© Published by the Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne. All rights reserved.
RUSSIA AND THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES *
Brad Williams
The informal summit between Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, held in the eastern Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk in early November 1997, was significant because of the agreement by both leaders to boost efforts to sign a peace treaty by the end of this century. Some have proclaimed the agreement as the beginning of a new era for Russo-Japanese relations that have been in a period of stagnation since the end of the Cold War. Building on the friendship established in Krasnoyarsk, another round of talks were held in Japan in April with both leaders agreeing to expedite peace treaty negotiations. The Japanese leader is expected to visit Moscow in Autumn where his proposal for a new border demarcation is expected to be the focus of talks. For Japan, a precondition for the conclusion of a peace treaty is Russia's return of several small islands seized by Soviet troops at the end of World War Two. Dispute over the islands, known by Russians as the Southern Kurils and by the Japanese as the Northern Territories, is the biggest obstacle to the development of closer relations.
Strong domestic constraints in Russia have limited policymakers' freedom to seek a compromise with Japan over the territorial dispute. Despite Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 Russian Presidential election and the economy showing some signs of improvement, factors such as the dominance of conservative hardliners in the Duma who are strongly opposed to a return of the islands, the rise of nationalism and speculation over the health of Boris Yeltsin continue to hamstring efforts at a compromise. Some doubts, therefore, remain as to whether the Russian leader can make the necessary compromises in order to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. There are some analysts in Russia who also question Yeltsin's motives in putting a timetable on the conclusion of a peace treaty, claiming there are economic and geopolitical factors at work. This paper will examine the influence of the rise of nationalism and of Yeltsin's political opponents, the Pandora's box theory, the Russian military, domestic public opinion and the issue of the President's health on Russian policy towards Japan vis-à-vis the Northern Territories problem. It will also analyse Russia's motives in seeking rapprochement with Japan.
The Rebirth of Russia-Initial Signs of Hope
The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 and the Russian Federation emerged onto the world stage assuming responsibility for all the former's international rights and obligations. For Japan, this meant that Russia had become its negotiating partner in the Northern Territories dispute. Images shown in Japan of a defiant Yeltsin, standing atop a tank in front of the Russian Parliament building during the failed coup attempt, gave the impression of a man strongly committed to democratic ideals. An official letter from Yeltsin, brought to Japan in September 1991 by the acting Chairman of the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov, heightened expectations for a resolution to the territorial dispute. Yeltsin's message stressed that the Russian Republic would put an end to the Soviet doctrinaire approach of regarding relations with Japan as those between victor and vanquished and that the territorial dispute be resolved on the basis of "law and justice"(zakonnost' i spravedlivost'). As the Soviet Union had long looked upon Japan as a defeated nation and the Northern Territories as war bounty, this represented a dramatic shift in Russian attitudes.
Also contained in the letter was a modification to the controversial "Five Stage Plan" for normalising relations between Russia and Japan. Initially proposed in 1990 whilst on a visit to Japan as a Russian delegate to the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin's original plan called for: 1. Moscow's acknowledgment of a territorial problem by the end of 1991; 2. granting Japanese citizens free access to the islands by 1993 or 1994; 3. demilitarisation of the region by 1998-2004; 4. conclusion of a peace treaty by 2005-2010; 5. final solution of the problem to be left to the next generation. The plan was significant in that it represented the first time a Soviet politician recognised the existence of a territorial problem. However, stage five of the plan was met with skepticism by Japanese officials who feared that it was an attempt to indefinitely shelve the dispute. Yeltsin's subsequent modification of the plan called for its implementation in a more expeditious manner.
Yeltsin's recognition of the existence of a territorial dispute between Russia and Japan and a call for its resolution to be based on the principles of "law and justice" represented a departure from previous Soviet policy. Together with statements proclaiming the importance of bilateral relations and referring to Japan as a "de-facto ally", it appeared Russo-Japanese relations were moving into a new era of friendship and cooperation.
Domestic Constraints and Obstacles
Despite early indications that Russia under Boris Yeltsin would be more conciliatory with regards to the Northern Territories problem than the Soviet Union, until the recent "no necktie" summit between the Russian President and his Japanese counterpart, little progress had been made towards its resolution. In fact, failure to reach an agreement over the dispute, coupled with a series of incidents including Yeltsin's twice-postponed state visit to Japan, Russian border guards firing on Japanese fishing vessels operating in disputed territorial waters and the dumping of radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan by the Russian Pacific Fleet, caused considerable friction between the two countries, leaving bilateral relations in a period of stagnation.
The transition from a centrally-planned economy to one based on market principles proved to be very painful for most Russians citizens. A rise in the unemployment rate, resulting largely from the privatisation of inefficient state-run enterprises, hyperinflation and reductions in government subsidies dramatically lowered Russian living standards. According to recent figures released by the Russian government, over 20% of the population have been living below the poverty line in recent years. This figure is far too high for a country that still has great power aspirations. The economic crisis, together with an alarming jump in the crime rate, led to harsh criticism of government policies and widespread dissatisfaction with the government itself. For many, the humiliation over the collapse of the Soviet empire and the enormous social, political and economic dislocation it brought about provided the necessary stimulus for Russian nationalism and gave rise to Yeltsin's opponents.
In December 1993, elections were held for the Russian Federal Assembly with results providing Yeltsin with a somewhat paradoxical victory. A new constitution, increasing the President's power by allowing him to veto legislation, was adopted by a majority of voters. Yet many of the democratic reformers, who were Yeltsin's strongest supporters, were not elected to the Duma. Among electoral associations the overtly pro-market and pro-Yeltsin Russia's Choice had the largest number of deputies in the parliament, with 70 (15.6% of all seats). However, nearly one-third of the parliament could be deemed hostile to Yeltsin and 'democratic reforms': Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party gained the largest share of the party-list votes with 59 seats (22.8% of the vote in this category); the Communists controlled 10.7% of the seats, and the Agrarian Party 7.3%. Richard Sakwa observed that:
In adopting the constitution and electing an anti-reform lower house the electorate sent forth two mutually exclusive signals: in accepting the constitution they were voting for stability; but in voting for the opposition, they were rejecting the existing basis for order.
With the election results came pressure to ease back on the economic "shock therapy" that had brought misery to many Russian citizens, particularly the elderly and those on fixed incomes who were beginning to yearn for the economic security the former system provided. Russia's foreign policy, initially overseen by the pro-Western Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, also underwent a transformation. Under pressure from the conservative faction, Russia's foreign policy began to increasingly reflect what was domestically defined as the national interest. However, this shift did not mean that Russia had adopted an anti-Western foreign policy. Rather, its purpose was the pursuit of a more equal relationship with the West. Russia's opposition to aerial attacks on Iraq and its tacit support for Serbian forces in the Bosnian conflict can be viewed within this context.
Russia is presently embroiled in a number of border disputes: with Japan over the Southern Kurils, another over the delineation of the Russian-Chinese border, and one each with Estonia and Latvia over regions acquired by Russia after the annexation of these nations into the Soviet Union. There are fears that a return of the Kuril Islands could open up a whole "Pandora's box" of territorial claims against Moscow. This is, however, a somewhat spurious claim given that Russia forfeited its empire in Eastern Europe and more recently agreed to make concessions to China over their disputed eastern border. The supposed link between Russia's various territorial disputes has been highlighted by Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, who claim that:
The Kuriles were the last straw for Russians, whose national pride was already wounded. With the Kuriles, they were compensating for what they had lost in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic, and Ukraine-getting their emotional revenge for their national humiliation.
More recently, a long list of potentially destabilising domestic problems which include increasing speculation over the Russian President's health, a divisive and distracting conflict between various banking groups and the government over access to the spoils of lucrative sales of State property and Yeltsin's shock decision to sack Victor Chernomyrdin and his Cabinet in late March and the subsequent conflict with deputies in the Duma over the appointment of Sergei Kiriyenko as Prime Minister have diverted much of the attention of the Russian government to domestic politics. Therefore, it has had little opportunity to mould public opinion into accepting Japanese sovereignty over the disputed islands.
During the Soviet era, Russians were ingrained with the belief that the islands were historically and legally an inalienable part of the Motherland (Rodina). Until Mikhail Gorbachev launched his policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost' (openness) in the mid-late 1980's, most were not even aware a territorial dispute existed. According to surveys, a majority of Russians support the idea of concluding a peace treaty with Japan, however, they do not want to see Russia return the disputed islands. For most Russians, a return of the islands and the conclusion of a peace treaty are separate issues, whereas for Japan they are linked- the former being a precondition for the latter. Russians living in the Far East, in particular the islanders themselves, are the most vocal opponents of any territorial concessions. Their biggest fears are that should the Japanese regain control of the rich fishing grounds around the islands that have formed the backbone of the local economy, their economic well-being will be threatened and they may even become refugees. In late 1991, former Sakhalin Governor Valentin Fedorov went as far as to warn that any attempt to make territorial concessions could lead to the creation of a separate Far Eastern Republic. In October last year, the chief administrator of the Southern Kuril District, Vladimir Zema, made a similar threat when in an interview with Itar-Tass he declared, " If a referendum on the fate of the islands were held right now, the result would be unambiguous-secession from Russia." In an apparent response to the Yeltsin-Hashimoto agreement, the Sakhalin government, which has jurisdiction over the disputed islands, constructed a memorial on one of the islands commemorating 300 years of Russian exploration in the region. This has been interpreted as a move by the Sakhalin administration, which fears losing control over lucrative fishing rights around the islands, to strengthen its claims of sovereignty over the Kurils.
The influence of public opinion on maintaining Russia's territorial integrity has strengthened with the Russian Republic's 1990 "Declaration of Sovereignty" and 1993 constitution which stipulates that a cession of Russian territory must be put to a referendum. The validity of Russian public opinion in determining the ownership of the islands has been questioned by Hiroshi Kimura, Graham Allison and Konstantin Sarkisov who claim that:
Because Russia has no rights over the disputed islands in the first place, it has nothing to cede. Accordingly, the decision to return this territory to Japan is, legally speaking, not a 'cession' of territory but merely the drawing of a border between Japan and Russia which remains unresolved since the Second World War.
Whilst Russian law may stipulate that a cession of territory be decided by a referendum, Japanese government officials stress that what they seek from Russia is not a cession but a handover of the disputed islands. This would not require a plebiscite and could be implemented by the Russian government should it have the will to do so. Furthermore, concerning the two smaller islands, Shikotan and the Habomais islets, it has been argued that since the 1956 Joint Declaration was ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet, their return does not require approval by referendum. Regardless of the debates in Japan concerning the legality of the dispute, the dominance of anti-Yeltsin deputies in the Russian Duma, should the government decide to return any of the four islands in the near future, would make ratification of such an agreement highly unlikely.
The Russian military is also viscerally opposed to the idea of returning the disputed islands to Japan. The islands were militarised in the 1970s and 1980s in response to new developments in strategic deterrence. The Sea of Okhotsk became a bastion for Soviet SLBM submarines based at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. As the islands straddle important access routes from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Pacific Ocean, their occupation was considered to be of vital strategic importance. Russian military planners fear that if Japan regains control of the islands, it would allow US attack submarines easier access into the Sea of Okhotsk making it more difficult to defend its sea supply lines to Petropavlovsk in the event of war. However, it has been argued that the end of the Cold War, the operation of the START-2 Treaty along with a reduction in fleet numbers, precipitated by Russia's economic problems, and the subsequent need for fewer fleet bases have invalidated the arguments for a bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk. Despite these arguments, the military opposes adjusting to Russia's reduced circumstances. The military's support for Boris Yeltsin during the October 1993 confrontation with Parliament strengthened its political position making it difficult for the President not to act in accordance with its wishes.
Speculation over the Russian President's health has cast some doubts as to whether he will last through 1998. Should Boris Yeltsin be forced to relinquish power, the Prime Minister would assume the Presidency. According to the constitution, he then must call fresh Presidential elections within three months. After three rounds of voting, Yeltsin's choice to fill the Prime Ministerial post, the relatively unknown former Energy Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, was finally approved by the Duma. During his visit to Japan in July 1998, the first ever by a Russian Prime Minister, Kiriyenko agreed to accelerate efforts to sign a peace treaty by the year 2000 based on the 1993 Tokyo Declaration. Former Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin made his views on the problem clear, when on a 1993 tour of the Southern Kurils, he said he was opposed to Russia returning the islands. This statement caused a stir within Japan, forcing the Prime Minister to backtrack somewhat by stressing this was only his personal opinion and not the view of the government. In a further reflection of the views of the leadership, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, in accordance with the final stage of Yeltsin's Five Stage Plan, stated shortly after his elevation to the post in June 1996, that he thought resolution of the territorial problem should be left to the next generation.
In opposition circles, the leader of the Communist Party, Gennadii Zyuganov, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky have both voiced their opposition to Russia returning the disputed islands. Asked how he would handle the controversy with Japan over the Kuril Islands, the pugnacious Zhirinovsky proclaimed: "If I am in charge, the Japanese will not ask me for the Kurile Islands. Because my ships will be sailing around Hokkaido. Let the Japanese save Hokkaido. They'll forget about the Kurile Islands forever."
Misperceptions of Boris Yeltsin?
As mentioned previously, until the recent agreement between Boris Yeltsin and his Japanese counterpart Ryutaro Hashimoto, little substantial progress had been made towards resolving the decades-long territorial dispute. As a result, bilateral relations, since the end of the Cold War, had fallen into what has often been described as a period of stagnation. In Russia, widespread disillusionment with economic reforms, and for many, the humiliation over the loss of the former Soviet empire, has given rise to a tide of nationalism which has seen the former communists and their conservative allies dominate the State Duma, making it politically dangerous for Boris Yeltsin to even consider returning the disputed islands to Japan.
Whilst the victory of Yeltsin's opponents in the December 1993 and 1995 elections gave them the balance of power and the means to dominate the legislative agenda, the President's version of the new constitution was adopted giving him wide-ranging powers. The reorientation of Russian foreign policy has been linked by some, with the ascendancy of the conservative Security Council (established in May 1992) over the Foreign Ministry in the policy making process. However, constitutionally, the President decides the composition of the Security Council. Whilst it is doubtful all the members will share views similar to the President, it is highly unlikely Yeltsin would appoint a Council dominated by his opponents. Therefore, it is doubtful the Council would formulate policies that were not in accordance with the President's views.
According to Douglas A. Borer, "Yeltsin is a political survivor, characterized by his ability to achieve goals through both democratic and autocratic means. Yeltsin's defiance of communist hardliners during the aborted coup in 1991 and his decision to forcibly terminate a tense standoff with armed opponents by blasting the White House with tank fire in October 1993, provide graphic illustrations of his employment of these two contradictory means of conflict resolution. It should also be noted that in the past Boris Yeltsin has issued a number of Presidential Decrees in order to break political stalemates. Moreover, in a further sign of his growing authoritarianism, he has moved the "power organs" (army, police and the former KGB) of the State under his own jurisdiction. Given the constitutional powers enjoyed by the President, is it possible that Boris Yeltsin is in principle opposed to returning the disputed islands to Japan, or in the very least, unwilling to deal with the problem? As previously mentioned, stage five of Yeltsin's Five Stage Plan, calling for resolution of the dispute to be left to the next generation (in the period 2005-2010), demonstrates a certain unwillingness to tackle the issue.
Boris Yeltsin's proposal for solving the territorial dispute based on the principles of "law and justice", later reconfirmed in the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, deserves a more thorough analysis. Concerning the concept of "law", in Japan, it is thought to refer to international law, in particular, confirmation of the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. This stipulated that Shikotan and Habomais were to be handed over to Japan upon the signing of a peace treaty with further talks to determine the fate of the two remaining islands. In the Tokyo Declaration, signed by both the Russian President and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa at the conclusion of the bilateral Summit, Yeltsin indirectly confirmed the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration by stating that "all treaties and international promises between Japan and the Soviet Union will continue to apply to Japan and Russia." Later in a press conference, the Kremlin leader declared that "We as the legal successor to the Soviet Union, cannot run away from the obligation of fulfilling all international promises. Of course, this Declaration [1956 Joint Declaration] is also included amongst these."
The concept of "justice" is, however, subjective and therefore open to many different interpretations. Yeltsin has not given a clear explanation as to what he means by these principles making it difficult to comprehend their true meaning. However, in a special address to the Russian people in November 1991, Boris Yeltsin referred to the principles of "justice and humanism" and the importance of defending the rights and dignity of Russians, beginning with the Southern Kuril islanders.As the islanders are strongly opposed to any Russian territorial concessions, this could be interpreted as government support for their position. Japanese Sovietologist Hiroshi Kimura provides an optimistic interpretation when he refers to historical justice. That is, Russia recognises the error of Stalin's expansionism and agrees to discussions on the sovereignty of the two remaining islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu. "Law and Justice", for those in Japan familiar with the legal and historical complexities of the Northern Territories problem, is the "two islands plus alpha" formula that is outlined in the 1956 Joint Declaration. Given the apparent divergence of opinions regarding the meaning of the concepts of "law and justice" within Japan and Russia, doubts must remain as to whether this can form the basis of a future resolution to the dispute.
In contrast to the prevailing opinion in Japan that Boris Yeltsin, in principle, supports a return of the disputed islands but is constrained by domestic factors, are the views of one Russian commentator who claims that Japanese analysts are mistaken in their view that Boris Yeltsin, as the flagbearer of democracy, is a fervent supporter of a resolution to the territorial problem, and that all opponents of a territorial return are conservative and anti-Yeltsin. In support of this claim, it must be remembered that under the present constitution Boris Yeltsin enjoys considerable power and as such should assume some responsibility for policy towards Japan. Various statements made by Yeltsin declaring his opposition to the return of the islands have often been seen in Japan as attempts by the pragmatic and impulsive leader at playing up to nationalist sentiments and have thus received little attention. Given the political climate in Russia and the President's populist nature it would appear that Yeltsin is simply not willing to deal with the problem. Furthermore, there are few political figures in Russia today, regardless of ideological affiliation, who support Japan's claim to sovereignty over the islands. Most of those who are sympathetic with Japan's position are politicians who lack any significant influence or are academics that are not particularly well known by the Russian public. For instance, former deputy foreign minister Giorgi Kunadze, in what has been referred to as the "Kunadze Line", believes Russia should implement the 1956 Joint Declaration and conduct talks on the fate of Kunashiri and Etorofu with the possibility of joint administration. A deadline for resolution of the dispute should be set and if no agreement is reached, the matter should be settled by the International Court of Justice. Grigory Yavlinsky has also declared the Northern Territories should be returned to Japan.
Motives in Seeking Rapprochement with Japan
If Boris Yeltsin is essentially negative towards making any territorial concessions to Japan, why make statements raising Japanese expectations for a return of the disputed islands? According to one Russian scholar "The essence of the Kremlin's policy is to extract the largest possible amount of material and technical aid in exchange for vague promises of a resolution to the territorial problem." The Yomiuri Shimbun also picked up on Yeltsin's strategy when it claimed that his recognition of the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, during his visit to Tokyo, was aimed at extracting economic aid from Japan. If this in fact is the rationale behind Russia's policy towards Japan, it is unclear whether it has been entirely successful.
Japan's economic aid policy towards Russia has followed a two-track approach with Japanese leaders attempting to draw a distinction between multilateral assistance through international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and bilateral aid. Japan has been described as a reluctant aid donor to Russia with its primary objective in contributing to multilateral assistance packages, not being a desire to see Russia succeed with its democratic reforms, but to avoid isolation from its major industrialised trading partners. Bilateral aid has been largely influenced by a policy of linking politics and economics (seikei fukabun). That is, Japanese economic cooperation is contingent upon Russia making territorial concessions. Officially, there has been some relaxation in the Japanese government's position with the adoption of a policy of "enlarged balance" or "expanded equilibrium"( kakudai kinko). This policy seeks a simultaneous improvement in both economic and political fields. In a further attempt to emphasise the "de-linking" of politics and economics, Prime Minister Hashimoto, last July, announced three new principles to govern bilateral relations: 1. trust; 2. mutual benefit; 3. long-term perspective.
Despite the change in official policy, there are some doubts as to whether a substantial policy shift has taken place. Nobuo Arai and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa believe that " By adopting the policy of 'expanded equilibrium', the Foreign Ministry never repudiated the policy of 'inseparability of politics and economics'. Therefore, the demand for the return of the 'Northern Territories' continues to be the foundation of Japan's Russia policy...." Furthermore, Japan's aid towards Russia has been criticised on qualitative grounds. A large portion of Japanese economic aid consists of non-grant assistance such as Export-Import Bank loans and trade insurance, which are designed to promote Japanese trade as much as Russian development. In recognition of the role Japanese aid can play in cultivating Russian public opinion and creating a favorable environment for a resolution to the territorial dispute, economic assistance has had a particularly strong focus on the Far East region. It is under this pretext that the Japanese government has been extending humanitarian assistance to the Northern Territories.
Russia is particularly eager to expand economic relations with Japan. It sees Japanese investment as a vital element for breathing life into the stagnant Far East economy and to help it emerge from economic isolation in the Asia Pacific region. A number of Russian proposals have been put forward in recent years for joint development of the disputed islands. However, a significant problem exists deciding under which country's legal system will companies operate. The Japanese government fears that if its corporations are subject to Russian laws, it could be interpreted as tacit consent to Russian sovereignty over the islands. It has therefore expressed reservations over such proposals. A recent plan outlined by Valery Zaitsev, director of the Centre for Japanese and Pacific Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, has attempted to address Japanese concerns by calling for the establishment of a joint administrative organisation to develop the islands' economies. A top Japanese diplomat says Tokyo is willing to consider the idea if it is proposed by the Russian government, and if it is treated as an interim step rather than a final solution to the dispute.
Most Japanese enterprises in the Russian Far East are engaged in small-scale trading and services. However, a number of Japanese proposals exist which will, if realised, have a major impact on future regional economic relations. Notable among these are plans to develop oil and gas reserves off Sakhalin Island (the so-called Sakhalin 1 and Sakhalin 2 projects). A proposal has been floated to build a pipeline from Sakhalin, via Hokkaido, to Niigata in Japan, combining the outputs of Sakhalin 1 and 2, with natural gas from the nearby Republic of Sakha. However, a myriad of problems casts some doubts on the viability of this and other large-scale projects. These include Russian defaults on previous credits, confusion over the distribution of power between central authorities and the administrations in the Far East, unclear legislation and the inconsistent legal enforcement of property rights and contractual obligations. An economic cooperation package (Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan) that is hoped will address some of these problems was agreed to at the Krasnoyarsk summit. An agreement at the following April summit to establish a joint investment company also aims to promote closer economic ties. However, it is unlikely that these proposals will shift the focus of Japanese investment in the Far East in the short-medium term.
In addition to seeking economic cooperation, it has been argued that Russia's growing uneasiness over China's economic growth and military power may be a significant factor in its seeking rapprochement with Japan. According to noted scholar Alexander Tsipko, "The improvement in Russo-Japanese relations will become the trump card for suppressing China's projection." Once considered to be the ideological, economic and military mentor to its former communist ally, the former Soviet Union and, particularly, Russia has been besieged by economic and political strife, whilst during the same period, the Chinese Communist Party has presided over an economy that is experiencing unprecedented growth and prosperity. This contrast in fortunes has been particularly lamentable for many Russians.
Russian perceptions of a potential Chinese military and economic threat are, to a certain extent, the result of Russia's myopic post-Cold War China policy. Cuts in military spending have severely impacted on Russia's sprawling military-industrial complex. No longer able to rely on the military for orders, the military-industrial complex has had to look overseas for buyers in order to stay afloat. Given the problems of capital flight and a decrease in exports, overseas arms sales have also become an important source of foreign exchange earnings for Russia. Fuelled by booming growth rates, China has, in recent years, increased its military spending and embarked on an ambitious modernisation program making it an important buyer of Russian arms. Examples of military cooperation between the two neighbours include the sale of advanced Su-27 fighters, hundreds of Russian scientists working in Chinese defense industries and Russian nuclear reactor technology transfers. The dilemma for Russia is that whilst it does not want to see China emerge as a dominant military power, it has very few options-economic considerations compel it to assist with China's military buildup.
The rapid growth of Russo-Chinese economic relations in recent years has caused a dramatic increase in Russian contact with Chinese citizens. Due to its close proximity and its extensive border trade, the Russian Far East has been particularly affected by these developments. Despite the obvious benefits to this new relationship, considerable strain has been placed on the social fabric of the Far East. An influx of Chinese citizens and goods into the sparsely populated region has heightened fears of a Chinese "invasion" which have been further exacerbated by an increasing migration of ethnic Russians from the Far East to European Russia. Problems over unscrupulous Chinese business practices and crime have lead to calls for limits on Chinese access to and activities in the Russian Far East.
It has been argued that a balance-of-power system is emerging in Asia. In what closely resembles a traditional balance-of-power system where power is checked with counterpower through the formation of alliances and counteralliances, Russia has, in recent years, been trying to deepen political and military ties with China. In April last year, Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed two documents, one outlining a security cooperation partnership and the other calling for troop reductions along their border. In November, just after his informal summit with the Japanese leader in Krasnoyarsk, Boris Yeltsin met his Chinese counterpart in Beijing and reached an agreement settling a long-standing border dispute between the two powers. It is believed that a driving factor for rapprochement with China is to use the development of relations as a lever to attain a position where it can check US power in Asia and regain its status as a great power. According to Irina Kobrinskaya, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Russia is looking for strong new partners to maintain a balance of power in the world. Russia is focusing its foreign policy on Asia to have room for manoeuvre."
Russia's use of the "Japan card" against China and the "China card" against Japan's major ally the US, bears some resemblance to the United States' détente policy of the early 1970s. In order to reduce the potential threat to its interests emanating from either the Soviet Union or the PRC and to induce their cooperation with American policy, the US sought to establish a measure of friendly relations with both of the archrivals. Having achieved this, it could then use its unique middle position in the triangular relationship to tilt in favour of one or the other. This strategy has produced some benefits for Russia. By trying to strengthen its relations with China, which has expressed concerns about the renewal of the US-Japan security pact and is unhappy with US-led pressure on issues ranging from trade and human rights to Taiwan, Moscow has won Beijing's backing for its opposition to NATO's eastern expansion. Conversely, by putting a time frame on the resolution of the territorial dispute with Japan, which also has concerns over China's growing economic and military strength, Russia gained Tokyo's support for its entry into APEC (which was agreed to in November last year) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). More importantly, it hopes to attract Japanese investment into the Far East to revive that region's sagging economic fortunes. If successful, this may halt the "dehumanisation" of the region and in the process allay fears of an imminent Chinese "invasion".
Conclusion
The agreement by Boris Yeltsin and Ryutaro Hashimoto last November to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000 is symbolic first step for both countries in their efforts to emerge from a period of stagnation in bilateral relations. However, it is quite unrealistic to expect both countries to achieve this goal within the relatively short time-span of two years. All that exists to date is an intention- many obstacles still lie in the path of its implementation. A significant divergence of perceptions over the preconditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty still exists. For Japan, the conclusion of a peace treaty is conditional upon Russia returning the Northern Territories. However, for most Russians (including the leadership), the return of the islands and the settlement of a peace treaty are separate issues.
In Russia, strong domestic constraints such as rising nationalism, the dominance of hardline conservative deputies in the Duma, opposition from the public (in particular the islanders), military and the leadership, and in the face of these, a lack of will from the Russian President, casts doubts on the disputed islands being reverted to Japanese sovereignty by the new millennium. However, given the relatively fluid nature of Russian domestic politics and the unpredictability of Boris Yeltsin himself, predictions cannot be made with absolute certainty. It would appear that in putting a timetable on the resolution of the territorial dispute, Russia is attempting to extract economic aid from Japan. This is a strategy that has been employed in the past but given the nature of Japanese assistance, there are some doubts as to whether it has been entirely successful. Russia, it also seems, is attempting to play a balance-of-power game by using rapprochement with Japan as a means to blunt China's rise in power and conversely, strengthening relations with China in attempt to regain its status as a great power.
Endnotes:
* I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Peter Lentini for advice used in the preparation of this paper.
1 This headline was carried in the major Japanese daily the Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 October 1997, p.1. Similar reports of the agreement concluded: "The mutual distrust has been overcome, the ice in relations has been broken, there has been a warming in all spheres and a breakthrough in economic relations, and a positive new page in world history has been opened...", The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (1997), vol. C LI C, no. 44, p.2.
2 Successive Japanese governments have been steadfast in their demand that Russia return the Northern Territories. Prime Minister Hashimoto's new proposal adopts a more subtle approach, which if implemented, would see the Russo-Japanese border redrawn to the north of the disputed islands.
3 Gaimushô Daijin Kanbô Kokunai Kôhô ka (1994),Warera no Hoppô Ryôdo (Our Northern Territories), p.29.
4 The Economist, 2 May 1992, p.41.
5 W. Nimmo (1994), Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, p.115.
6 In a memorandum to Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in November 1991, Yeltsin declared Russia and Japan to be de-facto allies.
7 Post-war bilateral relations have been characterised by a high degree of animosity and distrust. The casual dress code was an attempt by both leaders to create a relaxing environment for the talks, which were aimed at deepening the friendship between the two. An aim of the April summit held in Kawana, south of Tokyo, was to build on the friendship established in Krasnoyarsk.
8 Russian Economic Trends-Monthly Update (1997) <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/datalib/ret/>, accessed January 1998.
9 D. A. Borer (1997), "The new Eurasian state: Russia, the forgotten Pacific player", in M. T. Berger and D. A. Borer eds., The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century, London: Routledge, p. 114.
10 P. Lentini (1995), "Overview of the Campaign", in P.Lentini ed., Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly, Budapest: Central European University Press, p. 85.
11 Ibid., p.86.
12 J. Nakano (1995), "Roshia Gaikô ni okeru Ajia no Hijû" (The Relative Importance of Asia in Russia's Diplomacy), Roshia Kenkyû, no. 19, p. 67.
13 V. Solovyov, and E. Klepikova (1995), Zhirinovsky: Russian Fascism and the Making of a Dictator, Trans. C.A. Fitzpatrick, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, p. 113.
14 Immediately after a powerful earthquake shook the southern Kurils in October 1994, a public opinion poll was conducted in the Maritime Territory which showed that nearly 90% of respondents favored the prompt return of the disputed islands to Japan. This can be interpreted as a short-lived manifestation of the frustration felt at the inability of Russian authorities to provide normal living conditions for people on the ill-fated islands.
15 P. Falkenheim Meyer (1993), " Moscow's Relation's With Tokyo: Domestic Obstacles to a Territorial Agreement", Asian Survey, vol. C C C I I I , no. 10 October, p. 957. It has been surmised that Fedorov took a hard-line position because he saw the territorial issue as a useful way to gain popular support at a time when his economic reform program was foundering. Also, given the region predominantly consists of highly nationalistic ethnic Russians, it is difficult to imagine a secessionist movement gaining popular support.
16 Cited in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (1997), vol. XLIX, no.40, p.21. Like Fedorov, Zema has resorted to desperate measures whilst his own position has come under threat with signatures being gathered in the district to recall him.
17 NHK News, Tokyo, 11 November 1997.
18 H. Kimura, G.T. Allison and C.O. Sarkisov (1993), Nichi-Bei-Ro Shinjidai e no Shinario (Scenarios for New Relations Between Japan, the United States and Russia), Diamond Publishing, Tokyo, p. 48. The assertion that Russia has no rights over the disputed islands is not irrefutable. It is partly based on the argument that the Yalta Agreement, which specified that the Kurile Islands were to be handed over to the Soviet Union in return for its participation in the war against Japan, was not signed by the Japanese government. It would appear that Roosevelt was not aware of Japan's historical claims to the islands when he agreed to Stalin's conditions for entry into the war. Ownership of the islands was obfuscated by the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The onset of the Cold War brought about a change in U.S. strategic thinking. It adopted the position that title could only be transferred to those nations willing to be a party to the peace treaty. As Moscow was dissatisfied with many aspects of the peace settlement, the U.S. believed, quite correctly, it would not sign. In the peace treaty, Japan renounced its rights to the Kuril Islands but the treaty did not specify what nation was to receive them. It is the Japanese position that the four disputed islands are not a part of the Kuril Islands it renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This is contradicted by Prime Minister Yoshida's statement in 1951 that Etorofu and Kunashiri were part of the Kurils- a position also clearly stated in the Foreign Ministry's August 1955 pamphlet, "The Northern Islands". See R. de Villafranca (1993), "Japan and the Northern Territories Dispute: Past, Present, Future", Asian Survey, vol. XXXIII, no.6, June, p. 611.
19 According to the 1956 Joint Declaration, it was agreed that upon conclusion of a peace treaty the Soviet Union would hand over Shikotan Island and the Habomais islets. Continuing negotiations would take place concerning the larger two islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri. This is referred to as the "two islands plus alpha formula". In 1960 after the Japanese Diet ratified a renewal of the US-Japan security treaty, Moscow declared that it would only hand over Shikotan and Habomais if all foreign troops were withdrawn from Japan, thus effectively rescinding its offer to return two of the four islands in the dispute.
20 G. Jukes (1993), Russia's Military and the Northern Territories Issue, Working Paper no. 277, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 5-35.
21Asahi Shimbun, 14 July 1998, p.1.
22 Asahi Shimbun 5 July 1996, p.2. Just hours after Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced the agreement, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister, Boris Nemtsov, also gave his "personal opinion" saying that it would be unconstitutional for Russia to cede the Kuril islands to Japan. The St. Petersburg Times,10-16 November 1997,<http.www. spb. su/ times> , accessed 13 January 1998.
23 Cited in Solovyov and Klepikova, op.cit., p. 94.
24 P. Falkenheim Meyer (1994), "Russia's Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia", Pacific Affairs, vol. 67, no. 4, p.496.
25 N. Koizumi (1995), "Roshia Gaikô no Mosaku- Chikai Gaikoku to no Atarashii Kankei o Motomete" (Trial and Error in Russian Diplomacy: Seeking a New Relationship with the Near-Abroad), Roshia Kenkyû, no. 19, p.7.
26 Borer, op. cit., p.112.
27 Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 October 1993, p.2.
28 Ibid.
29 Nihonkoku Gaimushô & Roshia Renpô Gaimushô (1992), Nichi-Ro kan Ryôdo Mondai no Rekishi ni kansuru Kyôdô Sakusei Shiryôshû (A Joint Collection of Historical Records Concerning the Territorial Problem Between Japan and Russia), p. 44.
30 Kimura, op. cit., p.189. There are some who would disagree with the use of the terms "Stalin's expansionism" to describe the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan. Boris Slavinsky points out that according to secret agreement reached at Yalta, Moscow was obliged to join the Allies in the war in the Pacific in two or three months after the capitulation of Germany. See B. Slavinsky (1993),"The Soviet Occupation of the Kurile Islands and the Plans for the Capture of Northern Hokkaido", Japan Forum, vol.5, no.1, p. 97.
31 I. Shadlin (1993), "Nihonjin no Roshia-kan. Koko ga Machigatteiru" (Japanese Perceptions of Russia: Here is What is Wrong), Jiyû, June, vol. 35, p. 26.
32 In 1990, on a visit to Kunashiri Island, Yeltsin declared that "this land has a value that makes it a waste to hand over to another country. Early the following year on a tour to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, Yeltsin stated that he had no intention of returning the Kurile Islands. H. Kimura (1993), Nichi Ro Kokkyô Kôshô shi (A History of Japanese-Russian Border Negotiations), Tokyo: Chûkô Shinsho, p.201.
33 G. Kunadze (1988), "The Future of Soviet Japanese Relations" in Japan Times, 19 December, p.7. Resolution of the dispute by a third party has been suggested in the past. Both Japan and Russia do not have unquestionable legal claims to the islands and are therefore wary of taking the matter to the International Court. Russia sees the territorial dispute as a strictly bilateral issue and rejects any offer of third party mediation.
34 M. Krupyanko (1993), "Eritsuin Seiken to Nichi-Ro Kankei" (The Yeltsin Administration and Japanese-Russian Relations), Okayama Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyûsô, Trans. Takeshi Tomita. p. 40. This strategy is ironic, as it has been argued by one scholar that "The Japanese position has always been to hold out vague prospects of unspecified subsequent economic rewards in exchange for prior concrete Russian concessions on the territorial issue". H. Gelman (1994), "Japan and China as Seen From Moscow Today", Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol. XIII, no. 4, p. 51.
35 Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 October 1993, p. 2.
36 Gelman, op.cit., pp. 52-53.
37 Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 October 1997, p.30.
38 N. Arai, and T. Hasegawa (1997), "The Russian Far East in Russo-Japanese Relations", in T. Akaha ed., Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties with Asia Pacific, London: Routledge, p.176.
39 Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 October 1997, p.30. This proposal also calls for the islands to be taken from the Sakhalin region's jurisdiction and put under direct presidential rule.
40 East Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1996), Pacific Russia: Risks and Rewards, Canberra, p. 68.
41 Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 November 1997, p. 1. The "Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan" covers six priority measures: 1. protecting Japanese investment in Russia; 2. promoting the integration of Russia into the world economy; 3. upgrading aid for Russian economic reforms; 4. training Russian managers; 5. strengthen dialogue on bilateral energy talks; 6. cooperating in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
42 Yomiuri Shimbun, 11 November 1997, p. 2.
43 J.C. Moltz (1997), "Russo-Chinese Normalization from an International Perspective: Coping with the Pressures of Change", in T. Akaha ed., Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties with the Asia-Pacific, London: Routledge, pp. 190-191.
44 K.E. Calder (1996), Asia's Deadly Triangle, London: Nicholas Brealey, p. 126.
45 Stoessinger, J.G. (1990), The Might of Nations: World Politics in our Time, New York: Mc-Graw Hill, p. 25.
46 The Australian, 28 April 1997, p. 11.
47 G.A. Craig, and A.L. George (1990), Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 135.