On 19th December 1999, Russians went to the polls to elect a new State Duma, or lower house. Twelve days later, on new year's eve, President Boris Yeltsin shocked Russia and the world by announcing his resignation from the presidency, a post which was then taken up in an acting capacity by recently appointed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. These events were clearly linked, but to see how, we must go back to the preparations being made for the parliamentary election.
Parliamentary elections were constitutionally due in December 1999 and presidential elections in June 2000, and although there had at various times been rumours about the possible cancellation of these polls, this had never seemed a realistic possibility. The main basis for such rumours was the increasing edginess that was said to be evident among those close to the president, colloquially known as "the family" and "the oligarchs". These were, respectively, a group of close advisers to the president centred on his daughter, Tatiana Diachenko, but including some longer-standing colleagues and some newer businessmen, and that group of businessmen who had got together in 1996 to fund and run Yeltsin's re-election campaign. The latter group in particular had suffered as a result of the crash of August 1998, but their concerns were actually more long-standing. They were worried about what would happen when Yeltsin departed from the scene. They feared being vulnerable to attempts to deprive them of the wealth which they had been able to accumulate during Yeltsin's rule, and they were worried about being arrested once his protection had been removed; the numerous complaints about theft from the state and the attempt to impeach Yeltsin for state crimes in March 1999 seemed to give force to these fears. The move for a closer integration with Belarus was also seen by some as laying the grounds for delaying or even abandoning the elections. But there seem to have been no concrete moves toward either postponing or circumventing the elections, and all political forces continued to prepare for them.
In the long term lead up to the election, three different types of political actors were evident: the established political parties, new left-centrist and right-centrist blocs, and the Kremlin's own political forces. These will be dealt with in turn, with only those parties which cleared the 5% electoral threshold being considered in any depth. First, the established political parties.
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). The KPRF was the largest party in the State Duma elected in 1995, and public opinion polls suggested that it had been able to retain much of its electoral support. The party possesses the most developed network of regional and local party organisations throughout the country of any party, and this should have provided it with a firm infrastructure to mobilise its electoral support. The party should also have benefited from the economic dislocation stemming from the economic reforms, which clearly hit its natural working class constituency hard, and the feelings of anti-Westernism stemming from those economic changes and from the Kosovo conflict. But the party also suffered from a series of deficiencies. An important one is that it has never really been able to decide what sort of a party it is. Unlike its counterparts (which have been electorally successful) in places like Lithuania, Poland and Hungary, it did not transform itself into a social democratic party by moving decisively towards the centre of the political spectrum. But nor has it unambiguously embraced its marxist-leninist past and thereby offered a clear-cut, leftist, alternative vision of the future. This has had important implications. One is that it has caused continuing division in the party as groups fight over not only immediate policies, but the nature of the party itself. It has also contributed to a fracturing of the left of the political spectrum, as a wide range of groups struggle to project a leftist vision and thereby divide potential support. The KPRF has been unable to unite these groups and thereby build a coherent left-wing force. Part of the problem here is also the nature of the communist leader, Gennady Zyuganov. Despite his ability to win more than 40% of the vote in the 1996 presidential election, Zyuganov is neither a natural electoral politician nor a charismatic leader. He has been unable to unite the party and other leftist groups around himself or give decisive and convincing leadership to those willing to follow. Important too has been the party's lack of a consistent source of revenue and the hostility it has faced from most of the mainstream media. This hostility was a crucial factor in sinking Zyuganov's presidential aspirations in 1996, and there was no evidence that the party could expect an easier ride in either 1999 or 2000. Zyuganov was aware of these difficulties, and his strategy leading up to the elections seemed designed to blunt them. His strategy seemed to be two fold. First, to try to put together a leftist electoral coalition consisting of those groups which had supported him during the second round of the 1996 presidential election. Second, by playing a moderate role in the Duma - most particularly a tendency to compromise on the budget and to ensure that no confidence votes in the government fail - the party had hoped to combat some of the fear campaign that was so important in 1996. But these two elements of the strategy would seem to be mutually contradictory: it is difficult to construct an anti-government coalition when in practice you give the government significant support. The KPRF seemed, as it had since the fall of the Soviet Union, to be a party in search of a role.
Zhirinovsky Bloc. Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) had won second place in the party list vote in 1995 with 11.18% of the vote. However this was less than half what the party had achieved in 1993, and suggests that a large part of his original constituency had been a protest vote rather than one wedded to his policies. Initially in 1999, Zhirinovsky had sought to use the LDPR as the vehicle for his run at the Duma, but the Central Electoral Commission denied registration to the party, forcing Zhirinovsky to repackage his organisation. Initially Zhirinovsky's electoral appeal had rested on his image as a radical nationalist who offered a significant alternative approach to some of the problems besetting Russia from those offered by the government. However inside the Duma, the party had a record of supporting the government rather than opposing it, with the result that Zhirinovsky's personal antics appeared as puerile and senseless rather than actions designed to show up the hypocrisy of the government and therefore with deeply significant ideological or political meaning. To the extent that Zhirinovsky's nationalist credentials were thereby undercut, his main electoral strategy was called into question.
Yabloko. This is the party of perennial presidential hopeful Grigory Yavlinsky and in the two earlier elections won 6-7% of the vote. The main thing that seemed to be going for Yabloko as the election approached was its position, consistently adopted, in the Duma of being a liberal opposition to the government. It voted against government budgets and, despite one of its members Mikhail Zadornov being Finance Minister between November 1997 and May 1999, is not popularly linked with the economic policies that have been followed since the collapse of the USSR. In this sense, it could appear as untainted by association with earlier governments. Furthermore if in the past the party was seen as being too much in Yavlinsky's image, this may have changed somewhat in 1999 with the adherence to it of former popular prime minister sacked by Yeltsin, Sergei Stepashin, and former Democratic Party founder Nikolai Travkin. But although it could claim that it was untainted by former government association (a claim that was not negated by Stepashin's presence because of both his sacking by the president and brief tenure in office), it could also be seen as being both inexperienced and vocal in its views but short on delivery; Yavlinsky's refusal to take up government posts when offered reinforced this image. Yabloko had been working at building up a regional network, and some progress had been made here, although it did not come close to matching that of the communists. But, given its liberal disposition and many of the policies it espoused, the party has been able to get support from within the business world; both Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, two of the so-called oligarchs, publicly gave their support to Yabloko. But Yabloko's main problem seemed to be encapsulated in its inability to expand its electoral base beyond the 7% it had achieved in the two earlier elections. In part this difficulty was a reflection of the crowded nature of the constituency to which it sought to appeal. With a policy outlook which favoured capitalist democracy but objected to the substance of many of the policies introduced under successive governments, there were grounds upon which greater unity could have been forged between Yabloko and some of the small groupings to its right. Such attempts had been thwarted in the past, in part on the basis of personal objections to Yavlinsky, and in 1999 this problem appeared to be exacerbated by the way in which the party came under bitter attack from one of its founders, Yury Boldyrev, who had left in dispute with Yavlinsky. Yabloko's task also appeared greater given the emergence of the two new centrist election blocs (see below).
As well as these three main groups, there were a series of other established parties/groups which signalled their involvement in the poll, even if ultimately they did not all make it to the ballot. The most prominent of these was probably Our Home is Russia (NDR), the party established prior to the 1995 election by then prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. While Chernomyrdin was prime minister, the party had done well, winning 10.13% of the vote in 1995 and retaining solid support in the opinion polls. However following Chernomyrdin's sacking in March 1998, the party's level of support fell away. Another body which had been prominent earlier but which disappeared as a significant political player was the Agrarian Party. In the lead up to the election, this party split, with one section joining the KPRF and the other Fatherland-All Russia. Women of Russia, which had won some 8% of the votes in 1993 but failed to clear the 5% threshold in 1995 was still around, but had little exposure. More publicity had been generated by the Russian National Union (RNE), a fascist organisation led by Alexander Barkashov, and some believed that this would tap into extreme rightist sentiment across the country. The Central Electoral Commission barred RNE from participating, prompting Barkashov to form the Saviour Movement (SPAS), but this too was banned. There were other small groupings which sought the vote of the extreme right, but none of these seemed to possess the profile Barkashov's movement had had.
Two new centrist electoral blocs emerged, one on the right and one on the left.
Union of Right Forces (URF). This grew out of the Russia's Democratic Choice party which had been led in the 1995 election by former prime minister Yegor Gaidar and had been associated with the radical economic reforms of earlier in the decade. The leading figures in the Union of Right Forces were former prime minister Sergei Kirienko, former deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov and Irina Khakamada, who had been associated with the establishment of the Moscow commodities exchange and had had some responsibility for small business under Yeltsin in 1997. Yegor Gaidar was also a member of this group, although he did not receive national prominence because he stood in a constituency in Moscow rather than on the national list, and Anatoly Chubais was reputed to be a strong supporter. So this group was clearly associated with that radical wing of economic reform from which the government more recently had distanced itself and which many people blamed for their straitened circumstances. This was a major electoral handicap. But this was to some extent offset by the levels of support the group was to receive from elements within the business community, who were willing to donate significant sums to support its electoral campaign.
Fatherland-All Russia (OVR). This was widely seen as potentially the most powerful political force participating in the election. It had begun with the formation of the Fatherland movement, an organisation designed to act as a vehicle for the presidential aspirations of Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov. During his period as Moscow mayor from mid-1992, large parts of the capital had been transformed as money flowed into the city economy and was turned in part into rebuilding and renovating the city centre. Despite shaky financial foundations, the city economy boomed, and Luzhkov basked in the glory of this apparent success. But Luzhkov knew that the success of Moscow attracted widespread envy throughout much of the rest of the country, which felt that development funds were being sucked from their regions to fuel growth in the capital. In an attempt to counter this, Luzhkov launched a strategy of making bilateral deals with local and regional authorities, seeking to build a relationship between capital and regions which would both serve the economic interests of the former while providing some benefits to the latter as well as giving the appearance of linking nation-wide development with that of Moscow. This strategy laid the basis for the establishment of a broader political coalition designed to compete in the December election. In April 1999, Fatherland joined forces with the All Russia movement, a body founded by St Petersburg mayor Vladimir Yakovlev and Tatarstan president Mintimer Shaimiev, and consisting of a number of prominent regional leaders from across the country. The result seemed to be a political organisation which offered a truly national perspective, uniting the capital with the provinces and headed by a dynamic leader with a proven record of being able to stimulate economic development. Furthermore this economic development was widely seen to have been accompanied by a strong emphasis upon the continuing role of the state in providing some protection against the ravages of the market, an image which was starkly at odds with that surrounding the national government and its economic strategy. Luzhkov had also projected an image designed to appeal to nationalist concerns. The result was a political movement which appeared to have significant electoral appeal: an inclusive developmentalism directed at national ends. The adherence to the bloc of Yevgeny Primakov, a former prime minister who retained a high level of popularity, seemed further to bolster its electoral appeal. When this image was added to the substantial financial resources which the movement was likely to be able to get from its Moscow base, OVR seemed to be a formidable political rival to its opponents. But the movement was not without its weaknesses. The envy of and sniping at Moscow persisted in many quarters, while Luzhkov himself had numerous political enemies, both within the Kremlin (Luzhkov had been very critical of Yeltsin and some of his policies) and among broader financial and media elites. Nevertheless, OVR was widely seen as being a major likely victor in the parliamentary poll, a result which initially was believed would set the scene for a successful run for the presidency by Luzkov in 2000. This scenario changed after Primakov's adherence to the bloc, when Luzhkov declared he would not be a presidential candidate, but Primakov said he would. Regardless of the personality of its candidate, OVR's performance in the December election was seen as having implications for the presidential poll. In this sense, it was also seen as being important for the future security of those around Yeltsin; there were fears here that Luzhkov would take legal action against them if he was given the opportunity.
The perceived danger to their interests posed by the impending departure of Yeltsin and the possible election of his opponents to the State Duma and then the presidency prompted those around the president to take action designed to defend their position. One aspect of this was the succession of prime ministers that Yeltsin appointed and then sacked. In March 1998 Yelstin sacked long-serving prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and, after some difficulty in gaining Duma ratification, replaced him with Sergei Kirienko. Kirienko lasted until the financial collapse of August, when he was sacked and, again after opposition from within the Duma to Yeltsin's suggested replacement (Chernomyrdin), he was replaced by Yevgeny Primakov. Primakov was widely credited with preventing political and economic instability in the wake of the financial crisis, yet in May he was sacked and replaced by Sergei Stepashin. In turn, Stepashin was sacked in August and replaced by Vladimir Putin. How is this succession of prime ministers to be explained? Important in this is Yeltsin's physical and mental health. Yeltsin had never fully recovered from the heart surgery he underwent in 1996, with ill health frequently rendering him unable to carry out his official responsibilities. His frequent absences from office, allied to his suspicious disposition, seems to have made him question the loyalty of many of those in positions of authority around him, and especially his successive prime ministers. Chernomyrdin had used Yeltsin's absences to project an image of greater authority and to thereby build up his position, in part as a result coming into conflict with Anatoly Chubais. Kirienko was removed in part as a response to the economic crash, but perhaps also because he had foreshadowed increased targeting of business and the oligarchs for tax collection. Primakov was removed because of his popularity, his moderation of some of the policies of economic change (for example, there was some slowing in the pace of privatisation) and the fear that, owing to his close relations with the communists, he would not be a defender of the interests of those around Yeltsin. Stepashin's removal also reflected the belief that he would not defend those around Yeltsin.
The removal of Stepashin led to the appointment of Putin, who proceeded to build up his own machinery of personal power. Putin was widely seen as a Yeltsin loyalist. After a stint as a member of the KGB working in East Germany, Putin became an official in the St Petersburg/Leningrad mayor's office, initially under the radical democrat Anatoly Sobchak. He remained in the apparatus of that office until he moved to Moscow and into the apparatus of Boris Yeltsin, apparently on Chubais' recommendation. In November 1996 he became one of the leaders of the St Petersburg division of Chernomyrdin's NDR, and in 1998 he became the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB). When he was chosen as prime minister, Yeltsin also informally endorsed him as his successor as president, something that had been done with none of his predecessors. Putin's long term connections with Yeltsin, apparently mediated through Chubais, plus commitments that Putin gave (including after Yeltsin stepped down a formal guarantee for Yeltsin against prosecution), were sufficient to convince Yeltsin and his close supporters that he could be relied upon to look after their interests and that his position on the political stage should be consolidated. The war in Chechnya which began in September and the way in which it was prosecuted prior to the election (reliance on long range artillery and air power in order to limit Russian military casualties) boosted Putin's stocks; not only did he appear as the firm leader who was going to wipe out the memory of the embarrassment of the 1994-96 Russian military defeat, but he was going to do it with relatively few casualties among the troops. His appearance as a firm leader (in contrast to Yeltsin) and as a winner boosted his personal approval rating and made him the most popular politician in Russia. But if the Yeltsin group now seemed to have found the strong leader they needed to replace Yeltsin in 2000, they still needed to ensure that he was not stymied by a hostile parliament.
The second aspect of the strategy to defend their interests involved preventing a hostile majority in the Duma, and achieving this meant riding to some degree on the coat tails of Putin's popularity. The means for doing this was the creation of a new electoral bloc entitled Unity (Edinstvo). The leaders of this new body were the Minister for Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu, former Olympic wrestling champion Aleksandr Karelin and prominent criminal investigator Aleksandr Gurov. None of these were prominent politicians, none were tainted by association with the policies of the past, and all were seen as having followed professions which were of benefit to the nation. Unity had behind it the support of many regional leaders, all the resources of the Kremlin, the support of significant elements among the business class, and the open imprimatur of Putin; indeed, it was widely seen as Putin's party. It seemed to need these advantages because Unity did not have a clearly articulated policy program.
Twenty-six parties, blocs and electoral groups were finally registered to contest the election, seventeen fewer than in 1995. As in the 1995 election, much of the campaigning was conducted through the electronic and print media, with the former again seeming to have had the most impact. The media showed a vigorous campaign, with few holds barred as candidates battled with one another for votes. But according to the preliminary findings of the OSCE Observation Mission, media outlets were not even-handed in their treatment of the various parties. Rather "a media war was waged between [commercial media] conglomerates siding with, or controlled by the Presidential Administration, and its chief rival, the Fatherland-All Russia bloc. Notably, attacks and counter-attacks were fueled by journalists and commentators, rather than by representatives of the political blocs...most important segments of the Russian media failed to provide impartial and fair information about the political choices on offer to the electorate." Although the OSCE Report does not say as much, there were frequent complaints during the campaign about the way in which much of the national electronic media favoured Unity and attacked what was seen as its main rival, OVR. The print media too was not impartial, but because ownership of this is less concentrated than in the electronic sphere, there was a greater diversity of opinion on offer.
In the campaign for the single member seats there were also said to be some infringements of democratic norms, including harassment of opposition figures and their campaign organisations, pressure against local newspapers, the launching of spurious legal investigations against critics, and dismissal from employment. Such actions were usually to be found where local authorities were also up for election at the same time. Such dirty tricks were complained about by all of the leading opposition parties, and although there was some truth in their claims, according to the OSCE this election marked a "noticeable improvement" compared with its predecessors.
In the months leading up to the election, opinion polls suggested that the KPRF would be clearly the biggest party with Luzhkov's OVR the second largest. In response to the question "For which of the following parties or movements would you be most likely to vote if there were elections to the State Duma next Sunday?", the responses changed as follows:
| June | July | August | September | November | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KPRF | 21 | 24 | 23 | 20 | 20 |
| OVR | 11 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 11 |
| Yabloko | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 7 |
| Unity | - | - | - | - | 6 |
| URF | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 4 |
| Zhirinovsky | 5 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 3 |
These figures suggested a clear victory for those groups which had been most consistently critical of Yeltsin and his governments. Indeed, when the figures for "None of them" and "Don't know" are excluded, a majority of voters intended to support the KPRF, OVR or Yabloko. If this result transpired, the smooth run to the presidency those around Yeltsin had hoped Putin would get would be less likely. However when the results came in, the situation was not as bad as they had feared.
| % votes | % votes 1995 | PR seats | Individual member seats | Total seats | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KPRF | 24.3 | 22.3 | 67 | 46 | 113 |
| Unity | 23.3 | 64 | 18 | 72 | |
| OVR | 13.1 | 37 | 30 | 67 | |
| URF | 8.5 | 24 | 5 | 29 | |
| Yabloko | 6.0 | 6.9 | 16 | 4 | 20 |
| Zhirinovsky | 6.4 | 11.2 | 17 | - | 17 |
| Pensioners Party | 2.0 | - | 1 | 1 | |
| NDR | 1.2 | 10.1 | 7 | 7 | |
| KRO * | 0.6 | 4.3 | 1 | 1 | |
| DPA * | 0.6 | 2 | 2 | ||
| RNS * | 0.4 | 1 | 1 | ||
| Socialists | 0.1 | 2 | 2 | ||
| Spiritual Heritage | 0.1 | 1 | 1 | ||
| Independent | 107 | 107 |
* KRO = Congress of Russian Communities
DPA = Movement in Support of the Army
RNS = Russian Popular Union
There was no vote in Chechnya (one seat), and in nine seats the vote must be repeated because voters voted against all candidates.
A number of things about this result stand out. First, the overall turn out of 62% means that, again, only a very small proportion (around 15%) of Russia's voters supported the most popular party. This suggests that parties generally have not been able to expand from the narrow base of popular attachment they had had in earlier elections. Turning to the fate of individual parties, a number of interesting conclusions can be drawn. Despite widespread opinions that the party had run out of steam, the stability of the KPRF vote suggested that the party would remain a major player in the Russian political scene. It was still the largest party in the Duma, both in terms of its share of the vote and of the seats, and although its share of the vote rose, the number of seats it won actually fell by over a quarter (it had won 157 seats in 1995). The loss of seats occurred both at the national and regional levels, which suggests that its extensive network of local and regional organisations came under greater challenge than they had in the past, probably as a result of the increased activism of regional governors noted above. Nevertheless the robust nature of its electoral support seemed to suggest that it would remain a significant electoral base for the presidential poll. Yabloko's vote was also broadly stable, suggesting that it will be unable to break out of this electoral band without substantial change to its policies and image. The decline of the Zhirinovsky Bloc continued, a fate it shared with all of the other so-called "patriotic forces" which participated in the poll. The fall from grace of the former so-called "party of power", the NDR, which in 1995 had been the third biggest party in the Duma, was striking.
But it is the performance of the newer parties, particularly OVR and Unity, which was more interesting. The performance of OVR was disappointing for its leaders. It certainly did not constitute the launching pad for a successful Primakov presidential run as its supporters had hoped. Nor did it give the party the momentum which it could carry into the chamber in opposition to the government. Rather than receiving a resounding vote of popular confidence which it could then mobilise to reshape the political agenda, its level of popular support was well below that of the two leading parties, making it appear as a poor third rung relative of the real power holders. However it did win the second largest number of single member constituency seats of any party, reflecting the extent of its support outside Moscow, but it is the third largest party in the Duma.
Unity surpassed all expectations. No one expected it to garner almost a quarter of the votes, especially given that it was clear that all it stood for was those around Yeltsin. It offered no policies to solve Russia's problems, but in a paradoxical way, despite its connections with Yeltsin, it had something of the clean skin image about it because of its leaders. Although it almost equalled the KPRF in the level of its popular support, its relatively poor performance in the single member constituencies means that it is clearly the second party in the Duma. (The relatively poor performance in single member constituency seats may reflect the fact that its support among regional governors has not been as firm as some have suggested.) If it was to get the support of the Union of Right Forces, it would still not match the communists in terms of parliamentary deputies. This also assumes that Unity remains intact. But it may be a brittle alliance; for example, within its ranks is Aleksandr Rutskoi, Yeltsin's former vice president who was locked up following the autumn 1993 crisis. In the absence of clear policy commitments, it is not clear what is to keep this party together except the search for power.
Nevertheless, the election of this many Unity deputies added to the fall in communist representation did seem to represent a significant shift in the balance of the Duma compared with that of 1995. The number of deputies belonging to parties notionally supporting the government appeared much bigger than it had been, although there also appeared to have been a consolidation of opposition forces. Although it is too early to predict how parties will react to political life under President Putin, and since the dramatic rise in his fortunes in light of the Chechen conflict all parties have been careful to offer him their measured support, those parties which had criticised Yeltsin clearly outweighed those which had supported him. His supporters (Unity, URF, Zhirinovsky and NDR - although there are question marks over some of these) totaled 125 seats in the Duma, while his critics (KPRF, OVR and Yabloko) totalled 200 seats, 25 short of 50%. Assuming the parties remain united (which is a big assumption given the post-1992 history of Russian parties), the balance of power seemed again to rest with the independants. However this calculation was upset in January 2000.
At the first meeting of the newly-elected Duma, the KPRF, Unity and a group of 59 pro-Kremlin deputies who had come together into an alliance called People's Deputy, combined to elect the speaker and determine the committee headships. The result was the re-election of the former speaker, the communist Gennady Seleznev, and the sharing of most committee headships among these groups: of 26 committees, the communists gained nine, Unity seven and People's Deputy five. This deal, with which Putin was directly and publicly associated, and the resultant carve up of the spoils, alienated those groups which had been excluded, leading to about 100 deputies boycotting sessions of the Duma over the subsequent two weeks. The effect of this deal has been to foreshadow the potential control of the Duma by these groups, at least if they can remain united. And given the orientation of Unity and People's Deputy, this may constitute a supportive bloc within the Duma for the government.
What is to be learnt from the election? One important lesson that may come from the election relates to the weakness of democracy in Russia. Certainly in Russia there are free votes, and competitive elections have been held when they are constitutionally required (at least after the events of autumn 1993), but as the last two elections demonstrate, the outcome can be determined far too much by a partisan media. Furthermore the weakness of democracy is evident in the success of Unity which, within a few months, rose from nothing to gain almost a quarter of the popular vote. As in 1996 it shows the value of virtually unlimited resources and a heavily biased press. But it also shows how disarticulated Russians are from their political parties. If an organisation without clear policies and that was obvious to all as having been designed purely to halt more regular parties with policy programs from gaining a majority position in the Duma could engender such support, it shows that the existing parties are not satisfying the needs of many of their putative constituents. The performance of this anti-party is therefore an indication, not of the strength of democracy in Russia, but of its weakness. If the future is to be under a new President Putin, the performance of Unity seems to ensure that the legislature will remain hamstrung by a failing which has afflicted it all along, the weakness of the Russian party system.
But does the parliamentary election really reflect the central arena of Russian politics? The Constitution brought in by Yeltsin at the end of 1993 introduced a system in which the president holds significantly more power than the parliament. And as the experience of the Yeltsin years shows, the sort of role the president chooses to play sets the tone for the system as a whole. Consequently the presidency is the lynch pin of the political system and the main object of political struggle. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the course of Russian politics since the rise of the unknown Putin to the prime ministership in the middle of 1999 has been the subject of conspiracy theories. Such theories were given a significant boost by the elevation of Putin to the acting presidency.
The kernel of such theories is the view that Yeltsin has had a long term political strategy to structure the presidential succession and ensure the elevation of someone like Putin. The main outline of the theory is as follows. Yeltsin had for some time been searching for certainty after his term as president finished by trying to appoint a pliant prime minister he could elevate to the position of acting president. This was the motivation behind the sacking of four prime ministers between March 1998 and August 1999. The dismissal of Stepashin and the promotion of Putin in August 1999 was the last, and in Yeltsin's view successful, attempt to find such a person. Putin's elevation was followed in short order by an outbreak of bombing in Moscow and some regional parts of the country. This was publicly blamed on the Chechens, but many believe that Putin's former bailiwick, the FSB (former KGB) was responsible. In any event, the bombings produced both a crack down by the authorities and a surge of popular support for the imposition of tighter controls and, by extension, of support for the leader who imposed them, Putin. The following month the war in Chechnya was re-opened on a wave of popular enthusiasm to teach the so-called "terrorist bandits" a lesson. This war was waged, at least initially, primarily from the air and from afar in order to reduce Russian casualties. The resulting picture of successful Russian forces driving towards Grozny with few casualties fuelled Putin's increasing popularity. The next step was to create a political power base for Putin, hence the establishment of Unity, and to maximise its victory at the polls. This was achieved by the vigorous media campaign against the greatest perceived rival, OVR, and by fiddling the election results. Rumours have circulated of massive fraud and manipulation, and although precise figures have differed, those reported have been roughly of the same magnitude (in % of the claimed actual vote):
KPRF 33%
Unity 14%
OVR 21%
URF 3.4%
Yabloko 12%
Zhirinovsky 4.5%
If correct, these figures would reflect a massive miscarriage of the popular will. Those parties which generally have supported Yeltsin or would have been expected to do so and which were therefore seen as potentially supportive of Putin, have had their positions improved significantly, while those which have been critical have been massively robbed of votes. With Putin's position thereby bolstered, Yeltsin brought forward the handing over of power by resigning from the presidency and appointing Putin in an acting capacity. This benefited Putin not only by allowing him to compete in the presidential election as an incumbent, but by bringing the election forward, he gave less opportunity for Putin's star to wane and his opposition to organise. Indeed a number of potential presidential challengers soon announced that they would not run. Finally, the creation of the Duma alliance promised to give Putin a more stable parliamentary base while at the same time compromising his likely major presidential opponent, communist leader Zyuganov.
But is this theory correct? Certainly elements of it are demonstrably true and it is generally consistent with the public record. Putin's position was clearly strengthened by the bombings, by the early successes in Chechnya, by his appointment as acting president, and by the Duma alliance. However there is no evidence as to who was responsible for the bombings. It does not appear to have been in the interests of Chechen "warlords" to have instigated it, at least not without publicly acknowledging this. If they had brought on the bombing for tactical reasons, it made no sense to deny responsibility. But nor is there any hard evidence that the FSB was responsible. So the responsibility for and the object of the bombing remain uncertain. On the Chechen war, we do not have to assume a desire to boost Putin to explain the military action. Stepashin has said that there had been plans for a military operation in Chechnya since March, although it is conceivable that the timing of their operationalisation may have been influenced by the desire to boost Putin. But given that Chechnya was in practice outside Moscow's control and was widely seen as the source of a substantial part of the crime which was washing across the country, the Russian leadership's move against Chechnya is explicable on grounds of national interest and security. Similarly the tactics initially adopted could be seen as a result of lessons learnt from both the earlier Chechen debacle and NATO's campaign against Serbia rather than to protect Putin's standing. On electoral manipulation, it is difficult to see how this could have been engineered. It could have been carried out at the centre, but only if party scrutineers were denied access to the vote, and there have been no major complaints about this. In theory it could have been carried out in the regions, but this would have required substantial coordination across many regions of Russia, and coordination between people who generally were unsympathetic to some of those whose votes were reportedly increased. Furthermore none of the major parties whose vote tallies would have been reduced had such fraud occurred have publicly complained about it. It is unlikely that, had there been any suspicion of fraud, complaints would not have been forthcoming.
This suggests that Yeltsin certainly sought to assist Putin to be able to succeed him, by selecting him in the first place and then by resigning himself. But it is not clear that the bombing or the Chechen war were designed to boost Putin, even though this was their effect, nor that there was substantial electoral fraud. Thus while the possibility of an elaborate Kremlin plan to install Putin as Yeltsin's successor cannot be denied, nor can it be proved in all respects. But what is clear is that these events have set Putin up to succeed Yeltsin in the forthcoming presidential election, and have thereby if not broken at least severely bruised the principles of democracy and popular accountability. But this simply illustrates how weak democracy in Russia is, whereby a powerful president can use the undoubted powers of his office to subvert popular choice. This impression of weakness is reinforced by the way in which rumours of widespread electoral manipulation could gain public currency. It shows the low levels of trust the populace has in Russia's institutions.
So the parliamentary election has potentially brought about a new complexion in Russian politics, one whereby major parliamentary forces appear more conciliatory toward and cooperative with the president. Whether this lasts remains to be seen, but an important determinant of this will be how the new president chooses to play his role given the vast scope provided by the office. A powerful President Putin, capable of more vigorous and sustained activity than his predecessor, could wreak major change on Russian politics and society. It remains to be seen how he builds up his position and chooses to wield the power placed in his hands. With the parliament hamstrung by the weakness of the party system, the presidency constitutionally the most powerful office in the land, and the occupant of that office young, fit and healthy, substantial change in the Russian political system in the coming years is a real possibility. The driver of such change will be the president, and it is by no means clear that the direction in which he drives that change will be democratic.