Uzbekistan Looks West
Shahram Akbarzadeh
With the Soviet collapse in December 1991 the Central Asian state of Uzbekistan was bestowed the mantle of independence and national sovereignty. The political elite in that republic, under the leadership of President Islam Karimov, has taken great care to present itself, not as the beneficiary of this historically momentous event but, as the guardian and champion of Uzbekistan's statehood. In the space of less than five years, Uzbekistan acquired all trappings of an independent and sovereign state. It is now eager to display this newly-acquired status in both the national and international arena. In December 1992 Uzbekistan adopted its own constitution, complete with its own national anthem and national flag.
The constitution makes Uzbek the national language of the state; Uzbek is spoken by nearly 75% of the population. In September 1993 a presidential decree ordered the adoption of the Latin alphabet to replace Cyrillic. The transition to Latin is optimistically expected to be complete by 2000. The Russian language is to become redundant in the public sphere by 2000, creating anxiety and concern among Slavic citizens of Uzbekistan. The process of renaming public places and state institutions is nearly complete. Russian appellations no longer adorn state buildings; they have been replaced by Uzbek titles, though their meanings are often the same. For example, Oli Majlis is replacing Verkhovnyi Sovet, both of which mean the Supreme Council.
The move to assert Uzbekistan's statehood in the more tangible areas of the economy and security have been somewhat slower. Only after Central Asia was effectively expelled from the Russian rouble zone did Uzbekistan adopt its own national currency, the Som (November 1993). In terms of security, Uzbekistan was in a better position than its Central Asian neighbours, in that the Soviet Army's Turkistan Division with a considerable amount of armoury was based in that republic. Uzbekistan's transit routes used by Soviet forces withdrawing from Afghanistan also meant that the Soviet Army's hardware would initially have to be stationed in depots within Uzbekistan before being sent to their original base. It would not be surprising if some of this hardware never completed the journey and remained in the transit depots of Uzbekistan. Upon independence Uzbekistan laid claim to all Soviet properties on its soil, including all military hardware and personnel. The establishment of 'national' armed forces was seen in Tashkent as a critical and salient symbol of statehood. One of the very first measures (January 1992) of the young state of Uzbekistan was just that.1
This paper is concerned with Uzbekistan's security capabilities. It examines Uzbekistan's evolving relations with the Russian Federation, and its attitude towards security arrangements within the Commonwealth of Independent States. From Tashkent's perspective, alternative political and military alliances are growing to be more desirable. Uzbekistan's relations with Turkey and NATO are assessed in this light. This analysis concludes with some thoughts on the implications of this shift for Uzbekistan's sense of security and its regional status.
Defence Capabilities
Uzbekistan's armed forces operate on the principle of male conscription for a period of 18 months. The current strength of Uzbekistan's army and air force is estimated to be less than 40,000 men.2 This figure would obviously include logistics and communication personnel as well as combat troops. Uzbekistan's internal security is enforced by troops under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee for National Security (the former KGB).
Uzbekistan exercises direct responsibility for guarding its frontiers and maintaining their inviolability. Unlike other Central Asian states whose external borders with their non-CIS neighbours are patrolled by Russian guards, Uzbekistan has refused to forfeit this task to CIS border guards. There are no troops under Moscow's command in Uzbekistan's territory. The border with the troubled territory of Afghanistan is relatively short (137km) which makes patrol and control feasible. The border with the unstable state of Tajikistan is longer (1,161km) and more difficult to monitor. Uzbekistan's total length of borders is just over 6,221km.
The modest size of Uzbekistan's armed forces should not cause discomfort and a feeling of insecurity in Tashkent. The young state of Uzbekistan maintains the largest force in Central Asia. Amicable, if complicated, relations characterise Uzbekistan's ties with its neighbours; no external menace threatens Uzbekistan. The Taliban forces in Afghanistan have shown no stomach for advancing north of the Afghan-Uzbek border, and Afghan forces allied with Tashkent appear to have regained some composure to act as a buffer between Taliban and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's relatively large armed forces within Central Asia should inspire self-confidence in the strength of the state. Though there are continuing problems with subversive material and ideas being smuggled across borders, mostly from Tajikistan, these do not represent an immediate security threat to Uzbekistan. They are, however, ominous reminders of the precariousness of Uzbekistan's control over its borders.
Feeling Insecure
Uzbekistan's sense of security is not set in stone. There is no guarantee that Taliban forces will not change tack and launch a northbound campaign. In Tajikistan, the formation of a reconciliation government, brokered by the United Nations in June 1997, has brought Islamists and nationalist leaders to positions of power in Dushanbe. The reconciliation process has also involved the merging of government and opposition armed forces. Although significant differences still exist between the two sides, a deep distrust of Tashkent and its policies is a uniting factor. Islamist and nationalist activists regard the Soviet drawn borders between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as unfair. This view was most effectively put forward by the Tajik scholar Rakhim Masov, who claimed to have unearthed an Uzbek-Soviet conspiracy, dating back to the 1920s, to deprive Tajiks of their centres of civilisation, ie the two ancient cities of Samarkand and Bukhara now lying within Uzbekistan.3
On the other hand, Tajikistani's President Imomali Rahmonov who came to power at the end of 1992 and brought with him loyal allies from the southern province of Kulob, is also alienated from Tashkent by President Karimov's patronising attitude towards Dushanbe and Uzbekistan's suspected support for rebel commanders in Tajikistan's army.4 In November 1998 President Rahmonov went as far as accusing "the Uzbek leadership" of plotting to take control of "the whole of Tajikistan".5 Rahmonov's mistrust of Tashkent is ironic because the Kulobi forces which brought him to the presidential palace would not have been able to advance towards Dushanbe and seize power in December 1992 had not Uzbekistan provided them with transit routes, armoury and air power.
The inter-Tajik peace process that brought together the two opposing factions in June 1997 did not include the Abdullojonov faction from the north. Abdumalik Abdullojonov, who had served as Tajikistan's Prime Minister in 1992-94, is closely associated with President Karimov of Uzbekistan. His exclusion from the reconciliation process, followed by legal proceedings to bar him from public office is understood in Tashkent as a thinly disguised anti-Uzbekistan message by the new leadership in Dushanbe. From Tashkent's point of view, Tajikistan is a potential enemy state.
Even if the new government does not adopt clearly defined anti-Tashkent policies, the very fact that it is less than fully in control of Tajikistan's territory is a cause for concern in Tashkent. On 16 February 1999 Tashkent was rocked by a spat of early morning bombings, leading President Karimov to denounce extremists and accuse Tajikistan of allowing terrorist groups to operate freely in its territory.
To complicate matters, President Rahmonov has openly called upon Russia to uphold Tajikistan's security. According to ITAR-TASS President Rahmonov told reporters on 6 February 1999: Russia is the "only reliable partner and [guarantor] of stability and security in Tajikistan".6 Over 20,000 Russian soldiers are currently stationed in Tajikistan as part of the CIS peace-keeping force and border guards. The Russian military presence in Tajikistan is currently being formalised into a long term arrangement. In April 1999, the Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeev announced in Dushanbe plans to maintain a Russian military base in Tajikistan for 25 years.7
This is a direct affront to Uzbekistan's sense of security for Tashkent now sees Russian forces in Central Asia as posing the most serious threat to its sovereignty. Sergeev's announcement caused a public row between presidents Karimov and Rahmonov. The Tajikistani president criticised his counterpart for not respecting Tajikistan's sovereignty by suggesting that Dushanbe should have consulted Tashkent before agreeing to the Russian military base deal.8 This was not the first time the two presidents clashed in public. In the May 1995 CIS summit President Karimov mocked his Tajikistani counterpart for being incompetent.9 Tension between the two states originates from Uzbekistan's urge to retain a degree of influence over Tajikistan. Tashkent is not at all pleased with the way Dushanbe is slipping away from its sphere of influence and aligning itself with Moscow.
The sizeable Russian presence in Tajikistan and the anti-Tashkent climate in that republic present a challenge to Uzbekistan's regional aspirations. In a recent press conference, President Karimov laid bare his vision of Uzbekistan as a regional power, responsible for "security in Central Asia".10 Tashkent's regional aspirations are a source of discomfort for other Central Asian states, all of whom have large Uzbek minorities and long running disputes over borders and water distribution along the border. See Table 1 for an impression of the demographic weight of Uzbeks in Central Asia and the state of Uzbekistan as the most populated state in the region.
An example of border disputes was provided recently in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan, a region which borders Uzbekistan and is home to a large Uzbek community. (Osh was the scene of inter-ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in May 1990.) In March 1999 Kyrgyzstan's Defence Minister General Myrzakan Subanov told the Kyrgyz parliament that Uzbekistan has been "advancing its borders into Kyrgyz territory".11 Turkmenistan-Uzbekistani relations have also been complicated by their dispute over access to waters of the Amu Darya river which traverses Turkmenistan before reaching Uzbekistan and marking their common border near Charjou. Amu Darya is the only source of water for the precious cotton fields of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan along their common border near Charjou. It is critical for both states to have access to an abundant amount of water for their hard-currency earning crop. But Amu Darya's waters are not inexhaustible and neither state is willing to compromise on its export earnings from the sale of cotton on international markets, hence the unresolved Turkmenistan-Uzbekistani dispute.
Given the potential security challenges to Uzbekistan's frontiers, it is critical to ask whether the armed forces of this republic are ready and capable of defending that state. Uzbekistan has the largest military in Central Asia, but is it capable of securing the integrity of the state independently? One aspect of this question concerns manpower and logistics. The other concerns morale and the level of trustworthiness of the armed forces. If Uzbekistan finds itself at loggerheads with the Russian Federation, as President Karimov has already indicated, can the state rely on the loyalty of Russian men under arms in Uzbekistan's national army? Tashkent's response appears to be in the negative. After independence, de-Russification of the officer corps was seen in Tashkent as an urgent task. The Soviet-built Military High School in Tashkent has surely provided the young state with a tentative infrastructure to train Uzbek officers. Tashkent has also signed agreements with Turkey on officer training programs. But the question remains: how successful has Uzbekistan been in producing an officer corps derived from the dominant Uzbek ethnic group to replace Russian officers?12
Looking for Allies
It is clear, however, that such efforts are not regarded as adequate by state officials. President Karimov has made it abundantly clear that Uzbekistan needs strong allies and the active involvement of international security organisations in Central Asia. The Military Doctrine of Uzbekistan, announced in June 1995, conforms to the conventional principle of non-aggression and emphasises Uzbekistan's commitments to regional peace and security. It stipulates close cooperation with the United Nations to achieve these goals.13 More importantly, Tashkent has turned to NATO, and specifically to the United States, as a guarantor of its sovereign statehood.
Uzbekistan joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program in October 1995 and has participated in joint military exercises with US forces. Kazakhstani, Kyrgyzstani and Uzbekistani forces joined American troops in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for their Centrasbat manoeuvres in 1997.14 The 1999 joint manoeuvres are planned to be held in Louisiana in May.15 Uzbekistan has found it necessary to make its alignment with the United States and NATO explicit at every opportunity. At his March 1999 press conference, President Karimov once again reiterated his country's commitment to expanding military ties with Turkey because of that country's full NATO membership and the benefits that Turkish-Uzbekistani relations would have for Uzbekistan's closer ties with NATO.16
In this vein, Uzbekistan has moved closer to the former Soviet states of Azerbaijan and Georgia because of their open defiance of Moscow and apparent success in gaining a degree of recognition and support form the United States. Following an earlier agreement, Russian border guards patrolling the Georgian-Turkish border formally ceded control (and half their arms and equipment) to Georgian forces in February 1999.17 Georgian President Edvard Shervardnadze has spoken about closer military ties with Turkey and NATO. There have even been suggestions about a Turkish military base in Georgia, but Shevardnadze is too keenly aware of Russia's concerns and ability to destabilise ethnic relations in Georgia to extend Georgian-Turkish relations that far. This, however, has not deterred other office holders in Georgia from inviting the United States to take a more pro-active stand in Georgia.18
By comparison Azerbaijan had been much bolder. Azerbaijan's overtures to the US has a lot to do with the deteriorating Russo-Azeri relations and the war with neighbouring Armenia. Azerbaijan has categorically distanced itself from Russia and has vehemently opposed the consolidating Russo-Armenian military alliance. In a letter addressed to President Yeltsin, Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliev deplored the deployment of Russian fighter jets and air defense systems in Armenia.19 In an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Vafa Gulzade, an adviser to President Aliev, stated that Azerbaijan's very existence and territorial integrity was being threatened by Armenia, and Russia by association because of close military ties between the two states. He concluded that Azerbaijan has no choice but to call upon NATO to defend its territorial integrity.20 Early in the year, Azerbaijan had announced its readiness to host American military bases,21 and Azerbaijan's Defence Minister had stated his country's desire to be integrated in a European based security alliance.22
Although the United States has not officially responded to Azeri invitations, there are strong indications that the United States welcomes the opportunity to gain a foothold in the territory hitherto considered to be Russia's backyard. The influential foreign policy think-tanks Zbigniew Brzezinski and Fredrick Starr have argued this case separately in Foreign Affairs.23 Starr argues that Uzbekistan's geographic position makes it a potential "anchor state" and "stabiliser" in Central Asia, critical factors which the United State cannot ignore in its policy towards Eurasia. Starr sees here a timely opportunity to abate Russia's sphere of influence.
This is indeed Uzbekistan's objective. Freeing itself from Russia's influence is now most actively pursued within the CIS. The CIS Collective Security Treaty, signed in May 1992 by Russia, Uzbekistan and seven other former Soviet states, is now seen in Tashkent as a reminder and a tool of Russian hegemony. In the 1999 summit, the government of Uzbekistan refused to extend its membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty and questioned the need for Russia's military presence in Tajikistan, stationed there under the pretext of peace keeping, until the civil war in that republic has been concluded.24 These public misgivings about Russia's manipulation of the CIS Collective Security Treaty coincided with an official visit by a US delegation to Uzbekistan, though no detail concerning this visit has been disclosed.25 Similar reservations have been voiced by Georgian and Azeri statesmen, questioning the wisdom of their membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty.26
Consequently, the April 1999 summit of CIS states instead of being an occasion of public unity signified the gathering of centrifugal forces in the post-Soviet space. Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan refused to renew their membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty and effectively severed military ties with the multilateral CIS agreement. Only 6 members remain within the alliance.27 Moreover, in spite of Russia's efforts to turn the summit into a show of unity against NATO's Yugoslavia campaign, participants refused to sign a declaration against the bombings. Instead the CIS presidents issued a muted statement calling for the cessation of hostilities and bloodshed in Kosovo.28 Needless to say, this statement fell very much short of Moscow's expectations and an earlier statement that was signed by the defence ministers of Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. This statement (25 March) had condemned NATO air-strikes against Yugoslavia as "inhuman" and "a threat to peace and security" which violated "norms of international law".29
Moscow's response to the emerging pro-NATO alignment of Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia has been predictable. It has sought to strengthen its security arrangements with the remaining members in the Treaty. Tajikistan is to host a Russian military base for 25 years (mentioned above) and Armenia is becoming even more integrated in the Russian-led air defence system. In February, the Russian Air Force Commander visiting Armenia declared the readiness of CIS air defences to protect Armenia from "a possible attack by NATO missiles and fighter aircrafts stationed ... in eastern Turkey".30
Moscow has found common cause with Iran in protesting against the United States' encroachment into the former Soviet space. Iranian authorities are extremely dismayed at the prospect of a NATO base on their doorstep.31 The former Iranian president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, called any such moves "dangerous".32 US policies appear in Moscow as an elaborate design to box Russia within confined parameters. This perception has caused dismay across the Russian intellectual spectrum. Even the moderate Nezavisimaya Gazeta is now publishing very critical reports of US policies on Russia which reveal the injured pride of the Russian leadership (and people!). "Geopolitical blackmail" was the title of a recent piece that criticised the US ban on the sale of Russian nuclear technology to Iran.33 Moscow and Tehran find themselves increasingly marginalised by the aggressive American policy of dual containment.
Concluding Thoughts
The reason for Uzbekistan's desire to free itself from Russian influence is two-fold. Uzbekistan needs to assert its sovereign statehood even if symbolically. Military might is a salient manifestation of statehood and it is recognised as legitimate in both the domestic and international arena. It is therefore imperative for Uzbekistan to be seen as not relying on Russia for its security. Alignment with NATO serves this purpose. Uzbekistan also entertains regional aspirations. The numerical weight of Uzbeks in Central Asia and Uzbekistan's central location in the region have given rise to a sense of responsibility and at same time of insecurity. Tashkent appears to feel responsible for Uzbeks living in neighbouring states, a sense that has especially complicated Uzbekistan's relations with Kyrgyzia. At the same time Tashkent is concerned about the security of its borders. Tajikistan in particular has been singled out in Tashkent as a haven for terrorists and drug smugglers who cross the Tajik-Uzbek border effortlessly.
Tashkent's response to the dilemma of responsibility and insecurity has been to strengthen its military capabilities and bring itself closer to NATO in order to project its readiness to safeguard its territory. However, safeguarding the state of Uzbekistan and its national interests do not stop at the border. Tashkent feels it needs to be directly involved in the political process in Tajikistan in order to ensure outcomes that are compatible with its interests. Tajikistan is an urgent case in Tashkent's regional thinking. But it is not the only one. The same leadership aspirations apply to Tashkent's attitude to all its immediate neighbours. The projection of Tashkent's interests, in other words Uzbekistan's regional hegemonic aspirations, resembles Moscow's relations with Central Asia. Tashkent is aspiring to replace Moscow as the new hegemon in the region, hence the tension between the two.
Tashkent's aspirations are not rejected by NATO and the US. The US sees in Tashkent a reliable regional ally that can accelerate Russia's fast dwindling influence in the post-Soviet space and curb the advance of Iran's regional influence. Uzbekistan is, therefore, a valuable player in the US policy of double containment of Russia and Iran. This congruence of US-Uzbekistani interests is likely to lead to further links between the two states and strengthen Uzbekistan's role as a Central Asian hegemon.
Dr Shahram Akbarzadeh
Politics,
La Trobe University
S.Akbarzadeh@latrobe.edu.au
Endnotes and tables are available in printed version only.