In June-July 1996 Russian voters reaffirmed Boris Yeltsin's mandate to serve as President for another term. This was the third set of major elections in which Russians participated since Yeltsin's forcible dissolution of the Parliament in September-October 1993. Moreover, it was Russia's first post-Soviet Presidential election. The December 1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly in which voters cast their ballots to an upper chamber - the Federation Council (1) - and a lower house - the State Duma - could be considered Russia's 'founding elections' - they established the post-communist parliament and they were the first multiparty elections conducted in Russia since those to the Constituent Assembly in 1917. The second set of parliamenary elections in December 1995 re-affirmed the lower house's position in the Russian political order. The Russian electorate cast their ballots in two sets of parliamentary elections in exercises that helped create Russia's post-Soviet legislature (December 1993)(2) and further legitimated the lower house (December 1995). Although the parliamentary elections can be considered significant for their contribution to Russia's institutional development, they produced what could be considered the 'weaker younger brother' of the Russian political system - the Russian legislature. The Russian Constitution, adopted in a plebiscite on the same day as the 1993 Federal Assembly elections grants an enormous set of powers to the President, whereas, the parliament, and, in particular, the lower house, the State Duma is relatively less significant.(3) Although the Parliament made attempts to try to thwart Yeltsin's policies, particularly during its first sitting,(4) the President was able to by-pass it by using the constitutional arsenal of powers by issuing decrees - including secret ones - and threatening the chamber with dissolution. Thus, both in de jure and de facto terms, the presidency was clearly the dominant institution in the post-Soviet Russian polity, with the Duma an extremely emasculated lower house.
With this in mind, the 'relative victory' of Zhirinovskii's LDPR in the 1993 elections(5) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federations's (KPRF) attainment of nearly 35 per cent of the seats in the 1995 Duma elections may not have been as threatening to the reformers' hegemony as it looked at first glance. As Robert Cottrell argues, the 1995 elections can be interpreted as a form of 'presidential primary' in which voters' opinions were canvassed six months before the actual vote, which, incidentally revealed the depth of the electorate's weariness with the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin reform course. The elections 'jolted Yeltsin' into a policy reappraisal. Moreover, he accepted foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev's resignation and replaced him with Yevgenii Primakov, a significant move which indicated a shift away from Atlanticist foreign policy; he fired deputy premier and privatisation architect Anatolii Chubais, replacing him with Avtovaz car factory president Vladimir Kadannikov and removed his chief of staff Sergei Filatov of his responsiblities, putting former Nationalities Minister Nikolai Yegorov, a hawkish figure closely associated with the Chechen conflict in his position.(6) Although the KPRF's electoral success in December may not have posed much of an obstacle for progress in reform for Yeltsin in the interim between elections, there was a chance that the combination of a strong communist presence in the lower house and the prospects of the KPRF's candidate, party chair Gennadii Zyuganov's victory in the June elections could have set the course of reform back somewhat. As former deputy premier and leader of Russia's Democratic Choice Yegor Gaidar noted in his April speech at Melbourne University, 'the communists do not have the resources for a reconstruction of the socialist system but they can seriously undermine' the progress made over the past few years.(7) In this sense, therefore, and in line with an array of serious social problems,(8) including an unemployment rate of some 8.2 per cent of the active population,(9) and an incumbent president with a history of health problems, and, as the campaign began, very low public approval ratings(10), circumstances existed which could have worked to benefit Zyuganov.
This paper restricts itself to key points which the present author considers to have been the main factors in Yeltsin's re-election. The present author acknowledges that the campaign itself was extremely hard fought and contained many significant factors for the development of Russian politics. Indeed the fact that Yeltsin performed a phoenix-like comeback, overcoming poor health and negative approval ratings, topping the poll over 11 first-round contestants and the leader of the largest, most influential party in Russia in the second round is indeed significant in and of itself.(11) Nevertheless, space constraints militate against a full examination of the candidates' campaign tactics and the significant achievements like the formation of the Popular Patriotic bloc of nationalists and communists around Gennadii Zyuganov, which may have set in motion the process of consolidating the anti-Yeltsin opposition.(12) In addition, it is important to note that several candidates - Aleksandr Lebed, Svyatoslav Fedorov, Mikhail Gorbachev and Grigorii Yavlinskii - conducted talks to consider putting forward a 'third force' candidate who could serve as a credible alternative to Yeltsin and Zyuganov. It is also worth mentioning that Yeltsin and Yavlinskii also tried to come to some agreements on uniting the 'democratic' forces. Nevertheless, key issues like Yavlinksii's critical stance towards the continuation of hostilities in Chechnya proved that there were many irreconcilable differences between the two. Nevertheless, that dialogue among the main contenders took place is, perhaps a positive sign for the future of Russian politics in terms of a greater movement towards consolidating the main political forces and reducing the number of marginal political organisations in the political spectrum.
There are other factors which were also important in assisting Yeltsin's victory. It should be noted that Yeltsin began promising increased pensions, stipends and payments in back wages to the Russian population in the hope that these would be incentives for various social groups to cast their ballots in his favour. During an appearance on Vremya on 11 June, Yeltsin promised one woman that after he was elected she would have a new flat.(13) Despite these promises, it is obvious that Russian budgetary realities may seriously hamper Yeltsin's ability to fulfil his campaign pledges.
Another factor which may have contributed to the electoral result was Yeltsin's commitment to ending the war in Chechnya. Indeed, as a series of public opinion polls have indicated, ending the conflict was among the electorate's key concerns. Nevertheless, it is possible that Dudaev's death in April 1996 may have worked in Yeltsin's favour, because it provided the President with an opportunity to confront a new team of Chechen leaders who would have a different set of priorities. In turn, this could have provided a possibility for Yeltsin to claim he wanted to end the conflict and withdraw Federal forces while the troops remained in the breakaway republic. Yeltsin's intentions to end the war may not have been entirely straightforward and the recent increase in military activities in the immediate post-election period cast doubt on the president's campaign pledges. Finally, 'the Lebed factor' was crucial in assisting Yeltsin 'over the top' as he garnered the support of Lebed's first round electorate (as well as other democratic voters). Given these qualifications, this paper considers in greater detail the role of the media in assisting Yeltsin's victory, the role of elites and the youth factor in the elections.
The Media and the Elections
The European Institute for the Media's (EIM) coverage of the media presentation clearly indicates that the campaign itself was not conducted in a fair manner. Several points reinforce this fact. On the institutional side, the Central Electoral Commission (TsIK), the legal body empowered with overseeing the conduct of the elections failed to uphold complaints made by the communists that the media were biased in Yeltsin's favour. The TsIK did not pursue the sources of indirect contributions to the president's campaign, rather they focused their attention on the bank accounts only. EIM argues that all national television carried a pro-Yeltsin bias. In fact, anti communist material in the form of documentary and feature films 'were even shown on the day before polling in both rounds in apparent violation of the ban on campaigning'.(14) The sequencing of some television programming during the week before the elections also worked to his favour as Russian Public Television (ORT) broadcast films which would have been beneficial to his campaign by reinforcing the positiveness of reform and 'westernisation' (Petr velikii shown on 13 June and introduced by Nikita Mikhalkov) and discrediting the communists and putting fear into the population (Mikhalkov's Burnt by the Sun shown on 15 June).(15)
Yeltsin clearly had the state apparatus behind him. Moreover, he dominated the airwaves in terms of overall coverage. As EIM has established, Yeltsin had the lion's share of attention in the media, some 53 per cent in the first round compared to Zyuganov's 18 per cent, Yavlinskii's 6 per cent, Lebed's 7 per cent and Zhirinovskii's 5 per cent. It should also be noted that Yeltsin benefited from having far more positive references made to him in the media than did the KPRF chair. In fact, Yeltsin was the only candidate (bar Lebed during the final stages of the first round) to have more positive than negative references made in his favour.(16)
The monitoring team argues that the media's financial, logistical and administrative dependency on the state 'combined to ensure Yeltsin's position in the media'. These factors included subsidies, printing and distribution assistance and licensing dependencies. Moreover, journalists voluntarily compromised their professional duties in preventing objective viewpoints during the campaign. They supported Yeltsin in fear of a potential reversal of freedoms of press and expression under a Zyuganov-led administration.(17) Journalists continued to engage in Zyuganov-bashing despite the fact that KPRF member and State Duma Chair Gennadii Seleznev stated at a conference celebrating the 50th anniversary of the St Petersburg School of Journalism that there would be no threat to freedom of speech if Russians elected Zyuganov president. Moreover, he claimed, '"Should such a danger become real...believe me, I will either resign or make some other public demonstration."'.(18) In general, journalists were uncritical of Yeltsin's policies and failed to comment on his absence from the public eye during the second round.
In contrast, the media pressed negative criticism on Zyuganov and failed to discuss the merits or shortcomings of his policy objectives. Zyuganov's and the communists' reputation was damaged somewhat by a scandalous article published in Komsomol'skaya pravda which was supposedly based on Zyuganov's election platform. The end result of this piece was that it instilled fear into the population. Yevgenii Anisimov wrote that Zyuganov's platform envisaged such steps backward as the reintroduction of state control over resource mobilisation and distribution, the re-establishment of state control over the banking sector, renationalisation, the abolition of the State Property Committee, the State Committee of Industrial Policy and the Ministry for Cooperation with the CIS countries and, the simultaneous transfer of their functions to a Gosplan. While advocating multiple forms of property, the document envisaged transferring enterprises from the state-collective ownership to be the main form of privatisation. These economic units would be subjected to government-established production and price guidelines. Thus, the platform reduced the possibility for any state-private property transactions. The program also pointed out that there would be restrictions placed on the sale of commercial and luxury goods, 1.5 million ruble maximum bank withdrawals, bank clients would be forced to establish compulsory accounts with the Savings Bank of Russia and hard currency would be exchanged at a rate of 500 rubles to the dollar (or less than 10 per cent of the official exchange rate) within three months of the elections.(19)
The party leadership sharply rejected the document's validity in the press and during its May Central Committee session. For instance, articles by Nezavisimaya gazeta's Sergei Muslin suggest that the information published in Komsomol'skaya pravda was most likely a hybrid of different documents compiled by the party, statements of intentions and points of debate within the Popular Patriotic bloc which had yet to be resolved. Muslin contended that it was questionable whether or not the communists would have reversed privatisation in the event of a Zyuganov victory. Although the party claimed that it would respect privatisation conducted within the legal guidelines, the fact remained that most property was transferred from state ownership through a series of decrees as opposed to laws. This point certainly cast a haze over how this issue would be handled in the post-election atmosphere.(20)
Abstracts from Zyuganov's economic program were eventually published in Sovetskaya Rossiya on 28 May. A summary of the plaform reveals the following infomation:
...in the economic field, the Communist Party intends to pursue a pluralist course, which is expected to raise effective demand, facilitate the use of idle production capacities, accelerate modernisation and protect domestic producers. The interests of Russia and labour will be given priority, and indirect methods of economic management will be applied. The economic reform's pace and basic principles will be determined by the people, which is the main precondition of their participation in the reforms. ...the economic strategy will be aimed not at distribution of the titles of property owners, but at dividing the essential rights and obligations of owners and the state.
At the first stage of this course's implementation (1996-1997), a Cabinet of popular confidence will be formed from those sharing this platform. The Cabinet's course will be directed primarily at overcoming the shortage of circulating assets, the payments crisis, and price disparities. These aims will be attained through regulating prices for electricity, transportation and other basic commodities and services; cartel, inter-sectorial and trilateral agreements; price formation through negotiations, with the government's participation; and price fixing for certain periods of time.
During the second stage (1998-1003), a higher production growth will be attained through the use of currently idle capacities and accelerated capital investments. Increased invesment activity will be facilitated by the following factors:
-the government's broader involvement in investment activity and government guarantees for investments in the priority industries and infrastructure;
-a more active amortising policy;
-tax preferences for companies modernising their capacities.
At that stage, a pre-crisis production level will be attained, and preconditions for Russia's integration into the world economic community will have been created.
At the third stage (2004-2010), post-industrial technologies will be introduced in Russian industry, and Russia's active integration in thw world economic order will have begun.
The Russian banking system will be reorganised in order to turn banks into institutions accumulating finance. A system of state-owned and semi-state-owned credit institutions will be established for financing priority programs and attracting individual savings on the basis of Promstroibank, Agroprombank, and Savings Bank.
...In implementing its economic course, the government will actively interact with financial and industrial groups. Furthermore, a more effective management of state property will be the Cabinet's top priority.
Agrarian reform will be directed at developing the interaction of the state-owned, mixed and collective farms. The government's course in this field will be based on the primciple of limited selling of toiled land.
The government will fully recognise the new owners who obtained property in the course of earlier-conducted privatisation. At the same time, in the course of future privatisation, the government will preserve its complete control over or hold over the blocs in the country's strategically most important enterprises.(21)
Clearly, this document is not as radical as the one Anisimov reported. Nevertheless, as Andrei Illarionov, head of the Institute for Economic Analysis indicated, the program demonstrated Zyuganov's lack of comprehension of contemporary society. In addition, he noted that Zyuganov's proposals were somewhat close to those of the Chernomyrdin government and that the document could be used as a claim for the KPRF chair for the post of prime minister should he lose the election - a formula which had been applied in Poland earlier.(22)
Therefore, given the sharpness of the pro-Yeltsin media, the EIM 'monitoring team concludes that in comparison to the 1991 presidential elections and the Duma elections of 1993 and 1995 candidates were less free to get their views across and voters were given less information of a professional and objective nature.' Hence, they argue that 'the presidential elections of 1996 was not a step forward towards democracy as far as the media are concerned.'(23)
Nevertheless, it must be established that Yeltsin was not the only player in the campaign to 'abuse' the media. For instance, the Yavlinskii campaign was guilty of attempting to persuade the media in its favour. Yabloko's Perm' branch initiated a journalism contest to win over the local papers. Yabloko offered the winning paper an all-expenses paid accreditation to all the party's Central Board activities for one year, the winning journalist would receive a colour television set and the artist who drew the best political cartoon would win a 'high quality music center'. According to the Russian American Press Information Center, '[n]aturally, there [was] a string attached - the coverage must be sympathetic to Yabloko'.(24)
In the provinces there were numerous incidents in which the local communist elites abused their positions of power to the detriment of other contestants. In Tyumen', for instance, the oblast's administrative soviet gave 920 million rubles to Tyumen'skaya pravda, the former press organ of the Tyumen' obkom to conduct election coverage.(25) In Bryansk, local communist leaders donated 400 million rubles - or half of all its media subsidies - to the communist newspaper Bryanskii rabochii, 60 million to Golos profsoyuzov and 20 million each to BK Fakt and Bryanskaya pravda. Non-communist papers received, on the whole less money. For instance, Bryanskie izvestiya, Bryanskaya gazeta and Brzynsk TV each got 80 million rubles - or a bit more than half of the total that the local leadership donated to Bryanskii rabochii.(26) Nevertheless, despite its general pro-communist leanings, the regional press needed to maintain some balance between its coverage of Yeltsin and Zyuganov because the newspapers received subsidies from the regional administration who supported the President.(27) The campaign staff of Aman Tuleev, who stood down as a presidential candidate in favour of Zyuganov in early June(28), was able to turn an abortive attempt to launch a scandal against the Kemerovo regional assembly speaker to its advantage. According to the Russian American Press Information Center,
scandal mongering and rumors now abound in Kuzbas, often leaving journalists on unsure grounds. Tuleev's legal representative, for instance, takes legal action even if he knows that such action will be summarily dismissed, accusing journalists of libel for reprinting copy from national newspapers or citing official press releases of the regional administration. Absurd as it may seem, this makes journalists wary of criticizing Tuleev in any way, unnerving them and wasting their time.(29)
Regional Elites
Regional elites were crucial in their swaying the vote towards Yeltsin's favour. Certainly, the creation of Russia is Our Home assisted Yeltsin in having some of the representatives of the most powerful economic and political organisations backing him and his reforms. However, it can also be noted that Yeltsin's insistence that members of the Federation Council be comprised, ex officio of solely the heads of the subject executive and legislative organs assisted him in his re-election bid. Thus, these key officials would not have to pass through a cycle of national-level elections in order to sit in the Parliament's upper house and in so doing, Yeltsin was able to make a key trade off with the elites.
That the KPRF had lost in five successive elections, including those in areas that supported the party in the Duma contest is partially attributed to the resurgence of the regional elites' strength. For instance, in the 14 April 1996 elections to the Sverdlovsk regional legislative assembly, the KPRF received only 16 per cent of the mandates compared to the regional governor Eduard Rossel's Russia's Renovation Movement's 36 per cent. In addition, in the Altai krai's regional assembly elections where the KPRF held 26 mandates at the last convocation, their ranks were dropped to 16. The KPRF failed to win a seat in the elections to the Omsk regional legislative assembly and lost two elections in Moscow oblast'.(30) Yevgenii Sidov argues that by April 1996 the KPRF had begun to lose the support in areas where it was strongest in the December elections, however, simultaneously, the regional 'parties of power' began to consolidate their holds within their respective areas and were able to gain greater degrees of influence over the electorates. Thus, he argued that these elections could be considered a turning point in the lead up to the Presidential elections.(31) Similarly, Aleksandr Budberg claims that the regional elections largely depended on the governor's position and that if Yeltsin could pull them to his side, his chances of victory would be quite good.(32)
Generational Politics at Work
The importance of young people's mobilisation certainly benefited Yeltsin's campaign. Young people are among the key supporters of the continuation of reforms and democratic politicians and political forces. For instance, during the runup to the 1995 elections to the Duma, E. N. Prazdnikov, director of the Federal Youth Centre indicated that youth involvement in the electoral campaign was crucial to assisting the democratic cause: 80 per cent of young people supported democratic reforms, however, only 9 per cent intended to vote.(33) A poll published in Segodnya in early June 1996 demonstrates that young people, particularly those aged 18-24 were the most likely to support a captialist path of development, goods and services provided by privately-owned companies and employment opportunities in non-state owned businesses, while they were the age group most reluctant to see the restoration of pre-perestroika life patterns.(34) Moreover, a series of pre-election pulbic opinion polls demonstrated that students, in particular supported Yeltsin and Yavlinskii in much higher degrees that Zyuganov. For instance, Yeltsin led candidates among students at the Moscow Institute of Electricity Industry Machinery (31 per cent), the Moscow Open Pedagogical University (70 per cent), the Russian Humanitarian University (18 percent), the Moscow Higher Police School (63 per cent), Moscow University Law Faculty (40 per cent), Moscow University Economics Faculty (46 per cent) and the Sports Academy (20 per cent) - however, it is particularly significant to note that among students at the latter 70 per cent indicated that they would not vote. Yavlinskii was the preferred candidate of Moscow Construction University's students (20 per cent). Forty nine per cent of students at the Federal Security Service Academy supported Zyuganov.(35) Also employed as a campaign tactic was Yeltsin's use of rock concerts as mobilisational vehicles to attract youth to vote. Yeltsin drew upon a campaign tool that seems to have become increasingly popular in recent elections among democrats. For instance, Russia's Choice and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms utilised rock concerts to gain youth support in the elections to the Federal Assembly in 1993(36) and Our Home is Russia employed concerts and fashion shows for the same purposes in the December 1995 elections.(37) For example, journalists in Bryansk noted that young people's turnout was 20 per cent higher in the June elections than in was in December and that their increased involvement was directly related to the 'Vote or Lose' campaign, rock concerts and t-shirt give aways that the Yeltsin team coordinated.(38)
Perhaps one of the more negative aspects of the campaign was that voters were motivated largely by fear. Indeed, the Yeltsin campaign's slogan 'Vote or Lose' utilised extremely graphic images of the negative consequences of a potential Zyuganov electoral victory.(39) Here it should be reiterated that the Yeltsin campaign needed a high voter turnout among young people for its success. Zyuganov's support base was derived mainly from elderly voters who voted in the greatest instances. The Yeltsin campaign team, in conjunction with Europa Plus, Komsomol'skaya pravda and Intermedia distributed a series of five postcards depicting the positive benefits of voting contrasted with the binary opposites of not voting.
Voting
A singing voice
Not Voting
A sign indicating that music is prohibited
Voting
A solitary soaring eagle
Not Voting
A crowd of pigs feeding from one trough
Voting
A freshly hatched chick
Not Voting
A dry cooked chicken
Voting
A breaking wave
Not Voting
Dead sardines in a tin
Voting
A jean jacket
Not voting
A prison camp uniform (40)
The vote or lose campaign was also conducted on television. For instance one of the advertisements depicted several lines of people participating in what appears to be a back-breaking bucket brigade. However, rather than putting out a fire, the bucket-brigade is performing a repetitive task of gathering water from a lake or some other body of water and sending it to members of another part of the line who throw the water back into its source. As this activity is being conducted someone is ticking names on a list - presumably a list of voters. One of the young people in the advert asking why they were there 'still doing this'. He is answered 'Maybe because we didn't vote'. An unseen figure then appears on the screen backed with very bright light and he unleashes a powerful burst of water from a firehose, drenching the young people claiming that he voted.(41) Therefore, the viewer could interpret this message as a threat that they would have to live under the harsh conditions that would be imposed at the will of those who did vote if they avoided casting their ballots. If generational politics are considered in this advert, then it could be interpreted that young people would be doomed to a life of futility and non-fulfilment and a return to being subjected to the preferences of an older age cohort if they did not participate in the elections.
Conclusion
The Russian electorate indicated that it was looking towards the future by re-electing Yeltsin. However, it must be noted that a significant proportion (40.3 per cent) cast their ballots for Zyuganov and a return to social stability. This is a factor which Yeltsin appears to be taking into consideration and there is currently debate circulating about the possibility of including in the next government ministers with communist orientations. Yeltsin's alliance with Lebed indicates that he is willing to make political compromises. It is obvious that Lebed is already making his presence felt. For instance, his tough law-and-order policy is being implemented and he has initiated a crackdown on military corruption. Moreover, his influence is being felt in Russian politics in other ways. He was able to assist his political ally, General Rodionov, 'the Butcher of Tbilisi' in being elevated to the post of Defence Minister. This factor, combined with increased military activities in Chechnya may mean that the war in the Caucasus may drag on indefinitely. Moreover, that the new government is yet to be formed will be another challenge that the polity will have to face. Currently, Lebed and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin are locked in a political struggle for Yeltsin's favour. The composition of the new government may be an indication of who has won this contest. These factors may be extremely important given Yeltsin's poor health. Yeltsin has been re-elected for another term as Russian President. This next administration may be characterised by a move towards coalition, a lame-duck presidency or a possibility for the Russian Pinochet to emerge as the political system's most powerful player. During the Soviet period there was an old joke which asked the difference between a Russian optimist and a Russian pessimist. The latter would state that it could never get worse than current conditions, the former said it always could. It remains how 'optimistically' or 'pessimistically' Russians will view the state of affairs in post-election Russia.
Peter Lentini is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and an Honorary Resarch Associate of the Institute of Russian and East European Studies, Glasgow University.
Address:
Department of Politics
Monash University
Clayton 3168
email: Peter.Lentini@arts.monash.edu.au
NOTES:
1. It should be noted that there were heated debates over how the upper house should be formed during 1994-1995. The State Duma deputies and some Federation Council senators advocated that the chamber should be elected. The President and the bulk of the senators favoured a formula whereby membership would be non-elective. Both sides reached an agreement in late 1995 which stated that the heads of Russia's legislative and executive organs would ex officio become members of the Federation Council. however, all governors of the subject territories would be required to stand in a competitive election by 1996. Therefore, the December 1993 elections appear to be the only time that the entire country would go to the polls to elect the upper chamber as a whole.
2. For detailed studies of the election campaign and the impact of the elections see Peter Lentini (ed.) Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly (Budapest, New York & London: Central European University Press, 1995), Parts II-IV.
3. Konstitutsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii prinyata vsenarodnym golosovaniem 12 dekabrya 1993 g. (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1993).
4. See, Peter Lentini, 'Conclusion' in Lentini (ed.), Elections and Political Order in Russia, pp.246-259, pp.248-253.
5. Peter Lentini and Troy McGrath, 'The Rise of the Liberal Democratic Party and the 1993 Elections', The Harriman Institute Forum, Vol. 7, No. 6 (February 1994).
6. Robert Cottrell, 'Russia's Parliamentary and Presidential Elections', Government and Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp.160-174.
7. Yegor Gaidar cited in Peter Lentini, 'Russia: Variation Enigma', Arena Magazine, 1996, pp.7-9, p.9.
8. Ibid., pp.7-8 and Peter Lentini, Russia on the Eve of the 1995 Elections (Melbourne: Monash University Slavic Section East European Forum Occasional Paper No. 4, 1996), pp.10-19
9. Natalia Gurushina, 'A Snapshot of the Russian Economy', OMRI Economic Digest, Vol. 2, No. 25 (20 June 1996).
10. According to a VTsIOM poll of 1,600 people published in January 1996, Gennadii Zyuganov was the country's most trusted politician, commanded the faith of some 17 per cent of the respondents while Yeltsin (in a tie with Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov) was trusted by only 5 per cent. Yeltsin trailed behind (respectively) Grigorii Yavlinskii (15 per cent), Aleksandr Lebed (14 per cent), Svyatoslav Fedorov, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Yegor Gaidar (each 9 per cent), Ella Pamfilova (7 per cent) and Boris Nemtsov (6 per cent). See Oleg Saviliev in Obshchaya gazeta, 1996, No. 4, p. 8 cited in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic Mail Version, Vol. III, No. 4 (27 January - 2 February 1996).
11. For statistics on the first round of the voting see Vladimir Tikhomirov's contribution to June's Centre for Russian and Euro-Asian Studies Russian and Euro-Asian Economics Bulletin. Initially, there were approximately 78 candidates who expressed their interest in campaigning or considered to be strong aspirants for the presidency. For information on them, the numbers of signatures they garnered for their presidential bids and reasons why they were not included on the final ballot paper see 'Russian Presidential Candidates' on Dmitrii Gusev's homepage at http://www.cs.indiana.edu/hyplan/dmiguse/Russian/nomin.html; similar information, including the candidates' incomes are available at RussElect web site's 'Candidates in 1996 Presidential Elections' at http://www.users.aimnet.com/~ksyrah/ekskurs/preslist.html.
12. Indeed this may be the case as Vremya on 4 July 1996 broadcast a report on an organisational meeting for the future of the Popular Patriotic bloc, chaired by Nikolai Ryzhkov that also included such figures as Zyuganov, the Russian All-People's Union's Sergei Baburin and Aleksandr Rutskoi.
13. Vremya, 11 June 1996.
14. European Institute for the Media, Preliminary Report: Media and the Russian Presidential Elections (Dusseldorf, 4 July 1996, email version, no pagination.
15. Russian Public Television advertisements shown on 12 June 1996. I am grateful to Greg Dolgopolov for pointing out the significance of this programming sequence.
16. European Institute for the Media, op. cit.
17. Ibid.
18. Russian American Press Information Center, 'St Petersburg', RAPIC Newsletter, No. 2 (17 May 1996). Internet version, no pagination.
19. Yevgenii Anisimov, Komsomol'skaya pravda, 16 May 1996, pp.1-2 in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic Mail Version, Vol. III, No. 8 (8-17 May 1996).
20. Sergei Muslin's articles in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 May 1996, pp.1 and pp. 1-2 cited in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic Mail Version, Vol. III, No. 19 (18-24 May 1996).
21. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 May 1996, pp.3-4 summarised in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic Mail Version, Vol. III, No. 20 (25-31 May 1996).
22. Sergei Mulin in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 31 May 1996, p.2 cited in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic Mail Version, Vol. III, No. 20 (25 May-31 May 1996).
23. European Institute for the Media, op. cit.
24. Russian American Press Information Center, 'Perm Region', RAPIC Newsletter, No. 3 (24 May 1996). Internet version, no pagination.
25. Russian American Press Information Center, 'Tyumen', RAPIC Newsletter, No. 1 (6 May 1996). Internet version, no pagination.
26. Russian American Press Information Center, 'Bryansk', ibid.
27. Russian American Press Information Center, 'Bryansk', ibid., No. 3 (24 May 1996). Internet version, no pagination.
28. On his stepping down see, for instance, Marina Shakina in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 June 1996, p. 1 cited in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic Mail Version, Vol. III, No. 21 (1-7 june 1996).
29. Russian American Press Information Center, 'Kemerovo Region', RAPIC Newsletter, No. 2 (17 May 1996). Internet version, no pagination.
30. Yevgeni Sidov in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 April 1996, p. 1 and Aleksandr Budberg in Moskovskii komsomolets, 17 April 1996, p. 2 in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic mail Version, Vol. III, No. 19 (13-19 April 1996).
31. Sidov, op. cit.
32. Budberg, op. cit.
33. E. N. Prazdnikov on Vremya, 17 November 1995.
34. Rozalina Ryvkina, Leonid Kisals and Yurii Simagin in Segodnya, 7 June 1996, p. 5 cited in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic Mail Version, Vol. III, No. 21 (1-7 June 1996).
35. Moskovskii komsomolets, 12 May 1996, p. 2 cited in Politica Weekly Press Summary. Electronic Mail Version, Vol. III, No. 18 (8-17 May 1996).
36. See, Peter Lentini, 'Elections and Political Order in Russia: The 1993 Elections to the Russian State Duma', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4 (June 1994), pp.151-192, pp. 163-164.
37. Peter Lentini, Russia on the Eve of the 1995 Elections (Melbourne: Monash University Slavic Section East Europe Forum Occasional Paper No. 4, 1995), p.31.
38. RAPIC Newsletter, No. 7 (28 June 1996), internet version, no pagination.
39. It should also be noted that the Yeltsin team also circulated an anti-Zyuganov tabloid, Ne dai bog (God Forbid!) throughout the country which stressed the negative consequences in the case that the KPRF chair won the elections.
40. Golosui ili proigraesh' postcards. I am grateful to Marat Fairushin for making these available to me.
41. Golosui ili proigraesh' advertisement televised on ORT, 12 June 1996. I am grateful to Vladimir Tikhomirov for arranging the taping of this and other campaign advertisements.