It is only in the last six months or so that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has been put under genuine pressure to reveal its intentions in the area of economic policy if a communist president were to come to power. Evidently the prospect and reality of a communist-dominated parliament was not enough to concentrate minds in the way that the likelihood of a communist president has.
So far the response to that pressure has been contradictory and confusing. Some commentators have interpreted the communists' Jekyll and Hyde performance as being deliberate and cynical twofacedness. Anatolii Chubais, still close to Yeltsin even after his removal from the government following the December 1995 parliamentary elections, has criticised Ziuganov, the communist party leader and presidental candidate, for giving different messages to different audiences, with the implication being that it is his hard-line persona which is the genuine one.(1) It is a view which has apparently received corroboration in the comments of General Valentin Varennikov, 1991 putschist and communist hardliner, that the party has a public 'minimalist' and a private 'maximalist' programme.(2)
Others see the contradictions in policy programmes and public statements from various communist leaders as reflecting major differences of opinion and indeed an ideological divide within the party. Sergei Chugaev, writing in Izvestiia, has divided the party into two main camps: the supporters of Ziuganov, who tend to be those who have been in the party's parliamentary fraction for some time and who therefore have been well socialised into the ways of government, including a willingness when required to compromise with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin; and the supporters of V. Kuptsov, the head of the party's apparatus, who are either outside or newcomers to parliament and who tend to be far more uncompromising in their approach. (Chugaev also identifies as a potential third camp that developing around the speaker of the Duma, Gennadii Seleznev.)(3)
The evidence of a split seems strong enough to suggest that we have to look beyond a cynical disinformation strategy to explain communist policy differences. However it is noticeable that once the very public differences of opinion in the communist leadership began to coincide with a rise in Yeltsin's poll rating and stagnation in Ziuganov's, enough party discipline could be exerted for the hardliners to move themselves out of the spotlight. Chubais would no doubt claim that they will be far less ready to do so once the victory is won.
The two camps in the Communist Party can be broadly characterised as the hardliners versus the softliners; 'back to the past' versus continuation along more or less current lines; or to put it most technically, 'developed socialism' and central planning versus social democracy and the 'multi-level (mnogoukladnaia) economy'.
The author of this piece witnessed a dramatic demonstration of the divide in Moscow last year. The Committee for Property and Privatisation of the Duma had called public hearings on the privatisation of state television. It would have been a bitter debate under any circumstances, but coming soon after the murder of Vlad List'ev it was a very emotional occasion indeed. Two communists spoke. First was Vladimir Semago, the communist businessman, one of whose lines of business is, bizarrely enough, running a casino in Moscow. He spoke very reasonably of the need for the state to work with business and the need to create the conditions for the operation of a civilised economy, with a place in it for a civilised market.(4) He was followed by Iurii Ivanov, a lawyer, who in a rabble-rousing speech pointed the finger at the considerable number of participants in the proceedings who would be 'dealt with appropriately' once the communists came to power, including the government representative present, who would be 'visiting the prosecutor, not the parliament' next time. While it might have been no more than parliamentary rhetoric, it would have taken someone with a serious indifference to recent history not to find the performance a chilling one. The only problem with the two speeches for those supporting the communist split hypothesis, and something which might lend support to the Chubais approach, is that Ziuganov sat silent and impassive between the two speakers, giving not the slightest hint as to what side he might have been on. (And for what it's worth the two speakers seemed friendly enough in their personal relations).
The split has been most directly and clearly articulated, in the 'technical' terms outlined above, in the debate at the April 1996 conference of the communist 'thinktank', the Russian Researchers of Socialist Organisation, between Igor Bratishchev and Aleksandr Buzgalin.(5) The 'developed socialism' view involves, to put it in the simplest terms, the return to central planning.(6) The details on the precise steps to be taken constitute little more than rumour at the moment, rumours usually spread by the anti-communist press, but they are said to include 'a revival of Gosplan, control of all financial dealings by the Central Bank, reintroduction of price controls for key industrial and agricultural commodities, nationalization of strategic industries "by non-violent means", and import duties to protect domestic producers.'(7) There is no mention in this list of the revival, along with Gosplan, of sectoral state agencies, i.e. the old branch ministries, but that is certainly something one could expect. One could also expect a strong reorientation away from the energy sector towards heavy industry. (Despite the fact that the Brezhnev period of 'developed socialism' in fact saw the beginnings of the considerable reorientation from industry to oil and gas investment that continues so controversially to this day). Iurii Masliukov, the communist chair of the Duma's Committee for Economic Reform and a former head of the Soviet defence industry and Gosplan, has said that his committee is focusing on finding ways to increase output not just in the energy sector but in all branches of industry.(8) One commentator has suggested that the funds obtained through renationalisation will 'go to industrial and agrarian lobbies to reward their support of neo-Communists in the December 1995 parliamentary elections and in the upcoming presidential elections.'(9)
To most outside observers it must seem almost unbelievable that anyone could be nostalgic for the Brezhnev period, and one can only assume that the nostalgia is for the early, relatively prosperous years of his time in power. What the prospects for such a restoration might be are hard to judge. Clearly any hopes of the creation of a dynamic and thriving economy on such a basis are totally illusory. But the possibility of reintroducing the policy-making and administrative structures and procedures of that period and using them to provide the bare minimum living standards of the 'social contract' needs to be taken more seriously. Although they have taken a terrible battering in recent years, a core of Brezhnevite structures and procedures still exist, and one should not underestimate the capacity of economic elites to adjust themselves to new conditions. One doubts, nevertheless, that the 'Brezhnevite' leaders of the Communist Party would be subtle enough to administer the necesssary degree of 'repressive tolerance' - although perhaps Varennikov has learnt some lessons from August 1991.
The moderate communist platform would seem to involve not going much further with reform but not going backwards either. One assumes that there would be some limited renationalisation, but for little more than show. The strong indications are that this wing of the party would prefer to work with financial structures rather than with a revived Gosplan and state sectoral agencies. There have been reports of the communists holding consultations with 'influential bankers who formerly belonged to the nomenklatura of the Soviet communist party';(10) Ziuganov has been more than happy to speak to the members of the 'Group of 13' business and banking leaders about their calls for reconciliation between all sides of politics. In these terms it would seem entirely possible that a communist party in power dominated by moderates would continue what appears to be the most recent strategy of the current government, to build a sort of state capitalism based on a small group of 'state agency' banks and financial structures.(12)
In terms of an industrial orientation, Ziuganov's approach has been very strongly to look for 'sociological' support in broad sections of the community, rather than looking for narrow sectoral support. That has been a wise choice, since political movements that have based themselves on sectoral appeal, particularly the industry sector, have done very poorly. This is evident in the performances of the various industrial parties promoted by Arkadii Vol'skii and his colleagues. It was probably the overly sectoral orientation of the KRO that spoiled Aleksandr Lebed's chances in the last parliamentary elections. The communists appear to have avoided that trap. Although a pro-industry orientation is strongly implied in their policy programmes, it is not stated explicitly and it does not seem to be the basis of their support.
If we assume that Ziuganov belongs in the moderate camp and that he wins the election, what is likely to happen? The author would not presume to predict the outcome of a post-election factional fight within the party. History might tell us that he who controls the apparatus, i.e. Kuptsov, sooner or later controls the party. But one also notes the comment made by Yegor Gaidar when he was recently at the University of New South Wales that he would expect Ziuganov to win any factional fight.
If he were to do so this author feels that he could resist much of the pressure for a reorientation of economic policy towards industry. Because the party's support has been 'sociological' rather than sectoral, indeed the industrial elite has been far from generous in its support of the party, the party has few favours to repay in that direction. Equally it owes no favours to the energy sector and so might be able to milk it harder than the Chernomyrdin government has been able or willing to do. The proceeds could go directly to the population, especially those 'sociological' groups, such as pensioners, that do support the communists. That would have inflationary consequences, but presumably even neo-classical economists would see it as a better approach than propping up loss-making enterprises.(13)
This scenario would work only if Ziuganov could also resist renationalisation pressures. Particularly if he can build and maintain good enough relations with financial structures that the 'agency' approach remains an option, he could probably resist the pressure for significant renationalisation of major profitable enterprises. But the problem would be those enterprises, whose number would probably end up being not insignificant, whose situation is so desperate that they are begging to be renationalised.
It is that pressure that represents the seeds of disaster for Ziuganov. If he cannot resist it he will also be unable to resist the pressure for protection from imports and state credits to enterprises. (One doubts, after all, the tight money credentials of someone who employs Leonid Abalkin as an advisor and who can state that a softening of monetary policy is necessary 'because the volume of money in the country has been contained below any sensible level ... It is precisely the lack [of rubles] that lies at the base of the collapse of economic relationships.' The shortage of rubles is demonstrated by the dollarisation of the economy. The implication seems to be that increasing the number of rubles in circulation would drive out the dollar and produce an economic revival!)(14)
The classic scenario then goes that the resulting inflation would have to be met with price controls, goods would disappear from the shops, and the communists would lose once and for all whatever support they might have ever had.
Stephen Fortescue
Senior Lecturer and Head of the School of Political Science
University of New South Wales
e-mail: s.fortescue@unsw.edu.au
ENDNOTES:
(1) OMRI Daily Digest, Part 1, 6 February 1996; Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, 9 February 1996.
(2) Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, 8 April 1996.
(3) Sergei Chugaev, 'Im nuzhen novyi Chernenko', Izvestiia, 21 March 1996, p. 5.
(4) For his views more generally, see the intervivew in Jamestown Foundation, Prism, vol.2, no.1, part 4, 12 January 1996.
(5) OMRI Daily Digest, Part 1, 3 April 1996.
(6) OMRI Daily Digest, Part 1, 8 April 1996, citing Pravda-5, 5-12 April 1996. See also the calls for a return to developed socialism from Varennikov, Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, 8 April 1996.
(7) Jamestown Foundation, Prism, vol.2, no.8, Part 1, 19 April 1996.
(8) OMRI Daily Digest, Part 1, 18 April, citing Pravda, 17 April 1996.
(9) Maryanne Ozernoy, 'Russian bureaucratic power and current political developments', Jamestown Foundation, Prism, vol.2, no.8, Part 3, 19 April 1996.
(10) Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, 6 March 1996, quoting RTR television.
(11) OMRI Daily Digest, Part 1, 29 April 1996; Jamestown Foundation, Monitor, 1 May 1996.
(12) Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaia has used the hard-to-translate word upolnomochennye to describe ostensibly private structures which rely to such an extent for their prosperity on government favouritism that they become the 'agents' of the state's control of the economy. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 January 1996, p.5. The classic example of the 'agency' approach at work is the controversial 'shares for credit' auctions of late 1995, in which a few 'agent' banks were given at knock-down prices the state's major stakes in some of the largest Russian industrial and oil enterprises.
(13) See the views of Andrei Fadin in Obshchaia gazeta, no.8, February 1996, quoted in Jamestown Foundation, Prism, 8 March 1996.
(14) See Ziuganov's report to the Third Communist Party Congress, 'Vo imir otechestva, v interesakh naroda', 'Informpechat'', Moscow, 1995, p.24.