The Russian Presidential elections of June-July 1996 did not mark the culmination of the election cycle that began in 1990.(1) Rather executive [gubernatorial] and legislative elections in 52 regions of the Russian Federation began in September and are continuing until the end of December.
These elections are significant for Russian federal relations as they have helped many regional elites gain greater autonomy from Moscow. Some commentators argue that the elections have facilitated the emergence of a new political force in the form of regional governors. This may further the trend toward the establishment of autarkic political and economic systems in the regions. Discarding the secessionist aims of 1991 to 1993, many regions now want to reduce their ties with other regions.(2) Nonetheless, Moscow's policy of cultivating individual agreements with regions, as well as economic incentives, acts as a reintegrative force that can facilitate stable federal relations.
Regional governors play a major role in both regional and national politics. Most attention has been on the gubernatorial elections, rather than the legislative, because regional legislatures have occupied a secondary role since the closing of their predecessors [soviets] in late 1993. Regional politics is now similar to the Soviet era when the Communist Party First Secretary was the most senior official, although election has given governors greater autonomy from Moscow than their Soviet era colleagues. The current elections have continued the trend of the removal of "democrats" who moved into regional politics during 1990-1991.(3) At the national level, the governors form a major part of the Upper House of Federal Parliament [State Council]. Until now the State Council has supported Yeltsin against the communist-inclined lower house [Duma]. A change of governors could alter its political composition and change the balance of national politics.
The composition of regional elites, and their degree of autonomy from Moscow, is also important for the direction of economic reform at the regional level and the type of political institutions that develop. There are considerable economic differences between the 89 regions of the Russian Federation. Those regions with access to means of attracting foreign currency such as natural resources, high tech enterprises, the presence of commercial hubs such as ports, and even agriculture, are more likely to pursue economic reform. The continuation of local price controls on food and basic commodities (eg. Ulyanovsk, Belgorod, Orel which are all regions in the pro-Communist "red belt" south of Moscow) has been a sign of resistance to reform. Despite the Soviet background of most regional elites, economic differences will ensure that only some will attempt to develop internal and foreign economic ties independently of Moscow.
The quest for a system to regulate federal relations between Moscow and the regions has been a vital part of the process of Russian state-building since the late Soviet period. Although the Russian Federation claims to be a federal state in which different levels of government are constitutionally guaranteed a discreet area of authority, the balance of powers within the federal structure are still being established. Russian centre-periphery relations have been more problematic than in most other post-communist countries, due to the greater size of the country, and the greater state-building task. The institutionalisation of Soviet era political 'asymmetry' in the form of regions based on territory, and republics based on ethnic identity, in which the latter are granted greater rights and powers, initially appears to make the pursuit of political stability more difficult. The tragic war in Chechnya highlighted fears that the Russian Federation may even collapse like the Soviet Union. Although this is unlikely to happen, some regions are still seeking what Presidential Administration Chief of Staff, Anatolii Chubais, labelled as "legal separatism".(4) Examples include the resource-rich Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug which both want to separate from Tyumen oblast', so impoverishing the latter. St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast' want more autonomy by merging. Either way, both examples demonstrate regions taking greater initiative independent of Moscow. The Soviet era model where only Moscow dictated its will is no longer applicable.
Moscow's policy of ensuring federal stability has been to paradoxically strengthen the asymmetrical nature of the Russian Federation. Moscow has been negotiating bilateral treaties with individual regions.(5) This process runs according to the same logic as the process of budgetary allocations. More money is allocated to politically troublesome regions than those which support Moscow and follow a reform agenda.(6) Although initially such a policy seems likely to spark a regionalist agenda of greater autonomy, Moscow has managed to secure a degree of political stability. The success of this policy is emphasised by the Chechen war. The inability of Moscow to effectively assert its authority by force highlighted that individualised negotiations rather than force was a more profitable path to fulfil both Moscow and regional interests.
The current regional elections mark a significant change in Moscow's relations with regional elites. Between 1991 and 1995, Yeltsin managed to maintain control over the appointment of governors, despite pressure from the national parliament and lobbying from regional governments and legislatures. He permitted elections for December 1995 in regions where the incumbent would be likely to win. Nonetheless, three were defeated by candidates supported by the Communists.(7) This was an indication of the possible pattern for the gubernatorial elections in 52 regions that Yeltsin had ordered for late 1996. This ensured that his appointees would still be in place for the 1996 presidential election.
Trends from the elections
The regional elections have produced many interesting developments. These have included the victory of former vice-President Alexander Rutskoi as governor of Kursk oblast',(8) the presence of Alexander Lebed's brother, Alexei, in the Khakassia Presidential elections,(9) and the election of Russia's first female governor, Valentina Bronevich, in the Koryak Autonomous Okrug.(10)
Overall, several trends have already been evident:
1) Despite initial predictions that pro-Yeltsin governors would win, being an incumbent has not prevented opposition victories. In the thirty gubernatorial elections completed between September and early December, only 14 incumbents have won.(11) Voters seem prepared to judge regional politics differently from national politics. Emphasis on competent managers rather than ideological battles appears to be more important. After the pressure of the Presidential elections, the central authorities seemed "legally and psychologically unprepared" for the regional elections.(12) Despite the defeats, Yeltsin administration officials expressed confidence that they will be able to work with the newly elected leaders.(13)
2) The elections are institutionalising a new division of power between the regional and federal levels of government. The election of governors, rather than their appointment by Moscow, gives local leaders greater legitimacy, as well as greater responsibility for affairs in their respective regions. It also reduces the ability of Moscow to influence policy at the regional level, although control of financial levers, and the expressed desire of many governors to work co-operatively with Moscow, suggest that these political structures can be a source for stability.
3) The elections have seen changes in Russian political campaigning. Already anticipating the next Presidential election, the communist and opposition parties have tried to present themselves with a "reasonable face". They formed the election bloc Popular Patriotic Union of Russia. This was similar to the democratic bloc the United Consultative Council (OKS). The democratic bloc was significant for the lack of unity that was often displayed.(14)
4) The "de-ideologisation" of regional politics has also seen a decline in anti-Moscow rhetoric. This is opposite to what was expected at the start of the campaign. Moscow was even prepared for pro-Yeltsin candidates to berate Moscow, and Yeltsin to stay out of regional campaigns, as long as candidates favourable to the Presidential Administration won. The importance of management skills, could see greater conflict between different interest groups at the regional level.
5) There have been violations of electoral laws. The annulment of the Amur oblast' election which was decided by 189 votes was the result of one alleged violation.(15) On the whole, however, the electoral process has been notable for the observance of electoral laws, despite the weakness of the judiciary at the regional level. Although most regional electoral laws grant second rounds of voting if the first is inconclusive, most problems have emerged from regional variations. Krasnodar krai demanded a minimum turnout of 50 percent which nullified the election.(16) In the Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug both candidates were barred from a further election, as neither gained 50%, and the vote was declared invalid.(17)
6) Lastly; the elections have altered the political geography of the Russian Federation. The earlier division identified between pro- and anti-reform regions divided along the 55th parallel is longer appropriate.(18) The rural-urban that the recent Presidential elections identified as being present within regions has been strengthened by the regional elections.(19)
In summary, the 1996 regional elections appear to have granted greater political space to regional governors. Nonetheless, there is still considerable scope for Moscow to ensure federal stability. The longer-term result is that centre-periphery relations are likely to remain a crucial factor in Russian federal politics.
Department of Political Science
University of Melbourne
Russian Gubernatorial Election Winners September -December 8, 1996. - see hard copy of Bulletin for this table.
Endnotes:
1 This is part of the process of creating a new Russian state. It has included: the March 1990 elections to the RSFSR legislature, which proved to be a springboard for Yeltsin's opposition to the Gorbachev regime; the June 1991 Russian Presidential election, which created a legitimate political symbol and counterweight to the Soviet regime; the April 1993 referendum about trust in the President or the Parliament which Yeltsin won; the December 1993 elections for the new upper and lower houses of Parliament and a plebiscite on the new constitution; elections in 1994 for legislatures at the regional level; elections in December 1995 for the lower house of parliament [the State Duma], as well as elections for heads of regional executive branches in 12 regions; and the June-July 1996 Presidential elections which were decided in Yeltsin's favour in a second round against the Communist candidate Gennadi Zyuganov.
2 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.12.
3 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 September 1996: A5.
4 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.7.
5 Hughes, James, 'Moscow's Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion', in Transition, 20 September 1996. pp:39-43.
6 Treisman, Daniel, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', in Transition, 20 September, 1996. pp:45-49.
7 These regions were Moscow, Nizhnii Novgorod, Novgorod, Tomsk, Tver, Tambov, Omsk, Orenburg, Belgorod, Yaroslavl, and Novosibirsk oblasti and Primorskii krai. These were regions with strong, pro-Yeltsin governors. Paretskaya, Anna, 'Regional Governors could offset the 'Red Duma', in Transition, 23 February 1996. pp:34-35, 64.
8 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.9.
9 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.16.
10 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.13.
11 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.16.
12 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.7.
13 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.16.
14 There are many examples. Russia's Democratic Choice (DVR) did not want to support the incumbent governor of Krasnodar Krai, Nikolai Yegorov, because they claimed, as the nationalities minister from May 1994 through June 1995 and Yeltsin's representative in Chechnya, Yegorov was partially responsible for the fighting in the separatist republic. (Yeltsin then dismissed him as his presidential chief of staff on 15 July 1996). Yabloko was opposed to Ayatskov being re-elected in Saratov Ayatskov [OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol.1, no.1.]
15 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.9.
16 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.14.
17 OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.10.
18 Aleksandr Sobyanin, Eduard Gelman & Oleg Kayunov, "The Political Climate in Russia in 1991-1993," in Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, no.9, 1993.
19 Robert Ortuung & Anna Paretskaya, 'Presidential Election Demonstrates Rural-Urban Divide', in Transition, 20 September 1996. pp:33-38, OMRI Russian Regional Report, Vol. 1, no.16.
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