The history of Russian migration to Kazakhstan is arguably the single most controversial issue in Russian-Kazakh relations. It is of paramount importance both for Kazakhstan's internal development and its prospective relations with Moscow. In broader terms, political stability in the vast Central Asian region will depend to a large degree on how this issue is handled. Russian migration to Kazakhstan began more than a century ago and has ended only quite recently, in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR.
Despite its obvious significance, however, very little academic research has been conducted on this topic. In the West only one substantial work by Demko has been devoted to this subject, and this study dealt with pre-1916 Russian migration to Kazakhstan only.(1) In the Soviet Union the topic was carefully avoided in order to prevent inflaming ethnic tensions. Naturally, however, the silence and lack of discussion around the topic created fertile soil for various myths and misconceptions, many of which later came to serve as justifications for post-Soviet Kazakh nationalism. One of these deeply entrenched stereotypes in contemporary official Kazakh conceptions is the notion that the Russian government persistently deprived the indigenous population of their "traditional" land, clearing it for migrants from European Russia. In reality the process was considerably more complex.
Russian migration to what is now Kazakhstan started as far back as the 16th century. The first Cossack settlements appeared along the right bank of the Ural river in the 1560s.(2) In 1613 the towns of Uralsk and Lbishchensk were erected on the upper Ural river, and in 1615 the city of Guriev was founded in the Ural Caspian estuary.(3) This laid the foundations of the Uralsk fortified line, the first line of forward defence against nomadic invasions from the Great Steppe. At that time Kazakhs did not live in the area; it belonged to the Nogais, who had accepted the suzerainty of the Russian Empire in 1556. Kazakhs arrived in the area much later, in 1722-23, after the Jungars invaded the Kazakh lands from the east. This brought the Kazakhs into conflict with the Cossacks, as well as the Bashkirs and Kalmyks, Russian subjects who lived in the vicinity of the Ural.
One of the main reasons why the Kazakhs of the Little Horde accepted Russian suzerainty was their desire to gain access to the new pastures on the right bank of the Ural. Some time was to pass, however, before this wish was to materialize. It was only in 1801 that Tsar Paul I signed a decree allowing the Kazakh Sultan Bukei to cross the Ural, with 5000 families and their herds, to settle permanently in the area between the Ural and the Volga rivers.(4) This laid the foundation of the so- called Bukei Horde.
The situation in north-eastern Kazakhstan developed along similar lines. Russian presence on the right bank of the Irtish river was established earlier than that of the Kazakhs. On 22 May 1713 Tsar Peter I ordered that a fortress be built at the upper Irtish. At that time this territory was claimed by both Russia and Jungaria. Russian diplomatic exchange with the Jungars in 1715 failed to produce results, and in 1716 the Jungars attacked and destroyed a Russian expeditionary force which had arrived to build the fortress. In 1717 a new expedition was organized. For whatever reason the Jungars did not attack on this occasion. The fortress was rebuilt and called Iamishevskaya.(5) Soon a whole string of Russian fortresses was erected along the right bank of the Irtish.
Throughout the course of the Russian-Jungar dispute, the Kazakhs remained uninvolved and in no way registered their interest in the contested territory. This would appear to indicate that they did not regard the above area as belonging to them. In 1797 the Russian government granted Aitkhoje Kochin the right to graze on the right bank of the Irtish. 15,000 families crossed the river, effectively establishing Kazakh presence in the area.(6) By that time both the right bank of the Irtish and the right bank of the Ural had been populated by a substantial number of Russian settlers. Thus it might be said that Russian migration to Kazakhstan started with Kazakh migration into the territory of the Russian Empire.
Until the mid-18th century the Russian presence in Kazakhstan (with the exception of the above-mentioned areas) was negligible. Massive Russian migration to Asiatic Russia began in the mid-1860s as a consequence of the abolition of serfdom. It was a spontaneous process caused by objective circumstances, the most significant of these being rural over-population. Emancipated peasants received little land, as most land remained in the hands of landlords. As a result peasant landholdings were reduced by one-fifth throughout the Empire, and by even more in European Russia. The government's attitude to this spontaneous migration remained negative until the mid-1890s. The government not only discouraged migration but tried to curb it by various means.
After the emancipation of the serfs, migration to new areas and settlement on state land without permission from the authorities was still illegal.(7) A former serf could only move if he met all the necessary requirements, including obtaining permission to leave his commune of origin, acceptance by a receiving commune in the east and settlement of all outstanding debts. Because peasants were charged with allotment debts for land following emancipation, the last requirement was formidable and, in most cases, prohibitive.(8)
The government was apparently concerned about the massive eastward movement of Russian peasants, both in terms of its possible disastrous consequences for the market-oriented estates in European Russia, and of the problems it could potentially give rise to between Russian immigrants and local ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, thousands of peasants migrated without state permission, employing the most ingenious methods to circumvent existing rules. The absence of comprehensive legislation on migration substantially aided them in these endeavours.
In 1880 the Tsar ordered that a special law be passed regulating migration to the East. Meanwhile, Provisional Rules for Resettlement came into force as of June 1881. These rules removed several minor obstacles to migration. A notice of acceptance of the peasant on the part of the receiving commune was no longer required. Migrant stations were set up along the main travel routes to provide aid to legal migrants. Poor peasants could now be granted exemption from allotment debts, but this decision was left to the discretion of Ministers of the Interior and State Property. In general, however, the Provisional Rules can in no way be said to have facilitated legal migration; thus, for example, over a three-year period following the passing of the Rules, only 975 migration permits were issued, while the average annual movement to the east amounted to 60,000 people.(9)
Finally, on July 13, 1889 the Resettlement Act was adopted. It stipulated that intending migrants should receive the approval of the Interior Minister, which would only be given to "reliable" persons and only in the event that "plots of government land predetermined for settlement" were available. Illegal migrants were to be returned to their previous place of residence. The question of privileges for immigrants was left to the discretion of local authorities. In Kazakhstan the legislation defined special areas for migration within the Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Semirechie provinces. The latter was closed to immigrants in 1891, but Uralsk and Turgai provinces were opened.(10) The above legislation can hardly be regarded as providing incentive for migration. The complicated bureaucratic procedure alone may well have seriously deterred those considering migration. As a result illegal migration prevailed well into the 1890s. With an average annual migration of 100,000, at least 75% of settlers moved to the East without permits.(11) They settled wherever they saw fit, and this occasionally led to clashes with the natives, who usually emerged from these clashes in the worse position of the two.(12)
A certain shift in the government's attitude to peasant migration to Asiatic Russia occurred after Tsar Nicholas II ascended the throne. At the Cabinet meeting on March 8, 1895 the Tsar suggested that the peasant resettlement in the east did not present much cause for concern. He argued that, rather than having a negative effect on the Russian economic situation, the resettlement would contribute to the economic and political development of Siberia by introducing Russian culture there. Furthermore, it would contribute to the government's task of integrating Asian territories into European Russia.(13) In accordance with this new policy the 1889 Resettlement Act was amended so as to remove all barriers impeding migration and to create incentives for it. Penalties were waived for those who had migrated illegally in previous years and they were given the chance to receive legal status on common grounds. In 1896 a Resettlement Administration was created within the Ministry of the Interior in order to facilitate migration to Asiatic Russia. Kazakhstan was designated as one of the prospective regions for future settlers.
In 1895 a special commission headed by F. Sherbina was formed to identify areas in Kazakhstan where native land holdings exceeded native requirements. The commission studied 12 uyezds of the Steppe Governorate-General. It conducted a census of Kazakhs, their households, established what land areas were used as pastures, and examined the average Kazakh family's food consumption. The commission also surveyed soils, vegetation and water sources. It then established the average land area necessary in order to feed one head of cattle. According to the expedition's findings, the average Kazakh household would have been entitled to 187 ha of land, but the Interior Ministry increased this norm to 234-555 ha, depending on the area. As a result a total of 167,680 sq.km was designated for peasant resettlement.(14) Thus was initiated the policy of seizures of Kazakh land in order to satisfy the land hunger of migrants from European Russia.
On the other hand, prohibitive and regulatory measures taken by the Russian Government did play a role in curbing spontaneous migration to the Steppe region. They were the main reason why, in the 19th century, the Russian (Slavic) population in Kazakhstan grew at a relatively slow rate and did not acquire disastrous proportions, as it did later. Table 1 shows the rate of Russian migration to Kazakhstan in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The figures in the table indicate that Kazakhstan was never the main destination for migrants from European Russia with the exception of two years: 1904 and 1905 (and in these particular years the total quantity of migrants was insignificant). Moreover, it is quite obvious that in the 38 years following 1871, migration to Kazakhstan proceeded relatively slowly, even after 1895, and did not make any notable impact on the ethnic balance in the region. It was only the year of 1906 that can be regarded as a turning point, and this was a direct consequence of the first Russian revolution of 1905.
The revolution showed the authorities that the agrarian question remained the major cause of peasant discontent in European Russia, and the most serious threat to the regime. The Stolypin government determined to solve it without infringing upon landlords' rights and privileges, by promoting massive peasant migration to Asiatic Russia. The norms of land use for Kazakhs were cut to 55-350 ha per household and an additional 120,000 sq.km were seized for Russian peasant resettlement.(15) This policy met with criticism from progressive Russian intellectuals and the press. For example, well-known Russian agronomist A. Kaufman stated in his book Resettlement and Colonization (1905) that colonization of the Kazakh Steppe should be considered a completed process.(16)
Several members of the Kazakh political elite also voiced concern. In December 1905 Bukeikhanov, a Kazakh member of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party, convened a congress of delegates from the five provinces of Kazakhstan. The congress formed the Alash Orda party (17) and endorsed the Constitutional Democrats' political program. One of Alash Orda's major demands was for the abolition of the laws which declared all land in Kazakhstan state property and provided for its free allocation to Russian settlers.(18)
Sultan Karataev, State Duma Member for Uralsk, argued that an interdepartmental commission, which should include Kazakhs, should be established in order to investigate the problem of land distribution in the Steppe Region; Russian migration to Kazakhstan should cease; the best lands should be allocated to Kazakhs, and only what was left should go to the Russians. He received support from members of State Duma and the commission was in fact created, but it subsequently rejected Karataev's arguments, stating, in particular, that Kazakhs intending to take up farming should continue to be treated equally with Russian settlers.(19)
Russian colonisation had controversial consequences for social and economic conditions in Kazakhstan. The ethnic balance in the region changed significantly, with Russians comprising almost 35% of the population in 1916. Around 251,410 sq.km of land was allocated to Russian settlers.(20) On the other hand, this comprised only 9.1% of the total land area, and as late as 1915 Kazakhs continued to control 84% of the land area of Kazakhstan.(21) Many Kazakhs profited from renting their land to Russians and Ukrainians who had migrated illegally in previous years. Furthermore, the appearance of Russian farmers in Kazakhstan boosted trade between them and the natives, who provided the Russians with grain in exchange for cattle. This opened new opportunities for the Kazakhs to increase their livestock. From 1906 to 1916, for example, native herds expanded by almost 5,000,000, or 76%.(22)
But the most important contribution that Russian settlers made to the Kazkhstan economy was the provision of expertise for arable agriculture. As early as the late 18th century it had become clear that the nomadic Kazakh economy had reached a dead end. Further growth in livestock numbers had run into an insurmountable obstacle: lack of pastureland, particularly winter pastureland. Kazakhs simply could not support their growing population by relying on their previous economic practices. The only solution was to turn to intensive agriculture, but this required expertise that the Kazakhs lacked. Under the influence of Russian settlers many Kazakhs started to turn to arable agriculture. By 1916 land cultivated by Kazakhs amounted to 819,000 ha - 21% of all sown land in Kazakhstan.(23)
The Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent Civil War led to a substantial decrease in the Slavic population of Kazakhstan due to outmigration and deaths caused by hostilities and famine. According to the 1926 census Russians and Ukrainians made up 30.4% of the population of the Republic.(24) The Soviet government rejected the proposals of some in the new Kazakh leadership that all Russian settlers be expelled and all land returned to the Kazakhs. But all migration to Kazakhstan was stopped, and land which had already been seized by the Resettlement Administration but had yet to be settled was returned to the Kazakhs.(25)
The next wave of Russian migration to Kazakhstan did not begin until the mid-1930s, when more than 700,000 Russians moved to Kazakhstan in connection with its industrial modernization.(26) However, it was a different migration from that of Imperial times. The new migrants were mostly qualified industrial workers, engineers, technicians, plant managers, business executives, teachers and health care personnel. They settled in cities and towns and did not take any Kazakh land for farming. This trend is reflected in the growth of the urban population in both absolute and relative terms. By, 1939 it was 2.29 times the 1926 level, and had increased from 8.5% of the total population in 1926 to 27.8%.(27) Not only Russians contributed to this increase. Thousands of Kazakhs moved to the towns to seek employment in the newly created industries. By 1939 16% of Kazakhs were urban dwellers, an eightfold increase since 1926. A whole new class of Kazakh industrial workers emerged in those years, reaching 246,900 by 1939, a 3.7-fold increase since 1927. By the late 1930s 50% of all industrial workers in Kazakhstan were Kazakhs, though the numbers of highly skilled workers among them were still low.(28)
But the general effect of the 1930s on the ethnic balance in the Republic was disastrous for the Kazakhs. The collectivization of the early 1930s and subsequent famine led to a significant fall in Kazakh numbers due to deaths and migration out of the USSR. In combination with the inflow of new migrants this created a situation in which the Slavic and Kazakh populations were virtually equal in numbers, and the general trend was now working against the Kazakhs. In the late 1930s the beginning of mass deportations of "unreliable" ethnic groups from the border areas deep into the center of Eurasia, by way of preparation for World War Two, furter contributed to this trend.
The first such deportation took place in 1936 and involved Polish nationals, who were exiled from Ukraine to Kazakhstan. In 1937 when Soviet-Japanese relations struck their lowest pitch and war seemed imminent after a series of clashes at the border, persons of Korean origin were removed from the Russian Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In 1941, shortly before Hitler's attack on the USSR, groups of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians were deported from the Baltic states.
With the war raging deportations acquired bigger dimensions. The first really massive deportation was undertaken in August - September 1941, when the Autonomous Republic of the Volga Germans was abolished and its residents resettled in Kazakhstan and Siberia. Subsequently in the course of the war other minority groups were deported for alleged cooperation with the Nazis and for participation in brigandage on a large scale. Table 2 gives a picture of the volume and ethnic composition of deportees in Kazakhstan as well as of the role attributed to the Republic in this process. The table is based on figures given in a secret report of the Ministry of the State Security of the USSR on the number of deportees and exiles in the USSR as on 1 January 1953.
The table shows that Kazakhstan was one of the major regions receiving deportees, though neither the only, nor the principal one. It was selected together with other regions due to low density of population, abundance of land for settlement and relatively acceptable conditions for agricultural production so that deportees could provide for themselves.
Thus Kazakhstan became the main place of exile for Chechens, Ingush, Polish, Karachai and Balkar deportees. With the exception of the Chechens, these nationalities were small numerically and could not influence the ethnic balance in Kazakhstan. Besides, on 9 January 1957 Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a number of decrees which reestablished autonomous statehood for the Chechen, Ingush, Karachai and Balkar peoples, and most of them returned to their respective republics.
However statehood for Germans and Crimean Tartars was not reinstated, and they had to stay in places of exile together with the Polish, who had never had such a statehood in the Soviet Union. Though large numbers of Crimean Tatars were deported, only a small number were sent to Kazakhstan. The Poles, on the other hand, were almost all in Kazakhstan, but their absolute numbers were insignificant. This left the Germans, who being represented in Kazakhstan by only 36.6% of their deportees, nevertheless made a large absolute number. According to the 1959 census, Germans amounted to 7.09% of the Republic population.(29) Hence an important consequence of the war period for Kazakhstan was a large German community capable of influencing the political process there.
The last act in the drama surrounding Russian migration to Kazakhstan was played out in the 1950s. In 1954 a new turmoil descended on the Republic, due to the Virgin Lands campaign initiated by Khrushchev. The CPSU Central Committee plenum of 23 February - 2 March 1954 resolved to increase grain production by between 35.2 and 38.4 million tons. For that purpose new land areas (virgin lands) of 13 million hectares were to be placed under cultivation. Kazakhstan was to play a significant role in the campaign, since around 50% of the "virgin land" was to be found there.(30)
The economic viability of the Virgin Lands campaign was always a point of controversy in the Soviet Union. The problem with Kazakhstan was that the fertile lands designated for cultivation were situated in remote unpopulated areas, lacking both infrastructure and labor resources for their development. Some agronomists argued that it would have been more effective to invest the allocated resources into improving the degrading agriculture of European Russia, where proximity to major cities and developed infrastructure would have made grain production, storage and transportation more economical.
Many experts and influential party officials opposed the Virgin Lands plan. One of them was Molotov, a leading Politburo member at the time. According to his recollection the project "demanded tremendous resources, huge investments and expenditures, which would have yielded faster returns had they been used in the areas already settled and cultivated... I proposed investing the funds in the non-black-earth regions and opening up the virgin lands gradually". But Khrushchev, in Molotov's assessment, was "so carried away with his idea that he was like a runaway roan".(31) In 1954-1955 some 18 million ha of virgin land was put under cultivation in Kazakhstan and more than 640,000 people had migrated there from other parts of the Soviet Union.(32)
The Virgin Lands campaign was highly reminiscent of Stolypin's drive in the early 20th century. It is not surprising, therefore, that it met with opposition from the Kazakh leadership. First Secretary Shaikhmetov argued that any gains from increased grain production would come at the expense of livestock breeding. Khrushchev could not accept this, and in February 1954 Shaikhmetov was removed from his post together with his Second Secretary Afanov. Instead P. Ponomarenko and L. Brezhnev were appointed as First and Second Secretaries respectively. Kazakhs were demoted to secondary roles. In 1954-1964 the number of Kazakhs in leading party and state positions substantially decreased.
Ethnic balance in Kazakhstan was adversely effected, with Kazakhs becoming a minority in their own republic. By 1959 they amounted to only 30% of the total population. Not surprisingly, the impact of the Virgin Lands campaign on the Kazakh consciousness remains extremely negative. This campaign, conducted exclusively on the basis of economic considerations, is still perceived in Kazakhstan as forcible russification. It was not until 1989 that Kazakhs managed to reverse the ethnic balance in their favor.
Nevertheless the ultimate result of Russian migration to Kazakhstan remains unchanged even now. Russians comprise a very substantial non-Kazakh population of the republic, a group which cannot simply disappear into oblivion. The positive thing is that the Kazakhs did not cease to exist as an ethnic group, as was the case with many indigenous people in other parts of the world. In fact, they have survived as the leading nationality in Kazakhstan. This dual reality poses before the Kazakhs an uneasy psychological and political task. They have to adjust to the transformed nature of their country, which made an unreversable transition from monoethnism to polyethnism. The recognition of this simple fact by the Kazakh political elite is essential for maintaining ethnic peace and political stability in the republic.
Mikhail Alexandrov
Centre for Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies
Australian National University
email: Mikhail.Alexandrov@anu.edu.au
Endnotes:
1 Demko,G.J., The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896-1916, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1969, p. 58.
2 Wright,G.F., Asiatic Russia, Vol.1, New York: McClure, Phillips Co., 1902, p. 361.
3 Aziatskaia Rossiia, t.1, St Peterburg: Izdanie Pereselencheskogo upravleniia Glavnogo upravleniia zemleustroistva i zemledeliia, 1914, p. 347.
4 Tolibekov,S.B., Kochevoe obshestvo Kazakhov v XVII - nachale XX veka, Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1971, p. 238.
5 Istoria Kazakhskoy SSR s drevneishih vremen do nashih dney, t.3, Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1979, pp. 27-28.
6 Tolibekov,S.B., Op. cit., p. 238.
7 Aziatskaia Rossiia, t.1, pp. 450-451.
8 Demko,G.J., Op. cit., p. 58.
9 Aziatskaia Rossiia, t.1, p. 454.
10 Istoria Kazakhskoy SSR s drevneishih vremen do nashih dney, t.3, p. 255.
11 Aziatskaia Rossiia, t.1, p. 455.
12 Ibid., p. 541.
13 Ibid., p. 460.
14 Bekmakhanova, N.E., Mnogonacionalnoe naselenie Kazakhstana i Kirgizii v epokhu capitalisma (60-e godi XIX veka - 1917 g.), Moskva: Nauka, 1986, pp. 91-92.
15 Aziatskaia Rossiia, t.1, p. 546.
16 Ibid., p. 543.
17 Alash - the name of the mythical founder of the Kazakh people.
18 Burabaev,M.S., Segizbaev,O.A., Ideinie sviazi obshestvenno-filosovskoi misli Kazakhstana i Rossii (vtoraia polovina XVIII - nachalo XX v.), Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1967, p. 204.
19 Supargaliev,G., Karatelnaia politika tsarisnma v Kazakhstane (1905-1917 gg), Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1966, p. 171.
20 Demko,G.J., Op. cit., p. 196, 150.
21 Ibid., p. 150.
22 Ibid., p. 179.
23 Ibid., p. 161.
24 Kenjenbaev,S.M., Soveti v borbe za postroenie socialisma (Istoria sovetskogo stroitelstva v Kazakhstane 1917-1937), Alma-Ata: "Kazakhstan", 1969, pp. 250-251.
25 Istoria Kazakhskoy SSR s drevneishih vremen do nashih dney, t.4, p. 278.
26 Krader,L., Peoples of Central Asia, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1962, p. 212.
27 Ibid., pp. 187, 214.
28 Kiikbaev,N., Torzhestvo leninskoy nacionalnoy politiki v Kazakhstane, Alma-Ata: "Kazakhstan", 1968, pp. 138-139, 143.
29 Itogi vsesoiusnoy perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda, Kazakhskaia SSR, Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1962, p. 162.
30 Istoria Kazakhskoy SSR s drevneishih vremen do nashih dney, t.5, pp. 265-266.
31 Molotov Remembers, Inside Kremlin Politics, Conversations with Felix Chuev/Ed. A.Resis, Chicago: Ivan R.Dee, 1993, pp. 346-347.
32 Istoria Kazakhskoy SSR s drevneishih vremen do nashih dney, t.5, pp. 268, 271, 272, 275.