When Kabul fell to Taliban forces, the US Oil company UNOCAL shocked world public opinion by announcing its optimism about developments in Afghanistan. The Taliban victory was perceived as a positive sign. It was revealed that UNOCAL had been involved in negotiations with Taliban over a gas pipeline construction project that is designed to pass through western Afghanistan, delivering Turkmen gas to Pakistan. Before the escalation of fighting in Afghanistan, Chris Taggart, UNOCAL's executive vice-president in charge of the gas pipeline project, told Reuters his company was providing "non-cash bonus payments" to Taliban in return for their cooperation with this US$2 billion project. The Saudi Arabian Delta Oil Company is also a project partner and is believed to have had contacts with Taliban.
The pipeline is expected to deliver about 2 billion cubic meters of gas per day to world markets via Pakistan. Turkmen authorities anticipate a much needed boost to state revenues from this project. Turkmenistan has been searching for an alternative pipeline route since the break-up of the Soviet Union so that it would not have to rely on Russian pipelines. Turkmenistan is currently linked to Russia, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, all of which are suffering from economic decline with no cash to pay their debts. Russia has an unpaid debt of US$500 million and has recently offered to settle its account by sending industrial machinery to Turkmenistan. [OMRI Daily Report, 15 October 1996] Ukraine is training Turkmen military officers to clear its debt.
The construction of an alternative pipeline is also seen in Ashghabat, Turkmenistan's capital, as a means of reducing Turkmen dependency on Russia and a significant step towards Turkmen sovereignty. The initial plan was to build a gas pipeline through Iran and Turkey. The Turkmen Ministry of Energy is still decorated with a big map of the pipeline route through Iran and Turkey. Growing economic cooperation between Iran and Turkmenistan, evident in the volume of trade, seemed to justify the gas pipeline project. In May this year the Turkmen rail road joined the Iranian network at the border town of Sarakhs. But the pipeline project suffered financial set backs due to the US embargo on Iran which prohibits US investments in that country. The US position hampered fund raising for the project. Turkmenistan, caught in the web of international intrigue and unable to fund the project independently, has given the go-ahead to the less viable Afghan route.
The muted Turkmen response to the Taliban advance on Kabul did not come as a surprise. And when the Russian and Central Asian leaders converged on Almaty, capital of Kazakhstan, on 4 October to discuss the events in Afghanistan the Turkmen government abstained, citing its "positive neutrality". A week later, following high level contacts with Pakistan, the Turkmen government further distanced itself from other Central Asian states by reiterating its neutrality, offering implicit recognition to the Taliban government.[OMRI 11 October 1996]
Turkmenistan is eager for the construction work on the pipeline to begin, just as Taliban and Pakistan are keen for the gas shipments to commence so that they can benefit from transit revenues. This lucrative project has brought Taliban, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, UNOCAL and the Delta Oil Company together into an odd-looking coalition.
Uzbekistan has been the most vocal Central Asian critic of the Taliban advance. The government of President Karimov has built a working relationship with the Uzbek warlord, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, whose forces control northern Afghanistan, territory adjacent to the Uzbek border. It is believed that the Uzbek government has provided military training and financial support for Dostum's forces in the past. The Taliban victory in Kabul and their northward push threatens General Dostum's autonomy and Uzbekistan's influence in Afghanistan. This is not a favourable scenario for the Uzbek government. Uzbekistan's response was to lobby other summit participants in Almaty to commit themselves to tangible support for General Dostum.
Uzbekistan has massed its elite troops in Termez, on the border with Afghanistan.[OMRI 14 October 1996] The road leading from Termez to Mazari Sharif in Afghanistan is logistically important. It was used by the Russian army for the invasion of Afghanistan, later by Uzbekistan for supplying General Dostum, and also by the UN for transporting food and other humanitarian aid to refugees from Tajikistan who settled there after the outbreak of a civil war in their republic.
President Karimov has established a personal rapport with General Dostum. The residence of General Dostum's family in Tashkent is a significant token of Karimov's good-will in a region where familial and personal ties carry more weight than signed pacts.[Nezavisimaya gazeta, Sept 25, 1996 p.3] This cosying of relations between President Karimov and General Dostum has worried some observers. Nezavisimaya gazeta warned against Tashkent's hegemonic designs to incorporate northern Afghanistan and parts of Tajikistan with the help of Dostum. The combined Uzbek forces of General Dostum and President Karimov would be formidable.[Nezavisimaya gazeta, Sept 25, 1996 p.3] There is potential support for the secession of northern Tajikistan to Uzbekistan due to that region's close historical and economic ties with Tashkent and its sizeable Uzbek minority. A recent revolt in Tursunzade, west of Tajikistan, less than 20 kilometres from the Tajik-Uzbek border, seemed to have Uzbekistan's backing, adding fuel to speculations about Tashkent's intentions. Tursunzade is home to Central Asia's largest aluminium producing factory and a major currency earner for Tajikistan.
Alarm bells about "greater Uzbekistan", however, may have been sounded by the frustrated Russian policy makers who are unable to arrest the rift between Russia and the Central Asian states. In the past, Moscow used the imaginary threat of Islamic fundamentalism to keep its Central Asian neighbours under its wing. Now, 'Uzbek expansionism' seems to have been added to Moscow's list of threats to stability in Central Asia. But just as Islamic fundamentalism was a convenient misreading of the cultural revival in the region, 'Uzbek expansionism' seems to be a magnified depiction of Uzbek aspiration for leadership in Central Asia.
The official Russian approach to Afghanistan was initially unclear. Alexander Lebed, then chief of the Russian Security Council, went on the record by openly supporting the government forces of the ousted President Burhanuddin Rabbani against the advancing Taliban forces.[OMRI 2 October 1996] But Yevgeny Primakov, Russian Foreign Minister, immediately rejected open involvement in Afghanistan. Russia's current official position refrains from openly taking sides. This approach was endorsed at the Almaty summit. The joint summit declaration warned against Taliban's threat to regional stability but did little more than call on both sides to cease hostilities. [OMRI 7 October 1996] There was no open commitment to assist General Dostum and Rabbani. In spite of this official position, military support for anti-Taliban forces is likely to make its way across the Uzbek-Afghan border. Russia has a vested interest in sending Rabbani back to Kabul; it was developing a working relationship with his government just before the fall of Kabul. The alternative Taliban government with links to Pakistan and the US must surely be too unpalatable to Russian tastes.
A Taliban government is also unacceptable to Iran. In a rush to pre-empt the construction of UNOCAL's pipeline in Afghanistan, the Iranian government commenced work on a 200 kilometre pipeline to link the Turkmen gas-field of Korpedzhe to the Iranian Caspian port of Kurdkoi.[OMRI 14 October 1996] Iranian concerns about Afghanistan were made clear by its Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati. In a hastily organised tour of Central Asia on 15 October, Velayati discussed the situation in Afghanistan with his counterparts in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Implicit US support for Taliban and the risk of losing the Turkmen gas pipeline contract to Afghanistan and Pakistan has led Iran to step up its diplomatic activities to form an anti-Taliban alliance. The Tehran conference (29 October) which brought Russia, India, Turkey and four Central Asian states together was a clear step in that direction. (Uzbekistan did not attend due to its cool relations with Iran, while Turkmenistan appears to have attended to avoid alienating its southern economic partner). [OMRI 30 October 1996] India could be an influential partner in this alliance. India is weary of a Pakistani-backed government in Kabul and supports Tehran's call for a special UN Security Council meeting to exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.
Tajikistan's response to the toppling of President Rabbani in Afghanistan was to be expected. The Tajik government has been trying to secure its 1,500 kilometre-long border with Afghanistan against infiltrating Tajik opposition forces, stationed on Afghan territory. It had won major agreements on border crossings from the government of Rabbani. The Tajik government considers Rabbani's loss of power and escape to the Pamir region in the north, territory used by the Tajik opposition forces, as evidence of a reforming balance of power in Afghanistan, with grave implications for Tajikistan.
The Tajik government is concerned about the possibility of a coalition between Rabbani, himself belonging to the Tajik minority in Afghanistan, and Tajik opposition leaders in Afghanistan. Such a coalition would pose a real threat to Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan. This may not be an unlikely scenario if the stand-off between the Pashtun Taliban and the Tajik led forces of Rabbani is prolonged and Afghanistan is divided between Pashtuns in the south and Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras in the north. That is why Tajikistan enthusiastically supports Rabbani's return to Kabul.
Apart from Pakistan, all regional states regard Taliban as a threat to their national interests. A regional anti-Taliban alliance is crystallising. This is an encouraging development for the unity of Rabbani and Dostum against their common enemy. Backed by Russian military hardware, transferred from Termez, the coalition of Uzbek and Tajik forces is challenging the Taliban. But this coalition is unlikely to be able to bring a lasting peace to this war-torn country. Another Great Game is being played out by ethnic proxies. Regrettably, history has shown that once ethnic hatred is generated it takes on a life of its own.
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