in Central Asia which has occurred since mid-1992. Russia has come to realise the extent of its interdependence with the Central Asian states, especially given the vulnerability of those states to external pressure because of their economic weakness, political instability and lack of defence capabilities. The eruption of the Tajik civil war in mid-1992 further emphasised to Moscow that Russia should be actively engaged in the security of Central Asia, in the economic and political spheres as well as in the military sense.
Secondly, the growing conservative influence in Russian politics, and the increased role of the army in defining Russia's security requirements, led to a renewed focus on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border.(21) Senior figures in the military feared the loss of strategic installations in Central Asia as well as inter-ethnic conflicts, while powerful economic lobbies were eager to ensure the supply of raw materials from Central Asia. A powerful coalition of groups including the Civic Union and the army, and influential 'neo-Eurasianist' politicians and academics such as Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi, argued that Russia had a special destiny in Asia and advocated an aggressive expansionist drive southward and eastward, including colonisation and assimilation.(22) In contrast, the 'Euro-Atlanticists' supported the short-lived 'Slavic Union', excluding the Central Asian republics.(23) The Neo-Eurasianists also believed that Russia still had a paramount position in Central Asia and should take an active part in protecting the region from dangerous external influences, especially that of Islamic fundamentalism.
In 1992 and early 1993 the failure of the Atlanticists, who dominated foreign policy-making, to formulate a coherent policy toward Central Asia led to a significant shift in Russian foreign policy, with President Yeltsin transferring de facto control over foreign policy to the newly created Russian Federation Security Council.(24) Yeltsin declared that "the time for the Eastward move has arrived".(25) The Russian foreign ministry also announced a new policy on the 'near abroad' and the issue of the Russian minorities there.
According to Maxim Shashenkov, the key issues in Russia's emerging perspective on the 'near abroad' are based on five objectives. These include the safeguarding of Russia's territorial integrity, the creation of a 'good neighbour' zone, recognition of Russia's role as the guarantor of stability in the area of the former Soviet Union, the protection of Russian minorities abroad, and the promotion of CIS integration.(26)
Russian policy-makers were determined to follow an integrated collective security process within the CIS in order to protect its vulnerable southern flank. General Leonid Ivashov, head of the working group on defence issues, declared that a security system under a collective treaty was a paramount and achievable aim.(27) Russian military officials attempted to salvage the remnants of the Soviet defence system and to maintain Russia's interest in military installations in Central Asia.(28) A juridical basis for CIS, and particularly Russian, involvement in Central Asian conflicts was created by the signing of the CIS Treaty of Collective Security between Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan (but not Turkmenistan) in Tashkent on 15 May 1992.(29) Articles 1 and 4 of this treaty are particularly significant. According to article 1,
The participating states confirm their commitment to refrain from the use or threat of force in interstate relations. They pledge to resolve all disagreements among themselves and with other states by peaceful means. The participating states will not enter into military alliances or participate in any groupings of states, nor in actions directed against another participating state. In the event of the creation of a system of collective security in Europe and Asia and the conclusion of treaties on collective security to that end - for which the contracting parties will strive unswervingly - the participating states will enter into immediate consultations with each other for the purpose of incorporating the necessary intentions in the present treaty.(30)
Article 4 of the treaty states that:
If one of the participating states is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, this will be perceived as an aggression against all participating states to the treaty. In the event of an act of aggression being committed against any of the participating states, all the other participating states will give it the necessary assistance, including military assistance, and will also give support with the means at their disposal by way of exercising the right to collective defence in accordance with article 51 of the UN charter. The participating states will immediately inform the UN Security Council of any measures taken on the basis of this article. When implementing these measures, the participating states will abide by the corresponding provisions of the UN Charter.(31)
The political significance of the Tashkent treaty was confirmed by military circles of the participating governments. Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, General Samsonov, noted that the importance of the treaty was in forming an adequate guarantee of security in the CIS states.(32) For Roland Dannreuther, the most significant aspect of the agreement was as preparation for more important bilateral military agreements subsequently signed with the Central Asian states.(33) The treaty could in fact be the basis for a defence alliance of interested states.
In order to formulate a practical position on collective security and the involvement of CIS forces in Central Asian conflicts, especially the Tajik civil war, leaders from Russia and Central Asia held two significant meetings, in Moscow on 6 July 1992, and in Tashkent on 16 July 1992. At the Moscow summit, agreement was reached, inter alia, on a mechanism for the creation of a CIS peacekeeping force and its rapid deployment in the area of regional conflict.(34) The Tashkent meeting focused on the issue of security along the southern border of the CIS, and resulted in the signing of a collective security agreement and associated bilateral agreements.(35) In regard to the conflict in Tajikistan, the Tashkent meeting reached agreement on the necessity of reinforcing southern border security, especially along the Tajik-Afghan border. The treaty established that Russia would stand guarantor of the security of the other states.(36)
Russian Involvement in the Tajik Civil War
The Tajik civil war raised the spectre of conflict and instability on Russia's southern borders, and the possibility of the involvement of Russia and the other members of the CIS. Like the Central Asian states, Russia was increasingly preoccupied with the danger to Tajikistan of Afghan Mujahedin influence. Accordingly, Russian and Central Asian leaders issued warnings against outside interference, presumably directed at Afghanistan, and favoured Russia's involvement as a guarantor of security.(37) As Uzbek President Islam Karimov noted on the eve of the Tashkent meeting in an interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta, 'Tajikistan is an inseparable part of Central Asia, and ... to assert that Tajikistan might suddenly find itself under the sphere of influence or under any protection of Afghanistan's Mujahedin is absolutely unacceptable.'(38) Other Central Asian leaders such as Kirgiz President Askar Akayev and CIS Commander-in-Chief General Evgenii Shaposhnikov also affirmed that Tajikistan's security problem could not be solved without Russia's assistance.(39)
Other factors contributed to pushing Russia towards involvement in Tajikistan. Tajikistan was identified by Russia as a source of raw materials and as a sphere of economic interest. Tajikistan's aluminium, uranium, metal-working and chemical plants were integral to military production for the Russian army.(40) Russia is also the only major investor in these industries. A large segment of the Tajik economy is dependent upon Russia, with most of Tajikistan's factories operated by Russian technicians and producing primarily for Russian consumption. During Tajikistan's civil war, most of the major factories were operating at only 50% of capacity. According to Izvestiya, aluminium and uranium production was falling sharply and suffered from disruption to supply lines.(41) In order to solve these problems, to protect Russian personnel in Tajik industry, and to guard major economic installations, Russian policy-makers determined on intervention in Tajikistan. As President Yeltsin declared, 'we have much in common with the states of the CIS ... we shall remember the fact that millions, tens of millions of our compatriots reside in these states. It is the right and duty of Russia and Russia's leadership to protect their interests.'(42) Yeltsin also articulated Russia's unwillingness to withdraw from a region that had been located within Russia's sphere of interest for centuries.(43)
The Tajik leadership unambiguously requested Russian involvement, with the government and the Presidium of its parliament sending a message to the Russian President requesting assistance in ensuring economic production and in protecting the population.(44) In response to this request, Yeltsin proclaimed the Tajik-Afghan border to be Russia's border, and issued a decree placing the CIS Border Troops stationed on the Tajik border under Russian jurisdiction.(45) Yeltsin's action, probably approved by President Nabiev, was explicitly directed against the smuggling of arms from Afghanistan. The Tajik opposition, however, saw his action as evidence of a plan to re-establish Russian control in Tajikistan.(46)
At the end of August, a CIS delegation under Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov visited Tajikistan and reached a preliminary agreement with the Tajik President on the deployment of peacekeeping forces.(47) Russian troops were then able to protect the local Russian population, guard major economic installations, and act as a peacekeeping force.(48) Although welcomed by President Nabiev's camp, this agreement was condemned by the opposition democratic and Islamic parties as an encroachment on Tajik national independence. The opposition accused the Russian army of violating Tajik neutrality and of interfering in Tajik internal affairs by providing pro-Nabiev forces with weapons and other military equipment.(49) At any rate, the mere presence of the 201st Motor Rifle Division (MRD) in the midst of the Tajik civil war provided both sides with an opportunity to buy or steal otherwise unavailable weapons such as Kalashnikov rifles, heavy ammunition and armoured vehicles.(50)
In response to the influx of weapons into Tajikistan, whether from Afghanistan or other sources, the Presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Russia issued a statement warning that the Tajik conflict was endangering the security of the CIS. At a meeting in Alma Ata on 3 September 1992 they issued a joint statement declaring that 'we will take all necessary measures to provide assistance to the fraternal Tajik people in stabilising the situation in the country, consolidating its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States.(51) These states then sent troops to reinforce the border guards, who were in danger of being swamped, whether by the pressure of refugees fleeing into Afghanistan, or by armed groups trying to cross over in the opposite direction.
President Yeltsin expressed readiness to take all measures necessary to help Tajikistan to maintain stability and territorial integrity, as well as the security of the CIS's southern borders.(52) Additional Russian troops were sent into Tajikistan.(53) Russia put itself forward as a surrogate for the Tajik state, citing the preoccupation of the Tajiks with their own clan struggles and their failure to maintain effective military, police or social services.(54)
Analysis of Russia's political security role in Tajikistan, especially after the forced resignation of President Nabiev in September 1992, reveals a pattern of behaviour also discernible in other conflicts in the former USSR: attempts to balance the opposing sides, cautious sympathy for pro-Russian forces, and watching out for an opportunity to intervene in a peacekeeping capacity.(55) The Russian military, especially the 201st MRD, performed a balancing act between the opposition parties and pro-Communist forces in Tajikistan. At first the Russian military remained neutral, and was reluctant to become involved in anything other than the protection of military institutions, although it continued to support pro-Nabiev forces through secret sales of local arms and ammunitions stores.(56)
The emergence of a religious state in Tajikistan was not acceptable to Russia and could also jeopardise the Central Asian political situation, particularly in Uzbekistan, the most strategically important state in the region.(57) Uzbekistan's sensitivity with regard to Tajikistan is largely a result of the presence of a large Tajik population in Samarkand and Bukhara, as well as the growing Islamic influence. Under Karimov the Uzbek government supported the struggle of the Communist government in Tajikistan against the Islamic-democratic opposition.
By early October 1992, the spread of bloody civil conflicts between pro-Communist forces and the opposition had provided new pretexts for Russian and Uzbek intervention.(58) Despite their original reluctance, Russia and Uzbekistan determined that their security interests required the imposition of order in Tajikistan and that the ex-Communists and their supporters were the only force capable of establishing political order. Hence they decided to remove the 'democratic-Islamic' coalition government from power and crush its armed forces.(59)
Tajikistan's Supreme Soviet called on Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan to send peacekeeping forces and tried to arrange a cease-fire to ease their deployment.(60) At a meeting held on 30 November at Termez in Uzbekistan, Russian and Central Asian Defence Ministers recognised the legitimacy of the new government and agreed to create a joint peacekeeping force to support it.
Before the peacekeeping force could be deployed, however, the stalemate in Tajikistan was broken in early December by a new attack on Dushanbe led by new Tajik Interior Minister Yakub Salimov, and supported by Kulyabi and Hissar irregular forces. The advance was checked by Russian forces, who then threatened to intervene against the Islamic groups allegedly responsible.(61)
From this point, Russian and Uzbek involvement took on an increasingly military character. On 10 December, forces loyal to the new government, mostly units of the People's Front of Tajikistan from Kulyab, captured Dushanbe with the help of Uzbek and Russian military forces and began a massacre of Islamic and democratic groups.(62) During the same period, Uzbekistan continued to arm and train the pro-Nabiev forces, and Moscow ensured that the Russian-controlled CIS troops continued to provide them with arms while refusing to sell heavy weapons to the government.(63) After the downfall of the democratic-Islamic coalition government in Dushanbe, Russia took part in a series of anti-guerrilla campaigns and bombings in Garm, Navabad and Komsomolabad.(64) By the end of February 1993 Russia, with Uzbek support, had restored the old political order in Tajikistan, and Imamali Rakhmonov's government claimed to be in control of most of the country.(65)
This political and military victory was greeted with relief by the neighbouring Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan, and the Russian military authorities. President Rakhmonov declared that the joint Russian and Uzbek involvement had been a successful test of the new collective security arrangements.(66) In contrast, Russian-Uzbek intervention was condemned by the Tajik opposition, especially the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). Usmon Davlat, one of the IRP leaders, compared the Russian troops in Tajikistan to the Soviet troops sent into Afghanistan in 1979.(67)
After the victory, the Russian leadership attempted to consolidate its position as guarantor of peace and stability in the region. In early 1993 President Yeltsin declared that organisations such as the UN should give 'special powers' to Russia in view of the latter's role as guarantor on the territory of the former USSR.(68) Russian Defence Minister General Pavel Grachev agreed that the forces should operate under the CSCE or the UN.(69) These statements angered opposition leaders in Central Asia, who claimed that Russia was preparing to interfere in Central Asian politics by backing dictatorial regimes in the region. At the same time, other Central Asian leaders such as Karimov were pleased by Yeltsin's commitment and by the existence of a CIS security umbrella.(70)
Russian policy-makers, especially the neo-Eurasianists, favoured a more forceful security role in defence of the Central Asian republics, including Tajikistan. In carrying out this policy, Russian Defence Minister General Pavel Grachev and CIS Deputy Chief of Staff Major-General Farrokh Niyazov visited Tajikistan in early February 1993 and reached a security agreement with its leadership on forming a new Tajik army.(71) A few days later, 31 Russian officers arrived in Dushanbe to assist the new government in building the army, which continued to be dominated by ethnic Russian technical specialists and officers.(72) The Russian Motor Rifle Division was intended to form the nucleus of the new army, but instead it developed over time into an independent Russian unit, recruiting conscripts exclusively from pro-government forces in the northern region of Tajikistan.(73) Reinforcements also arrived from Russia to assist in the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border.(74) During his visit to Dushanbe in early April 1993, Andrei Kozyrev argued that, rather than constituting a Russian imperialist action, protection of this border was within Russia's legitimate rights, and called for an increased Russian military presence in Tajikistan.(75)
Many Russian army officers and commentators believed that the Russian military presence on the Tajik-Afghan border would facilitate a long-term solution to the conflict. However, they also feared that Russia could be sucked into an Afghan-style guerrilla war,(76) which the Russian public would be unlikely to support. These fears were confirmed by an opposition attack on a Russian post at the Tajik-Afghan border on 13 July 1993, when more than 25 Russian soldiers were killed.(77) President Yeltsin and his Defence Minister Pavel Grachev described the attack as 'a direct threat to Russia's national security'.(78) In addition, they stressed that Russia was concerned 'not only with the border situation',(79) and indicated that the Russian 201st MRD, as well as Russian fighter planes, might be used to attack rebel bases within Tajikistan - which did in fact occur on 19 July.(80) Abandoning the earlier stance of neutrality, Russian forces became directly involved in the conflict and were thus seen as legitimate targets for attack.(81)
Opinion polls in Russia indicated that a majority of the Russian population was in favour of a full withdrawal from Tajikistan.(82) As public concern and disenchantment with the conflict increased, the political leadership in Moscow considered other approaches to the Tajik conflicts. President Yeltsin invited the Central Asian leaders to a summit in Moscow to present a new Russian approach to the crisis. The major points made by the Russian leadership at the summit on 7 August 1993 were as follows: first, that Russia was not willing to shoulder the burden of the war alone, and required the cooperation of the Central Asian states. Second, Yeltsin stressed to the Tajik leadership that continued Russian support was contingent on its instituting a dialogue with all opposition groups.(83) Russia and the Central Asian states (again, with the exception of Turkmenistan) then signed an agreement establishing a CIS peacekeeping force to police Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan.(84) By December 1993 there were 25,000 CIS troops on the Tajik-Afghan border.(85) With the tacit approval of Russian policy-makers and Central Asian leaders, Uzbekistan became the de facto regional gendarme.(86) This meant that Russia was able to dictate its strategy to the Tajik government via Uzbekistan, thereby avoiding a direct interventionist role in the region.
Uzbekistan, for its part, accepted the role of gendarme for the sake of regional stability and the Uzbek-Russian minorities in the region, although Karimov also seems to view the Tajik opposition as an ideological threat to his personal position.(87) Uzbekistan showed itself to have regional leadership ambitions, and attempted to project itself as Russia's strategic partner in a common struggle against fundamentalism.(88) President Karimov has stressed Uzbekistan's strategic geographic location and political stability as key to its central role in the region, while at the same time professing a policy of regional neutrality, and of non-interference in the Tajik conflict in particular. The Tajik leadership itself has not been hostile to Uzbek support. For example, at a meeting between Karimov and President Rakhmonov in October 1994, Rakhmonov stated that Uzbeks and Tajiks were 'blood brothers', and went on to say that 'When things are hard, we turn to our blood brothers.(89)
Relations between Uzbekistan and Russia have improved against the background of regional instability, with each seeing the other as a force for stability. In early 1994 a military treaty was concluded between the two countries, allowing for arms sales from Russia, military training, and the joint use of military installations. Uzbekistan and Russia have also taken part in joint military exercises, and have signed several other military agreements.(90)
By 1993, Russia was attempting to mediate between the Tajik government and the opposition leadership in exile, in an effort to renounce imperialist policies and to end the Tajik civil war. Russia was now prepared to pull back its military operations and to consider political solutions to the conflict.(91) The Russian Foreign Minister began to urge the Tajik regime to engage the opposition in dialogue. He also held talks with the opposition leadership in March and prepared for peace negotiations in April 1994.(92) Discussions between the Tajik government and the opposition opened in Moscow under the chairmanship of the UN and in the presence of representatives of Russia, Iran, Pakistan and the USA. The result of these negotiations was a protocol on the establishment of a joint commission on refugees, and an agreement to hold further rounds of talks in Iran and Pakistan.(93)
Since that time, there have been more troubling developments for the Tajikistan government. In early 1996, President Yeltsin again urged President Rakhmonov to reach an agreement with opposition forces, warning that Russia was not prepared to bear the costs involved in propping up the Tajik government. During the uprisings of early 1996, Russia kept a close watch on events, with frequent visits by high-level officials. The Russian Defence Minister and Foreign Minister both made official visits to Tajikistan to show support for President Rakhmonov, and Yeltsin later sent his security adviser and the commander of the Russian border troops to support and advise Rakhmonov.
The new Russian approach may help to solve the Tajik problem, but the question still to be answered concerns whether Russia now has a consistent policy, or merely a flexible strategy, toward the Central Asian region. To explore this question, I have briefly compared the views of Euro-Atlanticists and Neo-Eurasianists within the Russian policy-making system. I noted that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has lacked a coherent policy towards Tajikistan and the other Central Asian states. However, a year after the fall of the USSR, Russian governing authorities began to favour a more active plan. Under this plan, Central Asia was again understood as lying within Russia's legitimate sphere of influence, with Russia having a major responsibility for maintaining stability and peace in the region.(94) Sergei Karaganov, a prominent foreign policy expert and a founder of the influential Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, expressed fears that Central Asia could quickly turn into a 'boiling cauldron' and argued that 'Russia should return to its traditional role and should win over local princes, dispatch forces, rescue people, and so on.'(95) In formulating a consistent policy with regard to Tajikistan and the other Central Asian republics, Russia attempted to provide the region with a satisfactory security framework. As military-strategic integration increases, so will the temptation for Russian intervention on behalf of its regional 'clients'. Despite its ostensibly neutral stance, Russia will almost certainly take on a more interventionist role in maintaining its regional interests.
In contrast to the period immediately following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia now seems more interested in formulating a security policy that justifies its intervention when it sees a threat to its vital interests in the former Soviet republics. Fred Halliday has called the new policy 'the Monrovskii Doctrine', by which Russia seeks to establish a sphere of influence, and in particular to stem the growth of any independent forces in the republics.(96) Central to this policy is the protection of CIS frontiers by Russian forces, under the auspices of the May 1995 Treaty for the Defence of the External Borders of the CIS. Halliday notes further that arms dealing or training agreements with the West by the former republics would raise serious concerns in Moscow.(97)
Conclusion
Russia's ambitions to protect and sustain historical Russian interests in Central Asia cannot be ignored. Central Asia's rich economic resources mean that the region has continuing geo-strategic importance for Russia. The fate of Russian minorities living in the region also remains an important consideration for Russian leaders.
The eruption of civil war in Tajikistan in 1992, and the potential threat posed by the war to the safety of the Russian population there, together with the possibility of the establishment of an Islamic state in Tajikistan, led to Russian concerns over the maintenance of Russia's historical interests in the region. However, Russian leaders assumed that the Central Asian states would be unable to consolidate their economic and political stability without Russia's help. This assumption rested on, among other factors, Central Asia's economic dependence on Russia, the crucial role played by Russian economic, administrative and military personnel in the region, and the lack of an indigenous foreign policy apparatus.(98) In addition, Central Asia is in need of extra military force to maintain internal and external security, as demonstrated by the case of Tajikistan. At the request of the Tajik government, Russian forces initially entered the conflict in order to guarantee Tajikistan's territorial integrity and the security of its vitally important facilities.
As noted, the protection of Russian minorities in the region is also a significant factor determining Russian policy. Large numbers of ethnic Russians fled Tajikistan in the wake of the civil war. This was a factor influencing the Russian decision to continue military deployment of the CIS peacekeeping forces.
After installing a pro-Russian government in Tajikistan, Russian leaders declared that they had acted to protect Russia's strategic interests in the region, especially in cotton, rare metals, and energy sources.(99) Clearly, Russia still desires to protect its historical interests in Central Asia, and it has the military and political will to do so.
Russia's role in Central Asia appears to have retained its colonial character, and Russia's conception of its national interest requires it to engage in military intervention in the region. Significant continuities can be observed between pre- and post-1991 Russian interests and policies in Tajikistan, and Russia seems determined to maintain what it perceives as its interests in the region. Russia played an important role in the civil war in Tajikistan, and can be expected to continue to play a crucial role in the fragile stability since established in Tajikistan.
Habib Shirazi
Department of Government and Public Administration
University of Sydney
1. Mavlon Makhamov, 'Islam and the Political Development of Tajikistan After 1985', in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 206.
2. Interview with Seyed Rasoul Mousavi, Iranian expert in Central Asian issues, 12 February 1995.
3. 'Making it Without Moscow', US News and World Report, 8 April 1991. For more details see Sohrab Shahabi, 'Moruri Bar Vazeyate Eghtesadi Jomhurihai Asiai Markazi', Journal of Central Asia and Caucasian Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Autumn 1992, pp. 117-136.
4 Graham Fuller, 'Russia and Central Asia: Federation or Fault Line?', in Central Asia and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 118. Also Graham Fuller, 'Central Asia: The Quest for Identity', Current History, Vol. 93, No. 582, April 1994, p. 196.
5 Roland Dannreuther, 'Creating New States in Central Asia', ADELPHI paper, No. 288, March 1994, p. 4.
6 Grigory Boundarevsky, Peter Ferdinand, 'Russian Foreign Policy and Central Asia', in The New Central Asia and its Neighbours, ed. Peter Ferdinand. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994, p. 41.
7 Dannreuther, 'Creating New States in Central Asia', p. 5.
8 Martha Brill Olcott, 'Central Asian Independence', Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992, p. 116.
9 Amin Saikal, 'Russia and Central Asia', in Russia in Search of its Future, ed. William Maley and Amin Saikal. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 142-157.
10 Boris Z. Rumer, 'The Potential for Political Instability and Regional Conflicts', in The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 89-105.
11 Lee Hockstader, 'Bloody Central Asian Border War Stirs Afghan Memories in Russia: Moscow Sends Thousands of Troops to Contain Tajik Uprising', Washington Post, 24 October 1994, p. A13.
12 Saikal, 'Russia and Central Asia', p. 146.
13 Alexei V. Malashenko, 'Russia and Islam: Will We Cross Ourselves in Time?', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 February 1992, p.3, trans. in FBIS-USR, 92-037-92-037, 2 April 1992, pp. 1-2.
14 International Affairs (Moscow), No. 4-5, April-May 1992, p. 82. See also interview with Giorgiy Arbatov, Moscow Radio, 18 February 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-035, 21 February 1992, pp. 49-50.
15 Bess Brown, 'Tajikistan: The Fall of Nabiev', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 38, 25 September 1992, p. 14. Also Alexei V. Malashenko, 'The Eighties: A New Political Start for Islam', Russian Social Science Review, March-April 1993, p. 82.
16 Saikal, 'Russia and Central Asia', pp. 146-147.
17 Interfax 15 July 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-138, 17 July 1992, p. 59.
18 Leon Gudkov, 'The Disintegration of the USSR and Russians in Republics', Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 9, March 1993, pp. 75-78. Also Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 'Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus', Central Asian Survey, Vol. 12, pp. 184-188.
19 ITAR TASS, 7 October 1992, SWB, SU/507, 9 October 1992.
20 Ahmed Rashid, 'Forced to Flee: Civil Wars Start New Wave of Migration', Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 November 1992, p. 24, and 'Troops from Tajikistan', Rossiiskiye vesti, 22 July 1993, p. 1, trans. in 'After Tajik Battle: Should Russia Defend Border?', The Current Digest, Vol. 45, No. 29, 1993, p. 13.
21 Mesbahi, 'Russian Foreign Policy and Security', p. 192.
22 Dannreuther, 'Creating New States in Central Asia', p. 54.
23 The Euro-Atlanticists (or Westerners) maintained that Russia should align itself with Western civilisation rather than the East: Hafeez Malik, Central Asia: Its StrategicImportance and Future Prospects. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 3. See interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Le Monde, 8 June 1992, pp. 1-5, FBIS-SOV-92-111, 9 June 1992, pp. 14-16, and Andrei Kozyrev, 'Challenge of Transformation', Izvestiya, 1 April 1992, p. 6, trans. in FBIS-SOV, 3 April 1992.
24Suzanne Crow, 'Processes and Policies', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 20, 14 May 1993, pp. 48-50. Also Maxim Shashenkov, 'Russia in Central Asia: Emerging Security Links', in From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, ed. Anoushirvan Ehteshami. Exeter: University of Exeter Press: 1994, pp. 166-178.
25 Interview with Boris Yeltsin in Izvestiya, Literaturnaya gazeta, 15 July 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-137, 16 July 1992, pp. 18-22.
26 Shashenkov, 'Russia in Central Asia', pp. 173-174.
27 Interview with General Leonid Ivashov, Moscow Central Television, 4 May 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-099, 21 May 1992, p. 31.
28 Shashenkov, 'Russia in Central Asia', p. 174.
29 Bess Brown, 'Central Asian States Seek Russian Help', RFE/RL Report, Vol. 2, No. 25, 18 June 1993, p. 83.
30 'CIS Tashkent Summit: Treaty on Collective Security', 23 May 1992, p. 2, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, p. 8.
31 ibid, pp. 8-9.
32 V. Samsonov, 'A Collective Security System is an Objective Necessity', Krasnaya zvezda, 3 July 1992, pp. 1-2. cited in IRNA, 5 July 1992.
33 Dannreuther, 'Creating New States in Central Asia', p. 55.
34 Interfax 6 July 1992 trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-130, 7 July 1992, p. 7.
35 'Results of Tashkent Summit Appraised', Komsomol'skaya pravda, 16 May 1992, p. 2, trans. in FBIS-SOV-099, 21 May 1992, pp. 27-28.
36 Shashenkov, 'Russia in Central Asia', p. 175.
37 Mesbahi, 'Russian Foreign Policy and Security', pp. 199, 175.
38 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 May 1992, pp.1-3, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-063, 19 May 1992, p. 86.
39 Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 16 July 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-138, 17 July 1992, pp. 9-10 and 59.
40 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, 'The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet Tajikistan', FORUM, Vol. 6, No. 11, July 1993, pp. 1-10.
41 See EIU country report on Tajikistan, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 4th quarter 1993, pp. 53-55.
42 New Year's message, Russian Television, 30 December 1992, SWB SU/576 C1/1, 1 January 1993, quoted in John Lough, 'The Place of the Near Abroad in Russian Foreign Policy', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 11, 12 March 1993, p. 29.
43 ibid., pp. 24-26.
44 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 August 1992, trans. in The Current Digest, Vol. 44, No. 36, 1992, pp. 8-9. See also FBIS-SOV-92-139, 20 July 1992, pp. 60-61.
45 IRNA, 25 August 1992. See also 'CIS Forces Dead: Shaposhnikov Arrives for Talks', FBIS-SOV-92-169, 31 August 1992, p. 39.
46 Bess Brown, 'Tajikistan: The Fall of Nabiev', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 38, 25 September 1992, pp. 12-18.
47 IRNA, 28 August 1992.
48 Tadjbakhsh, 'The Bloody Path of Change', p. 7.
49 Central Asian Monitor, No. 5, p. 7.
50 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, 'Tajikistan: From Freedom to War', Current History, Vol. 93, No. 582, April 1994, p. 174.
51 'Tajik President Nabiev Ousted: For Good?', The Current Digest, Vol. 44, No. 36, 1992, p.8. Also Interfax 4 September 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV, 8 September 1992, pp. 4-5.
52 ITAR-TASS, 8 September 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV, 9 September 1992, p. 11.
53 JANE's Intelligence Review, April 1993, p. 183.
54 William E. Odom, Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Indianapolis: Hodson Institute, 1995, p. 74.
55 Mesbahi, 'Russian Foreign Policy and Security', pp. 200-201.
56 Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994, p. 214.
57 Central Asian Monitor, No. 5, 1992, p. 9.
58 Michael Orr, 'The Civil War in Tajikistan', JANE's Intelligence Review, April 1993, p. 183.
59 Barnett R. Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan', Survival, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 1993, pp. 71-91.
60 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, 'The Bloody Path of Change', pp. 1-10. See also FBIS-SOV-92-223, 18 November 1992.
61 Orr, 'The Civil War in Tajikistan', pp. 181-184.
62 Guardian, 10 December 1992, and Observer, 3 January 1993.
63 First confirmed by a Russian Foreign Ministry official in Izvestiya, 15 April 1993. See Roland Dannreuther, 'Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf', Survival, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 1993, pp. 92-112.
64 International Herald Tribune, 22 February 1993, p. 4.
65 'Mixed Fortunes in Central Asia', Strategic Survey, 1993-1994, p. 191.
66 Izvestiya, 12 January 1993, trans. in IRNA, 13 January 1993, p. 12.
67 Central Asia Monitor, No. 5, 1992, p. 7.
68 Reuters, 28 February 1993.
69 Tadjbakhsh, 'Tajikistan: From Freedom to War', p. 175.
70 Kazakh Radio Network (Almaty), trans. in FBIS, 31 January 1994, p. 1. Also Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? London: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 207-231.
71 ITAR-TASS, 2 February 1993.
72 IRNA, 4 February 1993. Also 'Tajikistan: The Restoration of Dictatorship', Kayhan, pp. 1-3.
73 Mesbahi, 'Russian Foreign Policy and Security', p. 204.
74 Anthony Hyman, 'Central Asia: Rumblings from the North', The Middle East, January 1994, pp. 14-15.
75 Bess Brown, 'More Russian Troops to Tajikistan', RFE/RL News Briefs, Vol. 2, No. 37, 6-10 September 1993, p. 8. Also Amin Saikal, 'Russia and Central Asia', p. 148.
76 Hockstader, 'Bloody Central Asian Border War', p. A13.
77 Robert Haupt, 'Russia in Pact to Repel Mujahedin Along Tajik Border', Sydney Morning Herald, 19 July 1993, p. 10.
78 Reuters, 15 July 1993.
79 ibid.
80 IRNA, 20 July 1993.
81 Martin, 'Tajikistan: Civil War Without End?', pp. 27-28.
82 President Yeltsin, in Izvestiya, 2 February 1996, quoted by Bruce Pannier, 'Weathering Another Storm of Violence', Transition, 8 March 1996, p. 36.
83 ITAR-TASS, 7 August 1993 trans. in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Part 1, SU/1762 C2/3. Also Raymond Bonner, 'Asian Republic Still Caught in Web of Communism', New York Times, 13 October 1993, p. A3.
84 Mikhail Konarovsky, 'Russia and the Emerging Geopolitical Order in Central Asia', in The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, ed. Banuazizi and Weiner, pp. 50-52.
85 See EIU Country Report on Tajikistan, Economist Intelligence Unit, 4th quarter 1993, pp. 50-52.
86 Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, pp. 102-103.
87 Nasim Jawad, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, 'Tajikistan: A Forgotten Civil War', MRG International Report, p. 23.
88 Roger D. Kangas, 'Taking the Lead in Central Asian Security', Transition, 3 May 1996, p. 52, and RIA News Agency, 4 February 1996.
89 Quoted in Kangas, 'Taking the Lead', p. 54.
90 ibid., p. 55.
91 Amin Saikal, 'Forgotten, Fragile and Fraught with Dangers', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, December 93/January 94, p. 178.
92 Richard K. Herrmann, 'Russian Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Change and Tactical Contradictions', Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 3, Summer 1994, p. 472.
93 'Tajik Opposition to Hold Direct Talks with Junta', Kayhan International, Vol. 14, 10 March 1994, p. 1.
94 Shashenkov, 'Russia in Central Asia', pp. 169-179.
95 Diplomaticheskii vestnik, 15-30 November 1992.
96 Fred Halliday, 'The Empire Strikes Back? Russia, Iran and the New Republics', The World Today, Vol. 51, No. 11, November 1995, p. 220.
97 ibid., p. 220.
98 Boundarevsky and Ferdinand, 'Russian Foreign Policy and Central Asia', p. 41.
99 Andrei Nikolayev, commander of Russian forces in Tajikistan, quoted in Wall Street Journal, 16 October 1996, p. A18.
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