Conventional wisdom in the academic and journalistic communities seems to be that democracy in Russia is not working, with numerous everyday examples given to justify the argument. The war in Chechnya, corruption in high political places, mafia gangs in the economy, and strong support for so-called anti-regime parties are just a few examples. Yet no-one can be surprised, surely, just a few years after the fall of the Soviet empire that Russia does not function as a fully-fledged model of democracy. Making democracy work is hard work.
In this paper I simply offer some benchmarks from which to draw assessments about the extent to which Russia is moving toward representative liberal democracy. I do not deal with everyday issues such as corruption and crime (no democracy is free of such phenomena). Rather, essential features of traditional models of democracy are outlined, along with what are considered to be the prerequisites (social and economic) for democratic development. This is a huge topic, and hence in the space allotted only a sketch can be provided. But it is hopefully a useful sketch from which one can draw some tentative conclusions about the prospects for the institutionalisation of democracy in the Russian Federation.
In a recent interview Alexander Lebed stated that "We went to bed on August 21, 1991 in a totalitarian state and woke up on August 22nd in a democratic state, so the transitional period was just one night".(1) Of course, things are not so simple. As the history of twentieth century in Europe alone has demonstrated, making and sustaining democracy is a difficult enterprise. Many specialists would argue that Russia, seeking to transit from totalitarianism to democracy may find it particularly difficult to make it, let alone be in a position to sustain it, given that country's traditions, beliefs, political culture, and current economic situation. Furthermore, unlike transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, as for example in Spain and countries in Latin America and Asia in which the economic market and autonomous groups already existed under the previous regimes, Russia is attempting a transition to political democracy and the economic market at the same time. Arguments about Russia's poor prospects for democracy rest upon assumptions about what democracy is and what it takes to make it work, and the specific features of Russian society that are then thought to impede the democratic project. Yet rarely is an attempt made to actually specify clearly what is meant by democracy and then how exactly Russia post-1991 matches up to it. Such an attempt is made here.
Institutions of Liberal Democracy
Central to any modern conception of liberal democracy is the idea that citizens should have the right to participate in determining the collective will through elected representatives. So the key institution in a democracy is an electoral process in which officials are freely chosen and peacefully removed by (virtually) all adults engaged in fair and free elections where coercion is absent. Most adults can seek public office in elections, thereby ensuring that government decisions on public policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials. Democracy also requires a functioning civil society, "mediating institutions", a plurality of autonomous groups separate from the state. Citizens should have an effectively constitutionally enforced right to join and participate freely in political parties, interest groups, social movements, and other political organisations. In a working democracy civil society mediates its plural interests through negotiation, bargaining, and compromise. Periodic elections contested by more than one political party is, then, the key component of democracy.
In addition citizens should have the right to freely articulate their interests, even when opposed to the government of the day, have the right of assembly, and have access to information that is not monopolised by the state authorities. An important component here is that the media should be free from government or state controls. Democracy implies governance through consent rather than rule through coercion. Legitimacy of the political system rests upon legality: the belief that political power is wielded in a way that is legal.
It takes only a glance back at the Soviet system to quickly identify that is was anything but a liberal democracy. There was no popular control over the government; citizens had the right to vote, but in elections that offered no choice; officials were not responsible to society through free elections; adults had no right to run freely for elective office; there was no freedom of expression or assembly; trade unions and other groups served as "transmission belts" for the single ruling communist party and there were correspondingly no groups autonomous from the state; the media was rigidly controlled by the party/state authorities; citizens had no rights to information, and nor were they able in any legal or meaningful way to oppose the regime.
If we take a glance at the Russia that has emerged since 1991 the idea that Russia woke up one day to find itself in a democracy can be perhaps supported by the fact that it now has a constitutional order, in which citizens have the right to choose from a number of political parties and presidential candidates in open and free elections; with a large number of associational groups separate from the state; with freedoms of expression and assembly legally guaranteed; freedom of conscience; and the media freed from government control. Hence the constitutional and institutional structures of liberal democracy appear to be in place, and with three parliamentary elections, two presidential elections, and two referenda since 1989 covering each side of the transition period from Russia as part of the USSR to Russia as an independent state, perhaps the institutionalisation of democracy is being developed and sustained. But to what extent is this the case? Here we should turn to the question of the prerequisites of democracy and the different schools of thought on democratic development to assess the extent to which Russia really is consolidating liberal democracy.
The Path(s) to Democracy
There are three schools of thought relating to democratic development.(2) One, "new institutionalism", is traced back to John Stuart Mill's conception of constitutional engineering. Here institutions count, and rather than democrats creating and sustaining democracy, democracy creates and fosters democrats. Hence, a democratic political culture is not necessary for democratic development, for if a small number of Russian elites construct post-Soviet political and economic institutions that are democratic, then the democratic values to sustain the system will eventually emerge. The second school's focus is upon socioeconomic factors, linked to theories of modernisation, associated with the works of Robert Dahl, Samuel Huntington, Martin Lipset, and Francis Fukyama. The basic argument here is that internal pressures (social, economic, cultural, psychological and political) build up for increased opportunities--and the freedoms necessary to realise them--as society becomes more modern and dynamic, more complex and pluralist. The third school stresses the sociocultural factors that may serve to strengthen or weaken the development of democracy. It is our culture which provides us with our identity, hence, no matter how dedicated constitutional engineers might be in designing democratic institutions, an already existing political culture may not be conducive to attaining the desired democratic project.(3) Here Plato and Almond and Verba can be cited as exemplars. Using these three schools of thought as broad headings I will now briefly assess the prospects for democratic development in the Russian Federation.
Democracy Creating Democrats?
As noted above, Russia has, with some spectacular bumps along the way (e.g., the Presidential storming of the Parliament in 1993), established the basic institutional structure of democratic government. When engaged in constitutional engineering there are of course a variety of models from which to choose or adapt in building democratic institutions (various forms of parliamentary, presidential systems, or combinations of the two). One question then is: what is the likelihood that the institutions Russian elites have selected will actually serve to fulfil the stated democratic project? A second question is, to what extent, in so far as we can infer, have these institutions actually determined and changed behaviour?
Russian Presidentialism
The same political system can have a different fate in different places. The Westminster system, for example, fared much less well in many African countries than it has in India. Institutional performance is clearly shaped by the prevailing social context. Russia has constructed a presidential system, and one in which the incumbent president as head of executive has thus far stood above the party fray (although the main challengers in the 1996 election were leaders of political parties, so there is no reason to assume that Russia will always have a non-party president). The fragility of democracy in Latin American states demonstrates perhaps that presidential executive systems are not as conducive to institutionalising democracy as are parliamentary ones. In presidential systems political power and symbolic authority are placed in the same single individual, whereas in parliamentary systems they are shared between an elected government headed by an executive prime minister and a head of state. In parliamentary systems the head of state is either a constitutional monarch (as in the United Kingdom) with merely symbolic authority, or a president selected by the parliament to represent the state as figurehead but carrying no legislative powers. One problem here, as Lipset has noted, is that negative attitudes towards the policy makers is difficult to separate from the regime itself, which then undermines faith in the system and hence risks an erosion in legitimacy.(4) The U.S. presidential system is the exception to prove the rule concerning the risks to democracy of such a system. But then this could be explained (in both the success of the North American and the failure of the South American systems) by specific historical and cultural factors. Hence one could argue that the prospects for Russian presidentialism, given the specific historical and cultural traits of centuries of authoritarian and totalitarian government are not good.
However, the Russian case is different. It is a mixture combining presidential and parliamentary forms of government, borrowing from the United States system and the French system of the Fifth Republic. It is not a pure presidential system as in the United States, but nor is it a presidential-parliamentary system as in France. Unlike the U.S. presidential system Russia has a government headed by a prime minister (called the chairman of the government), but unlike the French system the Russian President is free to choose whomsoever he pleases as prime minister (with the "agreement of the State Duma") and controls the composition of the government (without requiring confirmation from the Duma). In the French system a directly elected president must choose as his prime minister the head of the largest party in the parliament, thereby ensuring a power sharing arrangement between presidency and parliament. In the U.S. system it is common and in the French system it is possible (and occurred under Mitterand) for the majority party in the legislature to be in opposition to the party affiliation of the president. A division of responsibilities and competencies, with checks and balances built into the political system to prevent the abuse of executive powers is a feature of all liberal democracies. One key role of a legislature is to check, challenge, monitor and legitimate policies undertaken in the name of the state by the executive branch of government. It could be argued then, if there is no tension between a parliament and the executive, that the former is not fulfilling its proper function.
Yet the constitutional framework involving a separation of powers should provide for effective government, in which the process of intragovernmental and institutional rivalry does not hinder the ultimate wielding of effective power. In the period leading up to the constitutional crisis in 1993 the post-Soviet Russian legislature was engaged in a struggle for power with the president in a serious dispute over which institution had competency over policy making. The problem related to the absence of any clear demarcation and division of powers between parliament and president as the new Russian Federal state was still then operating under the old Soviet constitution (with numerous amendments). It was a confusing picture which ultimately led to governmental impotency and a gridlock in public policy making. Arguing that the parliament was undermining constitutional government in its opposition to a democratically elected president Yeltsin, lacking any constitutional authority to do so, disbanded the parliament by force. This was the third time in modern Russian history that a legislative body had been forceably disbanded by executive fiat. The first was when the Tsar used troops to close down Russia's first Duma in 1906, and the second was when the Bolsheviks used troops to disband the Constituent Assembly in January 1918. Thus one might argue that this confirms the political cultural thesis of a tendency for authoritarianism and a lack of political tolerance for opposition to government policy. However, in the latter case the objective was the creation of a constitutional presidential system which, although weakening the powers of the legislature, would nevertheless provide for checks and balances and a division of competencies in policy making.
One could argue that in Russia's current economic situation strong leadership is necessary, for a parliamentary system of government would create greater potential for extremes to gain control of policy making and hence hinder the making of effective legislation. The transition from the plan to the market is perhaps better served if the government is insulated from popular frustration and anger. A competent, united, strong presidential executive is more likely, given Russia's circumstances, to ultimately reform the economy and to sustain the development of democracy than a divided parliament. Also, as with the U.S. presidential system, a directly elected executive president in Russia allows for a single individual to legitimately define what is in the national interest. A president is much better able to draw up long-term strategic goals than a disorganised and incoherent parliament. Of course it must be noted that Yeltsin's health is an issue undermining the potential for a strong presidency at present, but the important thing to note is that his re-election can be viewed as one in which far more than pocket-book policy issues determined the outcome. The election can be considered as an endorsement for the consolidation of democracy.
The 1996 presidential election is important on a number of counts. First the result was accepted by all sides. This relates to a significant prerequisite of democracy: that losing parties and the voting public all accept the basic legitimacy of the winner's right to form the government. The fact that the results of elections are accepted by losing sides is remarkable even in mature democracies, but in the Russian Federation it is even more noteworthy, especially given the fact that second place loser was head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (the successor to the former Soviet ruling Communist Party) which achieved the majority of seats in the Duma elections just six months earlier. And the winner of the election, despite being confronted with a hostile legislature, has continued to recognise the right of oppositional forces to continue freely competing for power and influence.
It should also be noted that the turnout in the 1996 presidential election was high, and greater than for each of the previous two elections to the State Duma. Fully 68.6% of eligible voters participated in the first round, and 67.8% in the second. In many western democracies turnout in elections has recently been declining -- barely 50% of voters turned out in November 1996 in the U.S. presidential election. Behind the scenes power struggles may be going on, often not very well camouflaged, but this is surely nothing to be surprised about given the state of Yeltsin's heath and the early workings of Russia's democratic institutions. Anyone familiar with the political process will recognise this as not being uncommon even in mature democracies (one thinks in the Australian setting of the struggle between Keating and Hawke when the latter was prime minister). Ultimately, though, thus far it is accepted by all that it is the electoral process that will decide Yeltsin's successor.
The presidential election was also judged by many to have been a contest between a project for the future, represented by economic reform and the consolidation of political democracy under Yeltsin, and a return to the communist past under Zyuganov. In this argument Zyuganov's bid for the presidency represented a challenge to the regime, and not just a challenge to the incumbent government. Yet the evidence points to a different conclusion. First, Zyuganov was careful not to portray himself as an old-style communist. Indeed, he deliberately avoided using the term communism almost entirely during his campaign, utilising a democratic discourse to appeal to those who were suffering most from economic reforms. It is also instructive to note that the Communist Party has not been totally obstructive in the new Duma, despite its large number of deputees. Indeed it has actually acted in a way conducive to pluralistic politics of bargaining and compromise. This then, in both discourse and practice does not reflect an anti-regime party that would return the clock back to Soviet-style totalitarianism. Surveys showing a large percentage of respondents (around 60%) having positive feelings towards the former Soviet Union have often been cited to show a large section of the population being opposed to the current regime. Yet of course having warm feelings for the past does not mean that people want to bring it back. As Yeltsin once pointed out, if Russians do not feel some sorrow for the passing of the USSR then they have no heart, but if they want to put it together again, then they simply have no head. Egor Gaidar voted for a continuation of the Union in Gorbachev's referendum on the issue, and would certainly feel some sadness at its passing away, but he certainly does not want to rebuild it and the old system that glued it together. And support for reintegrating parts of the old Union does not equate with a desire to restore totalitarianism.
Even if the competition between Zyuganov and Yeltsin is seen as one between two systems, then that represented by the past was unacceptable to the Russian population which must be seen as a strong boost for democratic consolidation. All the above points to the conclusion that the institutions of democracy are working, as reflected in the presidential election, and that these institutions are shaping politics, setting a dominant democratic discourse, and determining actors' identities, policies, and strategies. Nevertheless, what eventually happens to institutions is said to be shaped by historical, cultural factors, and current socio-economic trends.
Russian Political Culture and Democracy
Planning for democracy, like planning for an economy, it is posited, does not work (except where it has been imposed, as in Germany and Japan after World War Two). It is necessary to have certain sociocultural prerequisites. The workings of the economy and the polity are determined by societal practices, cultural norms, customs and habits. Russia's democratic revolution of 1991, it could be argued, will be railroaded by traditional political cultural forces. Culture cannot be restructured by executive decree, and placing the institutions of democracy in Russia is to place them on infertile soil. It has been said that Russia suffers from a problem of collective cognition, or a collective infantilism where society has not been socialised to take its own decisions. A society that has lived for its entire history under authoritarian rule cannot simply wake up one morning and take on full responsibility for itself. Russian society is not prepared or able to meet the demands of modern democratic institutions. For democratic institutions to work requires a democractic "personality". The democratic state is founded upon a primary separation of moral and ideological authority from political authority. Yet for centuries these have been fused in Russia under the Tsars and the Commissars. Political culture refers then to the underlying psychological dynamic in society, relating to fundamental attitudes, beliefs, and values. In Russia, it is argued, a democratic political culture, said to be necessary for democracy to be sustained, does not exist.
In contrast to the "democratic personality", which is adaptive to change, tolerant of counter-posing views, flexible and able to compromise, the Russian "authoritarian personality" is rigid in its views, fearful of anarchy and change, hostile, and conforming to strong centralised authority. Underlying attitudes will impose constraints upon the objectives of the democrats, for their plans come into collision with the political culture of the Russian people, and their policies risk being rejected by the popular masses and hijacked by anti-democratic elites more in keeping with Russian authoritarian traditions. A democratic project for a country whose citizens have been socialised and lived a life based upon its antithesis would be certain to meet some obstacles along the way. But how strong is the cultural continuity thesis?
Political culture is reflected in political orientations, attitudes, and beliefs as expressed in opinion surveys and polls. Thus it is possible now, with such data available (as it was not in Soviet times) to get some measure of these issues. Political culture can also be measured from behaviour such as the role and demands of interest groups and social movements, demonstrations, strikes, and voting. The evidence we have (and here I can only skate on the surface) is often contradictory, but some tentative conclusions can be drawn that suggest the political cultural argument is over-determined and exaggerated.
Many studies of Russian elites have compiled data to demonstrate a continuity of elites (in both the polity and the economy) from the 1980s to the present. For example somewhere over 80% of the elite in Russia in 1993 consisted of individuals who had previously been members of the Communist Party, with 50% of them having held executive office in the party. And two thirds of the private business elite in 1993 had been party members, and 78% of enterprise directors in 1993 were either enterprise directors or their deputies in 1988. In 1994 75% of elites serving in Yeltsin's presidential administration were members of the old Soviet nomenklatura elite(5). In and of itself this data tells us little. For example, it is the case that much of the Soviet elite that continue in elite positions today joined the Soviet elite under Gorbachev's reformism and many were strong supporters of further democratisation. Furthermore, as in the case of Yeltsin himself, many of the old elites were able very quickly to turn themselves into democrats, indicating that belief in the Communist project was in a state of crisis. One of the factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet system was a crisis in the belief system, for it had demonstrably failed to keep pace with social and economic developments in the West. The belief system was tied to the Cold War competition between western liberal democracy and the market economy and Soviet-style socialism and the command economy. One recent study of elite attitudes found that 65% of Russia's new political, economic, and military elites are market democrats in orientation.(6) Thus the current elite in Russia for the most part is generally reflective of an emerging democratic political culture. Belief systems are not static, they change. And in Russia democracy appears to be taking root amongst wide sections of the elite. The state has rejected any claim to a single higher truth and elites accept, tolerate, and support a pluralism of views and have been happy to allow citizens, through the ballot box, to determine who governs.
What about attitudes of the wider citizenry? Surveys of the wider population offer no simple interpretation. We find that most Russians support a market economy, but dislike the idea of large income differentials, and consider dictatorship to be bad, but favour strong leadership. This could be read as people supporting the idea of a market, but not the consequences, and disliking dictatorship whilst willing to have an authoritarian government to deal with crime and anarchy. The question is which part of the puzzle reflects fundamental attitudes and which merely opinion of the day? One way of finding the answer could be to look at behaviour. For example if we take the elections to the Duma in 1993 and 1995 and the presidential elections of 1996 we can note some seeming contradictions, for in the two parliamentary elections nationalist and communists critical of the government's economic reforms gained very strong support, whereas earlier this year Yeltsin was successful in his bid for re-election on a platform of continuing democratisation and marketisation. One answer to this could be that in the Duma elections voters were demonstrating their frustration about their own economic plight and rising crime (two salient issues mentioned by respondents in surveys asking what were considered the most important issues in the elections), whereas in the presidential election people were voting on fundamental issues (surveys indicated that many people saw the importance of the election as a choice between communism and democracy, the plan and the market). Hence it would seem there is evidence to suggest that mass culture, as well as elite political culture is becoming more democratic. Furthermore electing deputies to the Duma was not seen as being as important or significant as electing a president who wields the most power. Thus the strong showing against the "presidential party" (i.e., Russia's Choice in 1993 and Our Home is Russia in 1995) could be seen as a fairly 'safe' vote of protest.
Another indicator pointing to the development of democracy is associated with the demographic and generational voting patterns in the elections. One very evident correlation is that between the communist vote and relatively poor and small towns and villages in the western and southern provinces. The worse the economic situation the stronger the communist vote. The other strong correlation is that between those over the age of forty five and the communist vote. The older the voters the stronger the communist vote. Surveys also clearly show that younger people have a much stronger commitment to individual rights and democracy than do the elderly. Thus the communist vote is likely to decline in future elections and, assuming the economy eventually does improve, the commitment to democracy could strengthen too. Soviet political culture appears to be dying out with the older generations. Surveys and voting behaviour also indicate that there is a much stronger affinity with old Soviet values in areas relatively unaffected by modernisation, and, as is surely inevitable given globalising trends, when modernisation catches up with these provinces, then these old values will give way to those more conducive to sustaining democracy. This brings me to the third area I wish to cover, the socioeconomic.
Socioeconomic Prerequisites for Democracy
Technological developments proceed at a rapid rate, and as we have moved beyond the radio to satellite technology, the micro-chip and the internet, the revolution in science and technology has made social and political distances shorter and the movement of ideas, goods, currencies and peoples so much faster. The collapse of communism can be seen as part of the forces of modernisation, facilitated by modern methods of communication and organisation, which have increased the competencies and demands of individuals and groups. Internal pressures in the communist bloc built up--due to a modernisation dynamic--to break out of the old rigid communist system and to construct a modern democratic polity which would reflect the socioeconomic and psychological features produced by industrial society.
Russian society in the 1990s is radically different from that of the 1930s, when the Stalinist system was constructed. Soviet Russia had been transformed from a rural society to an urban society, bureaucracy and services had replaced agriculture as the dominant employer, and Russia had been transformed from a largely illiterate society to a highly educated one. The continuity theses of Russian political culture which takes us back to previous centuries has as its basic subject of analysis a society that is totally different from that of today. A modernising imperative will ensure, one argument holds, that Russia will continue along the path of economic reform and democratisation.
With the end of the Cold War, the victory of the market over the plan, and increasing globalisation of the economy, capitalist development would appear inescapable for Russia. And market capitalism will further stimulate democracy, for productive efficiency requires economic pluralism. It is a basic demand of economic entrepreneurs (or the capitalist class) to have freedom from government restrictions in the conduct of their activities (whilst also requiring the services of the state to ensure a legal framework to facilitate profit making). As the market develops, more elites will have a stake in maintaining it. Many of the old nomenklatura elites have proven themselves very adept at transforming themselves into an emerging capitalist class, whose interests are now closely tied up with the market.
Capitalism produces economic growth, which increases prosperity across a much wider spectrum of the population than was the case in pre-capitalist times, and this is then followed by democratisation. Marx once said, "no bourgeois, no democracy", and as Russia is slowly and painfully but surely building a bourgeois and middle class then this should also increase the prospects for democracy.
But for democracy to prosper, the economy has to prosper first. Polyarchy (Dahl's conception of modern democracy) is associated historically with a high sustained level of economic development, high income and wealth per capita, high levels of urbanization, widespread education, decreasing infant mortality and increasing life expectancy.(7) For Russia, following the collapse of the old regime the only characteristics that applied unambiguously were those relating to levels of urbanisation and education, but this needs now to be qualified as general standards of education have been falling. Infant mortality rates have increased since 1991, life expectancy has decreased, the economy has declined precipitately, and most people have suffered a loss in their material standard of living.
Capitalism may be a necessary condition for democracy to work, but it is not on its own a sufficient condition, as we have seen in Latin American states. Modernisation theories show that in the process of economic development the most important factor in transiting to a modern society is a strong centralised state authority. But the state should not limit the market (as happened in many Latin American countries where democracy failed) but should rather use its resources and powers to make the market work. This way political democracy stands a better chance.
The relative ineffectiveness of the Russian state today in taking on a strong role is readily gleaned: large-scale tax evasion; corruption and an increase in crime; the debacle in Chechnya; unpaid wages to public workers, pensioners, and the military; and the fear of many foreigners to invest in Russia. Yet the recent presidential elections and the potential powers of the office should enable Yeltsin, assuming he recovers sufficiently from his operation, to use these powers more confidently in a decisive way in order to continue reforming the economy and to integrate Russia into the global capitalist economy.
Conclusions
The prospects for democracy in Russia are mixed. It has the institutional structures in place, an emerging elite and mass consensus reflecting a democratic political culture, and the market is the project of a potentially strong and legitimate executive authority.
One piece of evidence to support the view that institutions can serve to overcome specific cultural factors is perhaps found in the communist experience itself. Cultural continuity has been used to explain the outcome of the Bolshevik experiment in 1917. However, rather than Russian political culture explaining political developments in the USSR, a more reasonable argument is that it was communism. The central features of the communist one-party system were, with some modifications, transplanted into other countries with very different cultures (for example, Cuba, Vietnam, China, Albania). Cults of personality, persecution of dissenters, non-tolerance of opposition, corruption, feature in all of these countries. Given the fact that Russia has now held a number of parliamentary and presidential elections in which all parties have accepted the result is evidence that a democratic political culture is taking hold.
One general problem for all liberal democracies is the fact that they are based upon individualism, making it difficult for elites to satisfy the multiple demands made upon the system. Electoral competition generates demands from the public which parties turn into promises that cannot all be kept. Competition raises the expectations of the voters and when these are not satisfied faith and support in the system decreases. This is true in mature democracies, reflected in the growth of anti-party parties in parliamentary systems and anti-regime independent candidates in presidential systems. Given the dire position of the Russian economy it is most unlikely that promises made by competing parties and presidential candidates can possibly be met, certainly during one term of office. Thus there is a risk of faith and support for democracy being undermined before it has time to fully develop. States lacking certain economic prerequisites find it very difficult to attain a democratic political order. The globalisation of the economy and increased economic interdependence between states makes it increasingly more difficult for governments to determine policy at the state level. One should also note the research findings on the link between democracy and peace between states, for the one strong correlation is not so much that democracies do not go to war against each other as democratising states are much more likely than even authoritarian states to go on the warpath. Studies have also shown that with most wars the trigger is usually conflict over territory. As a democratising state in severe economic crisis subject to external economic forces , one with territorial disputes with some of its neighbours, and a sick president with a power struggle taking place behind the scenes, confidence in the institutional, cultural and economic factors pointing towards sustaining democracy needs to be clearly qualified. But Russia, judged on the basic indicators of democratic development, is certainly not the hopeless case that many observers portray.
Department of Political Science
University of Melbourne
Endnotes:
(1) The interview was published by the Internet Magazine Intellectual Capital, 14 November, 1996 and reproduced in David Johnson's Russia List: http://www.cdi.org/mailing/russia/ on 18 November, 1996.
(2) See Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 9-11.
(3) Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994, pp. 184-189.
(4) Symour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", American Sociological Review, vol. 59, 1994, pp. 1-22.
(5) See David Lane, "The Gorbachev Revolution. The Role of the Political Elite in Regime Disintegration', Political Studies, vol. xlvi, no.1, 1996, pp. 4-23.
(6) William Zimmerman, "Synoptic Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia", Slavic Review, vol. 54, no. 3, 1995, pp. 630-641.
(7) Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press, 1971, and Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1991, 5th edn., pp. 71-94.
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