Immigration is an issue that has played an important role in post-communist Polish foreign policy and is a 'growth issue' in terms of the complications it presents for Polish society and government. However, it has received little attention either in the Polish or international media, and even less in academic literature. In 1991, for example, some 100,000 asylum seekers were thought to have crossed into Germany from Poland,1 while some 15,000 foreigners were estimated to have been camping along the Polish-German border preparing for the crossing.2 Despite the fact these immigrants were extremely visible and caused a great deal of concern, not only at the local level, but also in terms of Polish-German relations,3 the issue did not receive a single word of mention in a major academic collection analysing contemporary social issues related to the Polish-German borderland.4 Given that Poland borders with post-communist countries and with Germany, the extent to which immigration issues have been ignored is surprising.
Because most Poles tend to see their society as ethnically homogeneous, many were surprised, and even shocked, by the numbers, but especially the vitality and demands of the ethnic minorities living in post-communist Poland. During the communist period, the German minority, for example, was consistently represented as comprising 'several thousand', and had virtually no rights. Subsequently, scholarly estimates have been revised and place the German population at 600,000-800,000; moreover, this group has now also won substantial legal rights to express its identity.5
Poles were equally surprised by the large numbers of foreigners, including illegal immigrants and asylum seekers, who began arriving in Poland in the post-communist period.6 Polish society entered the post-communist era with a very poor - although improving, especially since 1993 - material base, including a chronic housing shortage.7 At the same time Poles generally have had high expectations of material development. However, by 1991 over half of Poles surveyed by the Polish Television and Radio Unit for the Study of Public Opinion (CBOS) said that economic restructuring had caused 'significantly greater hardship than they had expected',8 while three-quarters of the respondents 'thought that people were becoming poorer ... [and that] the income differential in Poland was too great'.9 Furthermore, according to Pawel Spiewak, a Warsaw sociologist, 'Poles have an acute sense of pain, believing that they have experienced more evil than good at the hands of neighbours and minorities, and that they have suffered undeserved persecution, pain and misfortune despite their own good works. In one survey, respondents said that Poles have received "more bad than good" from Germans [87%], Russians [71%], and Ukrainians [67%]. Twenty per cent of Poles interviewed also said that Jews are an "ungrateful people" who have persecuted Poles.'10 Overall, Polish society is characterised by a mix of values and experiences which are at odds with the values of wanting to share relatively meagre resources with outsiders.11
In literature on the subject, immigration tends to be represented somewhat inaccurately and unconventionally as the movement of foreigners from countries poorer and less stable than Poland onto Polish territory. Four types of immigration have received attention. The first is where foreigners try to use Poland as a transit country in their attempts to cross illegally to the west. The second refers to foreigners from the poorer post-communist countries, mainly the former USSR, who come to Poland in order to engage in petty, often illegal trading. Thirdly, there is the case of foreigners entering and/or staying in Poland illegally. Increases in crime are often associated with the second and third categories.12 Finally, there are refugees seeking asylum in Poland. Membership in these four categories tends to be quite fluid.
It is worth pointing out that the vast majority of immigrants that have come to Poland are not immigrants in the sense that this term is commonly understood in English, that is, 'persons who come into a country of which they are not native for the purpose of permanent residence'.13 Of the two largest groups of immigrants to Poland, the first, people trying to cross to the west, could be classified more precisely as 'transmigrants' - that is, 'persons passing through a country on their way from their own country to a country in which they intend to settle'.14 I refer to the second group as 'trading visitors'. These are 'seasonal migrants', or people who come to Poland on short-term visas, often making multiple visits per year, in order to trade, but without necessarily with the intention of staying for a prolonged period. However, largely for the sake of convenience, throughout the article the term 'immigration' is used to encompass transmigration, seasonal migration, immigration (including illegal immigration), and immigration for the purpose of seeking asylum - unless otherwise specified.
The evolution of Polish post-communist approaches to immigration can be divided into two periods: pre- and post-1993. Two distinguishing factors are apparent between the two periods. The first lies in the changed international situation. The second, which can be directly linked to the first, lies in the passivity of the approach in the first period, as opposed to the pro-active approach of the post-1993 period.
From 1989 to 1993, Polish immigration policy was dominated by a sense of helplessness, and a 'wait and see' approach. Poles tended not to believe in their own ability to deal with potential catastrophe. Nor did they have a great amount of faith in the ability of other states and societies, or the international system and its institutions, to deal with the movement of peoples from east to west. This feeling of helplessness stemmed from what Polish authorities described as two 'worst case scenarios [or] nightmare variants' of what might happen in Poland given the volatile international situation at the time.15 The first of these was the fear of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The worst case scenario here was perceived as chaos on the scale of the 1917 Russian Revolution, with a deluge of refugees from the east 'marching barefoot across the snow'.16 The second fear was that the west might adopt an isolationist policy towards the countries in transition, leaving Poland and the other countries of the region without sufficient aid. This was a fear that the Odra-Nisa (Oder-Neisse) line (the Polish-German border) would become 'the Rio Grande of Europe'.17
By 1993 these fears had ceased to play a dominant role in Polish thinking about immigration. By and large, the post-communist societies of east-central Europe demonstrated the ability to make the transition from communism in a relatively orderly manner, while it became clear that the west did not intend to pursue an isolationist path. The most prominent issues became the ever-increasing numbers of illegal immigrants coming to Poland and through Poland to western Europe, and how best to protect and develop Polish interests within the framework of a pan-European immigration regime. In 1993, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski summarised Polish approaches to immigration as an outcome of three considerations: firstly, the 'humanitarian', or the moral responsibility to fellow human beings; secondly, and more importantly, 'the multifarious social and economic consequences that countries which take immigrants have to cope with'; and thirdly, the need to be in line with the approaches and needs of the western European community, since 'every failure, each appearance of inconsistency ... evokes negative repercussions abroad and weakens our [Polish] position'.18
The failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow and the subsequent relatively orderly break-up of the USSR incrementally dispersed the fears of potential mass migration to Poland. However, it was the signing of the Polish-German repatriation agreement in 1993, and its immediate aftermath, that heralded a new era in Polish immigration policy. The change to a pro-active, integrative immigration policy was heralded during the 1992-93 negotiations of agreements between most of the central-eastern European countries with regard to the return of illegal immigrants to their countries of origin or original countries of transit. However, it was only after 1993 that this new approach became a clearly discernible mainstay of Polish policy on immigration. During 1993 and 1994, largely in reaction to the Polish-German agreement, Poland worked out repatriation agreements with most of its neighbouring countries. Moreover, and more importantly, it became apparent that most asylum seekers rejected by Germany had little intention of seeking asylum in a poor country like Poland. The combination of these two factors provided new assurances that Poland was not going to have to bear the burden of looking after large numbers of asylum seekers after all.
For the Polish authorities considering developments in immigration the events unfolding throughout eastern Europe, the Balkans and Soviet Central Asia were indeed menacing. The violence of Soviet troops in Vilnius, ethnic strife in the Dnestr region and the Transcaucasus, the attempted coup in Moscow and the violent break-up of Yugoslavia were all incidents that obviously lent credence to worst case scenario theories. Meanwhile, as Solidarity assumed government in 1989, travel restrictions, which had been a dominant feature of communist rule, were lifted in accordance with the long-awaited and hard-won values of personal freedom, while the shelves of Polish shops were filled 'almost overnight'.19 As poor as Polish society was, it was politically relatively stable and consumer goods were widely available, at least by pre-1989 standards, and certainly by the standards of Poland's poorer post-communist neighbours. Hence, from 1989 in many post-communist countries Poland was considered a lucrative place to visit and trade, and visitors from the east and south, particularly from Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania, began arriving in Poland in ever-increasing numbers - mainly on short-term visas - to trade. '"In a single trip I can make five times what I could in a job in Belarus", says Marina Mengaleva [who sells] wooden toys and clothing at a Warsaw market. She is going back with some fruit for the family and dollars.'20 This phenomenon had its parallel in the 1970s-1980s practice of Poles travelling to the west, as well as to other communist countries, to trade everything from gold, vodka and textile products for quality consumer goods unavailable in Poland and for hard currency.21
By 1993, the number of visitors coming to Poland from the Soviet Union and its successor states alone had increased significantly from 2.6 million in 1989,22 4.2 million in 1990,23 and 7 million in 1992,24 to 8 million in 1993.25 During the early years of transition 'trading visitors from the east' tended to be perceived almost exclusively in terms of 'immigration' rather than, for example, 'tourism' or 'economics', like visitors from the west.26 In fact, the literature and reports pertaining to immigration in Poland at the time consistently identified 'visitors from the east' as the dominant issue. The main reason why visitors to Poland on short-term tourist visas have taken such a prominent position in immigration literature appears to be the link with the aforementioned fear of the possible consequences of the volatility in the ex-Soviet region for the Polish domestic situation. Notwithstanding studies indicating that the Soviet transport system would simply not be capable of handling millions of refugees trying to escape the USSR to the west in the event of a 'worst case scenario incident', the millions of people coming to Poland reinforced the perception that a flood of refugees was a real possibility.27 On the day of the attempted coup in Moscow some 115,000 Soviet citizens were located in Poland.28
Furthermore, worst case scenario calculations also included the possibility of the 1.2 to 4 million ethnic Poles living in the (former) Soviet Union requiring asylum.29 This issue was of particular concern to the Polish authorities. Although the closing of borders to refugees of other nationalities could lead to major reproach at home and abroad, such an action could nevertheless be contemplated and justified to the public using authoritative arguments that in a worst case scenario, that is, with millions of refugees from the east and insufficient western assistance, 'Poland would fall apart as a state, as an economic system, in two or three months'.30 However, closing the borders to fellow nationals could not even be contemplated. It might be possible to persuade the public of the necessity of closing Poland's borders against refugees of other nationalities by citing the 'imminent collapse of the Polish state', but a refusal to extend asylum to ethnic Poles in the event of the latter being forced to flee from say, a civil war elsewhere, would be unacceptable.31
The second fear upon which Polish immigration approaches were predicated was the fear that the west might leave Poland to its own devices in dealing with a potential deluge of refugees. Much of the Polish public was generally dissatisfied, 'even bitter', with regard to the level of western aid provided to Poland during its initial transition period.32 Many Poles saw Poland as having been at the vanguard of anti-communist opposition and a major cause of the Soviet bloc's collapse. Consequently, Poles had expected that the grateful and morally obligated west would pour huge sums into the reconstruction of Poland, and that Poland would have an easy transition to a capitalist economy and would become the next economic miracle. Many also expected the west to welcome Poland with open arms into organisations like the European Community/Union and NATO.33 When these expectations were not fulfilled, arguments about the intrinsic selfishness or realpolitik of the west began to gain ground. Matters were not helped by such incidents as Chancellor Kohl's confusing messages as to the permanency of the post-1945 Polish-German border during the negotiations on German reunification. Classic, grand narrative reminders from Polish history such as the Allies having failed to come to the aid of Poland in 1939, or having sold Poland out to Stalin after the Second World War, were also used to emphasise the nature of realpolitik as practised by the western nation-states.
It was also apparent that immigration was one of the most important issues in western European politics and that Poland was perceived in the west as both a supplier of and a path for immigrants from the increasingly mobile east. Emigration of Poles was at its highest level between 1981 and 1988, when 653,000 Poles emigrated to the west.34 Subsequently the numbers of Polish emigrants dropped to about 20,000 per annum.35 Germany, Poland's wealthiest neighbour and a country with a highly advanced and generous social welfare system, was the goal for most post-communist migrants, and had to cope with hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers annually. Their numbers peaked in 1992 at about 440,000, 25% of which had come either from or via Poland.36
The strength of racist and anti-immigrant feeling in western Europe was alarming. Nationalist parties in France and northern Italy, which went to the polls largely on the issue of limiting immigration, were increasingly successful in the early 1990s.37 Violence against immigrants was on the rise throughout Europe in general, but it was the rise of disturbances in Germany, Poland's most powerful neighbour, that was particularly worrying for Polish policy-makers.38 Anti-immigration attitudes were beginning to dominate not just the far right, but the mainstream of western domestic politics. Many mainstream politicians emphasised the threat immigration was posing to their societies' social fabric, their positions at times echoing the attitudes of the far right. For example, Chancellor Kohl's statements that immigration was the cause of violence against immigrants, that is, that immigrants had only themselves to blame for the violence perpetrated against them, appeared to legitimise thuggish behaviour.39 Other German government officials also discussed the possibility of implementing new high-tech devices to control immigration from Poland, including the construction of an electronic wall along the Polish-German frontier40 and the use of 'infra-red devices' to scan for illegal entrants.41 From 1991 it was clear from the domestic debate in Germany that the country's liberal asylum laws would be tightened up.
Pressure was mounting for Poland to act to stop immigration to the west. The liberalisation and democratisation of Poland meant that western European countries were classifying Poland as a 'safe country', that is, a country which could no longer be legitimately described as a source of refugees, and one in which refugees could seek asylum. Poland was being accused by western governments of a lack of commitment to stamping out illegal immigration, and the western press was full of reports on how easy it was for illegal immigrants to cross Poland's western border, and how readily Polish border guards succumbed to corruption.42 As a result, successive Polish governments have attempted to dispel western fears. In 1991 Poland agreed to allow the return of those illegal immigrants who had been caught in Germany and who had not filed for asylum, provided that the German authorities could prove that they had entered Germany via Poland.43 By 1993 Poland had agreed to grant entry to asylum seekers from Germany who had entered Germany via Poland, if the German authorities were satisfied that their claims could be dealt with by the Polish authorities. This meant that virtually all asylum seekers (about 100,000 per year) arriving in Germany via Poland could legally be sent back to Poland.44
Fundamentally, the Polish authorities believed that they had very little control over regional immigration developments, particularly potential mass migration from the former Soviet Union. By and large Poland would simply have to wait and see whether the situation in the east deteriorated or stabilised. In an attempt to stave off these potential threats, the Polish government adopted measures to offer maximum diplomatic support to fellow post-communist countries attempting to stabilise and democratise the region, and called upon western governments to do their utmost to help the region, diplomatically and materially.45 As far as developments in the west were concerned, Polish approaches were again dominated by 'the waiting game'. In this respect, however, there were more opportunities to manoeuvre and to influence. The fear that western governments would leave Poland to deal with the refugee problem on its own was predicated on the view that the west would define its interests in isolationist terms.46 In order to counter this possibility the Polish government applied two strategies. Firstly, the government employed moral arguments which emphasised the west's moral responsibility to help Poland. Secondly, Polish politicians used a pragmatic line of argument, underlining the fact that it was in the west's own best interests to help Poland.
As far as the moral factor was concerned, Poles reminded the west that Poland belonged to a common, western civilisation, and that following the Second World War the Poles had been torn away from this heritage. Poles had suffered Soviet oppression partially as a result of western compliance at the partition agreed upon at Yalta. Furthermore, while the west was engaged in the Cold War with the USSR, the Poles had consistently acted as a thorn in the Soviet side - a partisan nation.
The second and more prominent Polish argument played on western fears of being flooded by refugees. It was argued that it was in the west's own best interests for Poland to participate in the European immigration regime. Since Poland lacked the requisite resources and expertise to deal with immigration, it needed aid. In return for western assistance, Poland assured the west that it would do its utmost to deal with immigration, both in terms of ensuring the security of western Europe's eastern borders, and in treating immigrants in accordance with the institutionalised norms of the west and the international community.47 General assistance for the transformation of the Polish economy would also have positive consequences, since if Poland were to become a materially affluent country, it would be able to care for immigrants out of its own resources, thus lightening the western load. Finally, aid for Poland's reconstruction would also ensure that Poles themselves would be less likely to want to migrate to the west.
Poland took the worst case scenario possibility seriously. That a 'state of emergency'-type solution was at the top of the Polish agenda was reflected in the 1990 appointment of a senior military officer to head the Bureau for Refugees, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The appointee, Lieutenant-Colonel Skoczylas, often spoke in very dramatic terms about the dangers of migration and the need to deploy the toughest measures possible in the face of this potential scourge. According to Polish calculations, the absolute maximum number of asylum seekers that Poland could manage was 50,000 - at an estimated cost of US$130 million.48 The appointment of this tough-talking military man to the top immigration post may also have been a message to the west that Poland viewed immigration as a pan-European problem and was prepared to play its part in the crackdown on immigration.
The 'wait and see' approach was reflected in the arguments put forward by the Polish authorities in their preparation for joining international society in dealing with immigration, as well as in the slow pace, or perhaps more accurately, the timing with which the Polish authorities developed and/or reformed domestic institutions to deal with immigration. Although the first governmental organ established specifically to deal with refugees was established in late 1990, few other major domestic infrastructural developments took place. The Bureau for Refugees drew up plans in case of a massive exodus from the east - for example, for the establishment of debriefing camps in isolated parts of Poland.49 It also calculated how much asylum seekers were costing the Polish public purse, and their potential future costs. However, no legal reform was carried out in relation to the treatment and status of foreigners in Poland. The operative laws dated from 1963, and were widely recognised as inadequate, both by the authorities and their critics.50 Neither were there any major attempts to take on the rampant corruption within the ranks of the Polish border guards.
Throughout the course of negotations with western countries (particularly Germany) with regard to the taking back of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants who had arrived from Poland, the Polish government presented its position as untenable. Poland needed substantial financial support from the west to enable it to develop its border controls, as well as the institutions dealing with immigrants; money was needed to employ and train more border guards, purchase more sophisticated equipment, construct camps, pay for housing and pensions, and to train and employ administrative and legal personnel, and so on.51 Poland also needed time, and support from the west, to negotiate with the countries from which and via which the immigrants were coming to Poland.52 In late 1990, Polish officials argued that Poland was not able to become party to the Geneva Convention on refugees and related protocols on the grounds that Poland 'could never afford to meet its requirements fully, especially in regard to provision of jobs, housing and educational opportunities'.53 Nevertheless, only a few months after this proclamation Poland signed the Geneva Convention.54 This was in line with the humanitarian sentiments of many Poles, and, perhaps more importantly, it was also in line with the imperative that Poland appear to be willing to embrace western-international humanitarian norms.
In the period from 1989 to 1993 numerous policies limiting freedom of movement, particularly from countries of the former Soviet Union, were maintained. Former Soviet citizens needed a visa, as well as an official invitation from a Polish citizen, in order to visit Poland. Quite rapidly, these invitations became an easily circumvented restriction, since they could be acquired very cheaply at most open air markets.55 In 1991 another policy limiting freedom of movement was enacted in relation to Romania. Prior to 1989, the Polish-Romanian agreement simply stipulated that travel was possible with the appropriate visa. In 1991, new visa regulations were put in place which required visa applicants to demonstrate possession of an official invitation, a return ticket and US$20 of spending money per day for the duration of their planned visit.56 Unlike the policy towards the formerly Soviet countries, this policy was not kept on the books from the communist period as a 'just in case' measure, but represented an active attempt to limit Romanian migration to Poland.
The most vivid example of Polish idealism and humanitarianism was the reported spontaneous and emotional invitation to thousands of refugees fleeing the Yugoslavian conflict in 1992. These refugees, who were mainly women and children, were provided with accommodation in former workers' resorts and sanitariums in southern Poland. The local population also played their part by donating clothing and home-cooked meals.57
Polish post-communist reactions to foreigners have been mixed. Many Poles empathised with the material and security needs of their poorer neighbours.58 Feelings of empathy were fostered by the fact that many Poles had had direct personal experience of 'travel for trade' since the 1970s. From a more pragmatic perspective, the petty trade conducted by these visitors provided Poles with access to cheap goods, as well as an outlet for goods produced in Poland. Most Polish-made goods could not find western buyers, largely because they were considered to be of inferior quality.59
On the other hand, however, Poles felt that their country was being stripped of its resources, that the demand created by foreigners added to price increases on still relatively scarce goods, and that the cheap products from other post-communist countries undermined domestic manufacture. Poles were also concerned that hard currency, crucial for investment at a time when Polish currency was barely convertible, was being bought up by foreigners. Other Polish fears stemmed from the belief that criminals from the east had infiltrated Poland. Many people also believed that the petty traders were operating mainly without licenses and without making customs declarations, thus denying the state treasury its revenue. The petty trade in alcohol, for example, challenged the government's monopoly of the production and sale of this item, and in 1991 the State Treasury lamented that it was losing as much as US$80 million a year.60
In 1993, the Christian National Union and the National Rebirth of Poland - arguably the most important proponents of Polish populism, advocates of 'Poland for Poles' (Polska dla Polakow), and of the slogan 'only a Catholic is a Pole' (Polak-Katolik)61 - organised a rally against the proposed signing of the Polish-German agreement on the deportation of asylum seekers. The primary objection was based on the notion that refugees should be the concern of the rich west and not poor Poland. The rally was countered by a protest organised by Polish anarchists chanting anti-racist and anti-xenophobic slogans.62
Although tension did exist between Poles and the traders and sometimes escalated into violence, the main group towards whom hostility was expressed was the Romanian immigrants, particularly the Roma. Between 50,000 and 70,000 Romanians, many of them Roma, have been staying in Poland since 1990.63 The Roma have been singled out, both by the authorities and the general public, as the main ethnic group 'causing' ethnic tension in Poland. The Roma were perceived as forming the bulk of foreigners causing nuisance, such as harassing for alms in the streets and at train stations. Large numbers of beggars - often women and children - have become a common sight in all of Poland's major cities, as have people sleeping in doorways and train stations. It is commonly believed that Roma live off begging and petty crime as opposed to 'honest work'.64
The primary instance of tension spilling over into violence between Poles and foreigners occurred at Mlawa. Ironically, in this case the foreigners were not foreigners in the sense used thus far, but Roma 'indigenous' to Poland. A riot broke out in a well-to-do suburb of Mlawa, a town in central Poland with a substantial Roma population; the mob torched cars, sacked shops and houses, and bashed a number of Roma men. After the incident hundreds of Polish Roma left for Sweden where they were granted asylum.65
Since 1993, Poles have felt quite comfortable that the worst case scenario was an unlikely event. The political volatility of the region has begun to stabilise, or at least exhibits fewer volatile or potentially explosive characteristics. The Soviet bloc's ability to make the transition from communism to pluralism and democracy in a relatively orderly fashion, as well as the transition of the USSR from Soviet rule to that of its independent successor nation-states, has greatly eased the fears of potential worst case scenarios, and such fears have begun to dissipate. Similarly, there have been the cases of the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia, orderly relations between Hungary and its neighbours where there were large Hungarian minorities, and so on. There has been little ethnic conflict in the post-communist states of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic republics. In short, relative stability has reigned between and within Poland's closest post-communist neighbours. More specifically in the context of this piece, the masses of refugees marching through the snow failed to materialise.
Although the Yugoslavian conflict remained as a reminder of the worst case scenario, it also served to strengthen the argument that pan-European co-operation was the best policy for Polish immigration policy-makers to pursue. The Yugoslavian conflict emphasised the fact that the west was, by and large, willing to look after refugees. The conflict also demonstrated that refugees were not interested in immigrating to Poland. In fact, Polish offers of asylum to 'Yugoslavs' were at times specifically rejected, with refugees preferring to go to western Europe where 'the conditions are better'.66
Fears of western isolationism waned, and western policies were increasingly interpreted in Poland in the context of a slow and difficult process of integration and progress, whereby all the parties concerned were putting their own interests first, but that the greatest gain would be achieved through east-west co-operation. In other words, it became clear that the west was unwilling to establish two Europes, and that the western governments, by and large, judged it to be in their own interests to swap import concessions or aid for a solution to the immigration problem.67 During negotiations with the west, for example in the context of agreements with Germany in relation to the return of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers, Poland managed to negotiate substantial aid to lessen its burdens. The main package was the 120 million marks obtained from Germany in 1993 to develop border controls and an infrastructure to detect and deal with refugees.68 Given the great concern in the west regarding immigration issues, the west's non-isolationist approach, and the increasingly apparent fact that immigrants were interested in Poland more as a route than a destiny, Poland found itself in a stronger position than had been previously envisaged. When it seemed that appeasement of the west was contrary to Polish interests, Poles proved willing to pursue policies contrary to the interests of the west.
Poland's foreign, economic and immigration policies now reflect a new-found confidence. Poland sees itself as a country of transit between west and east, and accordingly is pursuing policies emphasising free trade and freedom of movement. Poland is pursuing integration into the European Union free market, and free trade with neighbouring countries, including with potentially very large Russian market.69
In its pursuit of freedom of movement in Europe, Poland has found itself at odds with western governments, particularly on the question of visa-free travel between Poland and Russia. Poland has been incrementally reducing travel restrictions with Russia, and in late 1996 a Polish-Russian agreement was signed allowing visa-free travel between the two countries - subject to the signing of a repatriation agreement, which is expected later this year. The main western concern is that given that travel restrictions with Poland are being reduced, and that Poland is heading for the elimination of national borders under the EU, Poland will become (or continue to be) a major route for illegal immigrants from eastern Europe.70
Poland's pursuit of a freedom of movement policy reflects its current position on immigration. Since 1993, policy-makers have been describing the 'trading visitors' from the post-communist countries in increasingly positive terms; that is, the related discussion is increasingly couched in terms of trade, as opposed to immigration.71 The trading visitors bring inexpensive goods into Poland, purchase local goods and services, and provide contacts with other post-communist markets. Refugees and illegal immigrants are generally not perceived as an overriding concern for Poland, although Poles are increasingly surprised at the quantity of illegal immigrants, indicating a growing concern over the issue. The number of illegal immigrants staying in Poland appears to have increased substantially. In 1991 it was estimated that 20,000-30,000 people from the Soviet Union alone were staying illegally in Poland,72 while in 1993 some 500,000 illegal residents were reported.73
The two main categories of illegal immigrants in Poland are those waiting for an opportunity to go to the west, and those who have been attracted by the possibility of making a better living in what is now one of the most affluent of the post-communist countries. Most illegal immigrants tend to leave Poland within the space of a few months, the second group after they have saved some money, and the first either because they have found their way west or have failed to do so. Both categories are made up overwhelmingly of citizens of the poorest former communist European countries: Romania, Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Belarus. However, amongst illegal immigrants trying to get across to the west there are also substantial numbers of citizens from the 'developing world', particularly Sri Lankans, Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis.74
In 1996 about 2300 requests for asylum were lodged in Poland.75 Despite this relatively small number, the issue has taken on political significance, largely because the refugees are monitored internationally and the Polish authorities see it as crucial that they appear to be upholding human rights standards at a level akin to that of the west. This latter point emphasises Poland's readiness to be integrated into western structures, as well as an expectation of receiving further aid from the west. The ethnic mix of registered asylum seekers mainly comprises refugees from the former Yugoslavia and African and Asian 'developing countries'.76 Successful asylum seekers stay in Poland on renewable 12-month visas and, due to the housing shortage, can stay in 'rotating accommodations' for up to 15 months, after which time they have to cope on their own.77 They are shifted from dwelling to dwelling as housing becomes available. It is unclear precisely why their accommodation needs to be rotated. However, it seems that they are rotated within the general social security system in competition with other disadvantaged members of Polish society. Most asylum seekers appear not to want to settle in Poland but hope to be relocated to a western country. Nevertheless, the Polish approach of maintaining refugees on renewable 12-month visas emphasises the broader Polish approach that refugees are and ought really to be the problem of the west. There is no evidence of attempts to offer refugees citizenship, nor of any other meaningful programs aimed at integrating refugees into Polish society.
The Polish authorities appear to be interested in maintaining only the minimal fulfillment of international moral and legal duties. Furthermore, asylum seekers are of concern because they are directly linked to the public purse, and therefore open to scrutiny. The fact that this issue is linked to the public purse means that it can be used for political point-scoring, including right wing-populist criticisms that the money could be better spent on Poles - arguments that are potentially alluring in a political culture in transition. The fact that some of the very people who are employed to look after refugees and their rights think that 'we ... pamper them [refugees] ... [and] there is no country as open to abuse [by refugees]' reflects a lack of commitment by Polish authorities to refugees' rights.78
Poland has increasingly used immigration as a bargaining chip in its relations with the west. It has been emphasising that immigration is one of the great problems facing Europe, although not necessarily one of the great problems facing Poland. Poland is one of the most ardent supporters of the policy of exchanging aid and 'imports for migrants'. This is in line with the resolutions of bodies like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).79 The argument is that in order to ease the pressure of immigration on the west, the west must provide maximum support, particularly in the form of economic concessions and aid, to the developing post-communist countries. Despite the humanitarian resolutions emphasised by the west, it is quite clear that an equally vigorous policy aimed at physically stopping immigrants from entering the west is maintained on the books.
Poland is hoping to benefit from both the 'humanitarian' and the 'realist' policies. Firstly, Poland is hoping that the development of other post-communist countries will bring political stability to the region and strengthen the development of eastern markets, to which Poland, with its location in the heart of Europe, will have excellent access.80 Secondly, Poland is hoping to continue to secure major concessions from the west in its capacity as the vanguard of the European struggle against immigration. As Poland is being integrated into the western European economy and community, it is difficult for the Odra-Nisa to be the primary line stopping illegal immigrants from entering the west. According to Chancellor Kohl 'It cannot be that Germany's eastern border remains the border of the European Union'.81 As Poland is one of the first countries in line for EU membership, it appears that Poland's eastern border may well become the European Union's eastern border for some time to come, and so Polish authorities argue that it is Poland's eastern borders that need strengthening. Thus there is an optimism that Poland will continue to be a major recipient of aid from the EU in order to control illegal immigration.
In order to downplay fears that Poland might become an easy route for illegal immigrants, Poland is emphasising its domestic reforms and its co-operative attitude in the international arena in relation to refugees and illegal immigrants. It is also emphasising the fact that western aid provided for reconstructing the Polish immigration system is being used efficiently.
The main western aid package to tighten Polish border controls, reform its legal system and establish practices and facilities for the upkeep and processing of immigrants and refugees, came from Germany as part of a 1993 agreement on the repatriation of asylum seekers. A repatriation camp was subsequently opened in Poland in 1996, to handle immigrants awaiting repatriation, who had hitherto been held in ordinary jails.82
In early 1995, a new law was passed allowing Polish authorities to hold illegal immigrants awaiting processing for up to 90 days. The law took some five years of negotiations between the various factions in parliament and the judiciary. Previously, a 1963 law allowed only two days of detention of foreign nationals.83
Polish border guards have been re-trained and re-equipped with new sophisticated technology, including carbon dioxide detectors to scan container trucks for life signs. Polish authorities have also reported a crackdown on corruption among border guards. For instance, an example was made of six guards in early 1996.84 A joint database on criminal activity has also been established by the police and the border guards; until then, relations between these two formations had been characterised by a lack of contact and co-ordination.85
In the international sphere, since diplomatic flurry began in 1992 on deportation agreements with Germany and neighbouring countries, there has been no slowdown. In addition to signing repatriation agreements with virtually all of the countries in the region, Poland has continued to negotiate and sign numerous agreements related to immigration with most of them. Reports have been prolific of agreements reached at both the bilateral and multilateral levels regarding such matters as the control of the smuggling of drugs, people and stolen goods, the opening of new border crossings, and the establishment of databases on known criminals. The continuous flurry of activity in the international arena has been indicative of Poland's wish to be, or to appear to be, at the forefront of the construction of an integrated pan-European immigration regime.
The pursuit of a pan-European integration policy is also useful to the Polish authorities in their attempt to occupy the high moral ground, particularly as it is in line with the public resolutions of western governments and the major European organisations. The policy strengthens Poland's case in its pursuit of free transit in the region, especially since Poland is also adopting policies aimed at controlling immigration flows and placating western fears. It also strengthens Poland's relations with other post-communist countries. Not only is Poland offering diplomatic support to post-communist governments in their arguments for access to western markets and greater aid and co-operation, but it is also opening itself up and is doing so in spite of pressure from the west. Here Polish authorities are attempting to emphasise the commonality of interest between Poland and the other post-communist countries in the region. There is, of course, a price - for example, the lifting of restrictions on travel to Poland has tended to be tied to agreements on the repatriation of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers coming to Poland via a third country. Thus, however, Poland is increasingly finding itself in a similar position vis-á-vis the poorer post-communist countries as the western countries are to Poland. It has the economic advantage, and they have the refugees. The long negotiations with Russia have stalled, primarily because Russia does not want to accept repatriated refugees.
Although, in its pursuit of a free transit policy, the Polish government has ceased to frame the question of the 'visitors from the east' in terms of immigration and therefore threat, socially the same types of concerns and social tension remain as in the pre-1993 period.86 Negative attitudes towards foreign nationals sometimes even lead to violent confrontation, and the Roma continue to be picked out for 'special treatment'. Furthermore, it may be argued that the Polish authorities, and not just elements of the public, are increasingly involved in the mistreatment of foreigners, particularly the Roma.
Of all foreign nationals, Poles still perceive the Roma as the major cause of public nuisance. Since the establishment of the OSCE Democratic Institutions Office in Warsaw in 1995, it has received hundreds of complaints by Roma about mistreatment.87 It appears that the authorities, in response to public opinion, have begun moving to solve the problem of the Roma in Poland. For example, on 19 June 1996, 113 Roma were arrested during a massive 2 a.m. police raid on a Roma encampment in a Warsaw suburb. They were then deported to Ukraine the very next day. Polish authorities have argued that no civil rights of the deportees were violated. On this occasion, however, critics were particularly concerned.88 The Helsinki Human Rights Watch reports argued that Polish police and bureaucrats routinely fail to observe the full letter of the law in their dealings with illegal immigrants and refugees. The Group pointed out that foreigners receive very little protection under Polish domestic law, and that international law is largely left to the interpretation of domestic law, which needs to be developed. Lacking legal channels, foreigners are largely left at the mercy of 'the good will and competence of civil servants'.89 In this particular case, it is difficult to accept that a system which is admitted to be less than totally efficient, and which is clearly in need of further reform and funding, would be capable of processing 113 illegal immigrants in one day. The introduction of the 90-day detention law was largely based on the argument that illegal immigrants were notorious for making the processing difficult and time-consuming for the authorities, for example, by deliberately losing documents.90
Polish responses to immigration have developed primarily in the context of the changing pressures of the international situation. In the period to 1993, the main pressures were the possibility of mass migration from the former Soviet Union in the event of civil war erupting in that region, and the adoption of isolationist policies in the west. Apart from some preparation for the influx of refugees, such as the drawing up of plans to establish debriefing centres in isolated parts of the country, the primary response was to attempt to convince the west that it could not afford to take an isolationist approach.
Once the political situation in post-communist countries stabilised and the west showed that its policy was one of integrating Poland into its economic, political and defence system, the above-mentioned fears dissipated. Integrating Poland into a pan-European immigration regime took over as the new set of international considerations. Poland was a major route for immigrants to the countries of the EU - and particularly its most powerful member, Germany - which were extremely concerned with the effects of immigration on the stability of their social fabric. The main pressures on Poland were, and continue to be, how to crack down on illegal immigration and to cease to be a major route to the west, without violating western norms of how immigrants and refugees ought to be treated - a difficult task for a country in the process of developing its economy, as well as its democratic and civic traditions and institutions.
1.Reuters News Service, 5 May 1993 2.Radio Free Europe Daily Reports, 26 August 1991 3.ibid. 4.See the six papers send to print in November 1991 in Socjologia VI: Problemy Spoleczno-Gospodarcze Miast Pogranicza Polsko-Niemieckiego, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego, Wroclaw 1992 5.Kamusella, T. 'Asserting Minority Rights in Poland', in Transitions, Vol.3 No.2, 9 February 1996, p.15 6.Warsaw Voice, 23 June 1996 7.For example see generally, Dabrowski, P. Occasional Paper No. 10: Ethics and Creativity - Untold Stories about Transformation in Poland, Department of German and Slavic Studies, Monash University, Clayton, 1997; and The Financial Times, 24 February 1993 8.Radio Free Europe ..., 6 December 1991 9.ibid., 7 August 1991 10.Warsaw Voice, 21 April 1996 11.The Times, 12 April 1993 12.Guardian, 16 February 1993 13.The Macquarie Dictionary: The National Dictionary, The Macquarie Library, 2nd Edition, 1992 14.ibid. 15.Radio Free Europe ..., 12 October 1990 16.ibid., 26 August 1991 17.ibid., 30 August 1991; and Reuters News Service, 21 April 1993 and 16 March 1993 18.Polskie Radio, Warszawa 0744gmt, 29 April 1993 19.Presentations commonly made to the present author during his visit to Poland - November 1993 to February 1994. 20.The Guardian, 16 February 1993. 21.Financial Times, 17 June 1993 22.Radio Free Europe ..., 26 August 1991 23.ibid. 24.Guardian, 16 February 1993 25.ibid., 3 November 1994. It is also worth highlighting that there were 10 million arrivals from Russia alone in 1996; Warsaw Voice, 8 December 1996 26.In 1993 of 61 million visitors to Poland, 42 million were from Germany - obviously immigration discourse was not applied the them. The Times, 17 November 1994 27.Radio Free Europe ..., 10 October 1990 28.ibid., 27 August 1991 29.ibid., 26 August 1991 30.ibid., 4 January 1991 31.ibid. 32.The Times, 16 April 1993. It is worth pointing out that Poland benefited from substantial assistance programs organised by the western countries. For example, a group of 17 developed countries - often referred to as the Paris Club - cut Poland's debt owed to those countries by 50%, on the 21st of April 1991. Radio Free Europe ..., 6 December 1991. In May 1991 the Czechoslovak Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus even argued that American assistance to Poland was so substantial compared to that offered to Czechoslovakia that it was unfair - "US$ 15 million in assistance to Czechoslovakia, compared to US$ 1 billion and debt forgiveness for Poland". Ibid., 14 May 1991 33.ibid. 34.Korcelli, P. 'International Migration in Europe: Polish Perspectives in the 1990's', in International Migration Review, Vol.XXVI No.2, Summer 1992, p.293 35.Reuters ..., 12 March 1993 36.ibid., 9 March 1993 37.Hockenos P. Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, Routledge, 1993, pp.6,57 38.ibid., see generally chapters 1 and 2 39.ibid., pp. 33-4 40.Reuters ..., 4 January 1993 41.ibid., 15 February 1993 42.Guardian, 30 June 1993; and The Times, 5 January 1993 43.Reuters ..., 15 December 1992 44.ibid., 5 May 1993 45.ibid., 24 February 1993 46.The Times, 5 March 1993 47.Guardian, 16 February 1993 48.Radio Free Europe ..., 26 August 1991 49.ibid. 50.British Broadcasting Cooperation Monitoring Service; Central Europe and Balkans, 9 December 1993 51.Reuters ..., 24 February 1993 52.British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 1 April 1993 53.Radio Free Europe ..., 4 January 1991 54.ibid., 26 August 1991 55.ibid. 56.ibid. 57.Guardian, 15 October 1992; also see Reuters ..., 22 July 1992 58.Guardian, 15 October 1992 59.The Times, 16 April 1993 60.Radio Free Europe ..., 26 August 1991 61.Hockenos, Free to Hate ..., see generally chapter 7 62.British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 25 May 1993 63.Radio Free Europe ..., 26 August 1991 64.ibid. 65.ibid. 66.ibid., 22 July 1992 67.ibid., 21 April 1993 68.British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 18 May 1993 69.Zycie Warszawy, 29 November 1996 70.Warsaw Voice, 8 December 1996 71.See for example, Warsaw Voice, 8 December 1996 72.Radio Free Europe ..., 26 August 1991 73.British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 9 December 1993 74.Rzeczpospolita, 27 February 1997; Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 February 1997; and Nowa Europa, 27 February 1997 75.Warsaw Voice, 24 November 1996 76.ibid., 23 June 1996 77.ibid. 78.ibid. 79.British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 19 July 1993 80.Polskie Radio, Warszawa 0744gmt, 29 April 1993 81.Reuters ..., 7 October 1994 82.Zycie Warszawy, 18 July 1996 83.Reuters ..., 24 March 1995 84.Rzeczpospolita, 27 February 1996; Gazeta Wyborcza 27 February 1996; and Nowa Europa, 27 February 1996 85.ibid. 86.See for example, Warsaw Voice, 14 July 1996 87.British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 5 December 1995 88.Warsaw Voice, 30 June 1996 89.British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 9 December 1993 90.Warsaw Voice, 23 June 1996
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