In late January 1996 a cadre of 300 armed men crossed the Tajik-Uzbek border in armoured vehicles and invaded the industrial Tursun-zoda. Tursun-zoda is located some 60 kilometres to the west of the capital of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, and houses a large aluminium plant. The cadre was headed by Ibodullo Baimatov, a former commander of the Popular Front which seized power in 1992 and installed Emomali Rahmanov as president.
At the same time, further south, the 1st brigade of the Tajik army (stationed near the city of Kurgan-Teppe and headed by Mahmud Khudaberdiev) moved into the city and occupied all government buildings. Within days the rebel forces were moving toward the capital demanding the resignation of the entire government. After three days of deliberation President Rahmanov sacked his Presidential Chief of Staff Izatullo Khayeyev, Head of Khatlon Oblast Abdujalol Salimov and, later, Prime Minister Jamshed Karimov. The first deputy Prime Minister, Makhmadsaid Ubaidulloev, resigned. This appears to have placated the rebels, at least for the time being, who then moved their forces out of Dushanbe.(1) The crisis has been defused - but for how long? This latest challenge came on the heels of similar events that have torn apart the fabric of society, leaving behind a tattered conglomeration of cliques and fragmented communities.
Tajikistan is being torn apart by regionalism advanced by men who seem to be motivated entirely by personal gain. The Popular Front's incorporation into the national army left its former commanders in charge of armed bands. Two of these clashed in the south throughout 1995 over control of the lucrative transport company in Kurgan-Teppe.
Hostilities often take on the colouring of ethnic and regional disputes, and this further undermines the already weak sense of national community. Regional warlords are emerging as a new feature of Tajik politics. The present article is an attempt to trace the harrowing experience of Tajikistan that has reduced the country to this woeful state in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Rahman Nabiev, the man who inherited the Tajik state after the 1991 August putsch, was extremely inflexible in accommodating change and espousing independence. He was unwilling to redress the regional grievances that had developed in the Soviet period, resulting in uneven social and economic development between north and south Tajikistan. All this contributed significantly to the deterioration of the political situation in mid-1992. Even after the Soviet Union disintegrated in September 1991, the leadership in Tajikistan avoided taking an overt nationalist stance, instead reiterating its continuing commitment to the restoration of the Union.(2) The fragmentation of the multi-national Soviet empire into "nation-state" formations, and the unwillingness (or un-preparedness) of the Tajikistani state to emulate this otherwise universally glorified process contributed to the already growing popular dissatisfaction with the status quo. Unlike its Central Asian neighbours, the leadership in Tajikistan was obviously failing to cope with the transition period and its accompanying rhetoric. Public outbursts of indignation throughout 1992 were further fuelled by the general decline in living standards (itself partly a result of the Soviet collapse).
In May 1992 a coalition of various opposition parties, supported by mass rallies in the capital, Dushanbe, forced the creation of the short-lived Government of National Reconciliation (GNR). The traditionally powerful region of Leninobod in the north and the southern region of Kulob refused to recognise the new GNR, and in November 1992 armed units from the southern region of Kulob, headed by the notorious Sangak Safarov, closed in on Dushanbe and ousted the GNR. On November 1992 Emomali Rahmanov, himself a Kulobi, was elected Speaker of the Parliament (Majlisi Oli) and Acting President pending elections.
The following months witnessed a protracted and bloody conflict between forces loyal to Emomali Rahmanov and a range of opposition parties. The coalition of opposition forces included a number of so-called democratic and Islamic parties that drew their support from the mountainous region of Badakhshon, the southern region of Kurgan-Teppe and small localities like Garm and Hissar near the capital. But the arrival of Russian peace-keeping forces and military support for Rahmanov from neighbouring Uzbekistan purged most of the republic of opposition militia, propelling them over the border to Afghanistan. At least 40,000 refugees of the Tajik civil war also fled into northern Afghanistan.(3)
Foreign observers have presented the struggle in Tajikistan in terms of a battle of grand ideologies: Islam vs. Communism. But ideologies are of the least importance here. The conflict has more to do with the alignment of the disenchanted population of Gorno-Badakhshon and Kurgan-Teppe with the opposition parties, while the ruling elite (whose regional composition appears to be changing in favour of Kulob to the detriment of Leninobod) is forced to rely on the existing state structures to mobilise support and defend its interests.
Initially, opposition forces presented a united front against Rahmanov. As the conflict has progressed, however, the consensus of leading opposition figures seems to be cracking. The geographical dispersion of opposition leaders, now scattered throughout Afghanistan, Moscow, Paris and Washington, has perhaps contributed to this. The arrival in Moscow on 27 January 1995 of Shodmon Yusuf, leader of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan who is currently living in self-imposed exile in Tehran, was a surprising move. He met with Emomali Rahmanov on 20 February and stated his willingness to work within the current political framework.(4) In another revealing episode, high profile opposition leader Haji Akbar Turajonzoda met with Uzbek Minister of Justice, Alisher Mardiev, in Washington early in 1995.(5) Haji Akbar Turajonzoda was the highest Islamic authority (Qazi-kalon) in Tajikistan until he was dismissed by Rahmanov's government in 1993. The Washington meeting became a precursor for the closed-door meeting between Turajonzoda and President Karimov of Uzbekistan in the first week of April 1995.(6) Central Asia watchers viewed this encounter with disbelief - President Karimov has had no sympathy for Islamic leaders, to put it mildly. He has been a staunch supporter of Emomali Rahmanov and has lobbied Russia and the US, calling for the denunciation of Tajik opposition forces as Islamic fundamentalists.
The continuing hostilities sent shock waves through the neighbouring republics, disturbing other Central Asian leaders. The April '95 meeting between President Karimov of Uzbekistan and Haji Akbar Turajonzoda betrayed the depth of Karimov's concern. An ardent opponent of the Tajik opposition, President Karimov had apparently reached the conclusion that the Tajik crisis could not be solved by military means; hence his radical change of tack. In Almaty he even urged the Kazakh and Kyrgyz presidents to meet with Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, and criticised President Rahmanov for not showing enough flexibility in negotiations with opposition leaders.(7)
This growing diplomatic pressure led to President Rahmanov meeting with Said Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the opposition forces stationed in Afghanistan.(8) Negotiations between government and opposition delegations are still continuing.
Despite these overtures, however, President Rahmanov is pressing ahead with the formalities of government in Dushanbe. On 6 November 1994 a referendum was held to adopt the first post-Soviet constitution of the republic. Presidental elections were held on the same day, confirming Emomali Rahmanov as President. Parliamentary elections were conducted on 26 February 1995. All opposition parties were barred from participation. The international human rights organisation Helsinki Watch dismissed the elections as "seriously flawed".(9)
In the past months the prospect of a split in the ranks of the opposition forces has become more and more likely. President Rahmanov's uncompromising attitude toward the opposition parties, on the one hand, and the apparent softening of some prominent opposition leaders, on the other, may well further alienate armed opposition units, reducing the authority of their nominal leaders who reside outside the conflict zone. Based in pockets of resistance in remote mountainous villages in Badakhshon and northern Afghanistan, the militia could in fact be losing hope of a dignified political settlement. The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan showed no interest in establishing a Sharia-based Islamic republic when part of the GNR in 1992; however, given its prolonged exposure to the Afghan variant of Islam and the apparent "betrayal" of secular and moderate dissidents, it may well be edging toward a coherent Islamic model. If so, opposition leaders outside Tajikistan may be losing their authority among the militia. This diminishing influence of the opposition, accompanied by an increase in the significance of Islamic leaders, was tacitly acknowledged by Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, in his address (as commander of all opposition armed units) to an opposition summit in Tehran on 18 October 1994.(10) Said Abdullo Nuri lives in northern Afghanistan.
Russian military presence is vital for the regime in Dushanbe. The 201st Motorised Rifle Division, a remnant of the Red Army in Tajikistan, is providing the government with considerable fighting power against opposition units in Gorno-Badakhshon. President Rahmanov's government is also benefiting from a nominal peace-keeping force which in effect acts as a buffer between the two warring factions.
The peace keeping mission in Tajikistan was established after the signing of a collective security agreement between Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on 22 January 1993. The Collective Peace Keeping Force, however, in the words of its former Commander Lieutenant General Valeri Patrikeev, is essentially a Russian endeavour. According to Patrikeev, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have made symbolic contributions only to the 16,000 strong force in Tajikistan.(11)
In April 1995 large scale fighting erupted on the Tajik-Afghan border, resulting in the death of more than 42 border guards and 200 rebels. Each side blamed the other for the breach of the cease-fire agreement signed on 17 September 1994 in Tehran.(12) Over 250 Afghan civilians and Tajik refugees in the northern districts of Chai Ab, Farkhar and Toluqan suffered casualties as a result of indiscriminate Russian bombing raids. The Russian command claimed that these 'surgical' air attacks were aimed at opposition training bases. But the Afghan government dismissed that claim. The Afghan embassy in Moscow protested these attacks as violating "all international rules".(13)
This spate of fighting appears to have begun after the government forces tried to reinforce their military presence in the mountainous Gorno-Badakhshon under the protection of Russian border guards. The opposition forces and local self-defence units made up of armed Badakhshoni residents generally inclined to opposition demands for greater autonomy for Gorno-Badakhshon, stepped up their activities in response. Armed opposition units often cross the Tajik-Afghan border to the Tajik populated regions of Afghanistan for re-grouping and recuperation. However, in order to reach government units, the opposition militia needed to cross the buffer zone on the Tajik-Afghan border, thus engaging Russian border guards in the process. In doing so, the opposition was not merely pushing aside an obstacle; they were effectively issuing a challenge to the military might that has guaranteed the continued rule of Dushanbe. The overt identification of the Russian troops with the Dushanbe regime has made a sham of their so-called peace-keeping mission. In the eyes of the opposition fighters, Russian troops are legitimate targets. Fighting was heaviest around Vanch and Kalaikhumb in the second week of April 1995.(14) The road between Khorog and Vanch was blocked by opposition forces.(15)
The Russian government has publicly expressed the desire for a peaceful settlement in Tajikistan. But not everyone is keen on reaching a political solution. Diverging agendas may be dictating the action of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian military commanders in Tajikistan (with their allies in the Russian Defence Ministry) on the other. According to the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a high-ranking Russian diplomat has claimed that border troops can ignore the September 1994 ceasefire treaty on the grounds that they "were not a party to the signed agreement", and by implication not bound by it.(16) This seems to confirm earlier claims by Turajonzoda that a conclusion to the hostilities would not be desirable to "certain military-political circles".(17) The now-reinforced Russian military forces in Tajikistan with their ostensible mission of peace-keeping may indeed have a different agenda from that proclaimed by Moscow. The Chechen episode, which saw President Yeltsin humiliated after his own military staff refused to follow his instructions to cease the bombardment of Grozny, exhibited the presence of dual agendas within the Russian state. The Russian army appears to be following a strong tendency to reassert the now-discredited glory of the Soviet past. The continuing of state negotiations with the conspicuously anti-Russian opposition movement does not seem to be palatable to the Russian command in Tajikistan.
The fact that nearly 70% of Russian soldiers and officers of the 201st division voted for Russian chauvinist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December 1993 parliamentary elections would seem to confirm the above.(18) According to a confidential UN document, revealed in the Swiss Neue Zurcher Zeitung, the Russian border guards and the Russian media have dramatised border incidents in order to "justify their presence" in Tajikistan.(19) The Russian army's failures in Afghanistan and Chechnya have put enormous strain on its self-esteem. The Russian armed forces view Tajikistan as an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves in a struggle against "Islamic extremists". This could have dire repercussions for the prospects of peace in Tajikistan. In December 1995 Russian fighter planes engaged in bombing raids on opposition bases in Tavil-dara. This led to the suspension of peace-talks.
President Rahmanov's government has also been under intense pressure from his former allies. The latest armed rebellion is an illustration of growing antagonism. Rahmanov attempted to undermine the support base of the war-lords in 1995, and this may lie at the root of the trouble in Tursun-zoda and Kurgan-Teppe. In August 1995 Minister of Internal Affairs Yakub Salimov, a notorious figure in the Dushanbe criminal world who owed his government position to his armed support of Rahmanov's 1992 leadership bid, was sacked from his ministerial post and sent to Turkey as Ambassador of Tajikistan. Salimov's removal made a purge of his proteges possible; many of them were subsequently arrested on charges of corruption and illegal possession of arms and narcotics.(20) Khoja Karimov, a parliamentary deputy, was the most influential among these. But armed bands are loath to forfeit everything that they have secured by force over the last three years. President Rahmanov is now faced with the difficult task of uniting Tajikistan under his authority and simultaneously fighting off challenges to his leadership from opposition forces on the one hand, and his former allies on the other.
Endnotes:
(1) Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest, 5 February 1996
(2) See interview with Pravda, 12 December 1991, p.1
(3) Russian Information Agency, 13 October 1993
(4) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 February 1995, p.1
(5) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 March 1995, p.1,2
(6) Open Media Research Institute, Daily Digest, 5 April 1995
(7) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 April 95, p.1
(8) OMRI Daily Digest, 15 May 1995
(9) OMRI Daily Digest 10 November 1994
(10) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 February 1995, p.1
(11) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 April 95, p.1
(12) OMRI Daily Digest 12 April 1995
(13) OMRI Daily Digest 18 April 1995
(14) Nezavisimaya Gazeta 15 April 95, p.1
(15) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 April 95, p.1-2
(16) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 February 1995, p.2
(17) Nezavisimaya Gazeta 18 January 1995, p.2
(18) Nezavisimaya Gazeta 11 November 1995, p.3
(19) Nezavisimaya Gazeta 24 October 1995, p.3
(20) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 November 95, p.3