The presidents of Central Asian republics have always been more than mere elected officials. Since 1991, they have actively practised an authoritarian and highly personalised mode of leadership, only slightly camouflaged with the paraphernalia of democratic political culture. Every now and again each of the incumbent 'Fathers of the Nations' deems it necessary to come up with a conceptual writ, exploring the past, analysing the present, and mapping out the future for his respective nation, sometimes reaching substantial philosophical depths. It is hard to gauge where this literary zeal originates from; perhaps, it dates back to the old Soviet days, when every Politburo member strove to publish a treatise or two, especially on ideological matters. Surprisingly, even Emomali Rahmonov, the President of Tajikistan, and a relative outcast in the cohort of Central Asian charismatic leaders, has published a book where, amongst other things, he developed a novel idea of 'democratic political fundamentalism' which runs contrary to the basic 'freedom of the individual'.1
Regardless of the literary merits of executive ruminations, they provide a useful framework for understanding the dynamic processes in the respective polities generally, and amidst their ruling elites in particular. The creative genius of Turkmenbashi is especially translucent in this respect: in his Ten Years of Prosperity program for Turkmenistan, the 'Chief of All Turkmens' announced that "I, as the Head of State, have assumed the responsibility for the fate of my people ... Ten years is the period during which a transformation of the society from one state to another will occur. It will happen softly, without violence and calamities ... My firm conviction is that shock therapy is not for us."2 Not unlike great monarchs of the past, the President is expected to be strong but caring, strong first and foremost and caring afterwards. Stability, security and continuity are all-important: "Political pluralism would threaten, if not destroy, the internal harmony for which our country is renowned".3 It was only natural that in 1995 Turkmenbashi pondered changing his title to that of the 'Shah of Turkmenistan'.4
The President of neighbouring Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, has offered a more rational justification for the growing authoritarianism in his seminal work Uzbekistan: Its Own Way to Renewal and Progress:: "Without strong executive power even the decisions adopted in the most democratic manner can be jeopardised. This requires a strengthening and development of the presidential authority which will guarantee the realisation of legislative decisions, protection of citizens' rights and freedoms, and implementation of political and economic reforms."5
Karimov's arguments are echoed by the President of Kazakstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, who is by far the most prolific and sophisticated author amongst his colleagues. His latest creation, a brochure entitled Kazakstan - 2030. Prosperity, Security and Improvement in Well-Being for All Kazakstanis,6 offers an enlightening insight into the art of state building in Central Asia.
An exhaustive sociological study conducted in 1994 revealed the immensity of the task. Only 17.2 percent of respondents in Kazakstan favoured the establishment of a Western-style democracy, while 62.4 percent of those polled were prepared to support any political system 'as long as there is order'.11 In a similar vein, in 1995, only 6.1 percent of Russians and 15.2 percent of the eponymous people residing in Kazakstan believed in market economy.12 Naive faith in democratic change and private property as a universal panacea, so transparent in 1990,13 has given way to apathy and resignation. In the absence of political parties and other public organisations capable of social mobilisation on a nation-wide scale, the state remains the sole agent of reforms vis-a-vis a plethora of conservative social institutions. Even the state is not a homogenous entity. It consists of various agencies often with competing agendas, which undermines its overall efficiency in prescribing rules of social behaviour. Following this line of logic, Nazarbaev inexorably moves towards reproducing Rousseau's concept of the Enlightened Sovereigns, who are "morally and politically wiser, who consistently (dispositionally) choose and act in a morally and politically superior manner."14 As Nazarbaev has put it, "the President stands above society, parties, parliament and all institutions of power, coordinating and directing their activities ... He is the only guarantor of the constitution and the actual epitome of state sovereignty."15
By 1995 Nazarbaev had finished his reorganisation of Kazakstan's government. A parliamentary republic had been replaced by strong presidential rule. The 1995 Constitution granted the President nearly total control over the national executive, legislature and judiciary. A referendum held in May 1995 extended Nazarbaev's tenure until the end of 2000.16 In December the same year Nazarbaev issued a decree "On the President of the Republic of Kazakstan", which for all practical purposes exempted him from jurisdiction of any law.17 With 83.7 percent of residents of Kazakstan approving of some form of authoritarian rule,18 Nazarbaev obtained a carte blanche to conduct policies according to his vision and preferences.
Even more alarming for Nazarbaev is the fact that the titular nationality itself lacks cohesion and a common sense of identity. Affiliation to sub-ethnic units (clans, tribes and tribal confederations) often has an overriding significance in ordering political preferences, and underlies the solidarity networks within Kazak power elite. Nazarbaev, the undisputed leader of the Great Horde (2 million people in 1989), constantly has to seek compromises and make power-sharing arrangements with representatives of the Middle (3 million) and the Little (1.5 million) Hordes. While clans of the Little Horde headed by the incumbent parliamentary Speaker, Marat Ospanov, have been generally satisfied with their share of the pie, the Middle Horde, which had enjoyed political hegemony until the 1960s, has become increasingly restive. Its leader, the immensely popular writer and politician Olzhas Suleimenov, severely attacked Nazarbaev in late 1994, calling the latter a dictator and referring to his policy as harmful to the national interests of Kazakstan and generally inhumane.27 Suleimenov's political party, the People's Congress of Kazakstan, signalled an intention to field a candidate for the presidential poll due in 1996. Nazarbaev pre-empted contested elections with unclear results by holding the 1995 referendum; in addition, he appointed another influential figure from the Middle Horde, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, as the Prime Minister. Kazhegeldin's dismissal in October 1997 signaled a new round of tension in the clan politics of Kazakstan. Presently Olzhas Suleimenov, the former Ambassador to China, Murat Auezov, and the ex-Premier are busy consolidating all forces of the Middle Horde in order to challenge Nazarbaev during the 2000 elections.28
There is very little public discourse on clan politics, regional patronage networks and patrimonialism in Kazakstan. Only once did Nazarbaev make a cautious and rather ambivalent reference to these phenomena: "They inhibit formation of a Western-type democracy in traditional societies. At the same time, archaic institutions can quite unexpectedly assist the straightening of democracy."29 Meanwhile, even at the heyday of mono-organisational socialism, elite settlements in Kazakstan were achieved and maintained through constant negotiation and pact-making amongst various sub-ethnic units. Thus, following the election of Dinmuhamed Kunaev to the post of the First Secretary of the CPK CC in 1964, representatives of the Great Horde occupied all strategic decision-making positions in the republic. In the 1970s, the Middle Horde retained representation only at the level of a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and regional party secretaries, but it continued to dominate the Academy of Sciences, tertiary educational institutions and, generally, the intellectual strata of society. The Little Horde, a reluctantally of Kunaev in his game of political musical chairs, was rewarded with three seats in the CPK CC Bureau, including the influential post of Secretary in charge of ideology.30 After Gorbachev took over the Kremlin in 1985, strongmen of the Middle and Little Hordes (E. Auelbekov, 1st Secretary of Kzyl-Orda obkom, and Z. Kamalidenov, CPK CC Secretary for Ideology, respectively) mounted a successful attack against Kunaev.31 The father of perestroika, who did not have the slightest idea about the intricate balance of power and inter-clan rivalry in Kazakstan, had been persuaded that Kunaev was the leader of an omnipresent, sinister and utterly corrupt 'Clan of Hordes',32 and had him removed first from the Politburo and then from the republican leadership in 1986. The skirmishes in Almaty in December 1986 that followed Kunaev's resignation were dubbed by Moscow as anti-Russian, and such interpretation still prevails in the West.33 In reality, mass demonstrations were fuelled as much by the Great Horde patriarchs' fear of losing power, as they were the product of the popular resentment of the appointment of an ethnic Russian, Gennadii Kolbin, to succeed Kunaev. Ultimately, a compromise was mediated by the CPSU CC Secretary, Mikhail Solomentsev, who had previously worked with Kunaev. The influence of the Great Horde was preserved under the patronage of Nazarbaev, then the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. It is noteworthy that Kunaev, who initially treated Nazarbaev as a back-stabbing traitor, eventually forgave him and rendered him assistance for the sake of Horde solidarity.34 In 1989 Nazarbaev was elected to head Kazakstan's party organisation and promptly got rid of both Kamalidenov and Auelbekov, thus restoring the pre-1986 status quo.
In summary, it is hard to agree with the opinion that "Today one should not overstate the intraethnic competition among the Kazakhs."35 The fragmented state of a titular nationality, as the experience of Tajikistan has shown, is a greater threat to internal stability of the Central Asian countries than xenophobic nationalism. Nazarbaev has so far been successful in coping with these issues through skillful manoeuvring and coercion, but he doesn't have a long-term solution. In Kazakstan-2030 he simply acknowledges the problem of deficient state identity, arguing that internationally recognised borders and common history will rectify the situation in some distant future.36
President Nazarbaev has offered his own version of the Kazak Dream. Invoking the cases of Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and other Asian 'tigers', he writes: "I am convinced that by 2030 Kazakstan will become a Central Asian Snow Leopard and will serve as an example for other developing states ... This will be a Kazakstani Leopard, characteristically elitist, independent, clever, manly and noble, brave and shrewd."43 By that time Kazakstan will have turned into the economic and cultural centre of Eurasia, and its people, three quarters of whom currently live below the official poverty line,44 will be amongst the richest, most educated and most developed nations of the world. The key to this magical transformation, according to the Kazak leader, is the development and thoughtful exploitation of the country's hydrocarbon reserves.
Indeed, with proven reserves of 3 billion tonnes and potential reserves of up to 12 billion tonnes of crude oil, Kazakstan can reasonably expect a steady trickle of petrodollars to prop up its economy. The latest oil agreements signed in November 1997 in Washington envisage long-term investments of US$ 28 billion in Kazakstan on the part of Western, mainly American corporations. Over a period of 40 years, Kazakstan intends to receive up to US$ 550 billion in oil revenues; 45 given the fact that currently the entire government expenditure stands at US$ 3 billion a year, at first glance there are causes for optimism - but only at first glance.
The export of Kazakstan's crude oil is not economically feasible unless it fetches more than US$ 18 per barrel.46 Meanwhile, prices on the world market have been steadily declining since early 1997, pushing the benchmark to the record low US$ 10 per barrel. Moreover, it is not clear exactly how the country will transport its crude abroad: the existing infrastructure is oriented towards Russia, all grandiose plans concerning pipelines across the Caspian Sea have come to nothing, and the best Kazakstan can count on is shipping 15 million tonnes a year by 2003 through Samara, compared to the current volume of 6 million tonnes.47 Finally, previous experience has shown that actual remittances from oil export to the state budget are in the region of 10 percent of the figure expected by the government.48 Apart from poor accounting and mismanagement, money is simply stolen. Half a billion US dollars paid by Mobil for the right to develop the Tengiz oilfield have vanished without a trace, bypassing the treasury.49 In January 1998, Nazarbaev made the strongest commitment yet to uproot embezzlement and corruption, even using extra-judicial methods if necessary.50 The effectiveness of this campaign will obviously be minimal in a country where political and business elites are one and comprise members of a limited number of extended families.
In summary, the oil bonanza may eventuate in the future - in 10, 15 or 20 years. Does Nazarbaev's regime have that much time? In the words of Evgenii Zhoftis, Director of the Kazakstan Bureau on Human Rights, "this country's leadership has lost the sense of reality. If 2-3 years ago the authorities tried to react to the problems of industrial enterprises and even separate workshops, today the plight of whole cities such as Zhanatas, Kentau and Aktau are of little interest to them. The authorities wait for when the situation will remedy itself. This waiting game and the expectation that vast territories will quell the waves of discontent have already put the existence of the state as a system in jeopardy."51 Kazakstan already has to spend nearly 10 percent of its budget revenues on servicing its external debt, cutting all social programs dramatically.52 Labour unrest, a phenomenon hitherto unheard of in Kazakstan, is gaining momentum, spearheaded by coalminers from the dying city of Zhanatas. The Great Horde strongmen are beginning to question the ability of the incumbent President to secure their political ascendancy in deteriorating conditions, and are looking for a possible replacement.53
Nazarbaev has been drifting from the politics of reform to the politics of survival. According to the leading Kazak political analyst, Professor Nurbulat Masanov, "Nazarbaev stands out amongst all other politicians in the former [Soviet] Union because he has no principles he can betray ... Nazarbaev has an extraordinary capacity for mimicry depending on the environment he is in ... He does not keep those with ambitions and an ability to make decisions in his coterie. If someone, due to extraordinary personal faculties, acquires the position of an independent leader ... he is immediately removed from the ruling group."54 Not unlike President Yeltsin of Russia, these days he can rely only on the loyalty of his relatives and closest friends. This is reflected in his personnel policy, which is sometimes referred to as 'Chemolganisation' of power structures in Kazakstan, after Chemolgan - the native village of Nazarbaev.55 The appointment of Nazarbaev's first cousin, Ahmetzhan Esimov, to head the Presidential Administration in February 1998 is yet another testimony to his patrimonial leadership style.
From a perestroika democrat to a philosopher-king to a beleaguered khan appears to be the likely progression for Nazarbaev. He has taken the burden of leading his country in the post-Soviet period, and now he has to give account for what has been done. His vision of Kazakstan in 2030, executed with the help of such authorities as Virgil, Shakespeare, King Solomon and Benjamin Franklin, is a utopian exercise. At least he has learned the lessons of Khrushchev, who forecast the advent of communist paradise within the lifetime of his generation, and Gorbachev, who promised prosperity and decent housing for every Soviet citizen by the year 2000. Nazarbaev has generously allocated a third of a century for his grand design to materialise. The hero of Central Asian folk tales, Khoja Nasreddin, asked precisely for the same amount of time when the Shah ordered him to teach a donkey to speak. The cunning man reasoned that during this period either the Shah will die, or the donkey will perish ...
1 Emomali Rahmonov. Tojikiston: Chahor soli istiqloliyat va khudshinosi. Dushanbe: Irfon, 1995, p. 31.
2 Iu. Shishkov. "Turkmenistan: ekonomicheskii portret." Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 7, 1995, p. 93.
3 Quoted in: Richard Woff. The Armed Forces of Turkmenistan." Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1994, p. 135.
4 Oleg Moroz. "Prezidentskoe samoderzhavie." Literaturnaia gazeta, 8 February 1995, p. 11.
5 Islam Karimov. "Svoi put' obnovleniia i progressa." In: A.I. Ginzburg, ed. Uzbekistan: etnopoliticheskaia panorama. Vol. I. Moscow: TsIMO, 1994, p. 29.
6 N.A. Nazarbaev. "Kazakstan - 2030. Protsvetanie, bezopasnost' i uluchshenie blagosostoianiia vsekh kazakhstantsev." Published as a supplement to the newspaper Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 11 October 1997. Hereinafter referred to as "K-2030".
7 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 2 December 1997.
8 Nursultan Nazarbaev. Ideinaia konsolidatsiia obshchestva - kak uslovie progressa Kazakhstana. Fond politicheskikh issledovanii 'Kazakstan - XXI vek': Almaty, 1993, p. 31.
9 Martha Brill Olcott. "Nursultan Nazarbaev and the Balancing Act of State Building in Kazakhstan." In: Timothy J. Colton, Robert C. Tucker, eds. Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 180.
10 "K-2030", p. 8.
11 Nancy Lubin. "Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: The Views of the Led". In: Timothy J. Colton, Robert C. Tucker, eds. Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 219.
12 M.N. Guboglo. "Etnopoliticheskaia situatsiia v Kazakhstane v predstavleniiakh ego grazhdan." In: E.M. Kozhokin, ed. Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiia. Moscow: RISI, 1995, p. 252.
13 See: Martha Brill Olcott. "Perestroyka in Kazakhstan." Problems of Communism, No. 4, July-August 1990, p. 75.
14 Richard E. Flathman. Toward a Liberalism. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 79.
15 Nursultan Nazarbaev. Na poroge XXI veka. Almaty: Oner, 1996, p. 154.
16 As the then leader of the presumably opposition Socialist Party, Ermuhamet Ertysbaev, explained at the time, "there is not a single political figure equal to Nazarbaev. He will win over any rival easily in an election, so why drag the country in the election race, and do the people really want it?" (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 15 April 1995.)
17 Segodnia, 30 December 1995.
18 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 9 November 1996.
19 "K-2030", p. 15.
20 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 29 May 1996.
21 I.S. Savin. "Etnicheskii aspekt sovremennoi sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi situatsii v Kazakhstane (1993-1995gg.)" Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, No. 5, 1996, p. 46.
22 Vek, 20 July 1995.
23 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 12 December 1997.
24 Karavan, 17 April 1998.
25 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 26 November 1997.
26 Zavtra, 13 January 1998.
27 "Olzhake brosaet vyzov Nureke."Megapolis-Continent, No. 3, 1995, p. 2.
28 According to Nazarbaev's advisor on political affairs, Ermuhamet Ertysbaev, "in 2000, there might be a serious political fight." ("President Calls Opposition Leaders Big Oddballs." Online Document. Available: http://www.fca.asdc.kz/fca1/president.html)
29 Nursultan Nazarbaev. Na poroge XXI veka. Almaty: Oner, 1996, p. 169.
30 Val Ogareff. Leaders of the Soviet Republics, 1971-1980. A Guide to Posts and Occupants. Canberra: The ANU Press, 1980, pp. 134-139.
31 Kunaev disclosed some unsavoury details of the inter-clan struggle during 1985 and 1986 in his memoirs: Dinmuhamed Kunaev. Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva. Almaty: Sanat, 1994, pp. 284-293.
32 "I don't think that Kunaev was seriously affected by the illness of national conflicts. But irritation and dissatisfaction linked with the domination of one of the localised communities, 'Clan of Hordes', did take place." (M.S. Gorbachev. Zhizn' i reformy. Moscow: Novosti, Kniga 1, 1995, p. 497.) The mythical 'Klan dzhusov' existed exclusively in Gorbachev's imagination (and parlance, for that matter: nobody else had managed to mix the Kazak tribal confederation - zhuz - with a beverage before).
33 See, for instance: Dilip Hiro. Between Marx and Muhammad. London: Harper Collins, 1995, p. 112.
34 Nazarbaev belongs to the shaprashty tribe of the Great Horde, whereas Kunaev originated from its ysty tribe.
35 Anatoly M. Khazanov. After the USSR. Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, p. 166.
36 "K-2030", p. 15. Presently only a quarter of ethnic Kazaks and 3.6 percent of other Kazakstanis are prepared to defend their country if its sovereignty is violated. (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 12 December 1997.)
37 Kazakstan. Economic Trends. Quarterly Issue. October-December 1997, p. 89.
38 Novaia gazeta, 9 February 1998.
39 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 31 December 1997.
40 Karavan, 17 April 1998.
41 In September 1997 wage arrears in the enterprise sector amounted to a staggering figure of 40 billion tenge (US$ 528 million). (Kazakkstan. Economic Trends. Quarterly Issue. October-December 1997, p. 160.)
42 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 27 November 1996.
43 "K-2030", pp. 9-10.
44 "Divergent Views on Kazakhstan's Economic Performance." Jamestown Foundation Monitor, Vol. IV, No. 10, 16 January 1998. (Electronic Publication)
45 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 28 November 1997.
46 Karavan, 27 March 1998.
47 Karavan, 10 April 1998.
48 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 27 November 1997.
49 Karavan, 10 April 1998.
50 "Kazakhstan's President Vows to Crack Down on Corruption." Jamestown Foundation Monitor, Vol. IV, No. 8, 14 January 1998. (Electronic Publication)
51 Novaia gazeta, 17 March 1998.
52 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 26 December 1996.
53 One of the likely candidates would be Zamanbek Nurkadilov, who occupied the key post of Almaty mayor in the early 1990s. He was sacked by Nazarbaev, apparently for abuse of office, but in December 1997 the President had to reappoint Nurkadilov, this time as akim (governor) of the Almaty region.
54 Novaia gazeta, 7 April 1998.
55 Nurbulat Masanov. "Kazakhskaia politicheskaia i intellektualnaia elita: klanovaia prinadlezhnost' I vnutrietnicheskoe sopernichestvo." Vestnik Evrazii, No. 1(2), 1996, p. 55.